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THE

ENGLISH CAPTIVES IN OUDH:

AN

EPISODE

IN THE

28018

HISTORY OF THE MUTINIES

OF

1857-58.

EDITED BY M. WYLIE, ESQ.

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PREFACE.

THE history of the insurrection in Oudh will not be complete, till full information is obtained of the sufferings of all the Christian residents at all the stations. From Fyzabad, the fugitives were divided into three or four parties, and each has its own affecting narrative. From Secrora, some escaped into Lucknow with little difficulty; while others subsequently encountered serious perils, and some perished, while attempting to escape in another direction. The case was similar at Seetapore. From Salone, all were delivered by the noble conduct of Hunuman Sing, a talookdar. Various accounts have been published in the public journals relative to these stations. Of others much less has been made known. One party, in particular, the remnant of the Mohamdee and Seetapore sufferers, has justly excited special sympathy. Few of them survive their long months of imprisonment and oppression, and the terrible recollections of the past have rendered the task of recording its history an acute trial of feeling. In the following pages, however, it has been attempted.

Captain A. P. Orr placed the manuscript of [redacted] part of this narrative in my hands, when he was compiling it from the information of his lamented brother's deeply afflicted widow. I urged him to finish and to publish it,

and he consented, on condition, that I would assume the office of Editor. It was unnecessary that a narrative so striking should be introduced by any one; but desiring to assist in making known the whole truth respecting the insurrection in all its consequences, I could not refuse.

The Rajah of Mythowlie, whose conduct is depicted in these pages, has so represented his case to Government that it is understood his life will be spared. Apparently, however, he acted throughout, a double part, and finally betrayed those who trusted him, to barbarous enemies and a cruel death.

Captain Hearsey's narrative of his escape has already been published, but as he was closely connected with some of the sufferers at Mythowlie, I have added his statement in an appendix.

It is fair to say that not many of the Oudh residents were treated like those whose tale is here before us. At Sultanpore, Captain Bunbury and Mr. Charlton Tucker were saved by a talookdar, Rustum Sah; Maun Sing certainly saved several. Mrs. Dorin, flying from Seetapore, having escaped from the sepoys, was allowed to pass to Lucknow. Some fugitives from massacres in our own provinces found protection in Oudh. Such was the case of Mr. Edwards of Budaon, Major Robertson, and Mr. and Mrs. Probyn, who were sheltered by Hurdeo Buksh; and Captain Mowbray Thomson and his companions found safety in their flight from Cawnpore, in the proffered succour of an Oudh talookdar. There are, in fact, few evidences of the country people in Oudh or the talookdars having acted ill to the fugitives.

They were certainly not so hostile as many in our own territories. The massacres were the work of our own sepoys.

The final deliverance of Mrs. Patrick Orr, her child, and Miss M. Jackson, is one of the most remarkable incidents in modern history. Their wonderful endurance, the consolation sent to them in a brief passage of the Word of God torn by a Musalman doctor from a stray page of a lost Bible, the patience and skill with which Anunt Ram served them, the boldness and courage of the gallant officers who at length were providentially led to their abode, invest their narrative with singular interest. And the crisis at Shahjehanpore; the awful massacre and the meek submission of the unhappy sufferers at the close of their weary five days' flight for life; the painful imprisonment (for such it was) at Mythowlie; the march to Lucknow; the fury of the native forces; and the fearful death of poor Sir M. Jackson and his companions; described as they are in this simple narrative with the force of truth, present a picture of suffering scarcely to be paralleled even in the pages of romance.

The terrible experience of the past year should not be thrown away. When Mrs. Orr consented to the narrative being published, it was arranged that if any profits arose from its sale, they should be given to the projected Christian Missions at Lucknow, and to that purpose they will be devoted. The Christians in India may well feel, that the time passed has sufficed them to live to themselves; and that now they should begin anew, and seek God's glory in establishing here

His kingdom of peace, truth, and righteousness. If unhappily His past forbearance, His recent judgments, and His present mercies are forgotten, and the greatest duty of every Christian who plants his foot on the shores of India is neglected, greater trials than have yet fallen on us may speedily follow. Christian wisdom and Christian love alike bid us seek earnestly the evangelization of this country, and if unhappily our public policy or the conduct of our Christian community be hostile to this end, our next trials may issue in still more extensive and far more lasting disasters. But the blindness and folly of Anti-Christian measures and the wickedness of Anti-Christian lives are so apparent, that there may be fair hopes of better doings, and that these new Missions in Lucknow may be regarded as the commencement of fresh efforts and more hearty zeal in the great Mission of the Christian Church.

M. Wylie.

Calcutta, October, 1858.

ENGLISH CAPTIVES IN OUDH:

AN

EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF THE MUTINIES OF 1857-58.

On the 31st of May, 1857, Sunday, the mutiny broke out at Shahjehanpore. Most of the officers and ladies of the station were assembled at Church, when the building was suddenly surrounded by rebel sepoys, who, rushing in, murdered many of the congregation. Some, however, of the officers and ladies succeeded in obtaining refuge in the vestry and turret of the Church, securing the doors after them. Fortunately the sepoys were only armed with swords and lattees, and their efforts to break open the doors being unsuccessful, they withdrew to their lines for the purpose of arming themselves with their muskets, and returning to their attack. Seizing upon the opportunity of escape thus afforded to them, the officers and ladies sallied out of the Church and hastily availing themselves of some carriages and horses, still waiting outside, made the best of their way to Powaeen, the residence of a Rajah and situated on the frontier of Oudh, but within the Shahjehanpore district. The party was ill-received by the Rajah, who, urging his inability, real or pretended, to protect them, refused them shelter. Mr. Jenkins, the junior magistrate of Shahjehanpore and one of the party, on his arrival at Powaeen, wrote to Mr. Thomason, the Deputy Commissioner at Mohamdee, in Oudh, giving him notice of what had occurred at Shahjehanpore, and begging him to send

all available carriage to enable the party to reach Mohamdee. Mr. Thomason received the letter at the hands of a runner on the evening of the 31st May, and immediately complied with Mr. Jenkins' request.

Previous to this period, matters had been wearing a gloomy aspect at Mohamdee. It is true that the dawks were still running, but it had become evident that the minds of the native population were greatly agitated. At the station were Mr. Thomason, the Deputy Commissioner of the Mohamdee district, and Captain Patrick Orr, Assistant Commissioner, with Mrs. Orr and child. Of troops, there were two companies of the 9th Regiment Oudh Irregular Force, two companies of the Oudh Military Police, with about fifty Troopers of Irregular Cavalry.

On the receipt of Mr. Jenkins' letter, both Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr felt that the crisis was at hand, and that the mutineers of the 28th Regt. N. I. from Shahjehanpore, would shortly reach Mohamdee; attracted thither by the hope of securing for themselves, the contents of the Government Treasury. It was therefore at once resolved that Mrs. Orr should be sent immediately to Mythowlie, under the care of the Rajah of that place; a man, who not only had been treated with much consideration by Mr. Thomason, but who was indebted to Captain Orr for many acts of kindness shown to him by that officer before the country had passed under British Rule. It was also resolved that the Civil Officers together with their clerks, should withdraw from the station to the fort of Mohamdee, distant about one mile. This fort had since annexation been made use of as a treasury, as well as a jail. Mr. Thomason even hoped that he might, in case of necessity, by strengthening the fort and calling for assistance from the neighbouring zemindars, defend the place against the attacks of the rebels; but it was soon found that the building was in too dilapidated a state to admit of its being speedily repaired so sufficiently, as to render it secure against the efforts of a determined foe.

On the night then of the 31st May, 1857, Mrs. Orr, accompanied by an escort of the 9th Regiment Oudh Irregular Force, under command of Ishuree Singh, Soobadar, left Mohamdee; the men having previously sworn to defend with their lives Mrs. Orr and her child. The small party marched all night, a distance of about twenty-six miles, and reached Mythowlie on the morning of the 1st June about 8 o'clock. On her arrival at the fort of the Rajah, Mrs. Orr was told that he was asleep and could not, on any account, be disturbed. At the expiration of two long hours, the Rajah sent his vakeel or head-man with a message to Mrs. Orr, that she should proceed to another of his forts, at a place called "Kutchianee," situated in a dense jungle, and consequently, as he observed, less likely to attract the attention of the bands of sepoys who, it was expected, would be shortly over-running the country. Finding all remonstrances useless, Mrs. Orr proceeded with her escort to the Kutchianee fort, within which a place was pointed out for her own accommodation and another for that of the guard. It was a most dreary, desolate looking building, devoid of the most common articles of furniture and presenting a picture of the utmost discomfort. Mrs. Orr could not but shudder as she entered the place, but she was assured by the people whom she found within the fort, that the Rajah would shortly present himself and make every arrangement for her comfort. He did indeed come that very evening, and, taking a most solemn oath, assured his guest that he would be most faithful to her and protect her from all danger. He mentioned in the course of conversation that Mr. Christian, the Commissioner of the Division, had written to him to forward to Seetapore all his elephants, but that he had refused to do so, under the pretext that the animals were suffering from sore backs; but he plainly gave Mrs. Orr to understand that although Seetapore had not as yet broken out, still the troops there were rife for mutiny; and that he did not wish, by sending his elephants to such a place, to lose them. After renewing his protestations of fidelity, the Rajah took his departure for My-

thowlie, without, however, having made the slightest attempt to render her position a little less uncomfortable, or even to provide for her most pressing wants. The whole day had passed and evening was fast closing in, without any food having been supplied; and it was only at a late hour of the night that some provisions of a coarse kind were procured from a neighbouring village. Those acquainted with the manners and customs of the Oudh zemindars and who have experienced the courteous hospitality invariably shown by them to strangers, will not fail to remark this gross deviation on the part of the Rajah, from time-honored usage. It was but too evident that his mind was under the influence of that magic change that was so suddenly and so fearfully coming over the entire population of the district. One and all were fully persuaded that the English rule was at an end, and that a new era was dawning in India.

Let us now return to Mohamdee. On the receipt by Mr. Thomason of Mr. Jenkins's letter, he sent for a party of men from the lines to escort to the fort a sum of money which happened to be in the kutcherry. The men came, but although they still, as it were, mechanically obeyed orders, yet from their behaviour and bearing, it was but too evident that they were no longer under any real subordination. It was also from this party that the guard or escort which accompanied Mrs. Orr to Mythowlie, had been chosen; they belonged to the Regiment formerly raised and commanded by Captain Orr under the Oudh Rule. That officer now advanced towards the sepoys and plainly and frankly told them that the troops at Shahjehanpore had mutinied and that in all probability, sooner or later, they would come to Mohamdee, that he was anxious to see Mrs. Orr and her child placed in safety, that he had fixed upon Mythowlie as a place of refuge, and that he now asked them if he could rely upon their seeing Mrs. Orr safely to the Rajah's Fort. The men solemnly swore to do so. Ishuree Singh, Soobadar, especially, at once came forward and said that, not only would he accompany them to Mythowlie, but even should it be desired, he would see them

safely to Lucknow. To this latter proposal, however, the men objected; observing that Lucknow was at too great a distance. They, however, did not make the slightest objection to proceed to Mythowlie. We have seen how well they fulfilled their promise. Ishuree Singh behaved extremely well, showing in his conduct the greatest respect to Mrs. Orr, and even, when required, affording her assistance and advice,

On Mrs. Orr's departure from Mohamdee, Mr. Thomason and Captain Orr, followed by the troops in the station, removed to the Fort. It was now the 1st of June. On the day following the party expected from Powaeen arrived at Mohamdee. It must not be imagined that the officers that had escaped from Shahjehanpore had, in every instance, escaped without previously receiving severe injuries. No, several of them were severely wounded; and their wounds had been bound up by the ladies of the party with portions of their dress torn up for that purpose.

Sad was the appearance of the Shahjehanpore refugees on their arrival. Weary and with naked feet, it was with much difficulty that they reached thus far. Mr. Thomason now wrote to Mr. Christian at Seetapore, requesting him to despatch to Mohamdee all the conveyances that he could possibly collect, to enable the Shahjehanpore party to proceed to Seetapore, which was then considered the safest place. Mr. Christian sent the carriages under charge of a guard which reached Mohamdee on the 3rd, and which immediately spread the report that two Companies of their own Regiment had been destroyed by the English at Lucknow for having refused to become Christians. On the day following, the guard broke up the doolies, &c. that had been entrusted to them by Mr. Christian. It was on the evening of that very day (the 4th June) that all the party then assembled at Mohamdie, commenced their march towards Seetapore. An account of that dreadful march is contained in the following copy of a letter, written on the 8th June, by Captain Orr to his youngest brother at Lucknow.

"*Jungle near Mythowlie.*
"*8th June*, 1857.

"My dear Adolphe,

"I wrote to you on the 6th instant, but am afraid that my letter has not been sent on to you. On the 31st May, Sunday, the 28th N. I. broke out into mutiny and some of the men rushed into the church and murdered Collector Ricketts; wounded Spens of the 28th, and killed the Doctor. Major James was killed on his parade ground. The following made their escape, Captains Sneyd, Lysaght, Salmon; Lieuts. Key, Robertson, Scott, Pitt, Rutherford; Ensigns Spens, Johnston, Scott; Qr. Mr. Sergeant Grant, the Bandmaster, Drummer, Mr. Scott, Miss Scott, Mrs. Lysaght, Mrs. Key, Mrs. Bowling, Mrs. Sheils, Mrs. Grant, Mrs, Pereira, 4 children, Lieut. Sheils, Vetn. Establishment, Mr. Jenkins, C. S. They fled to Powaeen; but the Rajah turned them out the next morning and they came to Mohamdee. Thomason, the Deputy Commissioner, and myself, on hearing of this sad affair at Shahjehanpore, consulted together and sent away my wife to Mythowlie and went ourselves to the Fort to protect the Treasury, if possible. On Monday at about 12 noon, the party from Shahjehanpore arrived, and from that time the most alarming symptoms showed themselves amongst the men. I used every means in my power to pacify them, but in vain. By the most strenuous efforts, I persuaded them from hour to hour to come back to their allegiance, every minute seemed to be our last. The men were civil to me; but each one said that he could not answer for what some of the bad characters would do. I succeeded in gaining some influence over them and kept them quiet till a detachment of fifty men came in on Thursday morning, 4th, from Seetapore sent by Christian (Commissioner) to escort the ladies in. These men brought with them a report that the whole of their Light Company at Muchee-Bhawun had been cut up by the Europeans, and said that they were determined to take their revenge. Seeing the state of things, I sent for all the Native Officers and told

them to let me know at once, like men, what their intentions were; and, if reasonable, I should give my consent. They came to the resolution of marching at once to Seetapore, and swore that they would spare our lives, and taking Thomason and myself into Seetapore, would allow the others to go away unmolested. I made them take a solemn oath, and they all put their hands on the head of Lutchmun, Jemadar.—Well, we left Mohamdee, at about 5½ P. M. on Thursday, after the men had secured the treasure, about 1 lac and 10,000 Rs. and had released the prisoners. I put as many of the ladies as I could into the buggy, others on the baggage carts, and we reached Burwun, at about 10½ o'clock P. M. next morning. Friday 5th, we marched towards Aurungabad. When we had come about two koss, the halt was sounded, and a trooper told us to go on ahead, where we liked. We went on for some distance, when we saw a party coming along. They soon joined us and followed the buggy which we were pushing on with all our might; when, within half a mile of Aurungabad, a sepoy rushed forward and snatched Key's gun from him and shot poor old Shiels who was riding my horse. Then the most infernal carnage ever witnessed by man commenced. We all collected under a tree close by and put the ladies down from the buggy, shots were being fired in all directions amidst the most fearful yells. The poor ladies all joined in prayer, coolly and undauntedly awaiting their fate. I stopped for about three minutes amongst them; but, thinking of my poor wife and child here, I endeavoured to save my life for their sakes. I rushed out towards the insurgents, and one of our men, "Goordeen," 6th Company, called out to me to throw down my pistol and he would save me. I did so, when he put himself between me and the men, and several others followed his example. In about ten minutes they had completed their hellish work. I was about 300 yards at the utmost. Poor Lysaght was kneeling out in the open ground, with his hands folded across his chest and, though not using his fire-arms, the cowardly wretches would not go up to him until they had shot him; then rushing

forward they killed the wounded and the children, butchering them in a most cruel way. With the exception of the drummer boy, every one of the list above given was killed, as were also poor good Thomason and our two clerks. The bodies were denuded of their clothes for the sake of plunder. They had on them 1,000 Rs. and Thomason 100. We had managed to get this money, and had distributed it amongst ourselves in case of our escaping. On arrival at Aurungabad, some of the men proposed that I should send for my wife and, marching into Seetapore, put myself at the head of the Regiment. To this, I said, I could do nothing without knowing what the Native officers said. Fortunately these were not brutally inclined, and they explained to the men that it was only by the consent of these 2 companies that I had escaped, and that there was no knowing what the rest of the corps and the 41st and 10th would do or say, and that until their wish was known, it was better for me to go to Mythowlie. They let me have a horse and a few clothes (they had the evening before plundered Thomason's property and my own). I persuaded a guard to bring me here, and got a letter from them making me over to the Rajah Loonee Singh. On reaching this, the Rajah received me and sent me to a house a koss off, where my wife had been. We remained all Saturday there; and on Sunday morning, the Rajah's people, hearing of the mutineers coming to Mythowlie, advised us to remove into the jungle. Here we are since yesterday morning, exposed to the most trying heat, without any shelter from the sun, except a few thin branches and a sheet that we have put up. Moonshee Seetaram is with us sharing our trouble. A few of our faithful servants are hovering about. Our khidmutgar walked off with our spoons and cooking pots. Some of the Rajah's people feed us; but you may fancy if we have any appetites. My poor wife, as usual, is bearing up with her misfortunes like a saint; but is extremely weak. The Rajah sends word that he will do his best to protect us. The troops from Mohamdee and Seetapore are continually moving backwards and forwards between Seetapore and Aurun-

gabad: we cannot find out their intentions. Perhaps they will go to Delhi. Some talk of going there, some to Lucknow. They cannot, I hear, decide about the distribution of the money, and there might be a row. My opinion is that they will by degrees all walk home. You must have heard of the massacre at Seetapore: three men one lady and one child from that station are also here, but are separated from us. The Rajah thinks it advisable to divide us: so as to have smaller parties. He is right. From what I can gather, I think that young Jackson, his sister, and little Sophie Christian and Burnes are in the number. I can't make out the third name. The Rajah sent me word that when the mutineers leave the vicinity, he would try and send me to Lucknow. Show this to Sir Henry Lawrence, and tell him that my being here is kept a profound secret. If in the course of a few days something favorable turns up, we may be saved; but I fear that nature will not hold out much longer. I use my influence in behalf of the other poor fugitives in having food, &c. sent to them: they are in a house but do not know where I am. For the safety of both parties, I have not attempted to see them. I have not heard from Fyzabad for a long time, and am afraid things have gone wrong there also; as some of our men, whilst escorting me to this place, were saying that letters had been received from the 22nd Regiment N. I. and Barlow's late corps, exciting the corps at Seetapore to rise and to kill their Officers. If you can possibly manage, send a line by the bearer of this. Reward him handsomely. Do not be uneasy if you do not hear from me often, as I cannot get any one to carry our letters. I shall try, however, now and then to write. My dear Adolphe, pray to God that we may meet once again. God is all powerful, and may yet save us. In case of His will being different, I commit my poor dear wife, my child, and myself to Him.

"I heard to-day that two Europeans had escaped to Oël, and that John Hearsey had gone away somewhere on his elephant.

"9th.—I could not send this off this morning. I managed to communicate with the other poor fugitives by letter to-day.

Their names are Sir Mounstuart Jackson, his sister Miss Madeline Jackson, little Sophie Christian, Lieut Burnes, and Qr. Mr. Sergeant Morton of the 10th Regiment, Oudh Irregular Force.

"I have a servant to cook for us and he feeds the poor people.

"The privations we are put to are indescribable, but the fearful heat beats all, we could put up with any thing else, my wife is as well as could be expected. Poor Louisa is behaving like a sensible person; never once troubling for any thing. I keep this open to the last, in hopes of hearing from the mutineers' camp by evening.

"10th, 5 A. M. The Passees* came back last evening with the news that the mutineers are collected at Moholie, but cannot decide as to their future movements; they are quarrelling about the money. Some sepoys have as much as 8 or 900 Rs. each. Such fellows will walk home. Adieu, &c. &c.

"P. G. Orr."

It will be as well to mention that, during the night previous to the massacre, the native Officer Lutchmun, whose name is mentioned in Captain Orr's letter, came to him privately and, with tears in his eyes, begged him to leave the party and to join his wife at Mythowlie; adding that the men had consented to his departure. Captain Orr replied that he could not abandon his friends at a time of such extreme danger, and that unless the whole party were allowed to go unmolested, his fate should be linked with theirs. Lutchmun, notwithstanding Captain Orr's reiterated questions, refused to be more explicit; throwing out merely dark hints as to the probable fate of the party, and imploring Captain Orr to leave the camp. Lutchmun only took his departure when he found his entreaties of no avail.

* The Passees are very numerous in Oudh; they are considered by the Hindoos, of very low caste. Although inveterate thieves, they are invariably faithful to those by whom they are employed. They are much trusted by the Zemindars in Oudh, who, before annexation, always made over to them the defence of the outworks &c. of their forts. The bow and arrow are their favorite weapons, but they are equally skilful with the match-lock.

Who can describe the feelings that must have harrowed the breast of Captain Orr, when he heard the fate of himself and companions so terribly hinted at; the more terribly perhaps from being indistinctly shadowed forth: and with the knowledge too that to escape from this danger, or to attempt to avert it, was impossible, surrounded as they were by a numerous and vigilant enemy?

The kindly interest shown by Lutchmun Jemadar, and subsequently by other men of the same corps will be easily understood, when it is known that previous to annexation this corps had been raised and commanded by Captain Orr.

To render the letter we have just transcribed more complete, it is merely necessary to add that when the men, who escorted Captain Orr to Mythowlie, reached their destination, they bound the Rajah down by the most solemn oaths to protect Captain Orr, his wife, and child.

The names of the two clerks of whom mention is made in Captain Orr's letter as having fallen at Aurungabad, are Mr. Smith and Mr. Hurst. Mr. Hurst had brought a small Bible with him, the pages of which were eagerly read by the doomed party on their way from Mohamdee to Aurungabad. After the terrible massacre, the precious volume was picked up by the sole survivor and carefully carried away.

Let us now revert to a former period of our narrative. We have left Mrs. Orr in the miserable and gloomy fort "Kutchianee," her only comfort being the receipt of letters from her husband. At about 2 o'clock A. M. of the 3rd June, Mrs. Orr received a letter, or rather a portion of letter, from Captain Orr. This letter in its complete form had evidently been written in great hurry and on detached sheets of paper; and by an oversight, which at such a time can easily be understood, Captain Orr had only despatched the fragment received by his wife; and most providentially did it so happen. In this fragment Captain Orr requested his wife to proceed at once to Seetapore. The reasons by which he was influenced in making this request must have

been detailed in the portion of the letters not transmitted, and were consequently unknown.

In this dilemma, she thought it most prudent to communicate once more with her husband before taking any decisive step. She therefore wrote to him, mentioning that she should not leave Mythowlie, or rather Kutchianee, before again hearing from him. How inscrutable are the ways of Providence, and how often do we not see the most important events brought about by seemingly the veriest trifles! Had not Mrs. Orr thus written to her husband, he would in all probability have proceeded to Seetapore instead of to Mythowlie, and there would have met with certain death.

Not hearing, however, from her husband at the expected time and tormented with doubts and fears, Mrs. Orr determined at last to proceed to Seetapore and for that purpose, at 10 o'clock P. M. of the 3rd June, she, with her little daughter, left Kutchianee, escorted by the same guard under command of Ishuree Singh, Soobadar. The distance between Kutchianee and Seetapore is about 28 miles. The party had reached half-way, when it met two men, Passees by caste, who gave information that the troops at Seetapore had mutinied, that they had murdered their Officers; and that to take the lady and her child to that station would be to expose them to the most imminent danger. To prove the correctness of their statement, they actually showed some money, their portion of the plunder of the Seetapore Government Treasury. After a hurried consultation, it was decided that Mrs. Orr should return to Kutchianee.

The day of the 4th June was indeed a terrible one for Mrs. Orr, the information received from the Passees leading her to entertain the most gloomy apprehensions regarding the safety of the Mohamdee party. What would be their fate on reaching Seetapore? The dreary hours at length passed away, and the morning of the 5th June dawned. This day, with the same anguish, the same doubts weighed heavily on the heart of Mrs. Orr; at last towards 7 o'clock P. M. the arrival of Captain Orr

was announced; he came weary and haggard, his clothes still covered with the blood of his poor companions; and from him his wife heard of the late dreadful events. On the 6th June, Captain and Mrs. Orr heard that a party of fugitives from Seetapore and had also taken refuge at Mythowlie, where they had arrived on the previous day; but it could not then be ascertained of whom this party was composed. On that day (the 6th) the Rajah sent word to Captain Orr that the number of Europeans under his protection had now become too considerable to admit of their living together at Kutchianee; and that, for safety's sake, he wished to locate them separately: consequently it was his desire that Captain and Mrs. Orr should leave the Fort of Kutchianee, and betake themselves to the jungles (very abundant in the neighbourhood of Mythowlie), and that the new arrivals should occupy Kutchianee. Why the Rajah thus wished to drive Captain Orr and his wife into the jungle to make room for the new party, and why he did not rather cause the latter to be conducted to the jungle, is still a matter of mystery. However, on the morning of the 7th June, Captain Orr with his wife and child left the Fort and proceeded about two miles to the jungles. By this term, the reader must not be led to imagine a beautiful, or even an ordinary, forest, the noble trees of which would have afforded a grateful and necessary shade; but he must picture to himself a vast and dreary extent of land, covered, with the exception of a few patches here and there, with thorny brushwood growing to the height of two or three feet and totally incapable of affording protection against the fierce and intolerable rays of the sun. What their sufferings were in this wilderness, are touchingly described by Captain Orr himself in the letter already given. As night closed in, our poor sufferers were obliged to leave the thickly studded portions of the jungles, and betake themselves to an open spot; in order by lighting fires to scare away the tigers, wolves, &c. which infested the place. The Zemindar of Kutchianee, one Bustee Singh, sent food to the party, some dál and chuppaties.

This food, of a coarse description, was served on broad leaves tacked together with thorns.

On the arrival of Sir Mounstuart Jackson's party at Kutchianee, from Mythowlie, they were apparently totally neglected by Lonee Singh, but, as will have been seen, Captain Orr had done his utmost to provide for their wants.

A few words will explain how Sir Mounstuart's party reached Mythowlie.

When the massacre at Seetapore took place, Sir Mounstuart Jackson, with his sister Miss M. Jackson, effected his escape and fled from the cantonment, wandering he knew not where. In the same manner did Lieut. Burnes with Sergeant Major Morton escape, snatching up, on their way, poor little Sophie Christian. After wandering through a, to them, quite unknown country, every moment in danger of their lives, they were directed by some village people to Mythowlie, as being the only place in the neighbourhood capable of affording them refuge. After enduring many hardships, the wanderers met in a village a short distance from Mythowlie and proceeded in company to seek protection from the Rajah.

On their arrival, they were refused admittance into the Fort; but Lieut. Burnes, determined at all hazards to obtain an interview with Lonee Singh, boldly rushed forward through the wicket of the grand doorway of the Fort, and thus forced an entrance; but in doing so, he was struck on the head by one of the Rajah's retainers and severely wounded. Lonee Singh seeing him covered with blood, ordered him and his companions to be received into the Fort. They were located in a common cow-shed; their condition was sad indeed, completely worn out as they were by fatigue, their clothes in tatters, without any shoes, and their feet lacerated by the thorns of the jungle through which they had passed. They arrived at Mythowlie on the morning of the 5th. On the night of the day following, they were sent to Kutchianee.

In the meanwhile the troops from Shahjehanpore, Mohamdee,

and Seetapore, were continually hovering about the neighbourhood, evidently uncertain what steps to take, whether to proceed to Lucknow and swell the numbers of the rebel army there, or to march towards Delhi. They at last assembled at Mohowlie, a place situated about fourteen miles from Mythowlie; but their presence in such close vicinity, necessitated, on the part of our fugitives, the shifting continually of places of concealment in the jungle; and this caused them much anxiety and discomfort. At last on the 12th June, the troops were invited by Rajah Nawab Ally, to proceed to his place at Mahomdabad, situated about twenty-eight or thirty miles N. E. of Lucknow. This Rajah or Talookdar, of Mahomdabad, was the first of his class in Oudh, to raise the standard of rebellion, and he has ever since shown himself the bitter enemy of the British.

On the departure of the rebels from Mohowlie, Lonee Singh sent word to Captain Orr that he might now return to Kutchianee. This message was gladly received, as by returning to the Fort, shelter from the dreadful sun would at least be obtained. Situated as our people were, far from all aid, with none of their countrymen nearer than Lucknow, and with the whole country around them unfriendly, it will readily be supposed that communication with Lucknow was most difficult and uncertain; however, one faithful servant, by name Purwanee, never for an instant thought of abandoning his master, Captain Orr, and by his means a letter was despatched to the capital, to Capt. Adolphe Orr, and one to Sir Henry Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of Oudh. Purwanee succeeded in reaching the capital, and brought back with him answers to Captain Orr's letters, as also a purwanah addressed by Sir Henry to Rajah Lonee Singh, ordering the latter to escort the whole party to Lucknow, and promising him a handsome reward on his arrival. Previous to this, the same request had already over and over again been made by Captain Orr to the Rajah, who invariably replied that he would comply with it; and that to enable him to do so, he was collecting his men from

the neighbouring villages. This same answer did he give on perusal of Sir Henry Lawrence's purwanah. It was evident that it was not his desire to get rid of his guests. He verily believed that the English rule was at an end, and that he might at some subsequent period make better use of the Europeans now in his custody than by making them over to the British authorities at Lucknow. Days now passed on heavily and wretchedly. Every one was devoured with cruel anxiety.

On the 30th June, 1857, after the disastrous affair at Chinhut, the siege of Lucknow commenced. The rebels exulted in having forced the European troops to retreat from the plains of Chinhut with heavy loss: carefully concealing that this retreat had been caused by the treachery and defection of the Native artillery men attached to the British Force. The news of their victory spread far and wide into the district, anarchy and confusion commenced. The boy Brajees-kadr, the supposed son of the Ex-king Wajid Ally Shah, was placed on the throne, and a royal salute was fired at Mythowlie on the 5th July by Rajah Lonee Singh. Despair filled the hearts of our poor people as they heard the cannon sound from the ramparts of the Fort—despair, which increased on the receipt of a message sent to them by the Rajah, that they had better leave his place, as he could no longer protect them. Cruel mockery on his part! Whither *could* they go, surrounded as they were by danger on every side, and with no prospect of meeting with a friend to cheer them on and induce them to undertake a hazardous journey? The very Passees, dependents of the Rajah, set to protect or rather to guard them, told them candidly on no account to leave their present place of refuge, as most probably the moment that they were beyond *his* estate, he would behave treacherously towards them. Thus helpless and without hope, were the inmates of Kutchianee plunged in an agony of mind difficult to describe. The day passed in solemn silence, none daring to offer consolation or hope, when none such existed in the heart of either. Depart therefore they could not; but remain-

ed in their wretched place of concealment. The Rajah continued to feed his prisoners, (for such they must now be called); but allowed only 4lb of flour and a very small quantity of *ghee* for the whole party. Fortunately, in her flight from Seetapore, Mrs. Orr had contrived to carry a little money with her, and this was now of the greatest assistance, as she was enabled to add to the pittance given daily by the Rajah, by purchasing supplies from a neighbouring market held every eighth day.

We will now pass on to the end of July. The intervening period was passed miserably and sadly. It was well known that disasters had occurred at Chinhut and at Lucknow; but the bad news was by the Rajah and his people, distorted and exaggerated, and they were anxious to lead their captives to believe that the Mutchee Bhawun at Lucknow had fallen into the hands of the rebel soldiery, and that the Residency could not be held by the British for any length of time. It is not known that the Mutchee Bhawun had been abandoned and partially blown up by Sir Henry Lawrence himself, and that the above story of its having been wrested from our hands, was merely invented and circulated in order to increase the horrors in which our people were already plunged. As to the *certainty* of the Residency falling into the hands of the enemy, an event so confidently calculated upon by Rajah Lonee Singh, the glorious and successful defence of that post by a handful of Englishmen against the combined efforts of thousands of cowardly ruffians, has already shown how the hopes of the Rajah on that point were destined to be frustrated; but the absence of all intercourse with their own countrymen, left them in total and cruel ignorance of all that was being enacted in the country; and with minds distracted almost beyond endurance by doubts and fears, they were, however reluctantly, forced to give credence to what was industriously, and with such apparent confidence, related to them.

Besides the persons already mentioned in this narrative as having been saved from the massacre at Seetapore, another party

had also been fortunate enough to effect their escape. This party was guided to the Fort of the Rajah of Dhourayeah (in Oudh) by Captain John Hearsey, who had commanded the 2nd Regiment, Oudh Military Police, then stationed at Seetapore. Amongst the persons who composed this party was Miss Georgina Jackson, the sister of Sir Mounstuart. Towards the latter end of July, Captain Hearsey succeeded in communicating with our people at Kutchianee, and it was with no little delight that Sir Mounstuart and his sister heard that she, whom they had given up for lost, was still alive. Alas! her escape was only a temporary one, for she was with several companions treacherously betrayed by the Ranee of Dhourayeah, sent to Lucknow, and on Sir James Outram's advance on that city, in September 1857, shot to death. We will not follow the fortunes of Captain Hearsey's party, which, with the exception of himself, and of perhaps one or two of his companions, all miserably perished: either falling victims to disease and fatigue, or to the more ruthless fury of the rebels. We merely allude to them, in so far as their history is slightly linked with that of our own party.

But we must now introduce to the notice of the reader a person who was destined to exercise no little evil influence on the fate of those whose sufferings form the subject of these pages. We allude to one Zuhoor-ool Hussun. Before the annexation of Oudh, a friend at Bareilly had written to Captain Orr requesting him to exert himself in procuring employment for a person in whom he took great interest. Zuhoor-ool Hussun, bearer of the letter above alluded to, presented himself in 1851, to Captain Orr, with all the appearance of poverty and wretchedness. He was of course treated with great kindness, fed and provided with clothes. In the meanwhile steps were taken to obtain for him a suitable situation. His accomplishments consisted in his being a good Persian Scholar. After some unsuccessful efforts in other quarters, Captain Orr at last obtained for him, the much-coveted appointment of "Vakeel" to Lonee Singh, Rajah of Mythowlie. We say "coveted," because

the Vakeels of Rajahs, or in fact of any influential landholders in Oudh, enjoyed much power, as a Rajah seldom took any important step without previously consulting his Vakeel or "homme d'affaires;" and indeed in many, many cases, the Vakeel was virtually the master of the estate. Zuhoor-ool Hussun then could not but consider his fortune made, when, through Captain Orr's influence so kindly exercised in his favour, he was appointed to so important a post, and truly he was not long in ingratiating himself in his new master's favour, for ere many months had passed, Lonee Singh, to make use of a native expression, "only saw through his Vakeel's eyes." Poverty was now exchanged for comparative affluence, and day by day the Vakeel saw how necessary he had made himself to the Rajah's comfort. From the date of his appointment to that of annexation, Zuhoor-ool Hussun had had frequent interviews with Captain Orr, and when, after annexation, that officer was appointed to the district of Mohamdee in a civil capacity, these interviews, of necessity, had become very frequent; but on all occasions, Zuhoor-ool-Hussun was loud in his expressions of gratitude, and appeared always to consider himself most deeply indebted to his benefactor.

The rebel durbar at Lucknow had now assumed the reins of Government. Chuklahdars or Nazims (Collectors of Revenue) had been appointed to the districts, and very stringent orders were issued to Zemindars or landholders in Oudh, to present themselves at Lucknow, either personally or through their Vakeels, bringing with them as many as possible of their armed retainers to the aid and support of the rebel sepoys, who were now wholly occupied in mad and desperate efforts to crush the garrison in the Lucknow Residency. Zuhoor-ool Hussun was selected by Lonee Singh to represent his master at Lucknow; and towards the end of July he left Mythowlie with about 300 of Lonee Singh's armed followers. But before his departure, and from the time that our people had sought refuge at Mythowlie, never on any single occasion did Zuhoor-ool Hussun endeavour to mitigate the misery in which he saw them plunged; and although

he visited them on two occasions, it was merely to give utterance to what he knew was false, or to raise hopes which he also knew that the Rajah had not the slightest intention of realizing. He had now fairly thrown off all allegiance to the British Government, and, as representative of the Rajah, was himself proceeding to the capital, to swell, with his followers, the ranks of the rebel army. A conversation, however, took place before his departure between Zuhoor-ool Hussun and Lonee Singh which it is important to note. The Vakeel enquired of his master, whether, on his arrival at Lucknow, any mention was to be made to the Durbar of the presence at Mythowlie of the Europeans? He was told that unless his master, the Rajah, could derive some decided advantage by the disclosure, it was not to be made; but that should the rebel Government offer any inducement for his doing so, the Rajah would willingly forward his prisoners to Lucknow. This conversation was faithfully reported to Captain Orr by one Mehndee Hussun, one of the inferior karindahs or agents of the Rajah, and who had given several proofs of kindness towards the captives. It was then towards the latter end of July that Zuhoor-ool Hussun left Mythowlie. On the 6th August, towards evening, Lonee Singh sent word to his captives, that he had received information that troops were on their way to Mythowlie from Lucknow with orders to demand the persons of the Europeans under his protection, and that their safety required that they should leave the Fort of Kutchianee immediately and take refuge once more in the jungle.

Of the five Passees appointed by the Rajah to watch over his victims, Captain Orr (whose long residence in Oudh had made him well acquainted with all the customs and habits of its inhabitants) had succeeded in gaining over two to his own interests. Suspecting treachery, Captain Orr, on the receipt of the Rajah's message, immediately, but secretly, despatched one of these Passees to gain intelligence. The messenger soon returned and stated that troops had actually reached within one day's march of Mythowlie, that they numbered about two hundred and fifty men and belonged

to five different regiments.* Matters had now to all appearance come to a crisis: the Rajah had commenced his work of treachery. Zuhoor-ool Hussun had, almost immediately on his arrival at Lucknow, divulged the secret, and had urged the Durbar to send out a force to escort the hated Europeans to Lucknow. It will be naturally asked, Why was the Rajah anxious to remove our people from Kutchianee to the jungle, as, since he was determined to sacrifice them to his own benefit, he could as easily have betrayed them whilst in the Fort as in the jungle? The answer is easily given. With that vile cunning so common to men of his country and class, he hoped, should the British Government again obtain the ascendant, and any enquiries be made as to his conduct towards those whom he had sworn to protect, to make it appear that he had done his utmost, by sending his guests to the jungle, to conceal and to save them; but that his precautions had been rendered of no avail by the sudden appearance of a large body of regular troops, to whom he had been obliged, however unwillingly, to yield. Thus, whilst from the rebel Durbar he would reap the reward of his gross treachery, he would, at the same time be enabled to screen himself from all the consequences of his conduct, should the British once more assert their rule in Oudh. On the night then of the 6th, at 10 o'clock, our party left, with aching hearts, their retreat at Kutchianee, and proceeded, on foot, of course, once more to the jungle. They passed the dismal hours of the night in an open ground, for reasons once before mentioned. The guard of Passees were whispering very earnestly amongst themselves, and their conversation was partially overheard by one of the servants, who, like Purwanee, had remained faithful to Captain Orr; this man immediately reported to his master that he suspected that all was not right, and that foul play was being contemplated. Captain Orr sent for one of the

* This precaution of selecting men from different regiments was taken, in order, as it was thought, to obviate all chances of the captives winning them over to their own interests, a contingency which might have occurred had men of a single regiment been selected.

Passees, who revealed the whole truth, stating that the Rajah had sent him to the troops to give them information of the whereabouts of the captives, and to guide them to their place of concealment. Will it be believed that 250 men were actually afraid to accomplish the mission on which they had been sent? They were actually afraid to encounter our small party, expecting to meet with a desperate resistance. Such was the report of the Passee,—a report subsequently verified by the result; for the troops returned empty-handed to Lucknow in September, not having dared to penetrate the dreaded jungle, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of the Rajah. Faithful to his own line of double conduct, he himself refused to make over his captives to the sepoys, who had frequently urged him to do so.

A sad and fearful time was it indeed for our poor people, from this 6th of August to the 20th October, and no pen can give an adequate description of their many and great sufferings. Ladies, accustomed to the usual luxuries of life; two delicate little children,—the one but three years of age, a beautiful little blue-eyed creature, poor little Sophie Christian, whose thoughts constantly reverted to her mother, and who saddened the hearts of her companions by ever asking them why that beloved mother had not accompanied them,—the other, Captain Orr's own daughter Louisa, a little older, who bore up under all the dreadful trials and privations to which she was subjected, with astonishing patience and resignation; and lastly four men, already weakened in mind and body. Such was the party constrained to pass day after day during this long interval, exposed in a dismal jungle to the intense heat of the day, only tempered by the torrents of rain, which at this season of the year are of such frequent occurrence. Sickness too had commenced to prostrate our people: the deadly jungle fever had shown itself, the servants could no longer attend to the wants of their masters, and the ladies were forced to cook for the whole party. Small thin coverts, made of the long jungle grass and broad leaves, had indeed been erected as a protection from the rain; but this protection was most partial

and ineffectual. A small supply of quinine and of other medicines had been obtained from Captain Hearsay; and although it had arrived in rather a damaged state, still, most thankfully was it received.

On the 26th August, a letter reached Captain Orr from Capt. Gordon at Cawnpore. This letter gave a detailed account of the horrible massacre that had lately taken place at Cawnpore; but it also gave the cheering news of the shortly expected arrival of British troops from England, and above all of the march on Lucknow of the combined forces of Generals Havelock and Outram. Captain Gordon spoke confidently of the expected result of the operations, so soon to be undertaken by our troops. He told Captain Orr that he hoped that ere long we should be masters of Lucknow, when arrangements for the rescue of himself and companions should be made. Such were that gallant officer's hopes, and such were, as far at least as concerned Lucknow, the hopes that filled the hearts of every soul that composed that force. They had a noble object in view: the fate of the brave and glorious garrison of Lucknow hung on a thread, and the terrible vow muttered by our soldiers over the bloody grave of our countrywomen at Cawnpore, had to be fulfilled. Every energy was strained, and all were eager, not only to avenge the cruel death of those that had fallen, but to save those that were still in such great jeopardy. Oh, how often was that welcome letter read and read again, laid down but to be once more taken up! and how was the hand that had penned those cheering lines blessed by the grateful hearts to which, amidst the dreadful gloom which surrounded them, one ray of hope had been conveyed.

We will dwell no longer on the interval which elapsed between the 6th August and the 20th October, an interval filled with hopes and fears, with misery and distress. On the 19th September, the army under Generals Havelock and Outram, crossed the Ganges, and on the 20th during a halt, made to allow the baggage to be crossed over, a letter was received from Captain Orr

by Brigadier General Neil; this letter was immediately handed over by Neil to Sir James Outram. An answer was at once returned to it, giving cover to a purwanah signed by the General in his capacity of Chief Commissioner of Oudh, to the address of Lonee Singh, instructing him to take the greatest care possible of the Europeans under his charge, and giving him a promise of a high reward, if he should succeed in screening them from danger. Sir James also informed Lonee Singh, that he was at the head of an army marching against Lucknow, and that after the capture of the city, arrangements would be made to escort the refugees from Mythowlie to Lucknow. A letter was also addressed to Captain Orr by his eldest brother, then in Sir James Outram's camp, as also one to Lonee Singh, on the all-important subject of those under his care, pointing out the advantages that would accrue to him, should he remain faithful to his trust, and on the contrary, the dreadful punishment that he would inevitably incur, should he prove treacherous. It may be as well to add that Sir James in his purwanah, confirmed to Lonee Singh all the promises made to him by Sir Henry Lawrence. The letter received by Brigadier General Neil, was taken to camp by Purwanee, who was also bearer of the answers, which reached Mythowlie on the 26th September. The Rajah received the purwanah in silence, making no observations to his captives regarding it.

In the meanwhile important events had taken place at Lucknow. Generals Havelock and Outram had, with their troops, forced their way into the Residency. The undertaking was a most desperate one, and would scarcely have been attempted had not the object in view been of such paramount importance. That object was not then and there gained, and the relieving force was itself besieged, yet its presence within the walls of the Lucknow Residency cheered the weary hearts of the long-beleaguered garrison. A fresh stimulus was given to all, additional defences were thrown up, sallies were made, resulting in the capture of several of the enemy's guns which had

most annoyed the besieged; in short though not *released,* it may fairly be said, as events subsequently proved, that the garrison was *saved.* Unfortunately, however, Sir James's design to send an escort to Mythowlie was defeated; communication with the world outside was kept up with the greatest difficulty; and in fact it was only with much risk and at an enormous expense, that important despatches at irregular intervals, were conveyed to Cawnpore. This will explain why it was found impossible to communicate with those at Mythowlie, to which place our narrative must now be carried back.

It has already been stated that the detachment sent from Lucknow at the instigation of the villain Zuhoor-ool Hussun, had returned empty-handed to Lucknow in September. On its arrival at the capital, Zuhoor-ool Hussun, disappointed at not seeing his victims brought in, started in person for Mythowlie, under a promise on oath to the rebel government, that he would shortly return with them. Zuhoor-ool Hussun went even so far as to ask the Durbar, whether he should bring in the captives alive, or whether their heads only were required. He was ordered to bring them in alive. He reached Mythowlie one or two days before the Rajah received General Outram's purwanah, but it so happened that this document was put into Captain Orr's hands at a time which Zuhoor-ool Hussun had chosen to visit the captives. He, as well as the Rajah, heard all the accounts given of the British forces, &c. &c. by Purwanee, and read the General's purwanah, but retired silently.

All was again quiet at Mythowlie for some days after the arrival of Zuhoor-ool Hussun. The Rajah was watching the course of events before he ventured to take any decisive step. He wished to see the result of the operations at Lucknow. How cruelly and calmly was all calculated, and how cautiously did the villains carry on their foul plot! They were soon convinced that the balance preponderated in favour of the rebel government, and that the days of the English were numbered. Preparations were therefore made to send the captives to Lucknow, and on

the morning of the 20th October, 1857, a party of three hundred of Lonee Singh's men, armed with matchlocks and swords entered the jungle. Zuhoor-ool Hussun was himself present; but kept at a short distance. Captain Orr had with him a pistol and a gun, to seize which was the first act of these ruffians, and this was sufficient to throw a light upon their designs. All in our party were suffering from fever, which attacked them every other day; they were besides without clothes, except indeed the rags which still hung around them; they were without shoes; and above all without any protection for their heads; and in this state were they ordered to follow the Rajah's men. In vain did they ask where they were to be taken; no answer to the question being ever returned, but the order to move forward brutally repeated.

Sergeant Major Morton begged permission to take with him a piece of cloth which had served him as a carpet; but was refused. Mrs. Orr had also wished to carry away a sheet with which to cover her head, as well as that of her daughter; but one of the cowardly ruffians accompanied his refusal with a blow which levelled her to the ground. It is useless to attempt to describe the scene which ensued; and even could it be accurately described, it would be of too harrowing a nature. Let us hurry on. Our party, escorted by the three hundred men, walked or rather dragged themselves on to the edge of the jungle where two of the common two-wheeled carts awaited them. They were told to mount, and they proceeded to a village, distant about a mile or a mile and a half, where they were ordered to halt; for in this village another scene of brutal cruelty was to be enacted. A native blacksmith soon made his appearance, bringing with him heavy fetters. Zuhoor-ool Hussun had determined upon filling the cup to the full. With savage foresight he had prepared every thing: no delay was to accrue, the gentlemen of the party were to be laden with irons at once. At this gross indignity, the mind of poor Burnes received a shock from which it never recovered. Sergeant Major Morton, at the sight of the fetters, fell into a frightful convulsive fit from

which, with difficulty, he recovered, under the attentions that could be paid to him by his fellow-captives. Death at one moment seemed ready to terminate his sufferings. The operation of fixing on the irons was suspended; but only to be savagely renewed as soon as signs of returning life appeared. The heaviest pair of fetters was destined by Zuhoor-ool Hussun for Captain Orr. His wife begged that the indignity might be dispensed with, falling down on her knees before the monsters; but a rude laugh alone was returned to all her supplications. The irons at length fixed, the march was resumed, Zuhoor-ool Hussun ordering all the movements. Will it be believed that the string usually attached by prisoners to the upper ring or joint of the fetters, to enable them with a little more ease to keep the irons in a position favorable to motion, was, with a refinement of cruelty, refused?

The march lasted from the 20th to the 26th October. Each day the sad procession started at 8 o'clock A. M. and continued with slight interruptions until evening closed in. The sufferings from the sun were dreadful. A raging thirst tormented the poor captives, and no water was allowed to allay it. Food, such as it was, was *thrown* to them at irregular intervals, (and let this expression "*thrown*," be taken literally,) and it often happened that it was midnight, ere they had received their nauseous pittance.

But if their *bodily* sufferings were so great, their *mental* sufferings were still greater. At every village that they passed through, the prisoners were exhibited to the gaze of the wondering villagers. Oh! what a triumph to these cowardly jailors, to hold in their power those once dreaded Europeans whom they had been accustomed to respect and to obey! What a pleasure, what a triumph, to be able now to address them in the tones of the most brutal insolence and to load them with every indignity. A glorious triumph indeed!

But we must not fail to note the order of the march. One hundred and fifty men of the armed force marched in front, with a piece of artillery, which was ever kept loaded, and one

hundred and fifty men brought up the rear, further protected by another piece of artillery, the prisoners in the centre. A large force, in good truth, to guard four men, two women, and two little children!

On approaching the capital on the 26th October, 1857, the abovementioned party was reinforced by three Regiments of the Line (mutineers) and a swarm of cavalry. The Residency, besieged and beleaguered as it was, was carefully avoided, for it was still an object of dread; and a circuitous road was chosen to conduct the prisoners to the Palace, the now notorious "Kaïser-Bágh." Before reaching this building, Captain Orr recognized a large detachment of sepoys formerly belonging to his own Regiment. The detachment was drawn up in one of the streets of the city; and as the prisoners' carts passed by, many of the men were seen actually to weep. It will be remembered that it was a guard of this very corps that saved the life of their former commandant at the massacre, at Aurungabad, of the Shahjehanpore fugitives.

At some short distance from the Kaïser-Bágh, the captives were made to dismount from the carts; but they had hardly done so, when they were completely surrounded by a dense crowd, and progress was rendered most difficult. The reader will imagine the dreadful position of the captives, rudely and insultingly stared at by thousands, exulting in the sight. Captain Orr snatched up his little daughter in his arms, expecting every moment to have seen her torn to pieces by the crowd. Mr. Burnes performed the same kind office to little Sophie Christian. The thirst which had so long tormented the poor prisoners had now become intolerable; and in agony the ladies shrieked out for water. It was denied to them, until Mummoo Khan, (the paramour of the Begum, whose son Brajees-Kadr had been placed on the throne,) who had been watching the progress of the captives, from the walls of the Kaïser-Bágh, ordered water to be given to them. It was brought, but in such a vile vessel, that, even situated as they were, the ladies refused

to pollute their lips by touching it. *At last*, this agony was over. The party reached the smaller entrance to the Kaïser-Bágh: the door was suddenly opened, the prisoners admitted, and it was as suddenly closed. The excited crowd was excluded; but seeing themselves separated from their prey, they raised a fearful yell and dispersed. Poor Sir Mountstuart Jackson had suffered much from frequent attacks of fever and ague. In him, nature was fairly worn out; and it was a sad, melancholy sight to see his poor frame utterly and hopelessly reduced to the last extremity by sickness and misery. On entering the Kaïser-Bágh he fell down in a swoon. Orders were given to some menials to place him on a charpoy.

The whole party were now taken to their place of confinement, a small miserable room in one of the numerous outhouses of the Kaïser-Bágh, and attached to the stabling. A guard of twelve men of the Ukhturree* Regiment was posted at the door as a watch.

During the first day of their confinement, one Meer Wajid Ally, of whom more afterwards, was present with the guard. He had the humanity to give to the prisoners the dinner prepared for himself. At midnight, the place of confinement was changed for another, more roomy and better in all respects: the guard was considerably increased, and ever kept their swords drawn.

To render the subsequent portion of our narrative more intelligible, we will give a hurried sketch of the state of affairs in the Oudh rebel Durbar. Twelve regiments had been raised by the British Government on annexation. Of these, the greater number had previously belonged to the Oudh Service. This force, together with some regiments of Cavalry, was styled the "Oudh Irregular Force." At the commencement of the siege of Lucknow, it was by these troops, composed for the most part of Oudh men, that the choice of a king was made, in the person of a boy, ten or twelve years of age, by name Brajees-Kadr, the

* The name of a Regiment formerly in the service of the king of Oudh.

supposed son of the ex-king Wajid Ally Shah, but the real offspring of Mummoo Khan. The mother of this boy had originally been a dancing girl, with whom Mummoo Khan, then holding a subordinate charge in the royal cook-rooms, had formed an intimacy. The king hearing of this girl's beauty, admitted her to the number of his Mahuls, under the title of Huzrut Mahul. She received a handsome allowance, with a large establishment of servants, &c., over which she appointed Mummoo Khan, Darogah or Superintendent; the former intimacy was still, though of course secretly, continued, and resulted in the birth of Brajees-Kadr.

On the elevation of this boy to the throne, or rather on his being created "Nawab Wuzeer of Oudh," (for his authority was at first held subordinate to that of the emperor of Delhi,) his mother and Mummoo Khan enjoyed an amount of power, checked only by the caprices of the troops to whom their elevation had been due. Mummoo Khan was a man of no talent whatsoever, and was wanting in that courage, moral and physical, so requisite in a person placed in the critical position which he now held.

As to Meer Wajid Ally, whom we have had already occasion to name, he held with regard to another Begum, known as the Sultan (Sooltan) Mahul, the same position as did Mummoo Khan with regard to the Huzrut Mahul: *nominally* the Darogah of her household, *in reality* living with her on the most intimate terms. The king was of course the dupe of both these women. Between Mummoo Khan and Meer Wajid Ally, however, exists this great difference: the latter belongs to a respectable family of Syuds, and has received what, amongst Mahomedans, is considered a good education; the former, on the contrary, is of low origin and is almost ignorant of the art of reading and writing his own language. Wajid Ally had charge of the financial arrangements of the Durbar.

We will now refer to a person who has long since made himself notorious,—the man known as the Fyzabad Moulavy, one

Ahmud-oollah Shah. This fanatic first made his appearance at Fyzabad, in January 1857, when, at the head of a few armed followers, he commenced preaching in the Musjids to crowds of attentive listeners. He was ordered by the authorities to give up his arms, and those of his followers, whilst residing within the walls of the city. This he refused to do. Force was employed; in consequence of which, two or three of his followers were killed; others, together with the Moulavy himself, wounded, the latter slightly. On recovery, the Moulavy and three or four of his followers were brought to a trial. The proceedings of the district sessions court were forwarded to Mr. Ommaney, the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, who, most unfortunately, disapproved of them. The trial was again instituted on a fresh indictment, and the proceedings once more forwarded to Lucknow for approval. But a fatal delay had occurred: the mutiny at Fyzabad broke out; the European Officers in Civil employ had to fly for their lives, and the Moulavy was released from jail and elected chief under a royal salute. Three days aferwards, however, the Hindu portion of the rebel troops at Fyzabad, disgusted with the choice which they, together with their Mahomedan brethren, had made, removed the Moulavy from the high position he had begun to enjoy, and, giving him 300 Rs., dispensed with his presence. The Moulavy proceeded to Lucknow. He was gladly and cordially received by the Begum, and a handsome daily allowance was granted to him. But the Moulavy was not long content to play a secondary role, his ambition caused him to aspire to the throne itself. He was of the Soonnee persuasion, and many days did not elapse before he won over to his interests several hundreds of the Mahomedan soldiery. Fugitive sepoys, driven out of Delhi, had flocked to Lucknow; and amongst these especially he found many adherents. His first act was to seize, for his own private residence, the Palace of the ex-minister Ally Nucky Khan, situated at the Gao-Ghaut, on the banks of the river Goomtee; and from this place he issued proclamations, couched in blasphemous language,

arrogating to himself divine authority and assuming full powers of Government. He sent out parties to the districts, levied revenue from several villages and estates, and even exercised similar authority within certain portions of the city itself, substituting his own officials for those appointed by the Durbar. He insisted on the Begum renouncing her own, or the "Sheeah," persuasion, to adopt that of the "Soonnees."

The Durbar, seeing its own orders and proclamations day after day openly set at defiance by this Moulavy, could no longer brook such bare-faced opposition, and determined to employ force in order to rid itself of a rival, who threatened to become too powerful. Accordingly a force with Artillery was ordered to attack the Gao-Ghaut Palace, and, if possible, to secure the person of the Moulavy. A few shots were exchanged, the Moulavy and residence was surrounded, his own men began to desert their master, and on the third day he was constrained through hunger to surrender himself. He was made over to the custody of the Delhi troops, who kept him for a few days in strict confinement; we say, a *few* days, for the Moulavy had a cunning eloquence, and this eloquence, backed by the respect which the reputed sanctity of his character as Moulavy secured to him, soon converted his very jailors into staunch followers and disciples. At this period, Sir James Outram with a very inadequate force, was holding the important post of the "Alum Bágh." Repeated attacks had been made on this position by the enemy in overwhelming numbers, but without success. The Moulavy represented to the Sirdars (officers) of the Delhi troops, the unsatisfactory state of their affairs. He showed them that their want of success was to be attributed to the want of a brave, spirited and intelligent leader; that Mummoo Khan and his partizans were devoid of all courage, and were only occupied in enriching themselves; and, worse than all, that they even had a leaning towards the English; that the many Regiments that had been lately sent by the Durbar, to the various districts (of Oudh) for the ostensible purpose of coercing the Zemindars to pay the Revenue,

had, in reality, been removed from the capital, in order to facilitate the entrance into Lucknow of the British army. He then gave a vivid description of his own almost divine character, he enlarged on the sacred object of his own mission, and at length proposed himself as a leader devoted to the common cause, offering to head their numbers against the accursed "Kaffirs," whom he would, by their assistance, soon exterminate. His speech had the desired effect; and, without any intimation of the fact being given to the Durbar, the Moulavy was not only released, but became the chief-elect of the rebel army. It is not our purpose to follow this arch-impostor in his subsequent fortunes, enough has been said to show the great influence he was destined to exercise on the destinies of the European captives.*

At the period to which our narrative has now reached, the Oudh Zemindars and land-owners had, for the most part, in obedience to the several proclamations issued on the subject, presented themselves at Lucknow, with a portion, more or less considerable, of their armed retainers. One of the principal of these Talooqdars, whose name has become well known to the Indian Public, was Rajah Máun Singh. The history of his family is given at full length in Sir William Sleeman's "Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh." We will not therefore enter into any details regarding it: suffice it to say that Máun Singh, whose fidelity had so long been suspected, was evidently still uncertain as to which cause he should espouse. He was wavering between the two, and endeavouring to steer his course, so as to keep clear as much as possible of all the difficulties and dangers of his position. His name, too, is linked with the sad history of the European captives.

Having now brought before the reader, the principal persons who, directly or indirectly, took part in the events which are still to be narrated, we will return to the Kaïser Bágh.

* In July 1858, the Moulavy attacked the Fort of the Powacen Rajah, by whose brother he was killed.

Two or three days after the arrival of the English prisoners at Lucknow, the event became known to the English garrison. Some of the British scouts had already given information that certain European prisoners had been delivered over to the Durbar, sent from the district by Zemindars; but their information was vague; it was, however, shortly afterwards confirmed by one of Rajah Máun Singh's moonshees, who had presented himself within the British entrenchments, the bearer of a letter from his master to Sir James Outram. This person gave all particulars; and, through him, with the sanction of the General, communication was held with the captives themselves. A letter was received, written by Captain Orr and signed by all his companions, stating that Meer Wajid Ally, Mummoo Khan, and Rajah Máun Singh were showing them kindness, that their fetters had been removed, and that hopes had been given them that their lives would be spared.

Máun Singh himself wrote to the General and to Captain Orr's brothers, both of whom were in the Lucknow Garrison, stating that he would exert himself to the utmost to save the captives. Although the Rajah, in his letter, had somewhat exaggerated the extent of his kind offices towards our people, and had given the General and Captain Orr's brothers to understand that he had caused the fetters to be removed, (whereas, as subsequently discovered, it was to Wajid Ally that the prisoners were indebted for this act of kindness,) yet Máun Singh certainly rendered signal service in facilitating communication with Wajid Ally; and here let us state, once for all, that this last mentioned person, in his behaviour towards the captives, was invariably kind and considerate, and full of respect. It appeared from his subsequent conversations with Mrs. Orr, that he had endeavoured to prevent the massacre in the city of nineteen persons (amongst whom was Miss Georgina Jackson, the sister of Sir Mountstuart) on the memorable day of the entrance into Lucknow of the troops under Generals Outram and Havelock. Unfortunately the victims were in the hands of the Delhi

troops then under the complete influence of the Moulavy, and to have acted openly in their favour, would certainly have caused the death of Wajid Ally.

From the 26th October to the 16th November, the prisoners received frequent visits from Mummoo Khan. His object was to persuade Sir Mountstuart Jackson and Captain Orr to write, the one to his uncle Mr. C. C. Jackson, the other to Sir James Outram, that the Durbar was willing to release the prisoners, and to allow the Garrison to leave the city, should the British, on the other side, consent to abandon Oudh entirely. Both officers refused to be the channel of communication of this proposition, persuaded as they were, that, should the British on the faith of the rebels leave the Residency, the Cawnpore tragedy would again be enacted. Failing in this purpose, Mummoo Khan, through one of his agents, sent word to the Officers, that since they had refused to write, they must head the troops in their assaults on the Residency, cast shells, &c. This the officers indignantly refused to do, and plainly told Mummoo Khan himself, that nothing could induce them to join the rebel army against their own countrymen. On hearing this, Mummoo Khan left the room and mentioned the circumstance to one of the men of the guard, who ferociously made a fearful sign, passing his finger across his throat. This sign did not pass unobserved by the captives who thought that the last hour had come, and were preparing for the worst. But it did not suit Mummoo Khan then to carry the threat into execution.

Every thing tended to make the position of the prisoners as dreadful as possible. The nature of the feeling towards them of their jailors had been made sufficiently manifest, and this feeling would, it was feared, only be increased by the refusal of the gentlemen to act in a manner dishonorable to themselves. As to their personal comforts, they were but scanty: they received food indeed; but it was given in such small quantities that it only proved sufficient because several of the poor captives were in too sickly a state to partake of it. Poor Sir Mountstuart was

wasting away; Morton for days together, refused to touch food of any kind; Burnes was all but insensible to all external events. Captain Orr was so changed, that even those who for years past had known him in Oudh, could not recognize him. If such was the fearful change that had taken place in the health and persons of the gentlemen, how much more startling must it not have been with regard to the ladies, Mrs. Orr and Miss Jackson? Their clothes, even in the jungles, had already been in tatters; they were now completely in rags; their hair was completely matted, deprived as they long had been of combs and brushes, and in fact of all those little articles of toilette so necessary to ensure cleanliness. In a word, body and mind alike suffered: the sufferings of the one but increasing the sufferings of the other. The poor little children too, what a fate was theirs!

We have already stated that, through the kindness of Wajid Ally, the fetters had been removed from the legs of the gentlemen. The Moulavy had, by some means, been informed of this, and he sent one of his men to ascertain the fact. Wajid Ally heard of the circumstance, and, bribing the spy handsomely, induced him to report to the Moulavy that the irons had not been discontinued.

We have nothing new to relate until the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell to effect the release of the besieged Garrison. Some letters, it is true, had been sent by Captain Orr, and answers had been returned; but some of the former only reached long after date. During all this dreary time, alternate hopes and fears had been entertained at the Residency regarding the fate of the captives. General Sir J. Outram wrote in strong language to Rajah Máun Singh, enforcing upon him the necessity of saving the lives of the prisoners, and assuring him that this act alone would convince him that the Rajah was sincere in his protestations of fidelity. Indeed Máun Singh wrote several times on his own behalf to the General, but invariably received the assurance that the rescue from captivity and death of the prisoners was the condition of his ultimately enjoying the favour

of the British Government. But alas it was decreed that the warmest and most earnest hopes were to be disappointed. Wajid Ally had latterly been obliged almost to discontinue his visits to the captives. He had, for some time past, been suspected by the Moulavy of showing too much kindness to the prisoners, and so bitter was the feeling of the Moulavy on this account towards Wajid Ally, that the latter was obliged to conceal himself during four days in the city. Fortunately Mummoo Khan could not dispense with his services, and plainly told the chiefs of the rebel army that unless Wajid Ally was protected from the menaces of the Moulavy and allowed to return to his duties, he (Mummoo Khan) could no longer carry on his own. Wajid Ally was consequently, under the most solemn promise of protection, allowed to return to the Kaïser-Bágh; but of course he was obliged to be very cautious in his very rare interviews with the captives.

On the 14th November heavy firing was heard by the captives, in the direction apparently of the suburbs of the city: the guard placed over the prisoners immediately got under arms, and the Jemadar, or native officer in command, was heard to give strict orders to his men, not to allow either Mummoo Khan or Meer Wajid Ally to communicate with the prisoners. This day and the following one were passed in the most cruel anxiety. Great tumult and confusion reigned in the Kaïser-Bágh: so great indeed, that it prevented the prisoners from hearing the cannonading of Sir Colin's advancing army.

On the 16th November, at about 9 o'clock, A. M. a large body of men of the 71st Regiment N. I. rushed towards the room where the captives were lodged. These men were completely equipped, wearing the cross-belts over their own native cloths. On *their* arrival, the usual guard withdrew to a short distance, and all the inmates of that wretched abode were ordered, in language too brutal to be repeated, to rise and come forward. Not a word was spoken by our poor countrymen, who rose with some difficulty, having hardly the strength to do so. We cannot fully

describe the solemn and awful scene that now presented itself. Another person, evidently in authority, appeared and whispered some orders in the ear of the man commanding the party of the 71st. These orders, it was soon discovered, were, to leave the ladies where they were, and to drag the gentlemen away. All felt in that dreadful hour that the fiat had gone forth; the children, by very instinct, uttered a loud shriek, as if their tender reason was about to abandon them. A sepoy exclaimed to little Louisa, that he would put out her eyes if she were not silent. A solemn "adieu" was uttered by Sir Mountstuart Jackson and Captain Orr to those they had loved so much. Their cords were produced, and the prisoners, undaunted even at this fearful hour, calmly allowed themselves to be bound and soon they were no more seen! A rattle of musketry was heard by those who had been left behind; but its fearful tale was not then understood by them; nor was it revealed for some time afterwards, as the native guard persisted, when questioned on the subject, in saying that some native prisoners had been put to death, and that the English captives were still in the custody of the 71st Regiment. Whether this false statement was made from motives of pity, or for some other reason, it is difficult to determine. It was on the 7th January, that Wajid Ally, on being repeatedly interrogated by Mrs. Orr, disclosed the sad truth, adding that the crime had been committed at the instigation of the Moulavy. But, to continue: the Jemadar of the guard which had been placed over the ladies, was in the habit, now and then, of leaving his charge to assist in pointing the guns of one of the numerous batteries of the Kaïser-Bágh; he was considered a good shot, and was rewarded by a donation of 500 Rupees for having by a round shot knocked down the British flag which Sir Colin Campbell's victorious troops had hoisted on one of the turrets of a large building styled the Koorsheid-Munzil,* and which was known to the English residents of Lucknow under the designation of the Mess-house

* Koorsheid, the sun; Munzil, house, edifice.

of H. M.'s 32nd Regiment. This Jemadar was of a brutal disposition, and was killed at his battery by one of our shots about the 19th November. He was succeeded by another Jemadar, who, though bad enough, was still a little less cruel than his predecessor. After the enactment of the scene described as having occurred on the 16th, the ladies had apparently been forgotten, and for two whole days no food had been sent to them; a few morsels of dry chuppatie, the remnants of former repasts, had fortunately been carefully preserved; and these, moistened, with water, were now and then given to the children when oppressed and faint through hunger. At last the Jemadar reported to his superior officer, that either the prisoners must be fed, or that he must be relieved from his charge. A person, styled the "Adjutant Sahib," came to verify the statement of the Jemadar, and finding it to be correct, he gave one Rupee to the Jemadar, with which to procure the necessary food; which was daily cooked for the ladies by the camp-followers in the British service who had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

Preparations were now being made by the British for the masterly operations by which the Garrison of Lucknow was to be relieved. A sham bombarding of the Kaïser-Bágh had been commenced, and shot and shell were poured into the Palace. The house in which the ladies were imprisoned was not, of course, secure from the effects of this iron hail, and the guard, fearing probably for their own safety, were seriously thinking of obviating the necessity of remaining in so exposed a place, by cruelly getting rid of their charge; but, monsters as they were, they one by one refused to strike the first blow. At this juncture, their good genuis, Wajid Ally, came to the rescue of the ladies; and he persuaded the Jemadar to remove his prisoners to their former abode, the stables. As much confusion existed, Wajid Ally seized upon the opportunity thus afforded, to renew his visits, although they were indeed very "few and far between," and paid under disguise.

The Lucknow Garrison had now been relieved: women and

children, sick and wounded, had all, most providentially, been extricated from their perilous position, and the two forces, the relieving and the relieved, marched on to the Alum Bágh.* Sir Colin hastened on to the relief of Cawnpore then invested by the Nana and the Gwalior troops. Sir James Outram, with a very small force, was to hold the important position of the Alum Bágh, until the return of the Commander-in-Chief with a sufficiently strong army to storm and capture the city of Lucknow.

Great was the joy at Lucknow of the rebels when our forces abandoned the city. In their madness they thought that they were rid for ever of their hated enemies; and that the force left by Sir Colin at the Alum Bágh, would shortly join the main body of the army at Cawnpore. They were blinded, and in their mad joy, they at once released nearly two hundred native prisoners. But this error, on their part, was most providential, for in the general rejoicing, our captive countrywomen were forgotten. With aching hearts they heard that the British had left the Residency, and the last faint hope of delivery seemed destroyed for ever. On the 24th November (as nearly as the ladies could calculate) a sad event occurred, which added considerably to their sorrow. Poor little Sophie Christian, during the long period, the events of which we have been endeavouring to trace, had been struggling with sickness and every hardship. Her poor little frame had become shattered by repeated attacks of fever and of dysentery; and although she had latterly appeared to rally, yet nature was completely exhausted, and on the day alluded to, the 24th November, 1857, the little angel "laid her down and slept." Death passed his hand gently over her; her beautiful blue eyes closed as if in gentle repose, and before her companions were aware of the change, her infant spirit had fled for ever from the scenes of danger and of misery. Through the kindness of a man of the guard, himself the father of a large family, and upon whom Mrs. Orr had imposed a solemn oath, and also by bribing another person to assist in the performance of the sad ceremony, Mrs.

* Alum, world; Bágh, garden. Garden of the world.

Orr and Miss Jackson had the melancholy satisfaction of knowing that, during the dark hours of the ensuing night, the remains of the poor little orphan were carefully confided to the earth.

Day after day now passed away without bringing any comfort; indeed each one was still more painfully felt than the preceding one. The minds of the captive ladies were wrung to the utmost by apprehension, anxiety, and grief. Their food, instead of being cooked separately, was but a small portion of the general mess prepared for the native prisoners, and coarse native cloths (already worn) were given to them in lieu of the tattered remnants of their English garments.

Captain Orr's brothers had been attached to General Sir J. Outram's staff in the Intelligence Department at the Alum Bágh, and after many efforts, they succeeded, through native agency, in establishing communication with Meer Wajid Ally, and through his kindness with the prisoners themselves, to whom they were at length enabled to send secretly and with great precautions, a small supply of the most necessary medicines and of tea. A few letters were exchanged, but very irregularly and at long intervals. Communication was also held from the Alum Bágh with Rajah Máun Singh's Vakeel; for Máun Singh himself had left Lucknow for his own residence at Shah Gunj, or at least had pretended to have done so.

It is impossible fully to appreciate the kindness of General Outram in all his constant endeavours, by threats, by promises, by offers of rewards, to secure the safety of the prisoners; and to him, under Providence, are our captive countrywomen most deeply indebted for their subsequent release.

Wajid Ally, to whom General Outram had offered a reward of 100,000 Rs. (sanctioned by Government,) should he succeed in effecting the release of the captives, made a solemn promise to effect the desired object, and this promise made to the General and to Captain Orr's brothers, was confirmed in presence of the ladies by a solemn oath, Wajid Ally swearing by the heads of his own children.

But how, amidst the many intricate passages of the Kaïser-Bágh, exposed from every side to the gaze and scrutiny of the soldiery crowded within its walls, could the ladies be withdrawn? As a preliminary step, Wájid Ally, through his influence with Mummoo Khan, and by representing that the captives in their present abode were suffering much in health, removed them to a building, still in the Kaïser-Bágh, but nearer to one of the main roads of the city; at the same time he spread abroad in the city the report that the ladies had been killed by the shot from the English guns. One Anunt Ram, the Vakeel of Rajah Máun Singh, sometimes accompanied Wajid Ally in his visits to the ladies, and it was about the month of January 1858, that Anunt Ram suggested the idea of secretly carrying away, Mrs. Orr's little daughter Louisa, and rescuing her from captivity. Wajid Ally warmly entered into the plans proposed to be adopted by Anunt Ram. Food had, up to this period, been sent very irregularly to the ladies; and in fact, during a temporary absence of Wajid Ally, had been withheld entirely. Under pretext of putting a stop to this evil, but in reality with a far different object in view, Wajid Ally engaged for the ladies the services of a native woman, a resident of Lucknow. This woman was a rough masculine creature, but possessed of much ready wit and courage, and admirably adapted for the part that it was intended that she should play. The native physician of the rebel Court was a kind-hearted man, and his conduct, on more than one occasion, showed that he was touched at the sight of the sufferings of our countrywomen. Wajid Ally sought his assistance, and easily persuaded him to report to the Durbar that the child was dangerously ill, and that he had no hopes of her recovery. This report was given in daily. But it was necessary also to gain over the commandant of the corps which furnished the guard over the prisoners: this man, however, at once refused to connive at the escape of the little prisoner, and Wajid Ally was plunged into no little anxiety at having been obliged to divulge his secret to this per-

son, who would in all probability have made the whole plot public, had he not been restrained by the fact of his owing his own appointment to the kindness of Wajid Ally.

Although the scheme had thus failed, yet Wajid Ally did not despair of success by the employment of other means. He allowed several days to elapse apparently in inactivity, he treated the commandant with the greatest kindness; but in the mean while he adroitly persuaded Mummoo Khan to employ the commandant's Regiment in levying contributions of money (then urgently required) on the principal inhabitants of Lucknow. For this purpose all the guards of the Regiment were withdrawn from their posts, and relieved by men from other Regiments. This arrangement, it will be easily understood, pleased the commandant vastly; as it afforded to him and to his men an opportunity of greatly enriching themselves. Having succeeded thus far, Wajid Ally took care that the new or relieving guard should be composed of men of his own choice, who received orders not to allow any person to communicate with the prisoners; and if questioned as to the nature of their duties, to state that they were placed there as a guard over the stables. The "Hakeem" or Physician, again reported to the Durbar that the health of the little girl was in a very precarious state. The commandant, suspecting that Wajid Ally was again favouring her escape, reported the circumstance to Mummoo Khan, who immediately sent a person by name Ally Jan to ascertain whether the little prisoner was in reality as ill as had been stated. Ally Jan was on terms of friendship with both Mummoo Khan and Wajid Ally, but more especially with the latter, to whom he constantly reported all that was transacted at the Durbar and at the Councils of the rebel chiefs of the army, to the latter of which Wajid Ally was not admitted. It is needless to say that Ally Jan made to Mummoo Khan a report favourable to the designs of Wajid Ally.

The Hakeem now informed the Durbar that the supposed invalid had ceased to exist. The guard had already been duly

bribed by Wajid Ally, its commanding officer alone receiving 300 Rs. On the eighth day all was ready; the hands and feet and legs of the little girl had been colored so as to resemble in tint those of a native child. She was covered as much as possible with a cloth, and confided to the care of the woman of whom mention has already been made. To give as great an appearance of reality as possible to the whole transaction, Wajid Ally had instructed the Jemadar of the guard to depute one of his men to Mummoo Khan, to receive the money necessary to defray the expenses of burial. The woman accompanied by the Jemadar himself now left the place, carrying the precious burthen on her back, bemoaning and lamenting her pretended loss with all the frantic gestures and usages of native women on such occasions. Her acting was perfect; and, with great presence of mind, she passed all the guards without attracting suspicion.

She was guided, though very secretly, by the Jemadar to Rajah Máun Singh's city residence, whence, shortly afterwards, she was removed by Anunt Ram to one of the Rajah's Forts in the district, and thence eventually, after the lapse of several days, to the British Camp at the Alum Bágh; but the passage through the city and the journey to the Fort in the district, were not accomplished without incurring great risk. At Chinhut, a short distance from Lucknow, Anunt Ram and his party had to pass through the Camp of the Moulavy, who had suddenly, and without the knowledge of Anunt Ram, encamped at that place; and it required all the skill of Anunt Ram, to satisfy all the questions put to him by the Moulavy's people.

It would be difficult to describe the feelings of the mother when the moment of separation had arrived, and nothing but the ardent desire to see her child safe from all danger could have induced her to overcome all her doubts and fears, and all the feelings of the maternal heart, and to confide her child to the care of strangers; and it was with an anxious heart that day after day she looked for the letters which at last announced to her the safe arrival in the British Camp at the Alum Bágh, of the little captive.

General Sir J. Outram had now left the Alum Bágh to take command of a strong Division on the other side of the River Goomtee. The bombardment of the city had commenced in right earnest. During three days, the ladies were exposed to much danger, the shells falling near, and indeed on one occasion, on the very building in which they were lodged. Wajid Ally consequently determined to remove his charge to another house in the city, and to effect this the ladies were both placed in one "doolie," which, however, had not proceeded far when it was stopped by the sentry at the grand door-way of the Kaïser-Bágh. The soldier said that he would not allow the doolie to pass without seeing the hands and feet of those inside. This was a critical moment; but Wajid Ally, foreseeing every thing, had bribed an old chobdar (silver-stick bearer) of the former time, a man who had known Captain Orr well, and who had frequently received presents from him, to accompany the ladies. As soon as the sentry had uttered his wish to examine the hands and feet of the occupants of the doolie, the old chobdar came at once forward, and with ready answer told him that the doolie contained one of the favorite Begums, who was proceeding to offer prayers at one of the holy shrines in the city, and that she would return to the city the next morning. The old man pretended great indignation at the sentry having had the audacity to threaten to remove the purdah of the conveyance, and in fact, spoke and managed so well, that the bewildered sepoy allowed the doolie to pass without further opposition. Clear of the Kaïser-Bágh, many dangers still awaited our party whilst passing through streets crowded with a lawless soldiery; but Providence guided them, and they reached their destination in safety, followed by the guard, which, by the passers-by, was supposed to be one of honor accompanying a native lady of high rank. Of course the confusion reigning in the city at the time favoured the passage of the party. But again the new abode was not secure against the messengers of death hurled by the British against the doomed city; and Wajid Ally removed to yet

another house, in the suburbs, occupied by the Sultan Mahul and Wajid Ally's wife and children as well as by his brother-in-law's family. Here the ladies were most kindly received, clothes were provided for them, and all their wants as much as possible attended to. The British, already masters of the Kaïser-Bágh and of the principal buildings in the city, were driving the enemy from its outskirts, still held by the Moulavy. This monster had long suspected Wajid Ally of being friendly to the English; and his object was to seize him, as he had already seized and murdered Shurf-ood-Dowlah, the minister under the rebel Government.

Communication was still kept up between Wajid Ally and the British Camp; and Wajid Ally wrote that he felt the greatest anxiety regarding the safety of the ladies as well as of his own family, the Moulavy having on the 18th March discovered their abode. This information he (Wajid Ally) had obtained through his own spies. The position in which the ladies now found themselves, was most critical; for although, as we have already said, the British had obtained possession of the principal portions of the city, yet the Moulavy, with a considerable force, still held a position in the suburbs. Wajid Ally's note was shown to Sir James Outram, who, we believe, communicated on the subject with General MacGregor, then, most providentially, with the Goorka troops in the vicinity of Wajid Ally's house. But the danger was imminent. From his spies, Wajid Ally learnt that the Moulavy might every hour be expected: no time was therefore to be lost. In this difficulty, Wajid Ally begged of Mrs. Orr to write a note regarding the danger of the position in which she was placed, to the address of any British Officer; this note he would cause to be conveyed to the nearest post. The note was immediately written and confided to the care of Wajid Ally's brother-in-law, who, however, had hardly left the place when he encountered a party of Goorkas under the command of two British Officers, Captains MacNeill and Bogle. He immediately explained to them the nature of his errand, and led the way to the house. The Moulavy from another quarter was

already moving in the same direction. The Officers rushed in to the place pointed out to them. Without the loss of a moment, the ladies were placed in a Palankeen. No bearers could be found; but the servants of the Officers and some Goorkas were pressed into the service; and Captain MacNeill, accompanying the palankeen, commenced his hazardous journey to General MacGregor's Camp, leaving Captain Bogle with the Goorkas to escort Wajid Ally and his family. It must be remembered that Captain MacNeill had to pass through narrow streets entirely devoid of British troops, and about which the enemy were still hovering, and that he might, at every moment, expect an attack, or at all events a ball from some hidden assassin. However, he rushed on, stimulating and urging his men to make the most strenuous efforts. The Chan Bágh ravine is reached, crossed,—and in a little more, General MacGregor's Camp appears in sight,—on—on—swiftly is the palankeen borne along,—the friendly Camp is at length gained—and the ladies are saved! It was a joyful, a glorious moment! Kind and cordial was the welcome with which the ladies were received by General MacGregor and his Officers, and on the next day, the 20th March, 1858, they were escorted to General Sir J. Outram's Camp.

Meanwhile Captain Bogle, with much difficulty and at much risk, succeeded in escorting the whole of Meer Wajid Ally's family to General MacGregor's Camp. The difficulty of this enterprise will be best understood by those acquainted with native manners and customs.

To these Officers, Captains MacNeill and Bogle, our once captive countrywomen are indeed much indebted for the gallantry and presence of mind which they displayed on this occasion, when delay or hesitation would have been so fatal.

We must now conclude. We have accompanied our countrywomen step by step, as it were, amidst dangers, sorrow, and scenes of death, and have endeavoured to give a faithful, and perhaps not an uninteresting, narrative of what they suffered. Many details have been omitted, in order not to clog unnecessarily the statement of more important facts. Let it not be supposed that we

have from partial feelings placed Captain Orr and his wife more prominently before our readers than their equally unfortunate and suffering companions. We have merely done so, because their more intimate knowledge of the country and of its language, necessarily on most occasions constrained them to take a leading part in the every-day intercourse with the natives.

We will ask permission to make mention of one circumstance in connection with our captives, which cannot but strike the most callous mind. Before the fatal separation of the gentlemen from the ladies in the Kaïser-Bágh, Mrs. Orr had occasion to send for some native medicines. These were brought to her wrapped up in a piece of paper. On glancing her eye over it, Mrs. Orr saw that it was a portion of a leaf of a Bible, and contained the following passage of Isaiah li. 11:—"they shall obtain gladness and joy; and sorrow and mourning shall flee away.

"12. I, even I, am He that comforteth you: who art thou, "that thou shouldest be afraid of a man that shall die, and of "the son of man which shall be made as grass;

"13. And forgettest the Lord thy Maker, that hath stretch-"ed forth the heavens, and laid the foundations of the earth; "and hast feared continually every day, because of the fury of "the oppressor, as if he were ready to destroy? and where is "the fury of the oppressor?

"14. The captive exile hasteneth that he may be loosed, "and that he should not die in the pit, nor that" .....

Such were the words of comfort conveyed to those languishing in captivity in the Kaïser-Bágh. Can any one doubt, that He whose ways are not as our ways, designed to convey peace and consolation to the hearts of his children, by sending to them from the midst of a Mahomedan city and through Mahomedan hands, this message of love?

APPENDIX.

CAPTAIN J. B. HEARSEY'S NARRATIVE OF HIS ESCAPE FROM OUDH.

I returned to Seetapore on the 30th May, 1857, where I was informed by the late Mr. Christian, Commissioner of that Division, of the unsound state of the 41st Regiment N. I. In the evening of the same day, I met several officers belonging to that Regiment, amongst the number the late Colonel Birch commanding; I mentioned to him an aspersion cast on the corps, and he seemed much vexed at it.

The 10th Oudh Irregular Infantry, being supposed to be perfectly loyal, had been removed from their lines and encamped close to the late Mr. Christian's compound ditch. The 9th Oudh Irregular Infantry, 41st Regiment N. I. and the Wing of the 15th Irregular Cavalry, remained occupying their quarters. My detachment of about two hundred and fifty police, including those on duty, two days after my return, were placed in Captain Barlow's house and compound, previous to which they were in a tope of mango trees close to the Treasury. Three or four Hindustanee letters, written in the Hindustanee character, were brought by some men of the 10th Oudh Irregular Infantry, stating, it was the intention of the 41st N. I. and the 9th Oudh Irregular Infantry to make a simultaneous rise and murder all the European and Christian community in the station, but no date was fixed for the intended massacre. One sepoy, I believe, was promoted to Havildar for his exemplary conduct in apprising the commanding officers of these intended machinations.

About the 2nd of June, 1857, I received pay for the month of May, which was disbursed to all those that were present at Seetapore, depositing the remainder in the Quarter Guard, as the late Mr. Christian had informed me that he had directed the detachments of the 2nd Military Police from Mohamdee, Mullaon, and the neighbouring districts to join the head-quarters of their regiments. I am particular in mentioning these circumstances, as dawk communications had

ceased to exist, and I was, in consequence, unable to forward the usual monthly rolls, &c. for that month.

On the morning of the 4th June, memorable for the fearful tragedy, I met the late Mr. Christian at Captain Lester's quarters: he had come in to say that Major Apthorp of the 41st N. I. had just informed him that his regiment was on the point of breaking out into open mutiny, but that he, the late Mr. Christian, was going to see the officer commanding, who had, that morning, returned from Peernagur with the right wing, and ascertain the facts. On his return he told me that the Colonel still thought his corps perfectly loyal, and had assured him there was no danger. However, to guard against surprise, he directed the late Captains Lester and Dorin, as also myself, to take every precautionary measure. He desired me to increase the strength of the guard at his house, where all the ladies and children had taken refuge. I accordingly sent a strong party of the Military Police and some twenty Nujjeeb soldiers from the new levies that I was raising, in conformity with the order I had received. An hour had scarcely elapsed, when a man came to inform us that four Companies of the 41st N. I. had left their lines, and were on their way to plunder the Treasury and release the prisoners from the jail. I instantly went back from the house where my men were quartered. Dividing them in two parties, I posted them in such positions as to command the two roads leading to the civil lines, and with a Subadar and forty men, took up an advanced post near a tree some distance from the house. I saw the late Mr. Christian and Mr. Thornhill ride up towards the Treasury. They had not been away more than a minute, when firing was heard in that direction. They cantered back to the place where I was standing, and informed me that Colonel Birch and Lieutenant and Adjutant Graves had been shot by the mutineers of their regiment, and that we might presently expect an attack from them. Reports of musketry were heard in the lines of the 9th Oudh Irregular Infantry, and a sepoy of the Military Police came running breathless from them, saying that Captain Gowan and Dr. Hill had been killed. This appears to have been a signal for a general rise of all the Irregulars, inclusive of the wing of the 15th Irregular Cavalry and the Military Police, for I saw some men of the latter going away to join the 9th Oudh Irregular Infantry; on which I begged the late Mr. Christian and Mr. Thornhill to hurry home and get the ladies away, as now our only chance of safety was in flight across the river to the belt of jungle, which is

intersected by ravines. They immediately went to the house, but could scarce have had time to make any arrangements, when I saw the 10th Oudh Irregular Infantry give a shout and charge into the compound. I left my post and was hastening towards the spot, when Rugunath Singh, the Subadar, and six men forcibly carried me away to the tree. Here I was detained. Sergeant Major Rodgers, his wife, and son, arriving at this crisis, were also placed in custody. By this time some twenty-eight other men came up and surrounded us. Almost all these, I beg to say, including the Subadar, had belonged to my former regiment, the late 8th Oudh Irregular Infantry; but had been transferred to the Military Police after annexation.

The cruel work of carnage in the civil part of the station had been commenced by the 10th Oudh Irregular Infantry; but all others, as they arrived in succession, joined in the ruthless slaughter without exception or distinction. The din created by continued discharges of musketry for some time, the shouting of men, and general conflagration of the houses and buildings, baffles all description: in fact, the whole place appeared like one pandemonium.

About 2 P. M. we were removed from under the tree to the late Captain Barlow's house, which had not been burnt up to that time. Whilst there, my kidmutgar came in and informed me, that he had seen poor Miss Jackson and another lady concealed in a bush on the other side of the river. I instantly started up, but Subadar Rugunath Singh and the men would not permit me to leave the house; however, I earnestly begged, since their intentions appeared friendly, and to save my life, either to enable me to effect the rescue of these ladies or perish in the attempt, on which, some men ran out in the direction pointed out, and in a very short time brought in Miss Jackson and Mrs. Green, the latter, the wife of Lieut. Green, 2nd in command of the 9th Oudh Irregular Infantry. Towards evening, I obtained a covered cart called a *bylee*, belonging to one of my servants. In this I put the two ladies, Serjeant Major Rodgers, his son and wife, and assuming a native disguise, accompanied by some of the men, I marched towards the camp of the mutinous troops, which was pitched on the parade ground and topes, adjoining. Owing to the confusion which prevailed, I succeeded in reaching the neighbourhood without detection, and put up under a tree near the military police. This measure I was obliged to adopt by the advice of Subadars Rugunath Singh and Mahdoo Missur who represented that any attempt on my part to escape at that critical moment would be fraught with imminent danger,

as numberless parties of marauders from the regiments were out in pursuit of fugitives and plunder; and advised me to wait till it was dark; adding that they would arrange about my departure.

The native officers of the 41st N. I. and the other regiments notwithstanding the precaution above related, having, by some means, received information that my life had been spared, sent a deputation saying that as they had murdered all their officers, it was imperatively necessary that the Military Police must either follow their example or deliver me up a prisoner to them. On this being refused, the mutineers, apprehensive of causing dissension at so early a period, directed that the point in dispute should be settled by a punchayet, consisting of a certain number of native officers from each regiment. At 9 P. M. Subadars Rugunath Singh and Madhoo came and informed me of this circumstance, recommending my immediate departure, it being very near the time, and the night perfectly dark. Before the assembling of the council, I was enabled to leave. Placing the two ladies, Mrs. Rodgers and her son, on my elephant, the Sergeant Major and myself mounted on horseback. We left for the north about 9 P. M. Mahdoo Missur and fifteen men accompanied us as escort. My arms, which had been taken away at the commencement of the massacre by Rugunath and the six men, were restored, but the rest of my property, to a very considerable amount, fell into the hands of the mutineers.

We travelled all night, and by sunrise arrived at the village of Onel. I was refused admittance into the fort by Rajah Nurood Singh's people; but as the ladies were suffering much from fatigue and want of sleep, I sent a man asking permission to be allowed to rest ourselves for a couple of hours; even this request, though trifling enough, was denied. With much difficulty I obtained two of his followers in order to secure us a safe passage through the district. Accompanied by these, the Subadar and men having left us here, we pushed on towards the north, and reached a small fort near the Chouka river late in the evening. After a night's rest we crossed over and reached Baragaon. During the night the elephant broke loose and disappeared, in consequence of which I was obliged to halt for two or three days. Whilst at this place I received a letter from the late Mr. H. Gonne, who had been informed of my flight, mentioning that himself and Captain Hastings had been joined by Messrs. Brand and Carew from Shahjehanpore, and that they were going to Calcutta. He wished me to meet him at Mullapore without delay, as he had boats in readiness for the trip.

A day previous to this I had written to Anunt Singh, uncle to the Dhourund Raja, who sent down his elephant, a native palkee, and two ponies. These were found awaiting our arrival across the Orra river, and we continued our march to Mutheara village, the place of residence belonging to the Raja. We remained here about ten hours, and accompanied by Raja Anunt Sing, went down by the river Kowrecally and reached Mullapore next day, where we met the late Mr. H. Gonne.

The party now consisted of eleven—Miss Jackson, Mrs. Green, Mrs. Rodgers, Mr. H. Gonne, Captain Hastings, Mr. Brand of Shahjehanpore, Mr. Carew of Shahjehanpore, Serjeant Major Rodgers, 2nd native police, Mr. Brown, writer in Mr. Gonne's office, J. Sullivan, step son of Serjeant Major Rodgers, and myself.

Boats having been kept in readiness, we got on board during the night, on our way for Calcutta. Arriving at Rampore on the second day we were kindly received by Thakoor Gooman Sing, who, after giving us rest and refreshments in his place, informed us a passage down the river would be very unsafe, owing to the ghats being narrowly watched by the mutineers. Mr. Cunliffe and some others, who were going into Lucknow from Byraitch, were murdered whilst crossing Byram Ghat the day previous. This disheartening news made us retrace our steps by land towards Mutteeara. On arrival Fackeer-ood-deen Khan, the Government Agent, received us in the name of the Ranee, and the young Raja gave every assurance of safety and protection, telling Mr. Gonne that on the approach of any danger we should have timely notice, and boats would be kept in readiness to send the party across into the jungles, where we should be perfectly safe from pursuit.

We remained at his place for nearly two months; at the end of that period, in the early part of August, about 300 men of Girdara Singh's regiment arrived from Lucknow, sent by the rebels then surrounding the garrison on the Baillie Guard, to take us in. For two days we remained armed, and kept watch the whole night, refusing to go; but finding that Fackeer-ood-deen Khan would neither assist us, nor allow us to escape, we began to suspect treachery. At last, seeing no other alternative, and as a last resource, a sort of compromise was made with the leader of these mutineers, Bunda Hoosein of Tumbour; and the party, after nearly three weeks' delay, marched back to Lucknow; Fackeer-ood-deen Khan with 400 men of the Raja's were also sent. On our second march from Mutteeara, Thakoor Daba

Singh, a respectable zamindar in the Dhowraria Raja's service, came in the evening and confirmed our former suspicions, saying the Ranee and the Government Agent had formed a collusion with Bunda Hussein and deliberately sold us to the rebels, and that the agreement signed by the latter, allowing us to retain our arms, would be violated on our reaching Esanuggur.

This alarming piece of intelligence put the party on their guard; we held a consultation, and flight was decided on. Next evening, finding an opportunity, a few valuables were secured. We placed the two ladies and the Serjeant Major's wife on the late Mr. Gonne's elephant, and mounting our horses, fled towards Kypreegurh, en route to Raja Kholraja Sing's palace, Koolapore, travelling all night and till 2 P. M. to Bumpurpore, a village in Raja Rundhooj Sahaee's district. Here we dismounted to have refreshments, and give our jaded animals some rest. Whilst at meals, several villagers came in running to give notice that about 300 men of Dhowraria, sent in pursuit by the Ranee, were within a short distance. Instantly, leaving the village and proceeding further to the north, we arrived on the banks of the Mohon river about an hour before sunset, but could not get the ferry boat. Mr. Gonne proposed going up the stream, two miles to the west, where he said the Khowakaira ghaut might be found fordable. This also proved a failure, owing to the river having risen much. In the midst of a dense high grass and tree jungle, drenched to the skin from pouring rain since leaving Bumpurpore, the position of the party, especially that of the poor ladies, was uncomfortable in the extreme.

Whilst deliberating how to get across, suddenly a shout was raised. Our pursuers, under cover of the brushwood, had gained upon us. Fastening the horses in a neighbouring hollow, we took up a position behind trees. Presently the enemy opened a fire of matchlocks, and commenced advancing, but moving very cautiously, as they knew we were all armed with good double-barrelled rifles. When within 50 yards, I obtained a glimpse of the leader and fired. The shot took effect, which checked their further proceeding. Meanwhile the ladies, who had continued mounted on the elephant, and Mr. Carew with them, went off to the west when the firing commenced. The rest of the party also retired, the late Captain Hastings and myself remaining back to bring up the rear. We followed the tracks of the elephant for a considerable distance; but from the nature of the ground and the approaching darkness, the traces became more and

more indistinct every moment. The late Captain Hastings suggested it was more than probable that Mr. Carew had taken the ladies to Raja Rundhooj Sahee's palace, for he always used to speak of him as a very great friend; therefore it was useless our following, for we should never be able to overtake them, but very likely fall a prey to tigers or wild elephants. This made us decide on taking shelter in a patch of grass on the banks of the river.

The horses and property left in the hollow were of course plundered when the enemy came up to the spot, as for safety's sake we were compelled to abandon all.

Captain Hastings and myself not being able to overtake the elephant or the other members of the party, swam across the river about 8 P. M. and remained under a tree during the night. Next morning we pushed on towards the direction of Koolapore. Barefooted, and with scarcely any clothing, we reached the village of Gonapatia about 4 in the afternoon. This place belongs to Raja Koolraj Sing of Pudnaha. His karinda supplied us with food, and gave us the loan of ponies, which enabled us to prosecute our journey. Here we met Mr. Brand and Serjeant Major Rodgers; they also had swum the river in company with Mr. Brown, the writer; but unfortunately, before the latter had gained the shore, an alligator had pulled him down under the water, and he was seen no more. Exhausted and foot-sore we reached Koolapore late in the evening, where Mr. Gonne joined us on the day following.

Having learnt from Serjeant Major Rodgers that the ladies, Mr. Carew, and Mr. Sullivan, were still in the forest, we got Raja Koolraj Sing's uncle to send out parties in that direction. In the evening they returned after a fruitless search. Although disappointed in the first instance, we halted for two days, sending out men well acquainted with the jungle in every direction; but they also, I regret to say, returned without giving any satisfactory information. The Dhowraria Ranee's followers in the meanwhile, having learnt of our being at Koolapore, came across the river, and were within a mile of the place, when intelligence was brought during the night. We fled towards the forest of Seeshapanee, and remained concealed there for a couple of days. On the third, a jemadar of Raja Koolraj Singh's took us to Balchowra, and from thence to Dhoolee Kote in the Nepaul Hills. From the effects of the deadly climate and recent sufferings, the whole of the party, now reduced to five persons, was laid up with jungle fever. The Raja showed every kindness and attention; he fur-

nished us with clothes, food and shelter; the latter, though merely a grass hut, was prized as the greatest comfort, for during the past week our only canopy had been the heavens, and this during the most inclement part of the season.

Some days after our arrival at Dholee Kote, we heard a report that the ladies and the others that had got separated on the banks of the Mohow from the party, had fallen into the hands of the Dhowraria people, and were taken back to Mutteeara, from whence they had been forwarded to Lucknow. Further particulars regarding the facts, or of their fate, we did not hear, nor had we the means of ascertaining.* Mr. H. Gonne, after twelve days' sickness, died of the jungle fever at this place. For upwards of three months our party, now diminished to four, continued to reside in these hills, after which we came down to Bulchowra with the Raja and his family, and lived in the jungle. To avoid observation, or the inquisitive enquiries of the people belonging to the plains, our reed hut was constructed in a very remote part of the forest, far from any habitation. It is needless to speak of our sufferings, both mental and physical, notwithstanding the Raja's kind intentions, during our stay in this unhealthy place, where Captain Hastings died on the 28th December, 1857. About the latter end of this month the Raja received an order signed by Sherrif-ood-dowla, saying that the durbar had received authentic information from the Ranee of Toolseepore that he still gave protection to five Europeans in his district, and that "he must either send them in or their heads without delay." Moreover a letter which I had received from Mr. Wingfield, Commissioner of Goruckpore, sent through the Raja of Bulrampore, made me decide upon leaving our retreat for that place, the road being now practicable through the Nepaul Hills. Mr. Brand and Serjeant Major Rodgers, being still weak from continued illness, were sent by the Raja to the nearest military post in Nepaul, called Dyluck, and from thence to be forwarded on by the authorities to Bootwall.

Being anxious to reach in time to accompany Jung Bahadoor's force into Lucknow, I made a short cut, travelling along the bed of the Bubbyia river and managed to reach Seereegnauth which is three marches from Sulleean. A party of hill men just arrived informed me that the pass of Bootwall was blockaded by 20,000 rebels under Gooroopershad of Nepaul, and that several relations of Jung Bahadoor

* Anunt Ram subsequently stated to Mrs. P. Orr that Mrs. Green was shot with Miss Jackson.

who were in command at Palpa were put in confinement by the Goorkha regiments. This startling news was confirmed by the karinda of the Ranee of Seereegnauth, which induced me to return to Bulchowra.

Oudh and Rohilcund being still in the possession of the rebels, I was unable to make my way direct to Lucknow: therefore, assuming the disguise of a native trooper in want of service, I made towards Burrumdeo, passing through a great portion of the Oudh Terai and undergoing many hardships. I ultimately reached that place in twelve days, where I met General Kiseendooj of Nepaul. He received me most kindly, and enabled me to proceed. On the 29th January, 1858, I arrived at Loahghat, and from thence, after a tedious journey across the hills, viâ Nynee Tal, Mussooree, and Meerut, I reached Lucknow.

CALCUTTA:

PRINTED BY C. B. LEWIS, AT THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

1858.

A

LETTER

FROM AN

OFFICER

AT MADRAS,

TO A

FRIEND

FORMERLY IN THAT SERVICE,

NOW IN ENGLAND;

EXHIBITING THE

RISE, PROGRESS, AND ACTUAL STATE,

OF THE LATE

UNFORTUNATE INSURRECTION

IN THE

INDIAN ARMY.

SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED.

LONDON:

Printed by Harding and Wright, St. John's-Square,
FOR J. MURRAY, 32, FLEET-STREET.

1810.

A LETTER, &c.

My Dear G——

I now sit down to give you a summary of those strange events, which, from causes unimportant in the view of a careless observer, have led to a state of unexampled confusion in public affairs. This will reach you through the kindness of a friend who has promised to deliver it in safety. I should otherwise hesitate to incur the risk of committing my sentiments to paper, as it is confidently asserted and believed, that no seal, or form of confidence, can insure secrecy, or shield the writer of opinions not entirely favourable to the present measures, from the vengeance of that rigour beyond the law, which now rules over our miserable settlement.

I anticipate all the horror you will feel at learning that the army, in which you so long served, and the companions with whom you largely shared in the applause which was eminently due to enthusiastic ardour, loyalty, and

valour, stand now branded, (and justly too) with the name and character of rebels; that those who have ever been forward to shed their best blood in the cause of their country, who boasted, as a proud distinction, the honour of bearing a commission in the *Madras army*, and stood foremost in subordination and willing obedience to the government, have recently entailed indelible disgrace on themselves, and reflected it on the corps, whose honour was entrusted to them, by the guilt of open resistance to the authority which, as soldiers and as subjects, they were bound to obey.

In contemplating events which have led to a result so extraordinary as the actual rebellion of a considerable portion of the Madras army, it is natural to seek for some cause, which has produced a subversion of all those honourable principles which had hitherto distinguished and characterized that branch of the Indian army; for gratuitous rebellion, without an object, or a cause, or an intelligible plan, is an idea which a reflecting mind does not readily admit. Yet this is the state of the case which our government has deemed it wise to publish to the world, and this is the doctrine, which whoever would be thought a dutiful subject is called on to ——— profess to believe.

So long as an appeal was open to superior powers, legally constituted to controul the acts of the local government, no extent of grievance, real or imaginary, could justify, or even palliate, a crime so monstrous as rebellion: no acts, however oppressive, could give to a military man an excuse for disobedience or resistance. Those irritated and deluded men, who influenced the army to that unnecessary extremity, have incurred an extent of guilt which demands the extremity of legal punishment; they have forfeited their lives to the offended laws of that country, in whose defence they would, at the moment of their deepest guilt, have laid them down with pleasure; and their punishment, which every man who thinks as a soldier ought not only to anticipate but desire, will afford a dreadful warning to those who may, in future, be disposed to suffer private feelings, however cruelly excited, to supersede the obligations of public duty, or to subvert those principles of obedience which every soldier, on embracing the profession, especially binds himself to render to those whom the laws of his country have empowered to direct and regulate his public conduct. Such are the feelings of every reflecting mind; but he must be either more or less than man, who can separate these feelings from

those of genuine compassion for the fate awaiting many highly meritorious but mistaken men. You will perceive, by the blotted paper before you, that a frigid sense of public duty has not extinguished feelings of another description in mourning over the fate of our old companions in arms. But if, "albeit unused to the melting mood," and with a mind unruffled by any secret self-reproach, such be the tendency of my reflections, what must the feelings be of those whose measures have unnecessarily led to this most horrible result?

I will endeavour to trace the progress of those unhappy events which appear to have led to this distressing conclusion.

At the departure of Sir John Craddock, the officers of the Madras army were certainly in a state of considerable discontent, but neither disloyal nor seditious: their attachment to their country, and to the cause of public authority, was firm and unshaken, but they were disgusted with the effects of an alledged partiality to a favoured branch of the army, with the contempt too flimsily disguised, with which the Commander-in-Chief had always treated that, particularly their own (exaggerated perhaps in repetition): and, by some opinions he had given in a case of military-trial, which, although well merited

by the individual, were offensive to the established opinions of the service at large, and indicated (perhaps the result of a phraseology not always intelligible) an assumption of powers very distinctly denied to him by the laws of his country. It is but justice to the character of that officer, to add, that he preserved to the situation which he held by an arrangement with the Governor, resulting from his decided conduct, that influence and patronage in military appointments, which a most injudicious order from the authorities in England, received in the year 1806, had taken from the Commander-in-Chief and vested in the Governor alone. This measure, however, which was suspended during the command of Sir John Craddock, took full effect on the succession of General Macdowall, while the exclusion of the Commander-in-Chief from council, by an arrangement equally absurd, completed the degradation of his office.

On the succession of General Macdowall to command, the frankness and apparent sincerity of his manner derived popularity from contrast with his predecessor; and he studiously encouraged this sentiment by the conduct which he imprudently, and perhaps improperly, adopted, from the moment he assumed the command

The exclusion from the rank and functions of counsellor, of an officer specially appointed to the command of the army, was an unusual measure, and was calculated to raise his personal resentment in the same degree that it lowered the importance of his station, not only by impairing his influence, and consequently his authority, with the army, but by degrading* his actual estimation in public opinion. To maintain that influence of which he was deprived by this change in the constitution of the army, he courted popularity with the officers at large; he lamented, without reserve, his inability to support their interests in council, or to oppose alterations injurious to their welfare; he commented on the degradation of the army in the person of their Commander-in-Chief; and assuming the character of their *representative*, induced them, without reflecting on the

* A striking instance of this proposition (which in England would not be well understood without an example) occurred immediately after the General's arrival at Madras. His Highness, the Nabob of the Carnatic, sent a complimentary message, desiring to receive a visit from the General, but the next day, (having learned the uncommon restriction on his situation and powers) sent another message, intimating his desire, that the visit might be postponed until the Commander-in-Chief *had taken his seat in council.*

absolute absurdity of the *term*, to consider the alteration which had been made in the constitution of the local government, as a real military grievance.

In truth, the idea of injury to the army in the exclusion of the Commander-in-Chief from council, and from the exercise of military patronage, was not entirely fallacious, although it was crudely formed, improperly presented to their notice, and certainly not in the province of the officers of the army to discuss. The Governor in council possesses, and practically exercises, the right of determining, in the last resort, on all questions of a military nature; appoints officers to command; to the staff, and to all situations of military trust; decides even on claims of military rank; of course, on military applications involving the disbursement of public money; directs all military movements, and enacts, confirms, or changes, (at pleasure) all regulations for the conduct of the military service; the reports and projects of officers of the staff, formed under the orders of their military superiors, and sometimes by the direct command of the government itself, are submitted to the council for adoption or rejection; and these reports often involve considerations of the utmost importance to the army and its of-

ficers. Not one member of the council, as now constituted, is competent, either from professional habits or accidental acquirement, to discuss any military question with intelligence and propriety: and hence acts of serious injustice might obtain the sanction of the government without any intention on the part of any of its members to decide erroneously. The fact is obvious: it was felt by the officers of the army: and when they lamented among themselves that they had not a *representative* in council, they had it just as much in contemplation to organize a Sanhedrim, or crown an emperor of Lilliput, as to urge those claims to elective or other rights, which, with much ingenuity of wire-drawn inference, have been imputed to them by high authority. This unlucky term certainly afforded no proof of logical precision or rhetorical skill: the persons who employed it meant simply to express an obvious fact, which nothing but wilful perversion could misapprehend; namely, that a person possessing military knowledge, is a necessary member of a council, in which the sole power is vested of deciding the most important military questions, and that, as no such person was a member of that council, they were deprived of the fair and necessary means of having their pretensions un-

derstood by those who are appointed to decide upon them.

The first overt declaration of military dissatisfaction during the present government, was manifested chiefly by his Majesty's troops, and was occasioned by the diminution of allowances, which regiments previously serving on the Bengal establishment had experienced on their transfer to that of Madras (where they found the prices of every necessary of life more than doubled), and others, who, on their passage from England, had landed at Prince of Wales Island, and there received for a time the superior rates of Bengal pay. A memorial was prepared, soliciting to be placed on an equal* footing with the Bengal army in point of allowances. It was signed, as I have understood, by the officers of all the regiments of his Majesty's service on the coast, with only one exception that I have heard of; and, as the supposed grievance was common to his Majesty's and the Company's officers, they united equally in the

* The Court of Directors, in 1796, announced their desire and intention to equalize the allowance of the three presidencies. That body is said (I hope the rumour is unfounded) to have recently pronounced such an expectation to be unreasonable and absurd. The absurdity at least is not particularly obvious.—EDITOR.

prayer of the petition. At the earnest desire of Sir George Barlow, General Macdowal wrote to the officers commanding his Majesty's regiments to discountenance and stop the intended memorial; his influence succeeded in effecting that object, and the signatures of the officers in his Majesty's service were withdrawn.

The next cause of agitation was a proposal originating with the Quarter-Master-General, and which was adopted and officially announced in the general orders of the 3d May, 1808; namely, that the arrangement, by which officers commanding native corps supplied and conveyed the camp-equipage of their respective battalions, was to be abolished. This measure requires a more detailed description, because it led to more important consequences; and as the advisers of government have taken particular pains to misrepresent the incidents to which it gave rise in all the official publications of the government on this subject, it becomes the more necessary to state the facts with accuracy.

The plan of providing and carrying the camp-equipage of the army, by a species of contract with the officers commanding native corps, who received a fixed allowance for supplying the tents, carriage, and followers, and

defraying all incidental expences connected with their efficiency, was first suggested, as you may recollect, in the year 1791, when Lord Cornwallis, retiring with the crippled remains of his army from his first attempt on Seringapatam, called on the officers of the army to exert their individual means to do, what, in that hour of deep distress, he found it impossible to accomplish by the resources of the public. It will probably be also in your recollection, that, the expectation of success in this instance, was the result of very recent experience, inasmuch as the bulk of the equipment for the intended siege of Seringapatam had absolutely been conveyed to its destination by the exertions of the individual officers of the army, at a time when Lord Cornwallis, in the plenitude of his power, as governor-general and commander-in-chief, with the assistance of the most able officers at the head of his public departments, had found it impossible to command the means, which were readily brought into existence by the united zeal of the individuals under his command. My Lord Cornwallis knew how to excite and direct that zeal; his call for assistance in the provision and conveyance of camp-equipage was obeyed with alacrity, and, in

some instances, at great expence: the required equipment sprung up as by enchantment, but, at the conclusion of the war, the allowance was struck off, and the services of the officers were left unrequited by the advantage which they had reasonably anticipated from the expected permanency of the measure.

In the year 1799, similar difficulties in the army under General Harris gave rise, as you may remember, to a similar expedient; and the subsidiary force of Hyderabad, under Colonel Dalrymple, was, by the very same means, re-equipped in a few days, and commenced its march from Seringapatam in pursuit of Dhoondia by a similar exertion of the officers. These repeated proofs of the efficacy of this means, and of the constant and miserable inefficiency of the antient system, caused, in 1802, the adoption of a professedly permanent plan for providing on this principle the camp-equipage of the officers and of the native corps of the army; the expected and acknowledged profits of the contract in peace being computed as balancing, if not exceeding, the greater expences attending the period of war, and relieving the public from all expence of quarters, in garrison as well as tents in the field, at a lower rate than had

been paid under Lord Cornwallis's calculations for providing and carrying camp-equipage alone.

On the faith of this plan, adopted as a permanent regulation of the service, the officers commanding corps entered on the contract at the commencement of an active war, and, after incurring, in the course of the Mahratta campaigns in the Dican, unprecedented expences, to produce acknowledged and unexampled efficiency, they looked to the return of peace for reimbursement and remuneration, with that confidence which they were entitled to place in the faith of government, clearly implied, if not distinctly pledged, for the permanence of a plan which had been sanctioned by the approbation of the Court of Directors. That spirit of innovation which distinguished the period from 1805 to 1808, struck at this system, which had been the theme of praise with every officer who had the experience of field-service to guide his judgment. The Quarter-Master-General was instructed to devise a change, and this germ of discord was the result of his cogitations.

The report which was produced, suggested the plan denominated *new*, which was substituted for that of 1802; but its novelty chiefly

consisted in the hypotheses of certain occult energies in the heads of public departments, which former commanders-in-chief had not been able to call into action, and in applying cumbrous and newly invented forms to the principles of the antient and exploded system, which experience had shewn to be practicable only on paper, and on actual service to have been uniformly productive of inefficiency and absolute failure. The provision of carriage was certainly on a more permanent plan, but the radical defect of continuing to load the public departments with minute details, which experience had shewn them incapable to direct with efficiency, was uncured, and by any similar means incurable. With you it is unnecessary to enter into a detailed consideration of the merits of the two systems; but if the authority of great names may influence a question of this nature, there is something more than mere sound in the practical judgment of such a man as Earl Cornwallis, the founder of the calumniated measure; of General Harris, who adopted it from necessity; of General James Stuart, than whose a sounder judgment does not exist on every branch of military arrangement, and who, on the experience of every one of those campaigns, recommended its adoption

as a permanent measure; of sir Arthur Wellesley, who, on the actual experience of its effects, expressly ascribes to the operation of this system his being enabled to perform those movements of unexampled rapidity and efficiency which are the admiration of every military man capable of receiving lessons from experience. I will not draw a parallel between such supporters and the subverters of the system!

The report which the Quarter-Master-General made to Sir John, was in a confidential, but official form: but after the measure which he recommended had been approved by the supreme government, it became publicly known at Madras by communication (as is understood) from Sir George Barlow to the Adjutant-General. The measure of abolishing the contract was offensive to those who, having little else to lose, saw that wrested from them in the advantageous period of peace, which they had been suffered to retain without remark during the difficulties of a protracted warfare. The Quarter-Master-General, in his report, had argued on the baneful effects of this system; not from fact, for all fact was adverse to the inferences which he drew, but from abstract theory and hypothesis; the contract was by him represented as "*placing the interest of officers commanding*

corps at variance with their duty;" "*making it their interest that their corps should not be in a state fit for field-service;*" "*furnishing strong inducements to neglect their more important duties;*" "*divesting their attention and pursuits from the discipline of their corps;*" and finally, as "*wanting that efficiency which it professed to ensure.*". Such was the substance of observations at considerable length, which the Quarter-Master-General, in his report, declared to have been "suggested by *six years' experience of the practical effect of the contract system;*" an advantage not possessed by those who devised the plan, and *by an attentive examination of its operation* during that period of time.

This declaration gave a *body* to the insinuation which the officers commanding corps, and who had held the contract, considered as a stigma cast on their conduct and characters, in the execution of a public duty; and while they disclaimed, perhaps more explicitly than was demanded by the facts of the case, any title to discuss the expediency or *justice* of the alteration adopted by government, on the ground of this report, they individually applied to the Commander-in-Chief to direct such investigation as he should deem to be proper, for as-

certaining their conduct in the execution of this branch of their public duty, in order that delinquency, if proved, might be adequately punished, and that the innocent might be acquitted of the unmerited reflection which they deemed to be conveyed in the report of the Quarter-Master-General.

The Commander-in-Chief, piqued by the slight with which he considered himself to be treated by the government, in their adoption of an essential change in one of the most material equipments of the army without even the decent form of appearing to consult his opinion, refused to comply with their request; and assigned as a reason, in answer to every application, that "as he had not been consulted with regard to the abolition of the tent contract, he did not feel himself at liberty to take cognizance of any matter connected with that subject *on any individual application.*"

The officers complaining, foiled by this reply in their attempts to obtain an investigation into their own conduct, thought that they might attain the same end by compelling the Quarter-Master-General to prove the grounds on which he had inserted in his report the insinuations which they deemed to be injurious to their character: and adopting that form of

combined appeal which the reply of the Commander-in-Chief very unadvisedly seemed to prescribe, they jointly accused Lieut. Col. Munro of having falsely aspersed their character in his report. This charge * they forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, on the 23d of August, 1808, and requested that on it Lieut. Col. Munro might be brought to trial. The Commander-in-Chief after some deliberation consulted Lieut. Col. Leith, the Judge-Advocate-General. That officer in a laboured report confounded the measure of abolishing the contract (the act of government) with the reasons given for recommending the change (the act of the Quarter-Master-General alone), and advised (with a degree of ardour not altogether prudent in an office, where at least the semblance of impartiality was reputed to be a requisite qualification) the rejection of the charge as a ground of procedure against the Quarter-Master-General; urging at the same time, that a charge of *conspiracy* against that officer should be founded upon it, on which he would undertake to convict the complainants, if entrusted with the conduct of the prosecution.

The Judge-Advocate's opinion was commu-

* Appendix, No. 1.

nicated by a letter of the 30th of November, from the Adjutant-General, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, to Colonel the Hon. A. Sentleger, the senior of the complaining officers, with intimation that, "in consequence, all farther proceedings had been for the present postponed." The Judge-Advocate had stated in the progress of reference, that legal grounds did not exist for the trial of the Quarter-Master-General on this charge; and on being requested to explain more particularly the grounds of his opinion, he advised the Commander-in-Chief to consult the Company's Advocate-General on those grounds, of which he, as a lawyer, was the most competent judge: General Macdowall in preference consulted Mr. Marsh, a regular English barrister, who had during Col. Leith's absence in England officiated as judge-advocate-general. His opinion, delivered at considerable length, was at direct variance with that of Lieut. Col. Leith, and pronounced that *just and legal grounds* appeared to exist for bringing the Quarter-Master-General before a military tribunal, upon the charge preferred against him by thirty-two officers commanding corps.

The officers to whom the Commander-in-Chief had transmitted the Judge-Advocate-Ge-

neral's opinion, denied its justice; they perceived the partiality marked in the studied omission to consider the clause of the report, which gave the connection of alledged fact to the observations of which they complained, namely, the clause which declared these remarks to be the result of experience and practical observation: and on the 5th and 12th of December, two of their number separately, by letters from Trichinopoly, and from Chittledroog, urged the Commander-in-Chief to proceed in the trial of Lieut. Col. Munro. Shortly after this period, however, the more moderate course was adopted of appeal to the Court of Directors, to whom the complainants stated the case in a perfectly respectful memorial. In this appeal they declared that they suspended the proceedings, which they had commenced, to obtain relief by process of military trial: they besought the Honourable Court to free them from the recorded stigma thrown on their characters by the Quarter-Master-General's report: they recited the offensive paragraphs, and again explicitly disclaimed all pretension to the right of discussing the expediency or propriety of the *measure* of abolishing the tent contract, confining their complaints to the insinuations alone, which were understood to have

produced its adoption.* This memorial was in January 1809 forwarded through the Commander-in-Chief to the government for transmission, and by them it was rejected and returned as *unnecessary*. I do not exactly know the date of this rejection, but Lieut. Col. Munro was placed in arrest on the 20th of January 1809, and warned for trial on the original charge.

This may be the most convenient place to observe, that if, as the Quarter-Master-General insinuated, any deficiency in the equipments of the camp-equipage department, had in point of fact arisen from the neglect or cupidity of commanding officers holding the contract, no record of such deficiency can be traced. It was the duty of the office, at the head of which Lieut. Col. Munro is placed, and in which he had served either as deputy or principal, from the first institution of the system of contract, to examine the returns, and make quarterly reports to the Military Board of the state of the camp-equipage, cattle, and followers attached to each corps, as certified on muster, and monthly inspection: and the *perfect good condition* of all these equipments stands vouched

* Vide Memorial, Appendix, No. 2.

by his own reports, during the whole and every part of the period to which his *practical observation and experience refers*. If, therefore, the report proposing the abolition of that contract was meant to convey the most obvious meaning which the arguments bear (and among other allegations it directly asserts the inefficiency of the system), that report is at variance with the other official reports of the Quarter-Master-General's office. Those reports were *public*, supported by regular musters, and exposed, if erroneous, to instant detection; the other was *private*, standing solely on the personal assertion of the Quarter-Master-General, and regular investigation was denied——both could not be true.

The total absence of any thing in form of proof, in the course of the report, constitutes in itself the most powerful evidence that the insinuations were groundless.

The highest authority in India has recently told us, that *because* the report of the Quarter-Master-General had induced Sir J. Craddock (whose projected innovation it was intended to support), the commander-in-chief in India, the government of Madras, and the supreme government, to approve a plan founded on the basis of assertions individually made by its author,

(which others contended to be "false and infamous insinuations, injurious to their characters as officers and gentlemen,")* the stigmatized officers are guilty of *extreme injustice to the individual*, and *studied insult to government*, in attempting to disprove the assertion, by requiring a public investigation of its truth or falsehood. With all deference to that high authority, the insinuation to their prejudice, *if false*, was not less *false*, from the fact of its having misled those high authorities to believe and to act upon it; and the respect and deference due to their opinions rendered it only a more imperative duty in the officers who felt themselves to be calumniated by the reasoning of the report, to remove the aspersion by the most public refutation of the alledged slander.

The same high authority has styled the charge against Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, "*a collusive and pretended accusation against him of calumny and slander;*" while "*the tent contract, or rather its abolition, was in effect the subject;*" that the object was "*to withdraw* "*the direction of all military arrangement, re-*" *garding the regulation and economy of the ar-*

* Vide Appendix, No. 1.

" *my, from the legal authority of government,* " *in order to place it in the shape of courts mar-* " *tial, under the direction of the officers of the* " *army themselves;*" and the arrest of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, on charges preferred against him by thirty-two officers of rank, is termed " *the most tyrannical and detestable abuse of* " *power by which an innocent and highly meritorious individual was ever oppressed.*"

These are strong terms, and come from "honourable men," professing to be engaged in the temperate examination of a question on which it was their duty to pass an impartial and temperate decision. I have, however, seen the letters which were addressed to the Adjutant-General, in reply to his communication of the Judge-Advocate's opinion, and of the Commander-in-Chief's intention to postpone proceedings in consequence. The expression of unqualified acquiescence in that determination, and of humble hope that, when prevailing difficulties should be removed, his Excellency would direct an investigation either on the accused or accusing parties, as should appear to him the most proper course to attain the ends of justice, (for such is the tenor of the application,) appears to be a sufficient answe

to this moderate and temperate opinion of a *"collusive and pretended accusation."*

One of the principals in this *collusive and pretended accusation*, who requests a trial on *himself*, is the same person who, a few days afterwards, in farther proof of the above-cited observations, persuaded those who partook in his feelings, to withdraw their charge, and submit the case respectfully to the Court of Directors for decision!

If the Commander-in-Chief, in the exercise of that power which is expressly vested in him by his Majesty's warrant, bearing the sign-manual, and by authority of an act of the legislature, and which power the same act, when any of his Majesty's forces shall be serving in India, *expressly withdraws from the Company's government*, is guilty of "*a most tyrannical and detestable abuse of power*," in following the legal course to bring an accused officer to trial, what is the language which shall accurately describe the character of that authority, which assumes the right to impede the course of legal process, and, without a trial, brands with epithets so odious the conduct of an absent officer in the exercise of powers strictly legal?

The high authority from which these decisions proceed, and the tone of superior wisdom

with which they are promulgated, renders it necessary to examine the question with care. The military code for the government of the East-India Company's forces, is not an annual but a permanent act of the legislature of Great Britain, in the 27th year of the reign of George the 2d, (A.D. 1753). The second clause of the act empowers his Majesty to grant a commission, or warrant, under the sign-manual, to the Directors of the East-India Company, who shall have power to authorize the residents and councils, at their principal settlements, to appoint courts-martial, &c. But the third clause (immediately following) is in these words:

"III. Provided always, and be it further "enacted, that when, and so long as any of "his Majesty's forces shall be employed to act "in defence of any of the said Company's "settlements, or to assist against any of their "enemies in the East Indies, the power of ap-"pointing courts-martial, or authorizing such "appointments as aforesaid, shall be in the "Commander-in-Chief of such his Majes-"ty's forces for the time being over such of "the said Company's officers and soldiers as "shall belong to the principal settlement, where "or from whence such forces shall be em-"ployed."

The following extracts from the Articles of War under this act, are inserted for the convenience of reference, as applicable to the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro's arrest; as the Articles of War may no longer form the chief part of your library.

Sect. 2. Art. 2.

Any officer or soldier who shall behave himself with *contempt or disrespect towards the General*, or other Commander-in-Chief of the forces, or shall speak words tending to his hurt or dishonour, shall be punished according to the nature of his offence by *the judgment of a court-martial.*

Sect. 9.

Of Redressing Wrongs.

If *any commissioned officer*, or inferior officer, or soldier, shall think himself wronged *by his superior or other officer*, he is to complain to the commanding officer of the regiment, troop, or company, *who is hereby required to summon a court-martial for the doing justice to the complainant.*

The letter and the spirit of this article was strictly adopted in the conduct of the officers

commanding corps, on the wrong which they *thought* they had sustained from Lieutenant-Colonel Munro's insinuations to their prejudice; and the Commander-in-Chief strictly obeyed the injunctions of this article; he took measures for *summoning a court-martial for the doing justice to the complainants.*

The arrest of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, on the 20th January, 1809, is thought to have been accelerated by a conversation between him and the Commander-in-Chief on a subject entirely distinct from that of the charges which took place about this time and irritated the feelings of General Macdowall to a considerable degree. The strange practice had recently prevailed of arranging the movements of troops, and other measures of a military nature, by communication between the Secretary of Government and the Quarter-Master-General, who, in consequence of these communications, transmitted orders to the out-stations, for detachments, formation of field corps, and other important military objects, without any communication whatever with the Commander-in-Chief of the army. Abstract reports of these movements were usually sent on the 1st and 15th of each month, from the office of the Quarter-Master-General to that of the Adju-

tant-General, for the periods immediately preceding these dates, but until this routine brought them through the Adjutant-General to the Commander-in-Chief, he possessed no information on the subject. This extraordinary fact was brought to his notice in consequence of the accidental mention by a young officer at his table, of a movement of which he was entirely ignorant. He directed reports and returns to be examined, and found that above 3400 men of the army he was said to command, were then in motion without any consultation with him on the occasion.

The General, in presence of his aid-de-camp, and of the Adjutant-gen., questioned the Quarter-Master-Gen. with regard to this fact. Lieut.-colonel M. defended the measure, and distinctly stated, that *he*, as a confidential officer of the government, was the channel of their orders for these movements of troops, which, as a point of *courtesy*, might be made known to the Commander-in-Chief, but to the knowledge of which he must be aware that he had no claim of right. The *audacious insolence* (as General Macdowall afterwards named it) of this speech from an officer of his immediate staff, greatly incensed the Commander-in-Chief, and was supposed to have determined the mea-

sure of trial, in which this circumstance might perhaps have formed the substance of a distinct charge. A general* order by the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 17th of January, directing, that all orders for movement that might be received from the Quarter-Master-General's office, should be instantly reported to the Adjutant-general for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, confirms the leading facts of this occurrence, which is of general notoriety, or at least of general belief.

The interference of officers commanding corps ceased with the arrest of Lieutenant-colonel Munro, who was on the 21st, in reply to a letter he had addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, acknowledging his arrest, informed that General Gowdie would in a few days succeed to the command, and assemble a court-martial for his trial, and that if acquitted he would have the opportunity of bringing to trial those, who, by the charges they had preferred, he might consider to have traduced his character.

Colonel Munro applied to the Commander-in-Chief to report his arrest to government, and to transmit a letter he had addressed to the Chief Secretary on the occasion. On the 23d

* Appendix, No. 3.

General Macdowall declined to transmit that letter, informing Colonel M. that in a case "*purely military*" he considered the application of appeal it contained "extraordinary, indelicate, and disrespectful."

The letter which the Commander-in-Chief had declined to forward was enclosed by Colonel M. to the Secretary to government, accompanied by the refusal of the Commander-in-Chief to be the channel of its transmission. In the letter to the Secretary he declared that he would not have made the appeal if he had conceived the case to be purely military.

On the following day the Chief Secretary to government informed the Commander-in-Chief by letter, that Colonel M. had appealed to the government; that the Governor in council had looked in vain in the report for any just ground of complaint against him, and would support *their public officer*: that they adopt *as their own act*, and *approve the opinions* it contains as *confirmed by every competent authority*; that if trial were allowed, they should consider it as involving the discussion and trial of the late Commander-in-Chief's measures, and those of the council; that a previous communication might on such a case have been expected from the Commander-in-Chief; and finally, that they

earnestly recommend the release of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro from arrest.

On the 25th the Commander-in-Chief replied, at some length, and for reasons adduced, lamented that *he could not comply with the recommendation the government so earnestly urged;* he informed the Governor that he would direct a charge to be exhibited against Lieut.-Colonel Munro for disrespect to himself, in the appeal he had made on the occasion of the arrest; and quoted in support of his conduct the following opinion of Lord Cornwallis, when governor-general and commander-in-chief, as equally expressing the principles on which he acted on the present occasion:

"The *warrant* which I possess from his "Majesty, and the commission I hold from "the E. I. Company, guide me in the import-"ant duties attached to my situation, and "which vest in me certain powers, which I "cannot without danger abandon."

On the same day (the 25th of January) General Macdowall issued an order*, taking leave of the army, whom he complimented in strong terms, commenting at the same time with considerable imprudence and asperity on the re-

* G. O. 25th January, 1809. Appendix, No. 4.

cent changes in the constitution of the government, which he describes as having deprived him of "*his rights*," a restoration of which could alone have enabled him to exercise "the "functions of his station, as the representative "of the army, with honour to the service, and "credit to himself." *This order was published in the garrison of Fort St. George, under the usual sanction of the Governor*, (without which no order can be there published;) and this circumstance is worthy of particular remark in reference to what follows.

On the 27th of January, the Secretary of government desired to know from General Macdowall, by command of the Governor in council, if they were to understand that he (General M.) declined compliance with the *orders* of the government; as under the explanation in his (the Secretary's) letter of the 24th, the Governor in council considered it to be equivalent to an order.

Gen. M. in reply, on the same day, says, that referring to his commission, which directs obedience to the orders of the Governor in council, he considers that obedience limited to orders that are *legal*; and as he deems those which he has received to be *illegal*, he can only obey them *under protest*, if the Governor in council should

persist, after this explanation, in directing his submission to the release of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro from arrest.

The Secretary to government instantly acknowledged the Commander-in-Chief's letter, and conveyed the positive orders of the government for Colonel Munro's release from arrest, which order the Commander-in-Chief obeyed.

A circumstance occurred during the course of these events, which would seem to prove that the want of communication, alluded to in the first letter of the government, had not kept them even in official ignorance of the arrest of Colonel Munro, and that the measure of preventing his trial had not then been in their contemplation; for, on the 21st of January, a letter was addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, then about to embark for England, informing him, that in consequence of a request *from the Judge-Advocate-General the Commander-in-Chief had received the instructions of the Governor in council,* to direct him to remain, that he might appear in support of the charges against Colonel Munro, preferred by him and other officers.

On the 28th of January, the Commander-in-Chief embarked for England; but prior to

his embarkation he wrote a general order*, announcing that he had been compelled by the order of the Governor in council to release Lieutenant-Colonel Munro from arrest, a measure which had prevented his intention of bringing him to trial for disrespect to himself, for disobedience of orders, and contempt of military authority, in having referred to the authority of the civil government†, in defiance of the judgment of the officer at the head of the

* Appendix, No. 5.

† The following extract of a letter from Lord Cornwallis is said to have influenced the late Commander-in-Chief's opinions on this occasion:

Extract of a Letter from Earl Cornwallis, then Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief to Madras. (1789.)

The regular authority under which all military orders should be issued is either that of the officer who may be appointed Commander-in-Chief by the Court of Directors, or that of the government itself, if circumstances should render it expedient for the Board to exercise avowedly the functions of that officer.

Before I conclude this letter, I must express my wish that it should be recollected by the *civil* and *military* departments at Madras, that the Adjutant-general of the Company's troops on that establishment, cannot, without the greatest irregularity, (unless, as I before mentioned, the functions of the Commander-in-Chief should be exercised by the Board) have any direct communication with the *civil government*.

army, who had placed him in arrest; conduct which he considered subversive of military discipline, in violation of the sacred rights of the Commander-in-Chief, and as holding up a dangerous example to the service; of all which he expresses his strong disapprobation, and for which *he reprimands* Lieutenant-Colonel Munro.

This order, dated on the same day, viz. the 28th, was, by the Commander-in-Chief, delilivered to Colonel Capper, the Adjutant-General, with his orders for its immediate publication to the army. Colonel Capper, who desired the General's permission to accompany him on board the ship in which he was to sail, transferred the order in his presence to his deputy, Major Boles, with directions to publish it to the army that evening.

In the usual routine of publishing all orders, a copy of this order was submitted to the Governor, who, by a general order of the 31st of January*, when the ship in which General Macdowall had embarked had sailed, but was still in sight, annulled his appointment of Commander-in-Chief, directed the orders of the 28th to be expunged from every public record,

* Appendix, No. 6.

and suspended from the Company's service Major Boles, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, for having obeyed the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, in signing and giving currency to "a paper of this offensive description."

The Adjutant-General, on returning from the ship in which the Commander-in-Chief had sailed, was informed of this order, and hastened to exculpate his deputy, by waiting on the Governor, to inform him, that Major Boles had acted by his orders. He was denied admittance, but communicated the purpose of his attendance to the staff in waiting; the intimation was acknowledged on the 8th of February, by a general order, which declares he also "is implicated in giving currency to the Commander-in-Chief's orders," and suspended from the Company's service. This manly conduct of Colonel Capper, "Adsum qui feci; in me convertite ferrum," failed of its generous purpose, he was himself punished, but his testimony was deemed insufficient to exculpate his deputy.

On this subject it must ever seem extraordinary to a military man that a difference of opinion could exist, still more that the authority of the government should be committed in support of the principle of giving to military men the privilege of refusing obedience at their own

discretion. It must ever be most hazardous for a military man to incur the risk of disputing the legality of the orders of his superior officer; independently of the very slender shade of distinction between disobedience and mutiny; and the recorded cases, in which officers have been acquitted, who have put to death on the spot, inferior officers, who have hesitated to obey their commands; an officer who presumes to deliberate, ought to be completely satisfied, that the order which he hesitates to obey is so evidently and palpably contrary to some known law of the land, as to leave no doubt that a court-martial would be satisfied with this plea for disobedience. But in the case now under consideration, there could be no illegality except by inference and association, for the power to reprimand an inferior is an undoubted prerogative of every military commander, to be exercised by him on his responsibility; and as the order of the 25th of January (which was certainly much more offensive*

* The two orders are inserted in the Appendix, and the reader will judge. But it is peculiarly worthy of remark, that the copies of the order of the 25th of January, which have hitherto been published in the English newspapers, have been uniformly dated the 28th, thus leaving to different tastes and judgments the selection of that which to each may seem the best ground for the order of the 31st.—EDIT.

than that of the reprimand to Colonel Munro of the 28th) had been published in Fort St. George, with the sanction of the Governor himself; no officer of the staff could suspect that criminality should be imputed to him for circulating the subsequent order of reprimand.

The Governor-General has recently favoured us with a very elaborate and rhetorical disquisition on the military virtue of disobedience of orders, and however much the thinking part of the army differ from his Lordship in the theory of the case, it is my serious conviction that these doctrines have tutored many others in the sophistry of defending the merits of insubordination, and at all events I cannot but observe, that their recent practice has been guided more by his opinions than their own*. They have very liberally exercised their discretionary power in questions of obedience to the government of Madras; who, on the same principle I suppose, are *actually busied at this time* in teaching the native troops the propriety of ascertaining, by mature reflection, the abstract nature of their obligations, before they render obedience to their regimental-officers. God grant that the success of their endeavours may not lead to its

* See Appendix, No. 7.

most direct and obvious tendency—to the ruin of the empire of Great Britain in India.

The treatment of the Commander-in-Chief, and the suspension of the Adjutant-General and Deputy, gave *universal* disgust to the army. The officers of a distinguished regiment in his Majesty's service, were forward in resenting the insult offered to their service in the person of their General, by the most contemptuous behaviour to the Governor. In this, as in every other case of common grievance, they vied with the officers of the Company's service in complimentary attentions to the Adjutant-General and his deputy. Those officers were invited to the regimental mess, their healths were toasted with particular distinction, as *military martyrs*, they were universally considered to have done their duty, and no more than their duty, and to have suffered unmerited punishment.

The arbitrary abuse of authority displayed in this act towards two officers who were highly and generally respected, is the single fact which gave birth to those dangerous combinations, and lighted that violent flame which has since produced such dreadful consequences.

The ferment was too violent in its first ebullition, to escape the notice even of the govern-

ment. On the 6th of February, 1809, they issued an explanatory order, declaring to the army that the supposed insinuations of the Quarter-Master-General's report, which had given offence to officers commanding corps, had never been by them supposed, or by the Quarter-Master-General intended, to convey any insinuation to their prejudice. One singular inconsistency in this order, is worthy of remark, from being the production of the same authority which, six days before, had suspended Lieut.-Colonel Capper, and Major Boles, from the service, for obeying the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, for which they had been rendered responsible. The 2d paragraph of the order of the 6th of February, declares, "*that* "*it would have been*" (in the case of the Quarter-Master-General) "inconsistent with "the evident principles of justice, that a pub- "lic officer should have been liable to the "obloquy of a trial for an act not his, but "*that of his superior.*" We must suppose that the TRIAL is alone obnoxious to justice; *punishment without trial, for the act of a superior*, would seem to be liable to *no obloquy* in this new code. How valiant and how mean is despotism! This explanation, worthy *at the proper period*, of a great, a magnanimous, and a liberal go-

vernment, would, a month sooner, have completely appeased the agitation which the report had produced; now, it was worse than useless. The individual grievances of the small number of officers commanding corps had sunk to insignificance, in the comparative magnitude of the injury which every officer, whether of the King's or Company's service, felt to have been offered to the military character, in the wanton, unjust, and unnecessary suspension, without trial, of two officers of distinguished station and character, *for obeying the orders of the Commander-in-Chief*, and the feeling was aggravated at this moment by the arbitrary removal from office of several officers, highly and justly respected for public character and talent, who were hurried off from Madras without any cause being assigned for these portentous measures.

To justify these proceedings to the higher authorities in England, Mr. B. the Chief-Secretary to government, and Private-Secretary to Sir George Barlow, was dispatched express, *on public duty*, while the permission to proceed to England, solicited by Major Boles, was twice refused, although actually suspended from rank, and left with his family destitute of the means of subsistence. No other opportunity was likely

to occur for some months, yet, no sooner had the Lushington, on which Major Boles had agreed for his passage, sailed with this express, than he obtained free permission to embark, whenever he could find an opportunity to do so!

Sir G. Barlow himself, a stranger to the characters and persons of those he had been appointed to govern, of personal habits adverse to the degree and sort of communication which could alone ensure correct knowledge on these subjects, and with local experience only of a settlement every way differing in circumstances from that in which he now presided, was supposed to have selected, with peculiar unhappiness, two men as military advisers, who were perhaps the least qualified of any that could possibly have been chosen to remedy the defects which I have noticed. Lieut.-Colonel Leith, the Judge-Advocate-General, had long been removed from the exercise of military duties, and devoted to the contemplation of legal difficulties; this, with his habits of retirement, and reserved manners, had long estranged him from military society. Lieut.-Colonel Munro, with talents of considerable promise, had, by the favour of two preceding Commanders-in-Chief, been prematurely raised to a station far above his claims

from rank or service. In the attainment of this object, he had, with humility of manners ("for lowliness is young ambition's ladder") devoted himself to the interest of his patrons with much apparent zeal, and, in their various contests with the Governors of their time, had maintained the "indefeasible rights" of the Commander-in-Chief, and his exclusive title to the patronage, controul, and arrangement, of every branch of the military department, with a degree of ardour which had attracted considerable notice. On Gen. Macdowall's accession to the command, with very limited powers to advance the interests of his friends, *the paramount authority of the Governor* was said to have become the theme of the Quarter-Master-General's individual and official eulogium; and he was now described as standing forward, doubtlessly in the humble conviction of the errors of his former judgment, to deny that the Commander-in-Chief of an army could even claim, *of right*, to be acquainted with its movements; the officers of the army, whether correctly or otherwise, did not seem to impute the change to moral conviction: the most intimate of his former associates were the first to estrange themselves, whether from this or other causes I cannot correctly state, but it has been remarked

that these very officers have been most prominently distinguished by the rigours of this reign of terror.

To both these persons the late Commander-in-Chief had given ground of offence, by countenancing the charges preferred against the one in opposition to the opinion and official advice of the other; and these circumstances were stated to have indisposed them to such as might be considered to have shared in the offence, or to have enjoyed the friendship or favour of the General. When therefore, although the release of Lieut.-Colonel Munro from arrest rendered the evidence of Lieut.-Colonel Martin no longer necessary for the purpose of his trial, that officer was officially informed, on the eve of the departure of the ships, that his leave to proceed to England was recalled; a general belief prevailed that this unnecessary detention was the prelude to farther misfortune. Lieut.-Colonel Leith, on the 29th of January, waited on Lieut.-Colonel Martin, intimated the intention of the government to punish all who had concurred in the charges against Colonel Munro, and then urged him, with great earnestness, to express *sorrow* for having signed the charges, as a species of half apology; in which case, he intimated that he might yet be permitted to sail

that evening, in the ship in which he had paid for his passage: he declined to express what he did not feel, and his detention was enforced. On the 2d of February, a member of the council, whose spontaneous profession, that he acted without authority, excited an opposite belief, urged Major Boles, by arguments of a similar nature, to avert the ruin which the government, by their representations to England, would entail on him and his family, (by apology and acknowledgment of error in his obedience to the Commander-in-Chief); in which case, he should be restored to his rank and office, Major Boles dreaded dishonour more than he feared oppression; and this attempt also failed of success.

Whether these overtures were the result of a secret consciousness of injustice, and of fears for the result, which induced their authors to attempt to bribe the injured parties to an implied admission of their guilt, for the purpose of giving a colour of justification to their own proceedings, it is impossible to pronounce: whatever was the motive, the end was not obtained; and the attempt, which soon became publicly known, added to the general indignation which already prevailed.

On the 8th of February, an order of the

Governor removed Captain Marshall, the Secretary of the military-board, from that office, to be Paymaster at Vizagapatam, and he was commanded to quit the Presidency without delay*. Mr. Roebuck, the Military Paymaster-General, was at the same time sent with as little ceremony to the same place, as Commercial-President, and Mr. Maitland, a gentleman not in the Company's service, was removed from the situation he had held, as a Justice of the Peace. The appointment of the two former to offices of trust was a direct admission that no imputation against their public administration of the offices they had filled was the cause of their removal; but the manner, as well as the fact, of their removal from offices of much superior emolument and distinction, marked the proceeding as a measure of punishment, while the total silence of the order, with regard to the motives of the measure, seemed to shew, that the reasons, whatever they might be, were not fit to be avowed.

The deficiencies of public avowal were supplied by general conjecture. It was remarked

* His application for a few days leave to adjust his accounts, as Secretary to the military fund, was rejected, and his immediate departure ordered.

by those who seemed to have access to authentic information, that Captain Marshall, whose duties, as Secretary to the Military-Board, rendered him the organ of that board, in the enforcement of the standing regulations of the service, relative to the controul of expenditure in the departments of provisions and military stores, and field-equipments, had remonstrated against certain alledged assumption of authority by the Quarter-Master-General, as contrary to those regulations, and had animadverted on the public inconvenience of innovations which that officer was stated to be daily attempting to introduce, with the apparent view of removing, by degrees, the authority of the Military-Board, to increase the influence of that department over which he presided. It was also remarked, that Mr. Roebuck, and Mr. Maitland, had, in a recent cause, in which their private fortunes were at stake, prosecuted to conviction in the Supreme Court, for perjury and forgery, two persons, whose cause the advisers of government had induced them to support and defend at the public cost, and it was notorious that this act of the government entailed on those two gentlemen irretrievable ruin.

The interference of the executive power in the administration of public justice, is an omen

of monstrous import in any country, and I can be at no loss to conjecture the feelings with which Englishmen will learn that even some of the jurymen who pronounced an unpalatable verdict were visited with proscription. I am not so intimately acquainted with the civil derangements of this period as to give them in detail; the removals were numerous and extraordinary, and comprised a large portion of the talent and respectability of that branch of the service, including the Accountant-General, who will probably have arrived in England long before this letter, and is perfectly qualified to render a clear account of any thing he may undertake to explain. Colonel St. Leger too (who had first signed the charges against Colonel Munro) had, even before Gen. Macdowall's departure, in the arrangements formed by the Quarter-Master-General for composing the force for the service in Travancore, been directed to remain in cantonment with one troop and the sick of his regiment (the 6th cavalry), while the remainder of his regiment, and all the disposable force of the division, was ordered to march for actual service, under an officer junior to Colonel St. Leger. The indignant feelings of this officer induced him to dispatch to the

Commander-in-Chief an immediate remonstrance against this public injury, and to demand a court-martial to vindicate his character: the measure became known, while the application was in course of transmission, the arrangement was corrected, and the *intended insult* was not allowed to take its ultimate effect. It would scarcely be credited, were not the fact indisputable, that this remonstrance gave the first intimation to the Commander-in-Chief, public or private, that a force was assembling for field-service in Travancore!

Although many of these and subsequent circumstances were trivial in themselves, the whole had considerable influence in actuating the officers of the army to a combined expression of their sentiments; and when Major-General Gowdie, who had succeeded by seniority, to the command of the army, arrived at Madras, he found the military officers of his Majesty's and the Company's army united in resentment against the Governor and his supposed confidential advisers, and the civil servants of the Company, governed by similar feelings, for injuries sustained, by themselves.

To great personal bravery, an overflowing

zeal, and that extent of experience, which a man of small capacity for observation or reflection can gain from many years of service, General Gowdie added the quality of inflexible adherence to opinions once formed, and the reputation of good-nature. His staff, selected chiefly from his kinsmen, were young men not yet qualified to assist him. The suggestion of others, or his own sense of the absolute necessity of some man of experience in military details, to conduct the duties of the Adjutant-General's office, led him to renew the overtures to Major Boles; the General's influence with government was promised to effect his restoration to the service and to office, (although again it was asserted that the overture was unauthorized,) if the Major would acknowledge error, and express contrition: his known want of all pecuniary resources, except those which he derived from service, was strongly urged; but he again declined to sign his own condemnation and dishonour, in a case where he was conscious of nothing but innocence, and the strict performance of his public duty.

The officers of the royal regiment of foot had, after entertaining at their mess the suspended officers of the staff, marked their sense

of the insult offered to their service in the person of their late Commander-in-Chief, by refusing to accept invitations to dinner from the Governor, whose Secretary was said to have been in vain employed to induce a change in their determination. The Commander of the forces undertook the office of mediator, and, after assuring them that he considered it to be *their duty* to meet him at the Governor's table, and would view their refusal as a want of respect to himself, did succeed in obtaining the performance of this singular duty.

With a battalion of the 18th regiment of Sepoys, then in garrison, whose officers had also declined to accept Sir G. Barlow's invitations, the General was less successful; and this corps, which had only a few days before marched into Madras, was again marched, at a great and apparently unnecessary expence to the public, a distance of 500 miles, to occupy a post represented as likely to become the grave of any corps that might be stationed there!

On the 25th of March, a battalion of the 11th regiment was also ordered from Madras, as the Commander of the forces is stated to have informed Major Lindsay, who commanded it,

" because Major Boles had been invited to their " mess;" and on the 27th, although the example of the royals and artillery was pleaded, the order was enforced.

At the same period, Major Sutherland Macdowall, the Deputy Adjutant-General was removed from office; surprized at the measure, he respectfully applied to the government to know the cause, but in vain. His application to the Commander of the forces, for similar information, produced a reply unique in its kind: Gen. Gowdie acknowledged the merit and value of his services, and expressed his regret that " *existing circumstances, of which he was not competent to judge,*" had deprived him of the " services of a man of such sterling ability, " and for whom he had the strongest personal " esteem and regard."

Lieut. Stock, assistant in the office of the Military-Board, whose public and private conduct had conciliated the respect and esteem of all who knew him, was, on the 24th of March, removed, without any reason assigned, to a situation of inferior credit, at Vellore. Conjecture in this, as in many other cases, supplied the want of better information; and it was remarked, that Lieut. Stock had, for some time,

declined all personal intercourse with the Quarter-Master-General.

'Even the students at the Military-institution had their share of the general proscription! These boys had sent one of their number to Coventry, for entering the mansion of the Governor. This was one of the branches of public establishment, which had been drawn within the vortex of the Quarter-Master-General's controul. An order from the government appeared for dispersing the class, professedly founded on a report from Gen. Gowdie, which he declares he had never made or seen.

'Even the nomination of an aid-de-camp by Gen. G. was objected to, because the officer named, a young man of excellent character; but whom General Macdowall had patronized, was *said* to have signed a memorial to the Court of Directors, of which Gen. Macdowall was *said* to have taken charge. *The allegation was not true*, but the Commander of the forces was compelled to give up his choice of an officer for his own staff, and (as he declared in a letter to Lieut. Scott, the officer he had promised to appoint,) a friend of the Governor's Military-Secretary, to whose person he was a stranger, was placed in his family as his personal staff.

The influence of a Commander, thus dignified, could not be expected to produce much good. Memorials, various in violence and absurdity, as the tempers of those who composed them, were drafted and tendered for adoption at the different stations of the army; most of these effusions were abortive, and among them that most distinguished in absurdity, a surreptitious copy of which, obtained by this government, furnished to that of Bengal the text for their dissertation of the 27th of May. An address to Major Boles, (Lieut.-Colonel Capper having previously embarked for Europe) was more successful, and obtained the signature of almost every officer of the Company's army, and of some of his Majesty's regiments. In this address, to the expression of approbation of his conduct was added an intimation, that an arrangement had been made for securing, for his support, a sum equal to the allowances of which he had been deprived by suspension; and a pledge was given, that similar support would be provided for every officer who might, in future, be removed by the government, on grounds of similar injustice.

The principles of this address are so obviously unsound, in the judgment of every dispassionate

enquirer, that it is hardly conceivable how any set of men could deliberately have allowed themselves to sign and act upon it. You and I, however, who have witnessed the eagerness with which our countrymen in India join in any plan which has for its apparent object the relief of merit in distress, can estimate the strong effect of such a feeling, when applied to the case of Major Boles, whose want of fortune was as notorious as the punishment which had been undeservedly inflicted on him. The address, in itself, was imprudent and improper, even without the clause, which gave a pledge for future error; but a generous, though erroneous, feeling overcame the colder sentiment of respect and duty to the government, shaken as that sentiment had been by the numerous causes, of which I have selected but a few. An ebullition of equally imprudent but most honourable feeling in the Captain of the Governor's body-guard, who was then serving with the forces in Travancore, brought the paper in question to the notice of Sir G. Barlow. This officer had signed the address to Major Boles; and having done so, deemed his continuing to hold the command of the Governor's guards incompatible with this avowed dissent from the

justice of the late proceeding. He publicly and formally, in an official letter, requested leave to resign his command; and, at the same time, viz. the 19th of March, from that abhorrence of duplicity, which is the characteristic of his noble mind, and from a sense of delicacy to the individual, he stated, in a confidential form of communication, to his own particular friend, then military-secretary to the Governor, for Sir George Barlow's personal information, the measure in which he had joined, and the feeling which had produced his resignation. The Governor, whose feelings never embarrassed his determinations, placed this private and confidential communication on public record, and when the designs over which he then brooded were ripe for execution, made it on the 1st of May, the instrument of ruin to one of the bravest, noblest, best, most honourable, zealous, and loyal officers, in that or any other service—*Captain James Grant.*

The discontent of the army had hitherto been represented, and believed by the Governor, to be confined to the friends of Gen. Macdowall, or to those of the number who had been displaced from offices of trust and honour. When the receipt of this address, and intelligence of

interests of his advisers, the measure had tended only to increase the general disgust at his rule; wisdom or common prudence would have dictated a revision of the measures which had produced such effects: and I am convinced that at this period of the scene which I have endeavoured to describe, the restoration of Colonel Capper and Major Boles to office, or even their restoration *to the service*, by the removal of the sentence of suspension, would have restored order by an act of justice, as the result of appeals to England on the removals of other individuals from the presidency, would have been confidently expected to correct the errors of the local government.

Measures of conciliation were not however to the taste of this government or its advisers. Lord Minto's letter of the 20th of February, 1809, approving of their conduct had been received: extracts from it were circulated to the stations of the army, and they pursued the arbitrary system of terror with increased vigour from their confidence in the strength of his support.

The Commander of the Forces on the 10th of April, was instructed to combat, by a circular letter, the address to Major Boles, which was supposed to be then in circulation. In this

the numerous signatures to that document, of individuals of the first character, both in his Majesty's and the Hon. Company's service, had shewn to the Governor what nothing but wilful blindness could prevent his perceiving, that the discontent, reputed to be partial and unimportant, was only limited in extent by the limits of his government; and that, although he had filled the vacant offices with men devoted to the production, he attempted to prevent any contribution for the support of this officer, by stating that in his, the generals, opinion, Major Boles had forfeited all claims to the sympathy of the Army, by rejecting, the overtures which the General (*but without authority*) had made, and on the acceptance of which he would have *made it his business* to get him reinstated in rank and official situation. The only effect produced by this humane production was to confirm the determination of the officers to whom it was communicated, in supporting Major Boles, whose conduct they approved.

The mass of the army treated this letter with ridicule, contrasting the importance therein assumed by General G., when he spoke of *making it his business* to obtain the reversal of an important act of the government, on condi-

tions *wholly unauthorized by them*, with his recent confession to Lieut. Scott, that he had not influence even to obtain the appointment of his own aid-de-camp, for the officer to whom he had promised that situation in his family.

The seizure of the papers* of individuals, and the arrest of their confidential writers,† for examination on oath, as to the papers they might have copied, were among the energetic measures of the day. On the 11th of April, Captain Barlow, by command of the Governor, conveyed from the office of the Military Board two official writers, and a third young man, who had been in the private employ of Captain Marshall, to the council-chamber, where, in presence of Sir G. Barlow, Mr. Falconar, Lieut. Col. Leith, and Captain Barlow, the Company's Advocate examined them on oath, as to the subject of papers they might have copied for Captain Marshall, or

* The first attempt of this kind was an exertion of extra-official and unauthorized energy on the part of a member of the Board of Trade, who had in 1807 taken on himself to seize the papers of a gentleman in the civil service. This was one of the first acts to which sir George Barlow on his arrival at Madras had extended the sanction of his ex-post facto approbation, and which has since, according to general belief, been deemed worthy of respectful imitation.

† Clerks.

others (a point which few writers in India are competent to state ;) as to the company he kept; the conversation he was *seen* to hold; and other particulars of a similar nature. Such is the account given by these men of their examination, immediately after it occurred, and when still in a state of agitation, which rendered their narrative as indistinct as their evidence had probably been. 'Lieut. Col. Barclay, the town-major, at the same time seized in the Black-town, a private writer, from the counting-house of a private gentleman, holding no office under the government, for similar interogatory, Mr. James Balfour his master having been a friend of Gen. Macdowall.

'In addition to these public measures of coercion, the commander of the forces was on the same day directed by the government to supersedes, in the command of corps, four officers named to him, as suspected of being indisposed towards the government *(soupçonné d'être suspecte)*, and not content with this unreasonable power themselves, they delegated to Gen. G., whose powers of appreciating merit are sufficiently notorious, the authority to exercise a similar act of coercion whenever his private information might lead him to think it proper.'

When by such means a sufficiency had been

obtained of what was dignified with the name of *evidence*, the public operation of a system of general terror commenced by the promulgation of the general order of the 1st of May, 1809.*

This order was founded on *private examinations* of native writers, probably incapable of comprehending or reciting the tenor of the papers they had copied, if even divested of the influence of the agitation which I have described; on *private informations* from persons whose names and credibility, as well as the facts they professed to state, are said to have been concealed by the Governor, even from his council; and on the private and confidential communication, honestly, but most imprudently made by Captain Grant to sir George Barlow, in explanation of the grounds of his personal conduct. By this order, four officers of rank and character were *suspended from the Company's service* in the most disgraceful manner; the commandant of artillery was *removed from all military charge and command;* three other officers, two of whom were of rank, *were deprived of command and appointments on the staff of the army;* and the stigma was sent in

* Appendix, No. 8.

pursuit of another who had sailed for Europe. In the number of these proscriptions were two officers whose gallantry and distinguished good conduct on active service had, but two short months before been honoured with the public and recorded thanks of the government; Lieut. Col. Chalmers and Sentleger: and the guilt of the whole was confidently asserted to be *ascertained.* The measures of rigour thus announced were accompanied by a direct effort to excite dissension and jealousy between the King's and Company's troops, praising the former for a forbearance which hitherto they had not shewn, and the division of the army serving at Hyderabad received an unlooked-for compliment addressed to them with a like design.

A burst of universal indignation followed the promulgation of this order. If men of this high class, it was observed, were objects of suspicion, public accusation ought to be supported by public proof. The fixed principles of the British constitution and the more rigid letter of martial law entitled them to public trial before they should suffer public degradation and punishment. No man's character, no man's situation in life, could be for a moment safe, if anonymous accusation were considered as con-

stituting proof; if reputation could be whispered away by wretches whom no epithet of contempt can adequately describe, and if the name of an officer branded with infamy by the *fiat* of the Governor of Madras was to be held forth in public proclamations to the army and the world, as a man divested of the honourable principles which constituted his sole earthly possession; of all claim to public commiseration, or to the last refuge of the unhappy—the sympathy of an afflicted family of which he was thus declared to be unworthy!

In the case of Col. Robert Bell, the commandant of artillery, the cause of his removal had been distinctly stated to be "*for having promoted the circulation of a seditious paper among the officers of the corps of artillery at the Mount;*" a fact asserted in the order, like every other allegation it contained, to have been *ascertained;* the proof resting on the credibility of an unknown accuser. The officers of the artillery at the Mount, with one exception only, instantly, solemnly, and publicly, in a most respectful and proper letter addressed to Col. Bell, declared that he had never, directly or indirectly, done what was imputed to him;* but on the contrary, that he had uniform-

* See Appendix, No. 9.

ly discouraged the discussion of any of those questions which agitated the public mind. Their solemn assertions as officers and men of honour were disregarded: Col. Bell remained deprived of military command; and no particular delicacy of sentiment can be required for appreciating the feelings of these officers, thus virtually, but most distinctly, insulted by the government, by the imputation of deliberate falsehood. The officer who alone did not sign this declaration, had been gratified on the day of Col. Bell's removal by appointment to a staff office of importance at the Presidency, from the favour of the Governor in council.

It is confidently asserted, by those who seem to have had good opportunities of knowing the facts, that the conclusions of the government, in the case of Lieut. Col. Martin and Captain Marshall, were equally groundless; the writers examined having mistaken a most respectful appeal to the Court of Directors, which they had copied under the direction of those officers, for that of an offensive nature on the same original subject to which the questions of the government were directed, and which memorial it is notorious that these two officers decidedly disapproved, and most certainly did not encourage. Mr. Balfour's writer had merely copied

for Captain Coombs, late aid-de-camp of Gen. Macdowall, the orders and documents which had appeared subsequently to his departure on the subject of the General's conduct, and which, as an act of attention and justice to his absent patron and friend, Captain Coombs had connected by a summary of the events to which the documents referred. The charges against Lieut. Col. the Hon. A. Sentleger were refuted by the written declaration of every officer under his command; and in the case of the other officers, with the circumstances of which I am not so well acquainted, there is reason to infer an equal degree of exaggeration or error. The tenor of Lieut. Col. John Bell's conduct, at the mess, at the artillery, at the Mount, had been grossly falsified by some of the corps d'espionage. That high-spirited and highly respected officer, who had recently arrived from England, uniformly discouraged the agitation of political questions; he first affixed his name, as truth and honour demanded, to the address to Col. Robert Bell, disavowing the facts on which he had been removed from command; but when it was proposed that the officers in a body should wait on their late commandant to present the testimony, he combated this design in a speech of considerable animation, and actu-

ally succeeded in dissuading them from its adoption, as unnecessary to the justification of Col. Robert Bell, and liable to the imputation of being an act of ostentatious disrespect to the government. This strictly military, loyal, and respectful conduct of Lieut. Col. John Bell, was perverted into a seditious oration. He was peremptorily ordered to quit the Mount in twenty-four hours, and proceed to Seringapatam.

He strongly felt the unmerited insult; and it is greatly to be feared, or rather certainly to be inferred, that the keen sense of injury on this occasion has strongly influenced his recent criminal and fatal resistance of the authority of the government in the garrison of Seringapatam.

The compliment which was offered to the subsidiary force of Hyderabad on a want of common feeling with the rest of the army, which a sense of public duty alone had hitherto induced them to suppress, produced the effect of giving free vent to the long-smothered flame: they assumed a tone of violence hitherto unexampled; they declared to the rest of the army, by a circular letter, their union in the sentiment of disgust at the conduct of the government; they disclaimed all title to the proffered commendation, and at the moment when

Col. Close had been nominated by the government to command that force, its officers, in the height of that paroxysm of rage which had not yet begun to abate, in a direct address to the Governor in council, dated the 15th of May, required the abrogation of the general orders which on the 1st of the same month had been issued to the army.

It is scarcely possible to conceive a situation more extraordinary than that, in which the miserable policy of persevering in a floundering series of error to support an original act of fundamental injustice, had now involved the government of Madras. It would be superfluous to point the inference which obviously occurs to the mind, when the officers of an army, acknowledged even by the order of the first of May to have been ever "no less distinguished "for their obedience and discipline, than for "their achievements in the field," shrink from the commendation of the government they serve, and spurn its praises as dishonour.

The letter of the supreme government to that of Madras, dated the 27th of May, had been received, and was about this period circulated for the information of the army. The effect of this elaborate production did not accord with the apparent expectations of its author. Lord

Minto, bred to the Scotch bar, handled the cause of the Madras government with all the ability of an advocate for his client. His pleading had judiciously thrown into shade, or totally omitted, all the bearings of the case which formed the groundwork of the opposite argument; begging the question on every disputable point, he introduced a mass of popular doctrine on the principles of the British constitution, in answer to supposed pretensions, unasserted claims, and arguments that had never been urged. Truisms inapplicable to the case were clothed in language that did honour to his Lordship's talents for composition, and their splendour for a while dazzled the judgment of his readers, although warned against the admission of "confused analogy." Singularly enough, the chief object of this essay was to expose the absurdities of an imaginary "memorial, supposed to be addressed to him from the officers of the Madras army," which, as far as adoption, signature, presentation, and avowal are required to constitute an instrument, had never any existence. This fact will unquestionably excite your astonishment; but I pledge myself that the memorial never was presented to Lord Minto or to any other public authority, and that it was

decidedly reprobated by a large majority of the respectable officers of the army. Forty-two closely *printed* pages of argument on subjects extremely interesting to the great body of the officers, charging them in no very measured terms with pretensions, arguments, and designs involving the deepest guilt, which certainly they contemplated for the first time in the perusal of his Lordship's dissertation, seemed little calculated by their circulation to arrest the discussion of the subjects on which they treated: and the novel doctrine, that slander is disarmed of its sting, and should be welcomed with respect when it had obtained belief with high authorities; (par. 46.) that the promotion of legal trial constitutes a "*monstrous proceeding*;" (par. 50.) while its prevention was a just, legal, and indisputabe interposition of authority; (par. 50.) that the obedience of the Commander-in-Chief to this assumption of power (against which he formerly protested) is a proof of its legality; (par. 60.) that in reprimanding an officer under his command and one of his immediate staff, the Commander-in-Chief is guilty of sedition; (par. 67.) and that an Adjutant-general and his deputy, who under general principles of subordination were peculiarly bound to give the example of

that obedience which it was their duty to enforce, should on that occasion have been subject to the penalties of sedition for not being guilty of disobedience to their Commander-in-Chief; (par. 81.) were propositions so evidently repugnant to reason and justice, that even the eloquence of a Governor-General could not procure them credence.

It was remarked, however, that a clause of reservation was annexed to the opinion on each of the more delicate questions, which seemed to evince a doubt of its propriety even in his Lordship's mind; and that he desired to entrench himself behind the only genuine ground, namely the incompetency of the army, under any legal form, to take on themselves the decision of any question whatever. They traced in his Lordship's view of the powers of Governor and Commander-in-Chief, the continued influence of that contest which he had maintained in Corsica on a subject of the same nature in which the cause he argued was his own: and they regretted that his Lordship had quitted the profession of the law before he had attained its highest honours, as the acknowledged privilege of an advocate to press forward to decision on the evidence of one party, might have been corrected and matured by the appropriate ha-

bits of the bench, which dictate the delay of decision till both parties have obtained an impartial hearing. His Lordship's presence on the Coast about, or rather before this period, might have been highly beneficial to the state, but his elaborate dispatch tended only to weaken his influence.

The farther persecution of Major Boles, for no other reason that can be devised, except his extreme prudence in withdrawing himself altogether from society, excited additional indignation. I have already stated, that he had been twice refused permission to proceed to England while it was possible, and freely permitted when it was impossible: he was now, for the purpose of proceeding south round the Cape of Good Hope, transported north to Bengal. Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger and Captain Marshall had a similar destination.

In the progress of that system of inquisition which nothing could escape, private intimation that Captain Marshall, the proscribed, had dined with the mess of the Madras regiment on his route to Visagapatam, had been followed by the supersession of Captain Andrews who then commanded the regiment. His successor Lieutenant-Colonel I., a man of feeble intellect, filled with desire to manifest his gratitude to

those who had procured him the command of the station, officially reported that the Quarter-Master of the regiment at the regimental mess had alarmed his loyal feelings by giving as a toast, "*The friends of the army.*" Congenial absurdity gave public importance to this trivial circumstance; by return of post the proposer of the toast was deprived of a staff-appointment which he had held for several years; and the officer who had either seconded the proposal, or first drank the toast, was sent to solitary banishment in an unhealthy hill fort. These officers, for whose dismissal and exile no reason had been assigned, requested investigation; it was refused: and another officer, who had been appointed Quarter-Master, hesitating to accept the post, the officers of the corps were informed by the Lieutenant-Colonel, "that he had received "intimation from the Commander of the forces, "that such conduct should be followed by the "dispersion of the regiment, which should be "disbanded."

At this period a detachment was unfortunately ordered from the regiment to serve as marines on his Majesty's ships, (a duty from which it was understood that his Majesty's troops in India had recently been exempted by orders;) and another detachment was ordered to prepare for

embarkation to Prince of Wales' Island. For these duties, the two officers already condemned without trial were expressly named in the orders from head-quarters. This unusual interference marked the intended duty as a punishment, and the reported exemption of his Majesty's troops from a duty thus allotted to the Company's gave to the measure a character of degradation, and confirmed in the heated minds of the regiment the belief of its intended dispersion. Officers and men joined in a determination to resist; they confined the Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, whose folly had been the source of the evil, and, joined by the native battalion and artillery company in garrison, resolved to maintain the place in avowed mutiny, and to open a communication with the force at Hyderabad.

Intelligence of this event, when received at Madras, occasioned considerable alarm: on the 30th of June, Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, who had recently returned from a mission to Persia, was appointed to command the regiment and station, and proceeded to Masulipatam, where he was also nominated president of a court of enquiry, ordered to assemble there. Employing conciliation rather than violence, he succeeded to a great extent in re-

claiming for a time the deluded garrison; but by this conduct he offended, and perhaps alarmed for their own influence, the advocates of the coercive system; and on his return to the presidency towards the conclusion of that month, it was remarked that he had lost the confidence of the Governor: as did every man who attempted by moderation to stop the wild career of men irritated to madness, and to lead them back by reason and persuasion to the path of duty.

The actual seizure of the Fort of Masulipatam by its mutinous garrison, and the declaration of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, that they would not obey the government until the order of the 1st of May should be rescinded, seemed to mark the precise period when the time for conciliation was past. Every practicable means had for some time been taken for obtaining re-inforcements of European troops for the purpose of armed coercion; and on the 26th of July a measure was adopted, which certainly was entirely consistent with the former proceedings of the government.

On that day it was resolved to demand from all the officers of the Honourable Company a solemn declaration on honour, "That they "would obey the orders, and support the au-

" thority of the Honourable the Governor in
" Council of Fort St. George, agreeably to the
" tenor of the commission which they held
" from that government." The requisition, although extraordinary, implied no obligation beyond that which the acceptance of a commission more solemnly and unequivocally involved; and there was a singular obliquity of thinking, in supposing that men who were considered to be determined to abandon their most sacred obligations, should hesitate at the minor guilt of dissimulation. The test however was accompanied by a letter to be previously read to the persons required to sign it, containing the most unqualified intimation that the government considered a great portion of its officers to be *seditious;* that this test was therefore required of them for the purpose of ascertaining those who were fit to be trusted, and to such as should not instantly sign it, the alternative was announced of " being removed from the im-
" mediate execution of duty with the troops,
" and allowed to remain at an appointed station
" in the receipt of their ordinary allowances,
" until the situation of affairs, and the temper
" of their minds, should admit of their being
" employed with advantage to the state;" in the anticipation of refusal, directions were gi-

ven to place the officers of his Majesty's service (whose praises were coupled with the sedition of the Company's) in the command of the Company's troops, and in the staff situations held by the Company's officers, an expectation not calculated to produce the most conciliatory manner of executing the instructions, which, with few exceptions, it fell to their province to enforce. The letter concluded with desiring the native troops to be informed that their European officers were engaged in a criminal pursuit of objects, personal to themselves, and desirous to involve the native troops in their guilt, cautioning them to refuse belief to the suggestions of their officers; holding out the expectation of reward to the natives, and ordering force, if necessary, to march for effecting the objects described.

It is worthy of particular remark, that the officers of his Majesty's service had no cause to dread the injuries which formed the present ground of discontent in the Company's army; suspension without trial, being a power which no Company's government dares to exercise over an officer exclusively commissioned by the King.

At most of the stations, officers of his Majesty's service commanded; at the Presidency and

the Mount this most ungracious order was communicated in the most ungracious manner; and at Trichinopoly the officers who adopted the alternative of retirement, were sent like common felons to confinement, and marched in the same state to Tanjore!

Of above twelve hundred officers present with the Coast-army, only one hundred and fifteen signed the test. The triumph of duty over feeling prevailed with a few, and a sense of interest with many more. But no stronger proof of the impression which the test was calculated to inspire could exist, than the fact, that the effect of a measure of which they could have no previous idea, was on 1100 out of 1200 officers at various stations, without the possibility of previous concert, exactly the same, that of exciting indignation and disgust. Indeed no man of sensibility could listen to such an address without that feeling, and it is not matter of surprise that the alternative offered was accepted by nearly the whole, who rejoiced in an opportunity, which seemed distinctly to invite their temporary retirement to that private station, which presented itself to their fancy, as the post of honour, described by the most eminent of our Poets. I could name to you some hundreds of officers, who, with faultering steps and bleeding

hearts, were prepared to make the last sacrifice to duty in marching against their deluded brother officers; who hailed the alternative of retirement, as a reprieve from the bitterest punishment which public authority could inflict. Some indeed have supposed that the measure was intended to produce this effect, while others, who think that any thing savouring of humanity, would be a forced construction of any part of the system, have ascribed the measure to a still more hateful and incredible source.

I have described the result of the test, at three of the principal stations, and shall now briefly advert to what occurred at the others. At Bangalore, Colonel Gibbs of His Majesty's 59th, an officer whose conduct had particularly commanded the respect and confidence of the Company's officers under his command, delayed obedience to the order, against which he strongly remonstrated, because, as he had declared, he was confident in the loyalty and obedience of every person under his command, and was aware of the consequences which the communication of such an order must produce on the minds of any men jealous of their honour; he was compelled by a renewed and peremptory order to enforce it, and every officer retired. In the ceded districts and the northern division the

officers, with the exception of a few of the staff, universally refused. In Travancore and Malabar the officers declined (as my letters from thence describe it,) "to acknowledge the receipt of an insult," but assured their commanding officers, that they would be obedient, and, in every possible extremity, faithfully perform their duty. These commanding officers, Colonel Forbes and Colonel Stewart of his Majesty's service, acting with discretion, stated the circumstance to government, and were, it is said, strongly rebuked for preferring reason to violence. At Nundidroog, a battalion of the 3d regiment of native infantry, and the charge of that impregnable garrison, was left to the senior Subidar, the whole of the European officers, including the Commandant, having declined the test, and retired towards* their appointed exile. At Seringapatam, some indecision appears to have occurred with regard to the course to be pursued; the circumstances became known to the men of the battalion of artillery, and the native corps in garrison, who declared that they would not be separated from their officers; Colonel Davis commanding the division, who had gone on the 30th of July to

* Appendix, No. 10. Major Welsh's singular letter.

that garrison to enforce the order, was for a time detained as a prisoner, but afterwards released: a detachment of his Majesty's 80th regiment was sent out of the garrison, which shut its gates, and determined on absolute resistance, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel John Bell, of the artillery.

In that gradation of insanity, produced by gradations of injury, and the re-action of feelings permitted to overstep the boundaries of duty, the crisis had now arrived, which I conscientiously believe, not one of the officers then in resistance had contemplated, until irritated beyond the controul of reason. They had, in a period of phrenzy pledged themselves to support each other, and on a mistaken idea of what honour required from such a pledge, they acted to the injury of their honour, and to the disgrace of the service to which they belonged.

On the 3d of August the government announced in public orders to the *native troops* that a considerable number of their European officers had renounced their allegiance, and were removed from the exercise of authority; and called on them to give obedience exclusively to the government, and to those officers whom the government might appoint to command them.

On the same date Colonel Close arrived at Hyderabad, and attempted to take the command of the force. Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, who still exercised a limited command over the detailed duties of the troops, met him and reported their state; his Majesty's 33d regiment being the only corps fully under his command: the officers commanding the other corps, wished to enter into stipulations with Colonel Close: he demanded their obedience, and appealed to their feelings as soldiers, as subjects, and as men, in terms which produced the most evident agitation in their minds; but without immediate success. Finding his efforts with the officers unavailing, he addressed himself to the native troops, and, in a tone of peculiar eloquence and animation, demanded of them to obey him as the officer appointed by the government, to whom their regimental officers were disobedient. If any man in the service could have effected such an object, Colonel Close was that man. *Habit* and *discipline* prevailed against him. The men obeyed the officers in the customary gradation of command, according to the course of instruction by which every soldier is habitually taught to deem no order binding that does not come through its appointed channel. After a short and anxious

struggle to recall them to allegiance, Colonel Close observed indications of intended violence, and felt himself compelled to demand the only alternative which seemed to remain, namely, that he should be either their commander, or their prisoner. The field-officers, however, treated him with the highest veneration, deprecated the idea of personal disrespect, refused to consider him as a prisoner; and appeared to feel most poignantly the situation in which they stood. They had originally given way to the violence of younger men, who had gained ascendancy from numbers; and Colonel Close, after a display of ability, firmness, and ardent zeal, which elevated his high character even in the opinion of those who most opposed him, left the cantonment after requesting Colonel Montresor to resume the degree of command which he had been able to exercise, to avoid the dreadful consequences of total anarchy.

The effect of this scene was various as the minds which were called on to consider it. The senior officers, roused to reflection by the eloquence of Colonel Close, viewed with horror and remorse the extent of their guilt; the younger and more violent men resolved on measures of extremity. The natives were at this time steady in their attachment to their

officers, and so much alarmed and provoked at the idea of being separated from them, and placed under the command of young officers from the King's service, that they entered into a solemn pledge to each other to destroy the 33d regiment, if it should attempt to oppose them; the cavalry proposing that they should be allowed to charge them first. Circumstances, which accidentally occurred, tended to prove the reality of this feeling, and it was most fortunate that the prudence of Colonel Montresor prevented such a catastrophe.

The garrison from Masulipatam, and the field detachment at Jaulna, were summoned to join the Hyderabad force, which had prepared to march on the 9th of August, but was prevented by the temperate and conciliatory remonstrances of Colonel Montresor. The garrison of Masulipatam, which had been calmed by Colonel Malcolm's exertions, when he left that place on the 22d July, was, by the subsequently proposed test, replaced in mutiny, and had determined to march on the 8th of August to Hyderabad.

At this period the proclamation of the Governor-General, of the 20th of July*, announ-

* Appendix, No. 11.

cing his intention to proceed to the coast, for the purpose of making himself more accurately acquainted with circumstances, and endeavouring to reclaim the officers to a sense of their allegiance, reached Masulipatam, and was forwarded to Hyderabad. Reflection had already operated powerfully; Colonel Close's oration, for as such it eminently deserves to be distinguished, had shown to all but the most violent, the abyss into which they were about to plunge; they eagerly caught at the opening for escape offered by Lord Minto's proclamation; and, on the 11th of August, addressed a letter to his Lordship, submitting to his authority, signed the test, and asked amnesty for themselves and brother officers at other stations, to whom they earnestly recommended the immediate adoption of similar measures*.

On the same date a scene occurred, near Seringapatam, of a nature to recall to a sense of duty all in whom that sentiment was not utterly extinguished. The leaders of insubordination, in that garrison, had summoned to their aid two battalions from Chittledroog, which had marched on the 6th, and, after being harassed by the Mysoor horse, placed for that

* Appendix, No. 12.

purpose, on their route, had, on the 11th, approached within four miles of Seringapatam; a regiment of dragoons, his Majesty's 59th regiment of foot; a regiment of native cavalry, and a battalion of native infantry, both officered from his Majesty's corps, had marched from Bangalore, under Colonel Gibbs, to intercept this detachment. Worn out by a march of 180 miles in five days, the Sepoys from Chittledroog, at the moment of attack, were incapable, had they been willing, to make resistance; and, on the appearance of the dragoons joining the Mysore horse in the charge, threw down their arms, and endeavoured to escape across a nulla, beyond which a swamp of paddy fields would aid their escape to the fort, whence a detachment had sallied to make a diversion in their favour; all but the rear guard had crossed, when the dragoons charged the unarmed and unresisting Sepoys, and cut down 150 of their number. Captain Mackintosh, their commander, who had crossed the nulla, returned to endeavour to stop the carnage, and was wounded and made prisoner; the other officers, with above one thousand men, got into the Fort of Seringapatam without farther loss, one young officer excepted, who died from excessive fatigue.

On the 9th of August, the government had, by general orders, pardoned the non-commissioned European officers and privates of the European regiments at Masulipatam, excluding the officers as rebels. This order was, on the 14th, read to the regiment by General Pater. The men declared that they would accept of no pardon in which their officers were not included; a considerable agitation ensued; but the proscribed officers at length succeeded in persuading the men to *return to their duty*, and *leave them to their fate.*

The government had resorted to the most dangerous of all expedients to counteract the existing disaffection, by causing letters to be written to native officers, and employing agents to tempt the men, by promises and other means of persuasion, to desert their European officers, who were stated to be unworthy of respect and obedience. It was safe to trust to such a man as Colonel Close the personal exercise of such a dangerous discretion; and it may be added, that after his failure, it was absurd to expect more powerful effects from the intervention of any other agent. But the very success of an attempt thus thrown abroad to work desolation, under the blind, distant, and uncontrouled direction of chance, was infinitely more to be

apprehended than its failure, and it was fortunate that, in every instance that I have heard of, the receivers of such letters uniformly waited on their officers to report the fact, treated them as forgeries, and declared that these attempts only bound them more firmly in their attachment.

The first effect of this system was unfortunate. Letters, of the tendency above described, received by native officers at Jaulna, from the office of the Adjutant-general, were immediately communicated to their officers. This large and effective field-force, when summoned to march to Hyderabad, had resisted the measure, and remonstrated against violence; the present incident, added to the intelligence of the test, threw its officers into a state of phrenzy; they actually marched on the 14th, confident in the unshaken attachment of the native troops, and published a most inflammatory manifesto, to explain the objects of their movement. The intelligence of Lord Minto's proclamation, and the submission of the officers at Hyderabad, reached them on their second march, and they returned to their former frontier station.

A laboured account, "stating that nearly the whole of the rebel force from Chittledroog

had been destroyed," had been published under the authority of the government, on the 18th of August, and the *unhappy fate* of the whole had been pourtrayed in a very moving picture, inserted in the general orders, and translated for the edification of the native troops; it so happened that one of the battalions at Hyderabad was raised at the same place as one of those stated to have been destroyed, and both corps were nearly connected by family relationships. The account of this *destruction* produced the greatest agitation in the battalion alluded to, and through it in all the other corps. The women called loudly on their husbands and brothers to revenge their relatives, who had been butchered by the *Europeans;* and, it is difficult to determine, whether the storm would have burst on the 33d regiment, have terminated in a renewal of the scenes of 1806, or have involved the horrors of both, had not a private letter, which Colonel Montresor judiciously made public, contradicted the official statement. On the 30th of August, the government thought proper to contradict their narrative of the 18th, but the agitations which have been produced among the native troops, by the communications made

to them, under the authority of government, are assuming the most serious forms, and I shudder to contemplate their probable consequences.

Seringapatam surrendered unconditionally on the 22d of August; and all resistance is considered to be now at an end.

I have hastily described the progress of actual resistance and rebellion, not only from a dislike to dwell on a subject so painful, but from a persuasion that you will receive it at length in public documents, which you will of course peruse with the doubts and reservations arising from the example which I have just recited.

Lord Minto arrived on the 11th of September, and if he sees with his own eyes, and hears with his own ears, he may yet do much good, although his powers are greatly weakened by the unguarded approbation he bestowed, without a thorough knowledge of the nature of the system which he praised.

I inclose, together with copies of all the papers to which I have hitherto referred, an address, stated to be from the principal inhabitants of Madras, to Sir George Barlow, who answers and thanks in that character, the Chief

Judge, without his colleague, two members of the council, the participators of his measures, without the senior member, who is stated to have opposed them, and an assemblage of dependants, civil and military, including the Governor's own personal staff, who, in allusion to the official station and habits of its supposed author, were said to have been subpœna'd to sign what they had not been assembled to propose or discuss. A very differently signed address may be expected to Lord Minto: a meeting has been regularly announced by the Sheriff, and the sentiments towards his predecessor will procure him abundant congratulations, although he does not himself precisely correspond with the notion we have formed, from some examples yet fondly remembered, of "a patriot Governor-General."

Sir George, since he, like the non-conforming officers, has been obliged *to retire for the present from the functions of that office*, is said to claim, for his measure of influencing the Sepoys, the whole merit of subduing insurrection. Nothing can be more completely unfounded; the Sepoys adhered, even to the bad cause of their officers, until the moment of their submission, with an attachment at which all must rejoice, who know how to look beyond the present mo-

ment for the means of permanent prosperity in India. To the effect of Col. Close's address to the European officers at Hyderabad, their consequent reflection on the evils of civil war, and other countless mischiefs necessarily resulting from the fatal system they had adopted, and, above all, to the opening for hope afforded by Lord Minto's opportune proclamation, of the 20th of July, must be ascribed the return of the insubordinate to duty and obedience.

What may be the conclusion is a speculation at this moment of the utmost anxiety to all those (and they constitute the whole mass of society), who have friends they esteem, deeply involved in measures which they cannot but condemn, and who feel an interest in the future prosperity of India. May the Almighty grant firmness and decision to our present ruler, to inflict with promptitude, and according to due course of trial, those dreadful punishments, without which, the future exercise of government must be impracticable: and this work of imperious necessity, once over, and the requisite mercy extended to minor offenders, may the Source of all Mercy pour into his heart the wisdom to correct, by a radical change,

those errors in the recent system, which we view as the chief cause of all the evils we deplore!

I am,

My dear G———,

Your's, &c.

Madras, Sept. 13,
1809.

APPENDIX.

N. B. Many of the Papers transmitted with this Letter having already appeared in the daily Prints, have on account of their length been omitted by the Editor, such extracts only being retained, as appeared to be absolutely necessary for the information of the Reader.

No. 1.

CHARGE.

WE the undersigned Officers do hereby charge Lieut.-Col. Munro, quarter-master-general of the army, and captain in the Madras European regiment, with conduct unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman in the following instance, viz.

In having, in his plan for the abolition of the tent contract lately held by officers commanding native corps, made use of false and infamous insinuations, thereby tending to injure our characters as officers, and otherwise injurious to our characters as gentlemen.

Signed by thirty-two Officers Commanding Corps.

No. 2.

MEMORIAL from the OFFICERS *commanding* NATIVE CORPS *upon the Establishment of* FORT ST. GEORGE, *to the Hon.* COURT *of* DIRECTORS *of the Hon.* EAST-INDIA COMPANY, &c.

SHEWETH,

1. That we, the undersigned Memorialists, officers, commanding native corps upon the Madras Establishment, have the honour, with all deference and respect, to solicit the attention of your Honourable Court to the subject of our appeal, which we, with the utmost duty and submission, offer to your consideration.

2. Your Memorialists beg to state, that Captain JOHN MUNRO, of the European regiment on this Establishment, and quarter-master-general of the army, delivered some months since to the Commander-in-Chief at Madras, certain proposals, bearing date 30 June, 1808, recommending the abolition of the tent contract, which, on the 1st of July last, was taken from officers commanding native corps in your army, at Madras.

3. Whether the tent contract, as consistent with the good of the public service, should or should not have continued to exist, is a subject your Memorialists will not presume to trouble your Honourable Court upon; but certain articles which the Quarter-Master-General has inserted in his proposals, as motives that prevailed with him for recommending the abolition of the tent contract, your Memorialists have to observe, no less excited their surprise, than did the feelings of poignant concern, in perceiving such dishonourable principles so unjustly attributed to them.

4. Your Memorialists will here furnish the extracts from the Quarter-Master-General's proposals, on which they ground their complaint to your Honourable Court:—

" Six years experience of the practical effects of the " existing system of the camp-equipage equipment of " the native army has afforded means of forming a judg- " ment relative to its advantages and efficiency, which " were not possessed by the persons who proposed its " introduction; and an attentive examination of its " operations during that period of time has suggested " the following observations regarding it:—By grant- " ing the same allowance in peace and war for the " equipment of a native corps, while the expences in- " cidental to that charge are unavoidably much great- " er in war than in peace, it places the interest and " duty of officers commanding native corps in direct " opposition to one another; it makes it their interest " that their corps should not be in a state of efficiency " fit for field-service, and therefore furnishes strong " inducements to neglect their most important duties.

" By charging commanding officers of corps with " extensive concerns, immediately affecting their pri- " vate interests, it calculated, particularly in the field, " to divert their attention and their pursuit from the " discipline and management of their corps; objects " that should furnish them with sufficient employment " for the whole of their time.

(Signed) " JOHN MUNRO,
" Quarter-Master-General of the Army."

5. Your Memorialists, with the justest sentiments of deference to your Hon. Court, beg to state that these

articles unequivocally convey a most cruel and wanton insult, as well as an injurious aspersion (we all feel it) to officers who have faithfully served their country, many for nearly 30 years, some more; in affirming, that upon the experience and observation of six years, formed upon the judgment of practical effect, it appears, officers commanding native corps have strong inducements, from interest, to neglect their most important duties, in order that their corps should not be in a state of efficiency fit for field-service.

6. Your Memorialists conceive that these assertions, in their application with regard to time, and operation with respect to effect, are no less than accusing them of having sacrificed the interests and security of the public service for a base purpose, and of having violated that trust which your Honourable Court, which Government, and which the Commander-in-chief, in certain confidence place in them. Your Memorialists perceive in them also an insinuation of an utter dereliction of the pride of military spirit, in their having a wish, from pecuniary motives, not to be prepared to meet the enemies of their country.

7. Impressed with those painful sensations, which such serious imputations cannot fail to create, your Memorialists, in several instances, without delay, and with all possible respect, separately addressed themselves to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant-General HAY MACDOWALL, upon the subject of the Quarter-Master-General's allegations. His Excellency had the condescension to answer the several applications of appeal; but in a circular reply, observing in substance, that as he had not been consulted with regard to the

abolition of the tent contract, he did not feel himself at liberty to interfere in any matter connected with the subject, upon individual application.

8. Your Memorialists have to state to your Honourable Court, that, in consequence of this notification, feeling the injury done them by the insinuations in the Quarter-Master-General's minute, they adopted the means of redress which appeared to them to be most consistent with their ideas of justice, and, with the duty they owe to their superiors, submitted to their immediate principal, the Commander-in-Chief, the substance of their complaints, in the form of a military charge; but finding that this mode was considered by the Judge-Advocate-General to be irregular, or ineffectual towards the vindication of their injured feelings, they respectfully abide by that opinion for the present, and have solicited a suspension of the direct charge against the individual, while they appealed to the candour and justice of your Honourable Court, trusting it may please them to order an investigation of the subject, as from an investigation alone can they hope for a removal of the disgraceful impression which the insinuations in the Quarter-Master-General's proposals are calculated to produce, and which your Memorialists in confidence beg to assure your Honourable Court are equally unfounded in fact as they are injurious to the characters of the officers of the Honourable Company's army.

9. Your Memorialists have further to state to your Honourable Court, that had the Quarter-Master-General promulgated his injurious insinuations, serious as they are, in his capacity of Captain in the European regiment, a conscious integrity might, from the repugnance your Memorialists feel to complain, have

treated them probably with a dignified silence, or with private dissuasive admonition; but, armed with the authority of the Quarter-Master-General of the Army, your Memorialists are of opinion that they obtain a consequence and consideration, which, it is apprehended by them, cannot fail to influence the public mind, not only in India, but in Europe; and create a belief, that a Quarter-Master-General could not possibly circulate such serious assertions, against a body of officers of that army of which he is Quarter-Master-General, without an existing just cause.

10. To remove such an impression, and to establish upon incontrovertible testimony, that the officers commanding native corps have faithfully fulfilled those duties which the public service expects and requires from them, are the primary objects which gave birth to that solicitude on the part of your Memorialists, for an investigation. A secondary object is to stamp with due effect the nature of that offence in promulgating such serious and erroneous matter, so highly injurious to their characters as officers and gentlemen, as well as to the respectability of the Honourable Company's service in general.

11. Your Memorialists anxiously hope, that when the magnitude of the subject of which they complain shall be taken into consideration by your Honourable Court, it will fully appear to your judgment that they are not actuated, in their appeal, by any frivolous or unreasonably tenacious principles, on any object not strictly connected with that perfect moderation and temperate pursuit of justice, which your Honourable Court, in its wisdom and consideration, are ever dis-

posed to attend to, with those who, under the feeling and firm persuasion of just complaint, claim your protection and support.

12. "Your Memorialists, through the medium of their immediate Superior, his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Lieut. Gen. HAY MACDOWALL, transmit their memorial; and in relying upon that distinguished liberality and goodness which have invariably marked his attentions to them, to give their cause that support which in his judgment it may deserve; they will with every sentiment of profound respect and deference submissively wait for, and obediently conform to such decision, as your Honourable Court shall, in the justness of your wisdom, determine upon their cause.

Madras, Dec. 1808. Signed by thirty-two Officers, Commanding Native Corps.

[This was rejected by Sir GEORGE BARLOW, and returned to General MACDOWALL.]

To the ADJUTANT GENERAL of the ARMY.

"SIR—We the under-mentioned Officers, commanding native corps upon this Establishment, have the honour to forward the accompanying memorial which we request you will lay before his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Lieut. General HAY MACDOWALL, and which we have to solicit his Excellency will take such measures as to him may appear most suitable for the transmission of the same to the Hon. Court of Directors.

"The Commander-in-Chief being already so well acquainted with the general and particular circumstances that gave rise to the immediate subject of appeal, it be-

comes wholly unnecessary on our part to enter into any further explanation for his Excellency's information.

" The long series of years which the Commander-in-Chief has served with the Coast-army, and that benign goodness with which he has invariably, both in his public and private character, distinguished many of those who now appeal through his authority, under a period of painful concern, creates every confidence and hope that his Excellency will, as our immediate superior, condescend to honour our memorial with such assistance and support, as in his judgment the subject has claim to; and which, we are fully persuaded, cannot fail to give it the most impartial introduction to the attention of the Hon. Court of Directors.

" Madras Establishment, Dec. 1808."

[Signed by 32 Officers commanding Native Corps.]

No. 3.

Extract—General Orders, 17th January 1809.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is pleased to direct that officers commanding divisions, stations, corps, or detachments of corps, shall, on the receipt of orders directing the movement of any part of the troops under their command, forward by the same day's Post a copy of such orders to the office of the Adjutant-General of the Army, under similar exceptions to that contained in the 4th paragraph of the 7th section of the code of regulations respecting special orders from the secret department of government, when such copies shall be addressed personally to the Commander-in-Chief or officer commanding the forces, and superscribed—Secret.

28018

No. 4.

GENERAL ORDERS.—BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

"*Head Quarters, Choultry Plain, Jan.* 25, 1809.

"The moment is now arrived when Lieutenant-General M'Dowall is to take leave of the Company's army, whose ardent courage, consummate discipline, and persevering firmness, have been displayed in the achievements of those brilliant exploits which have secured its own glory, and added to the British Empire extensive fertile regions of incalculable value and importance. May your patriotism, valour, and worth, be acknowledged and rewarded by your King and the East-India Company, in proportion as they are known and appreciated by your Commander-in-Chief!

"Had Lieut. General M'Dowall succeeded to the high and enviable office with all the advantages enjoyed by his predecessors, he would, upon first assuming the command, have promulgated his sentiments on so flattering an event; but the circumstances of his appointment were so humiliating and unpropitious, that he declined addressing the army, in the anxious hope that the Court of Directors might, on further deliberation, be induced to restore him to his right, by altering the new and extraordinary forms of government, and have enabled him to exercise the function of his station, as the representative of the army, with honour to the service and credit to himself; no prospect of such an occurrence being at all probable, in justice to the army and to his own character, he has determined to retire.

"On quitting a country where he has passed the greatest part of his life, and where he possesses many

dear and respectable friends, Lieut.-General M'Dowall cannot view his separation from a body of men he is sincerely attached to, without suffering the most painful sensations from the nature of the service he can have little chance of ever meeting with them again, but he is bound to declare that the whole of their conduct meets with his entire approbation, and he will boldly affirm, without danger of contradiction, that his Majesty has not, in any part of his dominions, a more loyal, patriotic, and valiant class of soldiers and subjects, than the officers composing the army at Fort St. George. That success may continue to attend their steps; that their dearly bought laurels may never decay; and that their bravery and discipline may gather additional wreaths in the field of honour, is the sincere prayer of a man who will never forget them!

(Signed) "F. CAPPER,
"Adj-Gen. of the Army."

No. 5.

GENERAL ORDERS.

G. O. By the Commander-in-Chief.

Head-Quarters, Choultry Plain, Jan. 28, 1809.

The immediate departure of General Macdowall from Madras will prevent his pursuing the design of bringing L. Col. Munro, Quarter-Master-General, to trial, for disrespect to the Commander-in-Chief, for disobedience of orders, and for contempt of military authority, in having resorted to the power of the civil government

in defiance of the judgment of the officer at the head of the army, who had placed him under arrest on charges preferred against him by a number of officers commanding native corps; in consequence of which appeal direct to the Honourable the President in Council, Lieut. Gen. Macdowall has received a positive order from the Chief Secretary, to liberate Lieut. Col. Munro from arrest.

Such conduct on the part of Lieut. Col. Munro being destructive of subordination, subversive of military discipline, a violation of the sacred rights of the Commander-in-Chief, and holding out a most dangerous example to the service; Lieut. Gen. Macdowall, in support of the dignity of the profession, and his own station and character, feels it incumbent on him to express his strong disapprobation of Lieut. Col. Munro's proceedings, and considers it a solemn duty imposed upon him to reprimand Lieut. Col. Munro in general orders: And he is hereby reprimanded accordingly.

T. Boles,
Dep. Adj. Gen.

No. 6.

GENERAL ORDERS.—By Government.

"*Fort St. George,*
Jan. 31, 1809.

"It has recently come to the knowledge of the Governor in Council, that Lieutenant-general M'Dowall did, previously to his embarkation from the Presidency, leave, to be published to the army, a general order, da-

ted 28th inst. in the highest degree disrespectful to the authority of the government; in which that officer has presumed to found a public censure on an act adopted under the immediate authority of the Governor in Council, and to convey insinuations grossly derogatory to the character of the government, and subversive of military discipline, and of the foundation of public authority. The resignation of Lieutenant-General M'Dowall of the command of the army of Fort St. George not having been yet received, it becomes the duty of the Governor in Council, in consideration of the violent and inflammatory proceedings of that officer, in the present, and on other recent occasions, and for the purpose of preventing the repetition of further acts of outrage, to anticipate the period of his expected resignation, and to annul the appointment of Lieutenant-General M'Dowall to the command of the army of this Presidency. Lieutenant-General M'Dowall is accordingly hereby removed from the station of Commander-in-chief of the Forces at Fort St. George.

"The Governor in Council must lament, with the deepest regret, the necessity of resorting to an extreme measure of this nature; but when a manifest endeavour has been used to bring into degradation the supreme public authority, it is essential that the vindication should not be less signal than the offence; and that a memorable example should be given that proceedings subversive of established order can find no security under the sanction of rank, however high, or of station, however exalted.

"The general order in question having been circulated under the signature of the Deputy Adjutant-General

of the army, it must have been known to that officer, that in giving currency to a paper of this offensive description, he was acting in direct violation of his duty to the government, as no authority can justify the execution of an illegal act, connected as that act obviously in the present case has been with views of the most reprehensible nature; the Governor in Council thinks proper to mark his highest displeasure of the conduct of Major Boles, by directing that he shall be suspended from the Company's service.

"The general order left by the Commander-in-Chief for publication, under date 28th inst. is directed to be expunged from every public record, and the Adjutant-General of the Army will immediately circulate the necessary orders for that purpose.

"By order of the Hon. Gov. in Council,

"GEO. BUCHAN.
Sec. to Government."

No. 7.

Extract from the Officers at Nundidroog.

"The Right Hon. Lord Minto has admitted the right of soldiers on some occasions to consider the nature and tendency of orders: under this sanction we solemnly protest against measures, which, if persevered in, cannot fail to ruin our Honourable masters. We see the evil already far advanced; we behold the probable consequences of the present system; and we shudder for the fate of British India."

No. 8.

G. O. By the Honourable the Governor in Council.

Fort St. George, the 1st of May, 1809.

The zeal and discipline by which, the military establishment of *Fort St. George* had long been distinguished, induced the Governor in Council to expect that the measures which the violent and intemperate acts of the late Commander-in-Chief had imposed on the Government, would be received by all the officers of the army with the sentiments of respect and obedience prescribed by the principles of military subordination, and due to the government by which those measures were adopted, as well as to the authorities to which they were ultimately referred. The Governor in Council has however learned with a degree of surprise proportionate to the confidence which he reposed in the discipline of the army, that soon after the departure of the late Commander-in-Chief, proceedings of the most unjustifiable nature, and correspondent to the example which he had afforded, were pursued by certain officers of the army.

The most reprehensible of those proceedings consisted in the preparation of a paper addressed to the Right Honourable the Governor-General, purporting to be a remonstrance in the name of the army against the acts of the government under which it serves. That paper is not more hostile to the authority of this government than to the first principles of all government.

It maintains opinions directly adverse to the constitution of the British service, and is calculated to destroy

every foundation of discipline, obedience, and fidelity. The secrecy observed in preparing this seditious paper, prevented for some time the discovery of the persons engaged in that proceeding. But it has now been ascertained that Captain Josiah Marshall, late Secretary to the Military Board, and Lieutenant Colonel George Martin, lately permitted to proceed to *England*, were principally concerned in preparing and circulating the memorial in question; and that Lieutenant-Colonel, the *Honourable* Arthur Sentleger was active in promoting its circulation, employing the influence which he derived from the important command confided to him by the government, for the purpose of attempting the subversion of its authority, and spreading disaffection among the troops which it had entrusted to his charge.

It has also been ascertained, that Major John De Morgan has been active in the circulation of the memorial.

The Governor in Council is also under the necessity of noticing another paper of a most dangerous tendency, lately in circulation at some of the military stations, purporting to be an address from the Officers of the army to Major Boles, the late Deputy Adjutant-General. In this address a right is assumed to decide on the acts of the government, by condemning in unqualified terms the sentence of suspension passed on Major Boles; and an encouragement is held out to other officers to violate their duty to the government, by affording a pecuniary indemnification not only to Major Boles, but to all such officers as shall suffer by any act of the government which the subscribers to the address may deem exceptionable. This paper, so incompatible with the military

character, and so repugnant to the first principles of military discipline and government, was forced on the attention of the Governor by Captain James Grant, Commandant of his body-guard, who, while holding that confidential situation, and employed by order of the Governor in Council under the Resident at *Travancore*, transmitted a copy of the paper to be laid before the Governor with an avowal that he had affixed his signature to it, and a defence of the grounds on which he adopted that proceeding.

It has also been ascertained, that a paper of a similar tendency has been circulated among the officers of the corps of artillery at the *Mount*, and that its circulation has been promoted by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Bell, the officer commanding that corps.

The Governor in Council regrets that he is obliged to notice also the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers (commanding in *Travancore*,) and Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage (lately commanding in *Malabar*, and employed with the troops under his orders in *Travancore*,) who appear to have taken no steps whatever either to repress, or report to the government the improper proceedings pursued by part of the troops under their orders. It is not sufficient for officers holding commands, to avoid a participation in such proceedings; it is their positive and indispensable duty to adopt the most decided measures for their suppression, and to report them to their superior authorities.

It has further been ascertained that Captain J. M. Coombs, Assistant Quarter-Master-General in *Mysore*, has been concerned in these reprehensible proceedings.

It becomes the painful duty of the Governor in Coun-

cil to mark with the displeasure of the government the conduct of the abovementioned officers, who have been engaged in a course of measures equally dangerous to the existence of discipline, to the foundations of legal government, and to the interests of their country.

The undermentioned Officers are accordingly declared to be suspended from the service of the Honourable Company until the pleasure of the Honourable the Court of Directors shall be known :

Lieutenant-Colonel the *Honourable* Arthur Sentleger.
Major John De Morgan.
Captain Josiah Marshall, and
Captain James Grant.

Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant Robert Bell is removed from all military charge and command until the pleasure of the Honourable the Court of Directors shall be known : but he is permitted to draw his regimental pay and allowances.

Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant Chalmers is removed from the command of the subsidiary force in *Travancore.*

The undermentioned officers are removed from their staff-appointments, and ordered to join the corps to which they s tand attached :

Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage, Adjutant-General ; and Captain J. M. Coombs.

The Governor in Council considers it to be proper to avail himself of this occasion to correct a misapprehension highly dangerous in its tendency, which has arisen in the minds of some of the officers of the army with regard to the nature of the authority of the Governor in Council. This misapprehension appears to have origina-

ted in the general order published by the late Commander-in-Chief on the 28th of January last, from which it might be inferred that the authority of the Governor in Council is only of a civil nature; whereas by the express enactment of the legislature, the entire civil and military government of the Presidency of *Fort St. George* and its dependencies is vested in the Governor in Council. It is therefore to be distinctly understood, that no officer, of whatever rank, while serving under the Presidency of *Fort St. George*, can, without incurring the penalties of disobedience to the legislature of his country, issue any order in violation, or to the derogation of the authority of the government; and that every officer complying with an order of that description under any pretence whatever, renders himself liable to the forfeiture of the service, and to such legal penalties as the nature of the case may demand.

While the Governor in Council deems it to be proper to afford the foregoing explanation, he feels himself at the same time bound to acknowledge that the principles to which he has adverted, had never been called in question until the publication of the abovementioned order of the late Commander-in-Chief; on the contrary, these principles had been invariably acted upon by the government and by the officers of the army of this Presidency, who have been no less distinguished for their obedience and discipline, than for their achievements in the field.

The Governor in Council also experiences the most sincere satisfaction in publishing his conviction that the majority of the army have resisted all participation in the improper and dangerous proceedings

described in this order; and it is an act of justice to the troops of his Majesty's service to declare his entire approbation of the order, discipline, and steady adherence to duty, which they have invariably manifested. The information before the government does not enable the Governor in Council to distinguish by the expression of his approbation all the troops of the Company's service that have manifested the same dispositions; but he deems it to be proper to notice on this occasion the satisfactory and exemplary conduct of the part of the army composing the *Hyderabad* subsidiary force. The Honourable the Governor in Council is also confident that such officers as have inadvertently yielded to the misrepresentations of individuals who have been engaged in the prosecution of designs equally fatal to the honour and to the interests of the army, will in future manifest in the service of the government the obedience, fidelity, and zeal, which constitute the first principles of their profession, which hitherto distinguished the army, and which are indispensable to the prosperity of the British Empire in *India*.

By order of the Honourable the Governor in Council.

(Signed) A. FALCONAR,
CHIEF SEC. TO GOV.

By order of Major General Goodie,
Commanding the Army.

No. 9.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant, ROBERT BELL.

Sir,

The Officers of the Artillery now at St. Thomas's Mount have learnt with extreme regret, that by the orders of government, under date the 1st of May 1809, you have been removed from the command of their corps and this cantonment.

Permit us upon this occasion to express to you the happiness we have long experienced in your society, as an individual; the high respect we entertain for your military character, and the conviction with which we are thoroughly impressed of your being on every occasion actuated by a generous zeal for the public service, and the purest principles of private virtue, and professional honour. With such sentiments of esteem, it may be supposed, that the cause stated by government for the suspension of your functions has greatly distressed us; and firmly believing, as we do, that the Governor in Council must, on this occasion, have received information regarding you, altogether incorrect, we seize this early opportunity, in justice to you and to ourselves, to make this solemn and unequivocal declaration, that you have neither directly nor indirectly countenanced or influenced the circulation of any papers of the tendency alluded to in the above order; on the contrary, you have invariably evinced the greatest disinclination to making any comments whatever upon late occurrences.

With feelings of the highest respect and with a sin-

cere hope that we may soon again enjoy the honour and happiness of being under your command,

We remain, Sir, your sincere Well-wishers and very obedient Servants,

(Signed) JOHN BELL, Lieut. Col. and Twenty-eight Artillery-Officers.

No. 10.

To Col. DAVIS, Commanding, Mysore.

Sir,

I have this morning received your official letter, giving cover to a copy of a letter from government, under date the 26th ult.; and have in reply to state, that I tendered the paper in due form to all the officers present here, who (unanimously) refused to sign it. I have delivered over the command to Supadar Bohool Sing, a most respectable and good soldier, whom I had some trouble to persuade to supersede his European officers in the command of the corps and station. The enclosed will fully explain any thing farther.

August 6th, 1809. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) I. W——h.
late Major.

No. 11.

Extract from Lord Minto's Proclamation, or General Order of the 20th July, 1809.

The occurrence of this afflicting event*, combined with the agitation which unhappily prevails among the offi-

* The mutiny at Masulipatam.

cers of the army of Fort St. George, renders it the duty of the Governor-General to proceed without delay to that Presidency, in the hope of being enabled successfully to appeal to those sentiments of loyalty and attachment to their King and their Country, which his Lordship in Council yet confidently ascribes to the general body of the officers of the Coast-army, whose zeal, fidelity, and professional achievements have hitherto been the theme of just and unqualified applause, and by an accurate knowledge of all circumstances which have attended the late agitation, to devise such means as may best tend to avert the impending dangers of anarchy and insubordination, and re-establish the foundations of public security and national prosperity in this important branch of the British Empire.

No. 12.

(Copy.)

Secunderabad, 11th August, 1809.

We the undersigned officers of the Company's army, attached to the Hyderabad subsidiary force, awfully impressed with a sense of the dangers that threaten the country, and not less actuated by those pure sentiments of loyalty and patriotism, from which we have never departed, beg leave to assure you that we attribute the want of success of Colonel Close's mission to the sudden and unexpected manner in which he presented the test that was proposed for our signatures; relying however, as we are now disposed to do, upon the jus-

tice, wisdom, and clemency of your Lordship, we do not hesitate in avowing our determination to abide by your Lordship's decision; and as a proof of the sincerity of our principles, have subscribed the test which now accompanies this address: at the same time most earnestly appealing to your Lordship's generosity for granting a general amnesty to us and to all those who have been engaged in the late unhappy events.

To the Right Honourable Lord Minto, &c. &c. &c.

Circular to the Stations of the Army.

The above address with the test has been signed and dispatched by all the officers of the force: imperious circumstances demanded, and mature reflection impelled them to the measure which they earnestly implore their brother officers to adopt as speedily as possible.

(Signed) The Officers of the H. S. Force.

13th August, 1809.

FINIS.

Harding and Wright, Printers, St. John's Square, London.

A GLANCE

AT THE PAST AND THE FUTURE

IN CONNECTION WITH

THE INDIAN REVOLT.

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL H. T. TUCKER, C.B.,

LATE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY IN BENGAL.



LONDON:

EFFINGHAM WILSON, ROYAL EXCHANGE.

1857.

"If you see man or boy striving earnestly on the weak side, however wrong-headed or blundering he may be, you are not to go and join the cry against him. . . . . At any rate, remember that he has found something in the world which he will fight and suffer for."—TOM BROWN'S SCHOOL-DAYS.

THE INDIAN REVOLT.

CHAPTER I.

At a time when the eyes of all men are open to the glaring errors and imperfections in our Indian system of government, which has resulted in such a revolt and mutiny as cannot be paralleled in history, and when the columns of every newspaper have teemed with suggestions and plans from many who, before the realization of this fearful catastrophe, were content to repose in placid indifference and apathy, I feel impelled, in offering a few remarks for the consideration of those interested in the welfare of our fellow-countrymen in India, to reproduce a few extracts from the cautions and warnings which, in 1852, when all was peaceful and quiet, I ventured, at the cost of grave imputations of being an alarmist, to publish in an Address to the Proprietors of East India Stock. The subsequent alteration in the terms of the Company's charter induced me to forego my design of canvassing that body generally, but I printed and distributed no less than 400 copies, of which many were circulated to persons in the highest positions, and filling the most important situations both in India and in England. The elaborate Address I had prepared commenced as follows. Paragraph 1:—

"I beg to solicit your support in view to my election as one of your Directors for the management of the affairs of the East India Company.

"It is proper that I should state to you the grounds of my appeal, and I have thought it also incumbent on me to explain generally the views and opinions I entertain in regard to the system and policy it is desirable to pursue in conducting so difficult, so peculiar, and so vast a Government as that of the British Empire in the East.'

At Paragraph 7, I observed that—

"The stability and internal tranquillity of our vast Indian pos-

sessions require, in the chiefest degree, the constant vigilant attention of the Governing Authorities, both in Europe and in Hindostan. Our extensive conquests since the commencement of the present century have perhaps enlarged our dominions to the utmost extent necessary or desirable; but we may nevertheless find it impossible, consistently with safety and good policy, to arrest the tide of conquest. On the East, on the West, and to the northward of us, still remain powerful, turbulent, and in some cases warlike and ambitious neighbours. As with Bhurtpore formerly, so probably will it be with the kingdom of Nepal. A second war will some day be entered on to decide the final mastery, and our peaceful and fertile plains will witness the descent of an army of warlike and well-appointed Goorkahs, with possibly Thibet and China at their back."

After entering into various details, in which, among other matters, I enforced the necessity for "*confirming* and *consolidating our supremacy*," and observed that "to strengthen and secure our centre, and the long line of the Himalayan frontier, should be now, and during the years of peace, the subject of grave consideration and deliberate and scientific arrangement," I entered, at Paragraph 12, on the subject of the Native Troops. It runs as follows:—

"No considerations can be more important than those connected with the discipline and welfare of the native forces in India. Within the last twenty years much has been done in each of the armies of the three Presidencies in view to improvement, and it is to be hoped with effect. But fanciful and mere theoretical changes, however well intended, prove often fallacious when practically applied; and that some erroneous steps have been taken of late years, in regard to the increase of pay and allowances to the Sepoys, can scarcely, I fear, admit of a doubt. To retrace our steps on such occasions is sometimes impracticable, or, at the least, dangerous and unsafe, and we can do nothing at the price of disaffection. Those who hold the reins of Government, whether at home or in India, should never be forgetful of the fact that our armies are composed of mercenaries, not of national troops; and that when, in the course of events, they shall become nationalized, it must necessarily be in opposition to foreign rule and domination. Our conquests, which have brought so many kingdoms and provinces under one form of Government, together with our system of education and freedom of the press, are gradually *nationalizing India*. For the sake alike of the governed and those who control them, it is desirable that the just and philanthropic views which have actuated our Statesmen in introducing these and

other measures of amelioration, should be slowly, even tardily, progressive; and if this, as I conscientiously believe, is applicable to the great mass of the people, it assuredly, and in tenfold force, applies to the native troops of India in European employ."

And again, in the following paragraph:—

"We have carried to the very verge of prudence a system which was and is admirable while kept within due bounds. We have been so successful that there is danger of our becoming too secure; but the tens of thousands which compose our armies in the East, are simple mercenaries, opposed to us as much in faith, nation, and feeling, as in colour. We should be sedulously careful, therefore, *to maintain a just equipoise,* for our real strength does not consist in overwhelming bodies of mercenaries,—these may indeed one day constitute our chief weakness,—but in the numbers, the valour, and the discipline of our fellow-countrymen. These, and our European officers serving with the native troops, we should increase and foster as far as the means and finances of the State will admit, for on them we must depend when troubled and stormy times shall hereafter arise; while we should be ever on the watch to avoid that false and specious system that in its result would convert useful and obedient auxiliaries into greedy, pampered, and overbearing Pretorians."

In the foregoing, I endeavoured earnestly to attract attention to the necessity for maintaining "a just equipoise" between "the overwhelming bodies of mercenaries in our employ, and the European national troops;" and to enforce attention, I added: "It is not without a motive that I advert to these grave matters, for although no alarmist, I hold *that it is fatal to slumber on in a fancied security.*" It may be asked by some intelligent reflective reader, But did this paper ever reach the eye of any one in authority, having power to inquire and move in such a business? My reply is, Yes, many; but I give one proof. I printed this paper at Simla, in the beginning of August, 1852. I sent a copy to Lord Dalhousie, then in Calcutta, and had some correspondence with him on the subject; he uttered no word of dissent in reference to my estimate of the dependence to be placed upon the Sepoy troops; but his own words will be a convincing proof that he thought them just, and that my becoming a Director of the Company would be productive of good. I am not aware that in making this use of them I infringe on any received etiquette; I am not using them in order to attack his Lordship, but to show that I did make known my opinions in the very highest quarter, and that if no inquiry or reform followed, I at least

may claim to be exonerated from any charge of blindness or supineness. *Speaking before the event*, I think it will be allowed that I could scarcely have said more, for I was filling at that period a very important situation, that of Adjutant-General of the Army in Bengal, and I was liable to be called upon both to explain and justify my opinions. From Lord Dalhousie's communication, to which I have alluded, I extract as follows:—

"Government House,
"16th August, 1852.

"My dear Tucker,

"The intimation you give me of your views towards the Direction, does not take me quite by surprise; and I shall be heartily glad to see them accomplished.

"I doubt I can aid you with little beyond good wishes. When I was appointed to this Government, I did not know one of the Court, except —— and Mr. ——. Besides these I can't say I know any now, but those who have been in the Chair.

"It does not seem to me that they will let you start while you are employed. But if they do, as whenever they do, I will most readily write to those whom I do know among them. —— asked me (with the same object in view as you now propose to yourself) to write to him if I thought well of him, and say I wished him success. I was not vain enough to suppose this would be of much use. He thought so, however, and if it was useful then, it will probably be equally or more so now. If you should think so, I shall be truly glad to do it whenever you express the wish. Always yours sincerely,

"(Signed) DALHOUSIE."

At Paragraphs 15 and 16 of my Address, I entered upon the state of the Civil Government; that was a matter requiring delicate handling, for no persons are more easily aroused than the Bengal Civil Service of the present day, when any hint is given that they do not appear to be altogether infallible. Nevertheless I wrote as follows:—

"As regards the civil administration, there is still avowedly a wide field open for amelioration; much has been done, much remains to do. The state of trade and manufactures, the revenue, the encouragement and improvement of the agricultural system, the condition of the native press and its tendencies, as at present exhibited, the construction of railroads and other scientific works and discoveries which can be made applicable to the East, each

and all demand the most careful attention; and the fostering aid, guidance, and support of Government are essential to the well-being of these interests in India, and in many cases to the perfect development of the great resources of the country.

"The state and efficiency of the civil courts, their adequacy to the ends in view on their introduction, also, require to be looked into with a jealous and precise scrutiny; for on the purity and simplicity with which we administer law and justice to the natives of the country, the prolongation, stability, and popularity of our rule will, in a great measure, ultimately depend. I feel constrained to avow candidly that, in my opinion, great defects at present exist, and that the venality which is stated to pervade our courts of law is a theme of condemnation throughout the country, chiefly attributable, however, even among themselves, to native venality and falsehood, and in a great degree also to the insufficiency of European superintendence, a supervision which, I may observe, cannot judiciously be dispensed with until a higher moral sense and far greater integrity of thought and conduct shall characterize the natives, who are quick to observe, keenly apprehensive, and quite capable of distinguishing between those *ad captandum* acts which have merely a popular tendency, and those which emanate from a pure and true spirit of philanthropy. Those rare acts and judgments which stand the test of time, and which, often at first unpopular, confer nevertheless a just fame hereafter, are never lost upon them; and European domination will therefore sustain no shock and lose no ground in the native mind, by the pursuance of a firm, cautious, and circumspect system of government; on the contrary, our rule will be raised greatly in their estimation by observing that we are not hastily carried away by new systems and plausible theories, nor easily led into the adoption of unexpected, fanciful, and ill-digested measures."

Now I will avow that I look upon the Indian Civil Service as composed generally of a most zealous and admirable body of men; but I think, notwithstanding, that great defects exist in its constitution, and that it has of late years much deteriorated: that it has become too exclusive, too much of a "vested interest," and so puffed up with self-complacency, in consequence, that it is almost impossible for the sentiments and opinions of an outsider to penetrate within the circle of its clique-like reserve. Like the unhappy native army, it has been pampered, petted, and indulged, until it cannot stand the least control or opposition, and I am greatly in error if the corre-

spondence of the Court of Directors will not show that of late years, even in the Council Chamber, unseemly, disrespectful, and insubordinate letters were addressed by the civilians of that body to the Honourable Court. Hence, when the present mutiny broke out, the opinions of independent military men were disregarded, and when officers of conduct, courage, and experience were writing from the seat of Government, that "we had *only* now to fight for it," the civilians in the council of Lord Canning were hugging themselves in the belief that the crisis was past, that the mutiny was stifled, and that an undue and unnecessary outcry had been raised! Where, it will be asked, was the Military Secretary to the Supreme Government of India at this time? What were the counsels and opinions of that officer at such a crisis? More of that hereafter. His acts shall be given in the words of an eye-witness on the spot—one who has manfully dared to speak out. The very simple reply to be given to the question here, is, that the Military Secretary was "nowhere." Except for evil, he does not appear to have even found a place. Another proof of the impolicy of advancing men to high and important positions, who have no sterling merit, and whose rise is due to mere favouritism and that pliability of disposition which bespeaks a ready partisan, while it betokens the reverse of that honest independence so necessary to the just and upright discharge of important public duties.

To recur—at Paragraph 17 of the Address to the Proprietors, I observed that the number of civilians should be greatly increased, but "not by a temporary and makeshift system, such as that of borrowing by wholesale from officers of the army, by which practice the military service is so much injured in its efficiency."

And at Paragraphs 18 and 19, I thus wrote:—

"It has been, with great justice, thought a duty to foster and promote education in India; but education generally diffused will necessarily produce new desires and suggest new objects of ambition; the process will, it is to be hoped, prove gradual, but we should prepare for it, not only with reference to our own, but with advertence also to the future interests of the people of India. The apparent apathy and indifference of the Hindu will assuredly give place by degrees under this system to feelings of patriotism, and a natural craving to exercise as well as to emulate that exalted and ennobling virtue, the desire to promote the welfare of their country, which so generally characterizes the natives of the West.

"The effect of that extension of our Empire which the course of

events has forced upon us, has been to produce an internal though almost an unconscious pressure, but which must necessarily greatly increase; and the difficulties attendant on the Government of so vast a country will be increased with it, for we cannot expect the natives of India to remain stationary. Our conquests are consolidating and becoming by degrees nationalized; but it should be remembered that dominion, equally with "glory," may be likened to those circles in the water which never cease to enlarge themselves, "till by broad spreading they disperse to nought!" In brief, our difficulties and dangers augment with our greatness, and with every prostrate and conquered kingdom, we are raising up a united internal force and pressure, which it will require all the wisdom and all the prescience our statesmen can bring to bear upon it, to regulate and control; and it is therefore essential to the well-being and interests of our own country, no less than of India, that she should be ruled and governed by those whose practical knowledge, observation, and experience will guide them to correct views and sound policy."

From this document it will, I think, appear, that I was fully alive to the imperfections of both our civil and military system, and that I desired to draw attention to it, and to aid in reforming it. I have had little opportunity for either. The door is now practically closed to the East India Direction, except to such as have interest with the Minister, or are connected with influential and aristocratic families; and, although in the situation I filled in India I did my utmost to lessen the danger of our position, yet, as it was then impossible, *in the face of all received opinion*, to dilate and insist upon the danger to be apprehended from mutiny and revolt among the Sepoys, I was able to effect but little; what I did attempt I shall briefly advert to in another chapter.

Meanwhile, in reference to what is stated at Page 4, of the "erroneous steps" taken to increase the pay and allowances of the Sepoys, it appears desirable to give an idea to the home reader of what these steps sometimes were, to enable him to understand the peculiarly unwise nature of the system often adopted in dealing with these mercenaries: one instance will suffice. It may be broadly stated, in round numbers, that the pay of the Sepoy amounts to seven rupees per mensem: with that sum he is required to feed and support himself. Certain articles of military clothing are besides supplied to him from the State; but for his food and clothing generally, and the support of his family, when he has any, this is the sum which he ordinarily receives. It is very ample; as a general rule, he saves one-half

of it, and often more, for so covetous and penurious are these high-caste men, that they will often literally half starve themselves to add to their savings; and I have positively known the medical officers of corps (than whom no class of public servants in India are more intelligent and meritorious) report men for thus denying themselves a sufficiency of food, and who, in consequence, had become so weak and emaciated as to be obliged to go into hospital!

A few years since, notwithstanding, it was thought desirable, for the sake apparently of mere change, for nothing really called for such a measure, to "better the condition" of the Sepoy, and it was resolved on the part of Government to increase their pay, and to add to it one rupee monthly, after sixteen years of service, and a second additional rupee after twenty years of service in the grade of private: these additions were to be called good-conduct pay, and could only be drawn for when the man's conduct had been unexceptionable for a previous period of two years. The theory of this very impolitic and foolish increase, which took annually a very large sum from the public exchequer, without being productive of the least corresponding good, was this:—it was contended by the advocates for the change, that by giving such increases of pay after sixteen and twenty years' service, the Sepoy would be deprived of any just ground for feeling discontent if he were passed over for promotion to the non-commissioned ranks; these additions for "good conduct" would sufficiently compensate him, it was said, for the loss of promotion, and his position would still remain an enviable one, while the addition was a proper reward for previous faithful service and good conduct. To these *ad captandum* arguments the more practical reply was, Let well alone. Do not teach your mercenaries to think that pay can be so easily raised and increased at the pleasure of any Governor or Commander-in-Chief. To imbue with such an idea mercenary troops, is to court demands of a pecuniary description which no State could support, and is to introduce amongst us the instability and fluctuations so common among the troops of the native states; when, moreover, there is no real occasion for it, and when, except in mere theory, its action will be found alike embarrassing and injurious. And so in my judgment it proved to be; for to refuse a Sepoy promotion who was enjoying extra pay for being well conducted, involved, as was soon found, a practical contradiction. Sepoys so passed over were in the habit of inquiring, "Why then did they receive extra pay, if they were not fit to be made corporals?" and the specious arguments employed were of no avail to convince them that they did not suffer an injustice.

Now, that this tampering with pay was a dangerous principle to introduce, no one who reflects dispassionately on the peculiar position we occupy in the East, can, I think, doubt. The reasons for it were simply, to the best of my recollection, those I have stated; they were certainly those of a late Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, to whose firm consistent kindness and support I have been deeply indebted, and for whose memory I shall always entertain a lasting feeling of respectful gratitude. That nobleman, in conversing with me on such subjects at Simla, so expressed himself: and the intention was doubtless good; the policy and wisdom of the act most questionable. It received, however, as was understood, the approval of the home authorities at the East India House; and with advertence to these last, I may here very properly note the contrast between the unwise and profuse liberality shown to the Sepoy, and the obstinate, perverse illiberality, in the matter of half-batta, which affects only his European officer. Just thirty years ago, the Court of Directors, during Lord William Bentinck's tenure of government, issued orders for placing all stations within 200 miles of the Presidency, on what was called "half-batta," by which measure the allowances of every European officer at such stations were considerably reduced. Now the captains and subalterns in India are very ill-paid; and this order was peculiarly hard upon the latter, who were brought from remote, quiet, up-country stations, to the Presidency (Barrackpore), and on arrival there, found themselves on reduced allowances when exposed to all the numerous expenses and temptations of the capital. No idle attempts at argument, no sophistical reasoning could get over the facts of the case. The Government urged, that wine and beer, and European articles of consumption (jams and pickles!), were cheaper than up the country, because the expense of carriage was avoided; forgetful that everything else was more expensive, and the incitements and temptations to expense incredibly increased. To add to the inconsistency, the military staff in Calcutta, the well-paid officers of the military Secretariate, Audit, Adjutant, and Quartermaster-General's offices, were all exempted and excepted from the operation of the order. These influential persons were unaffected by a general measure of so-called financial reform, while needy subalterns were to be unsparingly retrenched! The whole procedure was well fitted for the sarcasm and satire of Horace or Juvenal; and the complacency of Leadenhall-street would have been sadly ruffled, if the remarks made throughout the army had ever penetrated to those musty and antiquated recesses. Lord Metcalfe, then one of the Supreme

Council, strongly and urgently denounced the injustice and harshness of the measure, but the military class of the servants of the Company have rarely any influence at the India House, and the injustice continues to be perpetrated to this day, and is to this day also the cause of just discontent; for no quibbling logic can upset the broad fact, that in support of a foolish theory, the Directors have continued a system of payment whereby the European officer receives least pay when he most requires it, while the Sepoy, who did not require any increase at all, and to whom it was most unwise to give it, continues to receive the same, although the reasoning under which it was bestowed has been found to be utterly fallacious.

CHAPTER II.

It is not only our military system that has failed in India, but our whole civil, fiscal, and judicial policy requires to be remodelled. We have been weak and philanthropical. We have shown ourselves as rulers entirely wanting in that stern vigour, foresight, and insight into the native mind and character, so essential to the maintenance of our supremacy. We have been unwilling and reluctant to believe in that deep duplicity and consistent guile with which the *Mahomedan* native of Hindostan, more especially, so well conceals his deep-rooted malignity and hatred. Now for a time the eyes of the British public are opened, and we should seize the golden opportunity, and amend our system. It is to that end I desire to contribute my humble quota to the general information, for the question is now a national one. The will and voice of the people must now be consulted, and it is not by the Court of Directors, or even by the *Sic volo, sic jubeo* of Lord Palmerston, that the future form of Indian Government will be decided. Indeed, if, as had nearly been the case, the indecision and delay of the Cabinet, and the seeming indifference displayed to the fate of our struggling countrymen, in apparently so wilfully neglecting the means of ready transit through Egypt, had led, as was only too much to be feared, to the total overthrow of our power in Bengal, it

is to be doubted if even the patient endurance of the public would have held the Ministry excused.

To proceed with the record of my own official experience. In the beginning of the year 1850 I became Adjutant-general of the army; and Sir Charles Napier, in nominating me to that responsible post, wrote as follows:—

"From General Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India, to Lieutenant-Colonel Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army; dated Simla, 27th April, 1850.

"My dear Tucker,

"Your situation as Deputy Adjutant-General, your abilities, and your good service in war, have made you Adjutant-General, and you owe me no gratitude. I have only done justice to merit.

"I am, etc.,

"(Signed) C. J. NAPIER."

The note is characteristic. I insert it to show that it was not through Directorial influence, or subserviency of any sort, that I obtained the appointment. I was naturally earnest to discharge my duties efficiently, after such an opinion expressed by such a man, and I worked hard and sedulously with him so long as he remained in India, and I continued to receive letters from him even from that sick couch whereon he not long after breathed away his noble but unquiet spirit. But I had no desire to be a partisan; and when, therefore, I was invited by Lord Dalhousie to discuss military matters, I readily availed myself of the opportunity to prepare for his consideration various elaborate memoranda, in the hope that some practical result would follow. I submitted to his Lordship, among other papers, a memorandum regarding the unsatisfactory state of the Cavalry, regular and irregular, and suggested various changes and amendments in the system. I submitted a similar paper, of great length, relating to the state of the Artillery, and pointed out the great evils resulting from the paucity of officers and insufficiency of men. At a subsequent period I forwarded to his Lordship a document which I very carefully drew up, in which I insisted on the denuded state of the Infantry in regard to officers, and offered for consideration a plan for the formation of a staff corps; and in treating of the state of the native army generally, I advocated the abolition of the grade of native commissioned officer, that rank which, in the convulsion and revolt we have to deplore, has only produced a nest of traitors, whose duplicity, baseness, and ingratitude will for ever stand unrivalled in the annals of military

revolt. What use his Lordship may have made of my suggestions, I have no means of judging; but for the Cavalry, nothing was done until, after an interval of two or three years, Government sent home to the Court of Directors a proposal to disband four, I think, of the regular Cavalry regiments, and to substitute for them two regiments of European Dragoons. That proposal came to head-quarters for the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief. I was called upon to give mine, and did so in a paper which gave so much satisfaction to his Excellency, that he drew the particular attention of the Government to it, and it was sent home for the information of the Honourable Court. The breaking out, however, of the Crimean war, put a stop to this plan, a circumstance greatly to be lamented.

To the Artillery, after a long interval, a slight addition was made, and an additional officer or two was given to each regiment of the line; but the arrangements were quite inadequate to meet the evil complained of,—the wholesale drain, that is, of officers from corps to fill civil and staff appointments, and under which system the most experienced officers were withdrawn from regiments, leaving for the discharge of regimental duties an altogether insufficient number.

But it is not to be supposed, that in advocating privately with the Governor-General changes and alterations, I thought I sufficiently performed my part. On the contrary, I pressed on the Commander-in-Chief, and by his authority on the Government, *usque ad nauseam*, the necessity for an increase to the Artillery, etc. etc.; and as opportunity offered, I endeavoured to bring about important changes. I will give two instances, both of them bearing nearly on the present state of affairs. Many people in this country have been surprised to hear of the admirable manner in which the mutineers have worked their artillery; the explanation, though scarcely credible, is as follows:—Application had been made by the military authorities, and Government had sanctioned the instruction in the artillery gun exercise of 100 men in each regiment of Native Infantry, and accordingly ten per cent. of our Sepoys were so instructed! I shall not enter into any discussion on this strange fact—it speaks for itself; but I was so sensible of its fatuity, and of the danger likely to result from it, that I took occasion to represent to the Commander-in-Chief the suicidal nature of the measure, and obtained from Sir William Gomm authority for submitting to Government a proposal quietly to stop the practice. In the letter I drafted to Government, I gave my reason for the recommendation in the plainest terms, and said, that in the event of any revolt or mutiny of the Sepoys, the knowledge

thus being acquired would only be an incitement to them to attempt to capture our ordnance. To this despatch a reply, briefly assenting, was received; not one word of remark or inquiry was made. I had been prepared to give *in extenso* my reasons for thinking that the Bengal army was ready, on any sufficiently exciting cause or occasion, to turn upon us in revolt; and the proof that I did entertain this opinion will be found in the letters I wrote in the *Times* at the first opening of this sad tragedy, in which I stood, I believe, almost alone in warning the public of what was to be expected.

The second instance of a warning bearing on what has now come to pass, was in a recommendation I made to Sir William Gomm for permission to apply to Government to disarm all travellers on the great high-roads. I represented, in a letter addressed to the Military Secretary to Government, that the Sepoys all had private arms in their possession, and that it was most desirable to deprive them of these weapons; that the Commander-in-Chief was prepared to do so; but as it was urged, that to deprive them of these means of defence, while proceeding on furlough to their homes, was to expose them both going and returning, and while there, to be murdered and robbed by the armed community and by travellers, for the sake of the savings they were known to carry with them from their regiments, he was anxious that the system of going about the country armed should be first put a stop to. To this proposal an almost scornful and derisive reply was received, and it was asked by the Military Secretary whether the Commander-in-Chief really meant to recommend to Government such an impracticable plan as that of disarming the whole population of the Upper Provinces. Now, there was nothing at all impracticable in the matter. Sir John Lawrence had done the same thing in the Punjaub, and we now know of what signal benefit such a procedure would have been; but the Governor-General was sick, and, it was said, splenetic, and there was a most pernicious and adverse influence at work in the Military Secretariate. I do not pretend to quote the actual words of the despatches in those two cases, but they were precisely to the effect I have described, and will be found on record in the Military Departments in Bengal.

It may be remarked, To what end write of past errors of Government, which can now in their narration be inoperative for good? To this I would reply, that not only may good be educed in the future, by showing the errors we have fallen into, but the wilfulness too often displayed by governors, secretaries, and others, in combating judicious measures merely because they were personally opposed

to those who suggested them, ought to be held up to just condemnation; and I will conclude this part of my subject by an instance, showing exactly how such feelings may operate to the detriment of the public service. I was much struck, when I first succeeded to the post of Adjutant-General, at the way in which numbers of the older officers in command of divisions, districts, and stations, applied to me, both privately and publicly, for advice as to how they had best act in such and such emergencies. I found that to rely on themselves was the exception—that almost all seemed to wish to lean on authority before committing themselves to action—in a word, a great bugbear prevented their acting on their own judgment: *that bugbear was the dread of responsibility*, produced chiefly by the "wigging" system of the Government. I set myself to work to combat this system. I wrote in the most friendly spirit numerous letters, showing how badly such a system must necessarily work; pointed out the purpose for which men were placed in these important and lucrative posts; and deprecated the reference of every petty detail for the opinion of the Adjutant-General, and more broadly the system of centralization which had sprung up. I had reason to suppose that my efforts, during the six years I was Adjutant-General, were productive of much good; but there was a higher influence than that of the Army Head-Quarters at work, an authority under which the native Articles of War, with all its faults and errors, had been prepared; I allude to the Military Secretary to the Government, who had previously served all his life in the department of the Judge-Advocate; a department admirably calculated for generating a quibbler where that turn of mind existed, but extremely ill calculated for the training of a Secretary to the Supreme Government, who should be one able and willing to take a broad, general view, free from the petty bias which, as Sir Charles Napier used justly to observe, far too frequently characterizes the class of military lawyers; but we have the opinion of this great soldier, in his life, by Sir W. Napier, of the amount of merit to be discovered in the *ci-devant* Chief of the Judge-Advocate's Department. To proceed: one striking reason for the laxity in point of discipline which too often called for censure, appeared to me to rest with the Government,—the appointing, namely, to important commands, of worn-out and incapable officers, merely on account of their seniority. Soon after I became Adjutant-General, I wrote, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, a very strong and earnest despatch, pointing out the evils, and suggesting the remedy. The then Secretary to Government, Colonel J. Stuart,

was a man of vigorous understanding and sound sense; he warmly seconded the proposal, and Lord Dalhousie at once assented in terms of praise and approbation. Vacancies existed on the Divisional and Brigade staff, and at once some half-a-dozen incapables were set aside; and the Commander-in-Chief, thus secure, as he imagined, of the support of the Indian Government, nominated junior officers, considered more equal to the performance of such responsible duties. But the affair did not thus terminate; Colonel Stuart fell sick, and was succeeded, though he was known earnestly to deprecate such an appointment, by the present Military Secretary; and at an interval of some two years, the Commander-in-Chief was called upon by this officer, in the name of the Government, to state more specifically the reasons for passing over one of these worn-out, used-up old Generals, a man who, in his best days, had been notoriously inefficient. The Commander-in-Chief observed, in commenting on this unexpected communication, that he did not know personally any of the officers who had been superseded; that he was obliged to depend in such matters on the confidential report and explanations of the Adjutant-General, who was responsible for the fidelity of his representations; but that it was altogether too much to expect of that functionary to give, in detail, each and every item constituting inaptitude and incapacity on the part of those superseded, for public report to Government, *and communication, when solicited, to the aggrieved parties concerned;* and that, finally, the letter from the Military Secretary under comment appeared to be strangely at variance with that from his predecessor on the same subject. Ultimately the supreme Government gave way, and no such explanation as had been required was furnished!

I have little to say in this place of the details of the measures of reform and change which the state of the native troops and the general disorganization prevalent everywhere in Bengal, so loudly demands. "Indophilus" and others have written nearly all that can be said of practical use in way of suggestion; and to re-echo and repeat what is now so generally seen and felt, would be merely pedantic and useless; I will therefore offer only a brief outline of the principal changes I would advocate. Those changes, to be of use, must be most carefully and dispassionately considered; and it is to be hoped that, in the alterations and revision which will take place, the brave and devoted Indian officers who are now so heroically upholding the empire, without one word of despondency, far less of despair, will not be made to bear the onus or to suffer for

the faults of a vicious system over which they had no control, or for the blindness, fatuity, and utter want of prescience which has characterized too many of the acts, both of omission and commission, of those in authority. The officers of the Bengal army, unwisely shipped for the East at the immature age of sixteen, are a wonderful body, considering the difficulties with which they have to contend. It is true they cannot perhaps dress, on their return to their native country, like the more finished loungers of Regent Street and the Clubs, they are not so graceful and refined in a drawing-room,—they were exiled ere they could attain to that style of seeming superiority; but for all real, manly feeling and acquirements they have, as a body, few superiors. Those acquirements have been diverted by the Government into improper and unprofessional channels, to the great loss and detriment of the military service; but for that *they* are not the responsible parties.

Of the army before Delhi, Henry Tombs, for daring gallantry, manly and professional readiness, could not be surpassed in all Europe. Nor in all the ranks of the British army here, at home, will a more accomplished, talented, or more thoroughly instructed staff-officer be found than is to be met with in the person of Captain Henry Norman. Of Brigadier-General Nicholson, who shall speak in terms of adequate praise? To the firmness, courage, and judgment of this officer, and to that equally brave and unhesitating man, Sir John Lawrence, we owe our very existence in the North-west. Major Edwin Johnson, Adjutant-General of the Artillery, in the field is an officer who, for calm excellent judgment and great official aptitude, cannot be surpassed. And from among those sacrificed to the inefficiency of our system, how many names of gallant and able men appear. Let me pay a brief tribute, in adverting to the fate of some few—men who were honoured and respected by all.

Colonel J. Finnis fell devotedly at the Meerut outbreak. He had written to me while his regiment was marching to that station; and, with his usual sagacity, observed, that "some very strange feeling had come over the Sepoys," that "something was brooding." That mystery was soon to be solved; and so fell one of my earliest Indian friends.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor Tucker, of the Cavalry, fell, after having for eight days worked day and night as a common gunner, with all that zeal and earnestness for which he was through life distinguished. He was as gentle and amiable as he was brave and devoted, and not a man in India fell more generally beloved. To the end he was

favoured, in that he died while yet the heroic defence of the few officers at Futtehghur was maintained—ere yet the captivity of his wife and family, ending in revolting massacre, had occurred.

Of that gallant, able, and most talented officer, Major Fletcher Hayes, Military Secretary in Oude; of Edward Fraser, Commandant of the Sappers; of Arthur Gibbings and John Smith, of the Irregular Cavalry; of Herbert Gardner, Stuart Beatson, Lieutenant-Colonel Philip Goldney; Lieutenant Robert Stuart, Adjutant of the 6th Native Infantry; Major Banks, who fell in the performance of his arduous duties at Lucknow; and many other dear friends, it need simply be said, that they fell in the execution of their duty, victims to the incautious policy of rulers too weakly secure in their ideal empire of opinion, and too fully persuaded of their personal inviolability—of that "divinity" supposed to "hedge" the persons of the present race of Indian civilians in high office—to take the commonest precautions the trust delegated to them demanded, even when it was notorious that Mahomedan and other conspirators had for years been preaching a crusade against us, and the native press teemed with articles only too well calculated to produce disaffection and revolt. The English world will not fail to notice the heroic struggle made everywhere, and in the face of all difficulties, by the general body of officers, Queen's and Company's—all alike confident in the final result, even when most pressed upon and outnumbered; and we may be justly proud of bearing and conduct which has so gloriously upheld the national character.

If here and there imbecility or cowardice have been productive of great evils, as at Jullendur, Meerut, Dinapore, Allahabad, even at Calcutta,—where at least a sense of duty should have assumed the appearance of firmness,—it has been owing to that system under which mere negative merit, when backed by seniority, has been considered to possess a *claim* to fill situations of responsibility and importance. Under this system, which has been common to the Horse Guards equally with the Indian Government, old and infirm officers have been appointed to commands, to discharge the duties of which they were physically incapable; in a revolt such men were helpless, hence the Dinapore affair, for which however the Government is the *real* party to blame. In Calcutta,—and one cannot record it but with a feeling of shame,—at the very time when firmness, courage, and a good example were most required, it is mentioned in letters as a positive fact, that on the night of the 9th of that month, now popularly called "fright night," one member at least of the Supreme Council

sent his wife, for safety, on board a vessel in the river, while the Military Secretary to the Supreme Government took his, under a similar plea, into Fort William. The scene of panic that would necessarily ensue, when the principal officers of Government set such a wretched example, may well be imagined; the only wonder is, that the native population were not incited by it to rise in revolt and insurrection; and if, seeing the causeless panic, they had done so, to whom but to these men could we impute the loss of the capital? It may be said, that it is easy to condemn others for want of firmness,—that if ourselves so circumstanced we might equally fail. That is true, in a general way, but we are to recollect that these persons are paid extravagantly for the *efficient* performance of their duties. The Councillor, whose timidity—the Military Secretary, whose "moral courage" induced him, at all hazards, to secure the safety of his "better half," receive, the former £10,000, the latter about £5,000 per annum of the public money. Surely, for such sums we ought to be able to ensure, at least, the respectable discharge of the duties entrusted to them? I may make such observations with the more confidence, because I never myself, while in office, shrank from incurring responsibility. On one occasion, even in a time of peace, I thought it my duty to point out to the Commander-in-Chief the inability, from age and other causes, of no less than three Brigadiers to perform their duties efficiently, and they were removed in consequence of such report from the command of their respective districts. On another occasion, I recommended the summary removal of an officer from the command of a station, who had demurred to obey the orders of His Excellency. And yet, with all these examples, no one, it seems, could be found to incur the responsibility of removing or suspending, at a most critical time, the officer commanding the Dinapore Division, when it should have been clear to any ordinary capacity, that the most sad results must almost necessarily ensue from his reluctance to disarm the native regiments there. At such a time energy and earnestness at the seat of Government were imperatively called for; and that the disasters in the Dinapore Division are imputable to the want of these qualities in those in supreme authority in Calcutta there can be no sort of doubt.

CHAPTER III.

It has often been asked, What are the precise causes which have led to this detestable display of the worst passions of human nature? Has love of country, or religious zeal and bigotry, or mere detestation of a foreign yoke, incited the native army to this revolt? To this I would reply, that fifty causes have combined to generate suspicion and jealousy and a general inimical feeling; but love of country or patriotism have no place in the catalogue. Our unhappy countrymen have been, in my deliberate opinion, the victims chiefly of the supine, unstatesmanlike, and weak, shallow views and proceedings of our rulers. It is painful to animadvert on the acts of men we have known and personally liked; and in speaking of Lord Dalhousie's administration I have no wish to say one word in unnecessary disparagement; but the truth is, that the rule of this nobleman has been most unduly extolled and over-estimated. He was young and of high birth, and the *protégé* and personal favourite of the Duke of Wellington, and he brought with him to India a reputation for quickness and ability scarcely exaggerated; but he had not the genius of the Marquis Wellesley, and his admirers (for he had many in India) were simply mistaken when they supposed him to possess a mind so gifted.

This is not the place to enter upon a general review of his Lordship's policy and acts, but I may observe, that much was no doubt effected by him worthy of praise and commendation, although, as a whole, his conceptions appear to have been destitute of originality. His thirst for "annexation" became a positive disease, and he was clearly not alive to the utter insecurity of our position, and was content, apparently, to believe with the herd, that the danger was distant, and the ultimate struggle for supremacy not to be looked for in our day; he seems to have shared, in fact, in that common feeling of common minds, who either do not really foresee danger, or else want the courage to look it steadily and manfully in the face. The annexation of Oude was one of the last important acts of his Government; that is a well-vexed question, and one on which excellent reasons may be adduced on both sides. It has been said that this act was urged on Lord Dalhousie from home; however that may be, my own conviction is, that it was as ungenerous, as ill-timed, and *wanting in good faith*, as it is now proved in its result

to have been impolitic; for no one, save a mere partisan, can now hesitate to believe that this act of annexation, more perhaps than any other single cause, gave scope and enlarged compass to the revolt now raging. That act cemented into one inimical whole the Mohamedan population of Upper India: after that act there was no further demur; prince and nobleman and peasant were all of one mind,—to compass, if possible, our entire overthrow and extirpation! And now let us inquire how, after this boasted bloodless annexation, the noble Lord proceeded in that business. True, his unexpected occupation of the country was bloodless, that of course necessarily followed; when there was no preparation against, or anticipation of danger, there would be no immediate struggle. A wise statesman would have seen this, and would, even if he thought himself secure for the time, have proceeded to render "assurance doubly sure." The reverse of this happened; to the already overwhelming native troops of India, his Lordship added other yet more dangerous additions, in the shape of Oude levies, and it nowhere appears that consequent on this occupation he added a single European soldier to our military establishment! The just equipoise so absolutely essential to maintain our supremacy was forgotten, or only so weakly enforced as to be either overlooked or indefinitely postponed! Further words on this subject were useless. The revolt, the mutiny, gradually and slowly commenced; how it was met it is sad and humiliating to detail. The Commander-in-Chief did nothing; European regiments near at hand in the Himalayas were *not* called to the plains, where their presence would have overawed the disaffected; not a European soldier was sent to secure the safety of our depôts and magazines; Delhi, Cawnpore, and Allahabad were unregarded; General Anson finally betook himself to Simla! The Government was nearly as supine; in the beginning, the grave nature of the impending struggle with the Sepoys was ignored, and most valuable time was lost. If in the beginning the unmistakable magnitude of the danger had been bravely faced, much might have been done, and the Government here at home must have acted with decision and promptitude. Troops would at once have been sent, and by the nearest route; and the blood of hundreds of brave men and helpless women and children would have been saved. But in reference to the conduct of the Bengal authorities, I shall content myself with extracting from the 'Historical Narrative' of the mutiny the description therein given of the capacity and proceedings of the Military Secretary to the "Supreme Government of India!"

"*Colonel Birch.*—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department was a man in every way unsuited for his position. Placed early in his career in the department of the Judge-Advocate-General, his confined understanding was exerted in mastering the quirks and quibbles of the law. His intellect being essentially shallow, he was unable to take a broad view of any question; but he would argue for hours, and exhaust all his ingenuity in combating some petty detail. When Sir Charles Napier assumed the command of the Indian Army, Colonel Birch was Judge-Advocate. He was rather afraid of Sir Charles's downright character, and at their first interview exerted all his powers to please him. No amount of special pleading, however, would go down with the great Conqueror of Scinde.

"Sir Charles's bad opinion was, however, of this service to Colonel Birch, that it obtained for him Lord Dalhousie's patronage. That nobleman, eager to show his spite towards Sir C. Napier, took the opportunity of the first vacancy, to appoint Colonel Birch Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department; thus placing him, *de facto*, at the head of the army in India—giving him a position, indeed, exactly analogous to that of the Minister of War in France.

"A worse appointment could not have been made. Colonel Birch was essentially a sycophant, always ready to give up his own opinion, if by so doing he could curry favour with his superior. He had tried this plan with Sir C. Napier, but Sir Charles found him out, and not only felt, but showed, contempt towards him in consequence; he found it an easier task to ingratiate himself with Lord Dalhousie and his successor.

"But he was also an ignoramus. He knew nothing of the Bengal Army. Many years had elapsed since he had even spoken to a Sepoy. He was ignorant of the composition of the army, as well as of its wants; whilst his previous training had so unfitted him for his post, that he could not even write an order without making it unintelligible by excessive quibbling."

So much for this functionary's characteristics, but that is not all: "Mr. —— had one recommendation: if he was narrow-minded and unscrupulous, he was honest; he could not 'smile and smile and be a villain;' he spoke his thoughts freely and honestly, and people, whilst they hated, could not help respecting him,—a sentiment never entertained towards his colleague in the military department."

And the colleague spoken of was Colonel Birch!

Again, the following, we are told, were his acts; and his antecedents quite prepare one for the detail:—

"Yet, in the face of these prejudices, of the order to respect them, and of the danger of the consequences which must result from their violation, no sooner had the Government of India resolved to introduce the Enfield rifle partially into the Indian army, than the Secretary to Government deliberately issued an order which, by violating the caste of the Hindoo, was alone sufficient to bring about a revolt. The Enfield rifle required a particular species of cartridge, and this cartridge, in England, was greased with lard made from the fat either of the hog or the ox. Without reflecting, or, if reflecting, ignoring the consequences of his act, Colonel Birch ordered that the cartridges for use in India should be made up similarly to the cartridges in use in England, and should be used by the native troops; that is to say, that Hindoo Sepoys should handle cartridges besmeared with the fat of their sacred animal, the cow. The knowledge of this fact was conveyed to the Hindoos in the most casual manner. These cartridges had been made up by Lascars—men of an inferior caste. It happened that one day a Lascar requested a Brahmin Sepoy to give him a drink of water from his lotah, or brass pot. The Sepoy refused, on the plea of his superior caste, and that the lotah would be defiled by the touch of the Lascar. The Lascar in reply taunted him for talking of defilement, when he every day touched cartridges besmeared with cows' fat. The Hindoo, horror-stricken, rushed to his comrades and told them the story; they inquired, and found it was true to the letter. Indignant, believing themselves deceived by the Government, they wrote an account to their comrades throughout India. From that moment the work of the agents of the King of Oude was easy.

"For a man occupying the position of Military Secretary to the Government of India to make so gross a blunder, was unpardonable. Equally so, that, when the mistake was discovered, no disavowal was made by Government for four months, and then only in consequence of the outbreak at Meerut! Well aware that the idea had taken possession of the Sepoys' minds, Colonel Birch made no attempt to counteract it, gave no intimation that the manufacture of greased cartridges had been stopped. He calmly surveyed the mischief his acts had caused, and did—nothing. Yet this man, whose blundering incapacity caused the revolt, is still Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department!"

Ex uno disce omnes! might almost be said of the Calcutta officials

acting in this sad and disastrous crisis, though in fairness some of the civil secretaries should be excepted, and perhaps General Low. The civilians were necessarily ignorant of just military considerations, as connected with the mutiny. And it would be unjust wholly to condemn Lord Canning; he, no doubt, has done his utmost; he had not been long enough in India to acquire reliable knowledge and information; he was dependent, therefore, on the judgment and counsels of those who surrounded him. That they were altogether unequal to the crisis, few will deny. It is true, that after the revolt was full-blown, troops were sent for to Ceylon, Pegue, China, and other places, but time had been sadly wasted, and when, as I have before remarked, officers of experience were writing to me from the very seat of Government that we had now "*only to fight for it*," the Government was busy in ignoring the magnitude of the revolt, and in endeavouring to induce the belief that the excitement and danger was subsiding!

Again, long after the whole country was everywhere in open revolt or commotion; when scarcely a regular regiment was left; when, to the shallowest intellect, all reliance on the Native Infantry was shown to be simple delusion, what was the conduct of the Government? At Dinapore, a station only two days' post from Calcutta, where an infatuated old General between seventy and seventy-five years of age commanded, three native regiments were suffered to retain their arms. The General is to be tried, we hear, by court-martial. To what end? He *had been* a brave and able officer, and had the Government done its duty, his career would probably have ended in honour as it began. To trust the safety of Bengal at such a time to the discretion of an old worn-out man, whose sympathies naturally were with the troops he had served with for half a century, was unwise to a degree. He ought to have been *ordered peremptorily* to disarm the native regiments; the Military Secretary to Government should so have counselled the Governor-General; and if General Lloyd had demurred or hesitated, instant supersession should have followed. But mere omission was not the only fault of the authorities. The Calcutta community saw the imminent danger, and petitioned Lord Canning to avert it, by disarming the Dinapore Brigade. Even this solicitation, it seems, was unattended to, for official incapacity does not readily give ear to even the wisest counsel. The result of this culpable inaction is well known to the British public, and but for the able conduct of that gallant officer, Major Vincent Eyre, of the Bengal Artillery, more fatal consequences would have ensued.

I now approach, and with reluctance, the case of the Court of Directors of the East India Company. I am a retired officer of the Company; one of my nearest relatives, the late Henry St. George Tucker, was an honoured and a most influential member of the Court for many years, and I feel every disposition to speak of them in terms of respect. Nevertheless, I am constrained to state broadly my opinion that the delegated rule of the Directors is no longer beneficial to the State; its day for usefulness has apparently passed away; it no longer commands any real authority; its influence, from whatever cause, is weak, and its component parts do not present to the public view those elements of strength and wisdom adequate to the government of a mighty empire. In India, it is no longer regarded with respect or deference; even its old traditionary virtues are ignored; and when a Government has once ceased to command the confidence of the governed, the sooner it is made to give way, the better for all concerned. The Court has struggled on of late years in a sort of hand-to-mouth existence; and there can be little doubt that its speedy dissolution will follow on the re-establishment of peace. This recent revolt must show clearly to the blindest vision the hollowness of that boasted system the Company and its Governors-General have so long pursued. The temerity of that system; its anomalies and inconsistencies; its weak milk-and-water philanthropy, through which the natives have lost all salutary fear and awe of us; its incapacity or disinclination to protect its European servants when arbitrarily ill-treated and injured by the Indian authorities, will all form the subject doubtless of prolonged and grave inquiry. I will only here suggest one cause of its failure, and point to a single instance in elucidation. It appears, then, that the Court of Directors is composed generally of men too old or too long absent from India to be able to work effectively in its government, and too pedantically wedded in many cases to old opinions and ideas, forgetful that India has moved onwards, and is no longer the precise India of twenty-five or thirty years since, when, for the most part, those gentlemen left the country. We have, for instance, a distinguished member of the Court writing in the 'Times,' that, but for the trials of certain disaffected troopers at Meerut, the Bengal Army might have remained the "loyal Bengal Army" still! How little this venerable senior can know of that army. I write a distasteful truth, but I do it deliberately, and I say now no more than I have often said before the late revolt, in confidential communications to friends and others interested, namely, that the Bengal Army never really has

been, any time the last thirty years, a trustworthy or loyal army; by which I mean that it never has been a reliable, obedient, well-disposed body. We in our blindness have been pleased to assume that it possessed all sorts of virtues; we have ignored and even fostered its vices, and allowed ourselves to be flattered as individuals into the belief that we had won its love and devoted adherence; but a more vain, a more idle and impotent delusion I am confident never existed. In this I know I shall be opposed by many, by many whom I greatly esteem; but I speak after thirty-two years' experience and observation, and I unhesitatingly affirm, that even mere personal attachment on the part of the Sepoys to their European superiors has been isolated and rare; that the singular cunning and duplicity of their character has not been fathomed by us as a nation; that in their guile and craft they have invariably befooled and laughed us to scorn; and that, dispassionately regarded, a more mercenary, huxtering, really inglorious body of men never before were banded together! These will no doubt be considered extreme opinions; I am persuaded, nevertheless, that they are thoroughly well founded. The Bengal Sepoys for many years have been simple mercenaries, without an attempt at disguise, greedy, covetous, and exacting; in the beginning these characteristics may have been less marked, but since the siege of Bhurtpore, in 1826, from about which period my more intimate acquaintance with them first commenced, the peculiarities I have described have undoubtedly attached to them in an unmistakable manner. I shall be told that these Sepoys have fought bravely: Certainly, led by their European officers, they have done so at times; but how often has their conduct been the very reverse! how often dastardly to the last degree—pale, trembling, sneaking out of the ranks on one pretence or another! Many of their European officers in time of war have regretted that it was their fate to be connected with such men. And recently, in a letter from a distinguished staff-officer serving before Delhi, this sentence occurs:—"I never saw the Sepoys fight *half* so well for us as they now do against us." The writer had seen them in all the actions of the Sutledge and Punjaub campaigns. Will the present speak in proof? What, with their overwhelming numbers, and perfectly armed and disciplined, have they done? Except to murder their too trusting and confiding officers, and defenceless women and children, what have they done worthy of the struggle for supremacy they sought to maintain? No! these boasted mercenaries, however at times useful in upholding our dominion in the East, never were loyal, in the proper acceptation of

that term; grasping self-interest has been all along their sole motive and consideration; they were thoroughly and entirely mercenary; and when they had become accustomed to consider themselves irresistible in numbers and discipline, they were ready at once to adopt any plea, such as that of the greased cartridges, for entering on that career of revolt and mutiny which, as they vainly hoped, would transfer to their own ranks and order the power and authority so supinely and unsuspiciously wielded by interloping foreigners. I maintain that for many years the Sepoy army was at heart disloyal to its very core, and all that was wanting to produce the blaze of mutiny we have witnessed, was just such a handle and opportunity as was so loosely and culpably offered to them. I cite the late Sir Charles Napier in corroboration of this opinion. He declared, on the occasion of his disbanding the 66th Native Infantry, in 1849–50, that no less than 40,000 Sepoys in the Punjaub were prepared to mutiny! Such was, we may now well believe, in reality the fact; and if the fortress of Govindghur had been seized by that regiment as attempted, the fearful revolt of 1857 would probably have been anticipated! But what did the Court of Directors know of this state of feeling? There was not a Bengal military officer a member of that body, to enjoin caution or inquiry, and all danger was denied and disallowed by the highest Indian authority in that famous controversy since made public. Sir Charles Napier was permitted to resign his office of Commander-in-Chief in India, and the unreflecting there and at home naturally followed in the belief which most administered to their own ease and quiet and to the gratification of their immediate superiors; so the dark cloud was suffered to grow and increase in density, hovering onwards till it broke in that overwhelming outpour which had so nearly uprooted us in our foundations. Whatever some of us in India might think and fear, there was clearly nothing to be said; all intimation of danger was authoritatively derided, and it requires more self-reliance than most men possess to persist in an opinion condemned and ridiculed by *all* around.

The 'Times' newspaper has said that those who accuse the Indian authorities of inertness and want of vigour, in not suppressing the revolt when it first appeared, and who say also that it was premeditated, and the result of previous conspiracy, are convicted of inconsistency in so speaking. The 'Times' is a great and weighty authority, and it is with deference I take leave to differ, and to state my opinion that this is only a *seeming contradiction*. For may not a

conspiracy be crushed and overcome? And if at Meerut short, sharp, and decisive action had, on the massacre of their European officers, flooded the native lines with the blood of those miscreants, what more probable than that the outbreak would have been suppressed? Whereas impunity lent it strength. At Delhi there was nothing to oppose to it; no foresight had been exercised, no judicious arrangements made, no one single precaution appears indeed to have been taken by General Anson, whose practical inexperience and incapacity can never be effaced by that "charm of manner and demeanour" his friends dwell upon, and of which I am equally sensible; but until the flame had burst forth he did not move his European battalions from the hills to the plains, where their presence would have overawed the Sepoys, or put down forcibly their revolt; he neglected to secure with European troops our depôts and magazines; he did not organize a strong column for rapid movement in whatever direction the flame might break forth; he did not enjoin caution and vigilance on that incapable officer, General Hewitt; no commissariat carriage was made immediately available; in short, nothing was done in way of wise prevention, and so the flame burst forth in all its appalling intensity! That sooner or later our own fatal security, the Pretorian insolence of the Sepoys, and that Mohamedan intrigue and virulent hatred which has formed so principal an ingredient in the revolt, would assuredly have produced a similar result, few, I should imagine, will be prepared to doubt. From henceforth our rule will be stronger and sterner, and our hold upon the country much firmer, I trust, than it has ever yet been: it depends upon ourselves to render it so. And we need have no dread of missionary labours—these never have done the least harm. It has been our late greedy and grasping policy; our mismanagement of the Sepoys; our neglect to secure real power; our recent financial blunders, amounting, in appearance at least, to positive fraud; and, generally, the *too rapid* introduction, recently, of general schemes of education and changes in Hindoo laws and customs, which it would have been far wiser for a time to have postponed. These, at least, are my convictions.

I beg now to offer a few brief, general observations, such as in my judgment will be found most conducive to the future permanency and strength of our dominion in the East.

1. The abolition of the Court of Directors; and in substitution, a Secretary of State for India, with a staff of efficient under-secretaries in the various departments, civil, military, and political.

2. The entire abandonment of the narrow and exclusive system in the Indian Civil Service; men best qualified should be appointed, and open competition the test.

3. An entire reconstruction of the military system; no officer to be appointed a cadet before the age of seventeen or eighteen, and all to be required to pass through a military college, whether intended for the Line or for the Engineers and Artillery.

4. No natives to be enlisted who are Bramins, or who will not engage for general service anywhere; and the recruiting districts to be carefully laid down.

5. No officers to be taken from regiments for any merely civil situations, but only for military staff employ, in the strict sense of the term, and after undergoing an examination as to acquirements and aptitude for the particular department for which it is proposed to withdraw them.

6. A knowledge of the native languages to be a *sine quâ non* before any promotion or advancement can be allowed.

7. A strong, stern, but just system of government to be introduced, so that the same shall be viewed with awe and respect by the natives.

8. Europeans should not be subject to trial before natives; and the least outrage on any European, however humble his station, should be punished with severity.

9. The utter futility of the existing native pension establishment having been fully proved, should be carefully revised; and the forfeiture of all present pensions having been justly incurred by the revolt or apathy and tacit hostility of the pensioners, their stipends should be at once swept away, except in very special cases.

10. The natives of India within the British territories should be carefully disarmed, and watchfully kept so.

11. Respect for all Europeans, and for Her Majesty's Government, should be firmly and *persistently* enforced.

12. The native press in India should be kept under a strict censorship. It has been disseminating treason and sedition for years; and the recent classing of the European and native press together, was alike unjust and impolitic, robbing the State, at a critical period, of the zealous services of the former.

13. The discontinuance of the practice of bestowing upon Governors-General pensions of £5000 per annum. That system is of the "springes to catch woodcock" order; and but for the desire it has generated to conciliate the Court of Directors, a more just,

equitable, and generous policy would often have been pursued, while the community, native and European, might possibly not have been outraged by the recent five-per-cent. "swindle," whereby the credit of the Government has been injured, and our good faith called in question. A clear £30,000 a year, with all travelling and many other expenses paid besides, ought to be considered sufficient remuneration for any services.

14. The "blue-veined" aristocratic element should be more guardedly employed in responsible situations in the East. Mere men about town, however "charming in demeanour," should not be placed in command of the army; and known incapables should not be sent out as divisional commanders, merely to fill their empty pockets, or *to get rid of their importunities here.*

15. The military element in India, instead of being degraded socially, as hitherto, should be raised; a new and more just order of precedence should be introduced; and grey-headed officers should no longer be made to give place to boys in the civil service, whose chief merit often consists only in their very near affinity to the Directors in Leadenhall-street.

16. The native police employed in Bengal is now proved to be, as was generally suspected, utterly worthless; it should be carefully remodelled, and an effective and reliable intelligence department should be organized.

17. Battalions of Africans might with advantage be organized; there are many special duties in which they might with great advantage be employed, exposure to which would be injurious to the health of European troops—to aid, for instance, in garrisoning Fort William, and our various magazines, forts, and depôts.

18. The fortifications and public buildings at Delhi, Agra, and Lucknow, ought *not* to be destroyed; these may all be of great advantage to us in the future. At Delhi, the "Jumma Musjid," a commanding and excellent position, might be occupied for other than religious purposes, and all Mohamedan and Hindoo processions within the walls of that city may be strictly interdicted; a rule which, if strictly enforced, will sufficiently mark our re-assumption of power and authority.

19. A body of *efficient* light cavalry ought to be raised. An Inspector of Cavalry should be added to the establishment; the unwise parsimony which would not hitherto grant one has been, as foretold, productive of the worst results.

20. The enormous salaries of the Governors-General, Members of Council, and other high civil and military functionaries, should be

greatly reduced; and the "savings to the State" made by parsimonious clippings from the under-paid captains and subalterns of the army, and clerks and others in the uncovenanted service, should be abandoned. One uniform rate of pay should be given to officers everywhere; and finally, the long-standing absurdity of the half-batta system should be abolished.

CHAPTER IV.

In reference to the very inimical feeling with which the Mohamedan population, in my opinion, regard us, as recorded in the beginning of this Pamphlet, I wish to state that my observation on this point is confined to Bengal chiefly. It may possibly be otherwise in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, and the feeling may be moderated in remote districts in Bengal; but I am confident, from personal observation, that at Delhi in particular, and in all our large Mussulman cities and bazaars, rooted dislike of us, as Christians and Europeans, is the invariable rule. Officers of the Army see much more of this than the civilians, because these last are in authority, and that with the Oriental generates mere lip-service to an unbounded extent. With the military it is far otherwise; and no man of common observation could well ride through the streets of Delhi, or any large city or bazaar, without being struck with the malignant, fierce expression of countenance with which, on meeting their glances, one is so frequently regarded. The civilian on such occasions rides out with Sowars (armed horsemen) in attendance; and it is with bated breath and seeming respect and humility that these attributes of office cause him to be observed; but the whispered curse and smile of derision, which follow after, are as invariably a part of the performance. I was, as a young man, for three years in garrison at Delhi, and I know the place and its inhabitants well, and have often and often had occasion to marvel at their astonishing duplicity, effrontery, and low cunning,—characteristics common to the great mass of Mohamedans of the cities of Upper India, who, as a body, are as grossly ignorant, morally depraved, and fanatical as it is pos-

sible to imagine. I speak of *the mass;* for undoubtedly there are highly-respectable and upright men of this persuasion, but they are few and far between, and even these are fanatical to an uncommon degree. It may easily be imagined how injurious, with such people, has been our easy, unsuspicious, milk-and-water system. It has made them despise as well as dislike us; and the result we witness, in the fearful outrages and almost universal revolt of this class of our subjects, whenever there has appeared a chance of success against us. I think therefore that the greatest caution should be exercised in enlisting Mussulmans of the Upper Provinces. When, after the Sutledge campaign, so many Irregular cavalry regiments were raised, it was a common remark about Delhi, Meerut, and Seharumpore, that the effect had been to remove all the lowest scamps and vagabonds of the vicinity, who, in the zeal felt by officers to complete their corps, were far too easily entertained, without reference to character or connection. Fisher's Horse was thus unhappily organized, and its treacherous mutiny has cost us the lives of some of our best officers. For the future, or at least for some time to come, we should not, in my opinion, recruit in the Oude or Delhi territory, or in Rohilkund; the Punjaub and Cis-Sutledge states, together with our Hill Districts, will afford us a sufficient and much better field, and for this purpose the less we have to do with the disaffected districts the better.

Grave misapprehension has existed even in India as to the strength of Delhi and its means of defence. I have many correspondents now serving before those walls, and some details which I am confident may be relied upon, will be highly interesting at this anxious period. On reaching Delhi, General Barnard's force had to oppose a garrison consisting of the 11th, 20th, 38th, 54th, 74th Regiments of Native Infantry, the Hurrianah Light Infantry, portions of the 9th, 44th, and 67th and 5th Native Infantry, the majority of the 45th also, and 300 of the Sappers and Miners; of cavalry, a wing of the 4th Irregulars, the whole of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and detachments of the Oude and Gwalior regiments. In addition to these, it is known that the mutineers had a vast number of men who had gone on furlough to their homes. Of artillery, they had Captain De Teissier's battery complete, and four batteries of guns which were ready for issue from the magazine. From whence they obtained their artillery-men it is not difficult to guess; I have already explained that 100 per cent. of the infantry had been trained, under the auspices of Government, to the use of ordnance. The King of Delhi, moreover,

had some artillery-men of his own, and there was a company of old pensioned artillery-men at the place.

That they had great numbers, and well-trained, there has been plenty of proof in the way they have served their guns, both from the batteries on the bastions and in the field; in fact their artillery has been the chief difficulty. In the Delhi magazine they found 114 pieces of heavy ordnance, with ammunition and stores in immense quantities; take for example the following items: 24-pounder round shot, no less than 37,700; of 18-pounders, 33,300; of 8-inch shells, 18,900; of powder, upwards of 14,000 barrels: these will show their means of defence. Besides this the enemy was joined by all the Customs' patrols, Burkundauze, and police, than whom no class of men are stated to have committed greater horrors and atrocities. All these trained men, added to the immense population of fanatical Mussulmans in and around Delhi, constitute a force and a power not to be treated contemptuously or encountered carelessly. It must be borne in mind, too, that the walls of Delhi are of considerable strength; there is a deep ditch also, and the place is at least seven miles in circumference; and as to cutting them off from communication with the Jumna and so investing the place, the idea is simply ridiculous, not to say preposterous. With 4,500 bayonets, of which the force originally consisted, that was not to be done, and on the whole the delay in storming the place has doubtless told to our advantage. One side of the city, which takes in the palace and the interior defences of Selimgurh, is washed by the Jumna, the bridge of boats across which we had been unable in the beginning to destroy, although the rise of the river must, when the rains commenced in full flood, have probably done that work for us, and thus one means of escape will, it is to be hoped, have been destroyed. Prematurely to have made the assault might have been eminently disastrous, and failure would have imperilled our authority throughout India. When the last letters left the Camp, on the 25th of August, the siege-train was within ten days' march; and we may, in my opinion, expect confidently to hear that by the 15th of September at latest the city was in our possession. Major-General Wilson is an officer of great ability and judgment, and every confidence may be reposed in him. With the re-occupation of Delhi, the revolt *in our old possessions in the Upper Provinces* will cease, and we shall have simply to resume our control and authority; with Oude it will probably be found more difficult to deal.

And now, before committing these brief pages to the press, I cannot do better than record my humble testimony in favour of the English in India,—of those men who are now so heroically fighting for their country's honour and supremacy, and with whom I can only wish that it was my good fortune to be serving at such a crisis. It may be all very well for those who, in the pursuit of mammon or notoriety, indite exaggerated stories in novels, or for those who desire to shine at the expense of their comrades, to indulge in the ideal description of imputed laxity and immorality in India. The fact is otherwise; simply I may affirm that *it is not so*, and for this sufficient reason, that there are neither means nor appliances available to the European officer for indulgence in vice. We all know what sort of conduct may be "sugared over" in London or Paris, but nowhere in India is the European able thus to pass unnoticed and unknown; the result is, that living openly, and as it were in the face of the community, vice is the marked exception, and decorum and decency are the natural and usual results of our position. The English public at large will not think the worse of Indian officers for being free comparatively from the *pretence* and *affectation* of superior virtue and goodness. My own experience leads me to the broad conclusion, that nowhere are men brought up to be bolder, and more free from all the subservient vices; more honest, sincere, and trustworthy, than they are in India. Our class, by which I mean the middle class, is well represented; there, no one need blush for them; and I will venture to predict that, when the causes of these tragical mutinies come to be hereafter sifted and ascertained, it will be found, that in no one instance were men incited to join in them by indignation or disgust at European vice or immorality. No! lust of dominion and of mammon, lured on these brigands to their fate. It may sound inflated, but theirs has been a struggle for empire; they have sought to "push us from our stools" and to rule in our place; they are now fatally undeceived. Their unexpected battalions burst irresistibly upon our defenceless out-posts, but their superiority has been short-lived; and it is to be hoped that no puling miserable weakness will be suffered to interfere with the stern, just retribution which is due to the memory and fate of our slaughtered countrymen. If the Calcutta Government is too weak to deal with the mutineers and murderers, who have outraged human nature in the infamous atrocities they have perpetrated on our women and children; if, as reported, meekness, tenderness, and lenity are now being enjoined, by the Indian Government, on those who have

endeavoured manfully to uphold our supremacy; if, as stated, the civilians who, at Patna and Monghir, acted with courage, promptitude, and decision, have been removed from their appointments under the displeasure of their rulers, a Royal Commission, to examine into and condemn the guilty who have taken part in this infamous revolt, should be at once sent out to India, and should be composed of men who know how to uphold the honour of our country, protect and avenge the innocent, and to punish the guilty. If a man escapes of those who have outraged humanity, in this fearful revolt, we shall ill have performed our part or our duty to those who have fallen.

In conclusion, I am aware that I shall be blamed by some for so openly expressing my opinion of the incapacity of the Indian Government, and of some of its more prominent subordinates; I shall be blamed for speaking as I have done of the Sepoys, for the delusion connected with these men is yet strong upon many; I shall be blamed, possibly, for presuming to censure some of the acts of the Marquis of Dalhousie. To all this I have but one simple reply, namely, that under ordinary circumstances I should have held my peace, for I have no further connection with public business, or desire to re-engage in it; but I consider that this, if ever there was one, is a time to speak out, and to make known boldly the truth and facts to the best of my knowledge and ability. In the inquiries which I presume will follow on the re-establishment of peace, it is desirable that the conduct of those who govern India should be rightly understood and thoroughly sifted; if it be then found that I have "set down aught in malice," I am content to abide the condemnation of my fellows. I need make no further apology for the open expression of my opinions; and I will only add, that the details I have given in connection with our position before Delhi have been added since the arrival of the Mail from thence of the 25th of August, and since the first part of the MS. was placed in the printer's hands.

Newport House, near Exeter,
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INDIA

THE

REVOLT AND THE HOME GOVERNMENT.

WHILE war and tumult prevail throughout the length and breadth of India, while a bloody struggle is taking place between barbarism and civilization, while the blood of our brave soldiers is flowing, and the cries of the wife and daughter are only stopped by the sword of the fiendish monsters who have gloated over their sufferings; while unexampled patience and pious resignation are exhibited under trials almost beyond human endurance, and the most heroic fortitude is maintained by our beleaguered half-famished countrymen and women; while this fearful drama is being enacted, a voice is heard from the metropolis of that land of woe. Does it cry for succour to these helpless beings? Does it suggest measures of relief or point out any means of salvation? Does it call upon all classes to rally round the Government and to strengthen its hands? Nothing of the kind. It is an address to this country, where attention is, for the first time, riveted to India; where hearts are breaking with anguish and suspense, and where the heroic efforts of England's small and gallant bands are being watched with an impatience hardly bearable, and with an anxiety

breathless with apprehension. It would be expected that Englishmen, under such circumstances as these, would endeavour to stimulate the exertions of the brave by expressions of sympathy and admiration, and strive to raise the faint-hearted and desponding by the example of a bold and confident attitude. Has this been the case in Calcutta?

We lament that certain individuals, calling themselves Englishmen, have given utterance to sentiments which betray a lamentable want of any such loyal feelings; that at such a season of peril and difficulty they have thought fit to propound a grave constitutional question, and to accompany their address with attacks upon the constituted authority, which too plainly betray their desire to embarrass the Government and to weaken it in the eyes of the country.

We will not stop to inquire into the characters of the authors of the precious document, which is styled "The Petition of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta to the Lords and Commons of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled." The public will judge of the men by the act to which they are parties, and need not, therefore, scrutinize the past conduct of the chief supporters of this unpatriotic proceeding.

By what real motive they have been actuated it would not be difficult to guess. From conviction, after mature deliberation, they cannot have acted. Opportunities they have had, when the subject of the Indian Government was under the consideration of Parliament, of preferring their complaints and pressing their views. Why were they then silent? Why did they not raise the cry of want of confidence in the East-India Company when

men's minds were calm and undisturbed by the threatened massacres of their fellow-countrymen, and when they could calmly consider the question? Why? Because they felt the benefit of the rule under which they were living. A man does not wait to insure his house until it is in flames. If the Indian Government was constituted of such inflammable materials, why were not representations made before? No; this is the conduct of panic-stricken, craven-hearted men, who see trouble and darkness around, and, with the fickleness and faithlessness of cowards, call for change—change.

> "An habitation giddy and unsure
> Hath he that buildeth on the vulgar heart."

The only other explanation of this proceeding which occurs to us, is that Sir A. D. Larpent and his friends may be in league with Mr. Disraeli to embarrass the Government during the ensuing session. Party spirit has done much on other occasions, and it is often too strong to be restrained either by the ties of good sense or patriotism: and Mr. Disraeli, smarting probably under the disappointment of his futile attempt to censure the past and present Government of India, and to provide the natives of that country with reasons for disaffection, may have cast about for further weapons of attack. But we will look into the complaints of the petitioners.

First, they represent that "the Government of the East-India Company, to whose care the interests of Great Britain in the East have been confided, possess from their constitution absolute power. They have a perpetual majority in the Legislative Council, which is composed entirely of official persons."

It is needless to inform the English public that the power of the East-India Company is anything but absolute; that, on the contrary, it is very circumscribed; that there is such a department of the Government of this country as a Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, by which the acts and proceedings of the Company are controlled on behalf of the Crown. By this constitution of the Home Government of India, the real responsible power of the Government of India is vested in the Crown, and the Cabinet is as much answerable for the conduct of the affairs of India as any secretary of state could be. But, urge the petitioners, the Government has a perpetual majority in the Legislative Council; "there are no private or corporate rights that can be effectually opposed to them, nor is there any representation of public opinion." Will any sane man say that the time has arrived for the introduction of popular institutions in India? Long will it be necessary to rule the country with a vigour and decision bordering on despotism as just and humane as you like. No one, who knows anything of India, will deny that, when tranquillity is restored, a firm and unbending policy must be maintained. The people will thank you for nothing short of this. They will respect you the more, and be happier under the security which it will provide. And yet men are found on the spot,—English merchants, forsooth! — who profess to understand the native character, and who attempt to influence public opinion in this country in favour of a measure which would have the effect of keeping the native mind in perpetual ferment and excitement. But although the Government of India must act with sternness and vigour, it is not, and never can be, "absolute."

Appeal from every subject, British or Native, is always open; and the East-India Company and the Government in this country review with the utmost scrutiny all the proceedings of their local representatives.

Another grave complaint made against Lord Canning is that he has destroyed the liberty of the press, an act which the Petitioners characterize as "repugnant to British feeling and subversive of the principles of the British Constitution." It is gratifying to find that the people in this country do not take this view of the measure. They do not require to be told that in time of intestine war and commotion, when the minds of a sensitive people living under a foreign yoke are open to receive with unbounded credulity the poisonous falsehoods of a licentious and treasonable press, it is necessary for the welfare of the country and the maintenance of authority to check and prevent the circulation of such trash and sedition as has appeared in many native papers. If Government is to blame, it is for not sooner quenching so dangerous a firebrand.

While any attempt, in ordinary times, to stifle public discussion—which, if carried on with truth and moderation, has an undoubted beneficial effect both upon the governors and the governed—is to be deprecated, it must be admitted, and it has been admitted, by the strongest advocates of a free press in India, that circumstances may arise when interference on the part of the Government is necessary. The law was only passed upon the conviction that the Indian Legislature, as Mr. Macaulay represented at the time, possessed "the unquestionable power to interfere with overwhelming rapidity and energy, and could, in a single sitting, make a law for stopping every press in

India." Lord Metcalfe, the author of the Act which finally emancipated the Indian press, himself says, "The liberty of the press, like other liberties of the subject, may be suspended when the safety of the state requires such a sacrifice." And we cannot entertain a doubt that Lord Canning's measure would have received the warm support of that high-minded and far-seeing statesman if he had now been alive. It is to be feared, however, that of late years the privilege has been grossly abused by one portion of the press of India, and that the falsehoods, libels, and sedition which it has propagated have done much to delude the minds of the people and to foment disaffection. The English papers, with some exceptions, have been conducted, upon the whole, with moderation and sobriety, and the "Friend of India" especially has been conspicuous for its ability and sound sense. Journals of like stamp would materially assist the authorities in the detection of abuse and error, while they would enlighten the public mind and provide a medium through which the expression of public feeling would find a vent; but, on the other hand, there has been a certain class of papers which have been productive of unmixed evil. The native press, which is supported, of course, by the native communities, is prepared so as to gratify their low and immoral tastes. Contempt for British authority, and abuse of British agents was the burden of its song. Corrupt and licentious, it has sown discontent and sedition broadcast over the land, and has been the means of spreading the grossest misrepresentations and the foulest lies amongst an ignorant and credulous people. No public servant was safe from its abuse, no officer discharging his duty was free from its calumnious shafts. It had become the plague of

the land. The words of Sir Thomas Munro, written a quarter of a century ago, sound almost prophetic upon the subject:—

"The high opinion entertained of us by the natives, and the deference and respect for authority which have hitherto prevailed among ourselves, have been the main cause of our success in this country; but when these principles shall be shaken or swept away by a free press, encouraged by our juries to become a licentious one, the change will soon reach and pervade the whole native army. The native troops are the only body of natives who are always mixed with Europeans, and they will therefore be the first to learn the doctrines circulated among them by the newspapers; for, as these doctrines will become the frequent subjects of discussion among the European officers, it will not be long before they are known to the native officers and troops. Those men will probably not trouble themselves much about distinctions regarding the rights of the people and form of government, but they will learn from what they hear to consider what immediately concerns themselves, and for which they require but little prompting. They will learn to compare their own low allowances and humble rank with those of their European officers,—to examine the ground on which the wide difference rests,—to estimate their own strength and resources, and to believe that it is their duty to shake off a foreign yoke, and to secure for themselves the honours and emoluments which their country yields. If the press be free, they must immediately learn all this, and much more. Their assemblage in garrisons and cantonments will render it easy for them to consult together regarding their plans; they will have no great difficulty in finding leaders qualified to direct them; their patience, their habits of discipline, and their experience in war, will hold out the fairest prospect of success; they will be stimulated by the love of power and independence, and by ambition and avarice, to carry their designs into execution. The attempt, no doubt, would be dangerous; but when the contest was for so rich a stake, they would not be deterred from the danger. They might fail in their first attempts, but even their failure would not, as under a national government, confirm our power, but shake it to its very foundation. The military insubordination which is occasioned by some partial or temporary cause, may be removed, but that which arises from a change in the character of the troops, urging them to a systematic opposition, cannot be

subdued; we should never again recover our present ascendency; all confidence in them would be destroyed; they would persevere in their designs until they were finally successful, and after a sanguinary civil war, or rather passing through a series of insurrections and massacres, we should be compelled to abandon the country.

"We might endeavour to secure ourselves by augmenting our European establishment. This might, at a great additional expense, avert the evil for a time, but no increase of Europeans could long protract the existence of our dominion. In such a contest we are not to expect any aid from the people: the native army would be joined by all that numerous and active class of men, formerly belonging to the revenue and police departments, who are now unemployed, and by many now in office, who look for higher situations; and by means of these men they would easily render themselves masters of the open country, and of its revenue. The great mass of the people would remain quiet. The merchants and shopkeepers, from having found facilities given to trade which they never before experienced, might wish us success, but they would do no more. The heads of villages, who have at their disposal the most warlike part of the inhabitants, would be more likely to join their countrymen than to support our cause. They have, it is true, when under their native rulers, often shown a strong desire to be transferred to our dominion; but this feeling arose from temporary causes,—the immediate pressure of a weak and rapacious government, and the hope of bettering themselves by a change. But they have now tried our Government, and found, that though they are protected in their persons and their property, they have lost many of the emoluments which they derived from a lax revenue system under their native chiefs, and have also lost much of their former authority and consideration among the inhabitants, by the establishment of our judicial courts and European magistrates and collectors. The hope of recovering their former rank and influence would therefore render a great part of them well disposed to favour any plan for our overthrow. We delude ourselves if we believe that gratitude for the protection they have received, or attachment to our mild Government, would induce any considerable body of the people to side with us in a struggle with the native army."

That the present lamentable events in India owe their origin in a great measure to the causes thus so ably

pointed out, we cannot doubt; and a measure which deprives a weak and excited population of so dangerous an instrument of mischief was imperatively called for. Happy would it have been for India if the restrictions now imposed had been decided upon long ago.

But what is the panacea for all the evils enumerated in the petition? To remove the government of the country from the East-India Company and to substitute in its place the direct government of her Majesty the Queen, with an open Legislative Council, suitable to the requirements of the country and compatible with the British supremacy. Queen's Courts presided over by trained lawyers, with the English language as the official court language!

We have already seen that the government of the country is at this moment so far in the hands of the British Cabinet that they are as much responsible now for the state of affairs in India as if its government had been confided to a Secretary of State. Nobody will affirm that the form of the Home Government can have had any share in producing the lamentable occurrences which are now taking place in India; and to attempt to throw the responsibility upon the East-India Company proceeds either from ignorance of its functions, from an hostility to it as a governing body, or from the innate desire of violent and unthinking men to satiate their Nemesis by the sacrifice of some one or other.

> "Passions are winds, to urge us o'er the wave,
> Reason, the rudder to direct and save;
> This without those obtains a vain employ,
> Those without this but urge us to destroy."

The other measures proposed for the improvement of

the government of India are an open Legislative Council, which has before been alluded to, the establishment of Law Courts under barristers sent straight out from the Temple or Lincoln's Inn, and the compulsory use of the English language. It is not difficult to recognize the paternity of these sage propositions; and we doubt not that the author of them will appear as the advocate, when Parliament meets. That oracle of the "Young Indian" party, Sir Erskine Perry, well recollects his position in this country before he went to Bombay, and it is natural that he should sympathize with barristers in this country similarly situated now—no briefs, no clients. It is impossible to avoid admiring the kindness of heart which prompts him, while fattening upon a handsome pension, after filling an easy berth, to strive to obtain the same benefits for his less fortunate brethren. The proposals are, however, too frivolous and puerile to deserve serious notice at a time like this: but the opportunity may be taken to examine the effect and working of the present system of the government of India. This is not the season which would have been chosen for the consideration of the subject; but as it has been forced upon the notice of the public by the unpatriotic, narrow-minded, and illogical document, which bears, upon every line, the stamp of having been begotten by a few shallow, panic-stricken individuals, it may be advisable to inquire into the possible effect of the change they have proposed in the constitution of the Home Government. It is, no doubt, a most important subject, and one which appears generally to be misunderstood.

It is hardly necessary to occupy the reader in tracing the rise and progress of the East-India Company. That

it was originally a corporation of merchants, and that it has now become a purely administrative body is known to all. Truly can they say, "Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis." It is with the present constitution of the Home Government that we have to deal.

This may be briefly explained. To a Court of Directors composed of eighteen members, twelve of whom are elected by the proprietors of East-India stock, and six appointed by the Government, is committed the administration of Indian affairs, subject to the control of her Majesty's Government, exercised by the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India. The Directors are, by their constitution, of far more consequence than a simple council, for they initiate every measure, and their propositions can only be objected to and rejected by the Board of Commissioners upon an explanation of "the reason why." A power of remonstrance is of course reserved to the Directors, who thus have the opportunity of urging the grounds of their propositions. If ultimately obliged to submit to the judgment of the Board of Commissioners, they can place upon record their protest against the measure which is forced upon them. Upon questions of peace and war the Government retain an undivided power, and transmit their instructions through a secret committee composed of three members of the Court of Directors. The appointment of Governor-General, and local Governors, and of Members of Council are made jointly by the Government and the Court, each retaining the power of removal. The appointment of Commander-in-Chief rests with the former only.

To facilitate the transaction of business and to insure a careful deliberation upon the various questions involved

in the numerous departments of the government of a great empire, the Court of Directors divides itself into Committees, who first consider in detail the measures appertaining to the different branches of the government they undertake. Thus, one committee takes in hand the military and the political; another the revenue, the judicial, the legislative, and the public works departments; another the financial concerns, and the management of the railways and telegraphs, as well as the home establishments of the East-India Company. The results of the labours of each committee are subsequently reconsidered and approved or disapproved by all the Directors in full court assembled.

Such a division of labour would seem to insure sufficient deliberation; and the knowledge and experience of Indian affairs possessed by the members of the Court would hardly seem to call for supervision on the part of those who cannot be so well acquainted with the peculiar circumstances and condition of India. But it is right and necessary that the Government of this country should be responsible to the people of this country for the good government of this great dependency, and a Secretary of State, as it were, is appointed to approve of the acts of the Directors. The initiative remains with those who are possessed of the information which is the best qualification for the direction of public affairs, and the confirmation rests with those who are responsible. But, it is urged, why should there be two co-ordinate authorities at different parts of the town with separate establishments? Why not bring this Indian Secretary of State in closer connection with the Court? This could not be done without affecting the independence of the Court, and thus

reducing its power and contracting its influence for good. It would also remove the salutary separation which is now preserved between the Court and any political party. The Court's independence is the key-stone to the whole fabric of the Government.

Such is the machinery which now works the wheels of the Government of India. It has grown with the empire which it has created. The anomalies it contains are as unavoidable as those which exist in the constitution of our own country. It has, like that, adapted itself to the circumstances of the times, and combines elements which experience has shown to be suited to the interests of this country and the wants of India. And although, from the nature of its unchangeableness and the appearance of monopoly, it has had many enemies and been subject to violent assaults, it has always been found desirable, by the deliberative assemblies which have from time to time considered the schemes of government proposed as substitutes, to maintain the existing form, with certain modifications.

So important a body is the Court of Directors, that whatever can possibly improve its composition would be a benefit to the Government; and the provision of the East-India Act, which conferred upon the Crown the power to appoint six of the Directors—the choice being confined to persons who possessed Indian experience from actual residence in that country—is likely to be attended with advantage as long as the selection falls upon men of high character, ability, and standing, uninfluenced by party politics. But any proposed change in the relative position of the Government with the Court of Directors (whether as the representatives of the East-India Company or as a Council) should be jealously watched. The

greatest caution is necessary in dealing with so large and difficult a problem as that of the government of India, and no sweeping measure should be sanctioned without previous attempts to introduce gradual reforms where required. What is the opinion of the eloquent historian of England upon this question? "It is, I think," says Mr. Macaulay, "indispensably necessary that the government of India should be divided between two bodies, between a minister or council appointed by the Crown and some other body acting independent of it. It may," he added, "be said that this House [of Commons] is the constitutional check upon the abuse of the royal prerogative, but that this House is, or that this House ever can be, an efficient check on the abuse of the royal prerogative in India, I altogether deny. What we want is a body independent of the Crown, and no more than independent; which shall be neither the tool of the ministry nor the tool of the opposition."

"Any plan" said Sir John Malcolm, "for effecting reform would be incomplete that does not unite the objects of improving the Direction without taking from it that distinctive character which gives it a particular value as part of our Indian Legislation. What would be the probable consequence of the Indian empire coming under the direct influence of the Government? What English Government could possess the general and familiar acquaintance with the affairs of India which the Court must from their constitution have? And by what different principles would they be swayed! Would not every measure become a question of expediency, and any means of decision be encumbered by a party or fettered judgment?"

Lord Broughton filled the office of President of the India Board for many years. The natural bias of his mind would be opposed, probably, to an institution like that of the East-India Company. The Conservative character of such a body would have no charms for him. But what does he say after his long and personal experience?—"I warn those of my honourable friends who are so inclined, that if they break through the general principle on which India is governed, except on the most urgent necessity, they will strike a blow at our great and wonderful dominion in the East from which it will not soon recover."—*Speech, House of Commons* (*6th July*, 1847).

A blow it will be said has now been struck, under the very system which he advocates, from which India will not soon recover. Unhappily, it is too true. But will any man say that the system of Home Government has been the cause of these disasters? Will any man venture to affirm, that if the Government had been more directly under the Crown, the mutiny would not have occurred?—that Mussulman conspiracy, that Hindoo craft would have been prevented?—that the spirit of treachery and demoniac cruelty would have been quenched? and that men's hearts and heads at important and critical periods of the revolt would never have failed if the Government had been carried on in the Queen's name? And can it be really supposed that the natives of India are not aware that, although that honoured name is not actually used, her authority is practically exercised as much as if an East-India Company never existed? Does not her effigy appear on every coin that passes through their hands? If it can be shown that the more extensive use of the name of

Queen Victoria in India would have a beneficial effect upon the minds of the natives or the councils of Government, by all means let it be done. But still there must be a body separate from the Government of this country, and that body, to be of use, must be independent. Such a body is the Court of Directors of the East-India Company; and it is, no doubt, very essential to the success of the system that its composition should secure the services of the best-qualified men that can be obtained.

It is not perhaps possible to say who may or who may not be qualified to assume the functions of government. The metaphysical understanding of Burke could not get over the difficulty. "My experience in life teaches me," he said, in his speech on Mr. Fox's India Bill, in 1780, "nothing clear upon the subject. I have known merchants with the sentiments and the abilities of great statesmen; and I have seen persons in the rank of statesmen with the conceptions and characters of pedlars. Indeed, my observation has furnished me nothing that is to be found in any habits of life or education which tends wholly to disqualify men for the functions of government, but that by which the power of exercising those functions is very frequently obtained. I mean a spirit and habits of low cabal and intrigue; which I have never, in one instance, seen united with a capacity of a sound and manly policy."

That the Court of Directors are free from this disqualification, their separation from, and want of sympathy with, all political parties and creeds in this country, afford the best security. But there is one qualification which *is* essential to enable men to govern, and that is an

acquaintance with the country the affairs of which they are called upon to administer. Upon this part of the Court's character, we again have the testimony of Macaulay. "I know," he said in the House of Commons, in a debate regarding the recall of Lord Ellenborough, "how it [the Court] is composed. I know that in that Court are to be found a great number of men eminently qualified to judge of Indian politics. I know that there is to be found in that Court one gentleman, for example, who himself acted as Governor-General of India for some time. I know that there are persons to be found there of the highest distinction, whether in war or diplomacy, or any other branch of the public service. I believe most firmly, and I believe that no person who is acquainted with India will dispute what I am about to say, that at least there are ten gentlemen in that Court, the least-informed of whom is better acquainted with, and is better informed upon India, than the whole of the Treasury Bench opposite."

But, under the existing constitution of the Court, its members do not consist entirely of persons who have spent their lives in India. There is an English element, which many consider exercises a very salutary influence over its proceedings. Lord Ellenborough considered the preservation of this element as very important, and looked forward with alarm to the day when the Court might, by altered circumstances, become entirely Indian. "I am by no means desirous," he said, "that India should be wholly governed by retired Indians, or that all the prejudices, all the partialities, and all the interested feelings which may have grown up with them in the course of a long residence in that country, should be

carried into the councils of the Court of Directors, and there predominate. On the contrary, one great advantage of the practical working of the system hitherto has been this, that the Court of Directors, while partially composed of persons connected with India, has yet had the means of having within itself merchants of the first eminence: persons connected with the trade of the city of London, and others who have been influential members of various classes of society. What has been the effect? The beneficial distribution of their patronage: not distributed solely among the sons of Indians—not to those who, from their very childhood, have acquired all the prejudices of native Indians by a constant residence in that country—but their patronage has embraced every class of society; there is not a class of the community which has not its representative in India; and in so searching among those middle classes, from which they have derived so many useful and great men, they have produced the greatest benefit, not only to this country, but to India itself."

Thus from all sides do we receive the strongest testimony in favour of the maintenance of the Court, in favour of its constitution, and in favour of its character.

It is said by those who are opposed to the system of double Government, that the East-India Company is a fiction, inasmuch as the real authority is vested in the Board of Control. But is command over the purse nothing? Does the duty of initiating every despatch and every instruction to the Government involve no practical influence? And is the power of recalling a Governor-General so slight a matter that the party who possesses it may be called a sham? But besides these separate and distinct powers, the influence which knowledge and

experience invariably exercise must remain with the Court; and it is notorious that on several occasions, to the credit of the Government be it said, the Board of Control have, upon the representations of the Court, reversed instructions upon which they originally insisted. Much, however, must depend upon the manner in which the control of the Board of Commissioners is exercised, and it is all-important that discretion and forbearance should characterize the acts of the President, who should, moreover, be a statesman of wide and enlightened views.

It is impossible to deny that the weak point of the system is the delay which occurs in the transaction of business. It does not follow that slowness in deciding involves obstruction to progressive improvement. Decisions, although long in being passed, may be in the right direction. But there can be no doubt that such promptitude as is compatible with a due consideration, is a most desirable feature in the management of public as well as of private concerns. A vessel that can perform a voyage in a month gets through twice the work equally well with a slow going ship that occupies two months on the same passage. The delay which, unfortunately, occurs in the transaction of business is, therefore, an evil. But it is one that can be remedied, without sacrificing a system generally so beneficial for the country to which it is applied. Some people think, indeed, that there is no necessity for greater celerity; that the Home Government is one of deliberation more than of action. Sir Charles Wood was inclined to think so, and attached little importance to despatch in the transaction of general Indian business in this country. India, undoubtedly, is the place where India should be governed, and much of

the business here consists in reviewing the proceedings of the Indian executive. When cases have occurred in which immediate instructions were necessary, a mail has not been allowed to go out without those instructions being prepared, settled, and transmitted. Nevertheless, the defects of circumlocution still exist and might be remedied. There is always a tendency in a controlling party to intermeddle and exercise too minute an interference, and this error, it has frequently been represented, the Board of Commissioners have not been able to avoid. Reports will get abroad, and the complaints of the slow and tedious movements of the Board of Control are too common to have escaped attention. It is a well-known fact that, with regard to the supervision of the proceedings of the Railway Companies in this country, although an *ex-officio* Director sits at each Board on behalf of the Home authorities, every matter is required to be submitted for their approval. This system is, we presume, carried out in other branches of the service, and the unnecessary delays which occur must be most obstructive. Where the delay occurs it is not for unofficial ears to learn, but a certain degree of experience in both places has resulted in the impression, that while at the east end of London business is conducted with great celerity, at the west there appears to exist a drag which is productive of considerable inconvenience. So fertile, indeed, has Cannon-row been in delays and objections that it is commonly designated "the Board of Obstruction."

It is supposed also, in many quarters, that in opinions as well as in action this Board is behind the body it controls. Yet it is a common thing to complain of the old lady of Leadenhall-street, whose back is made to bear the burthen

of all the sins of commission and omission of which the Home Government is considered to be guilty. Rumour, however, is busy upon *this* point. Indeed one journal, distinguished for its ability and intimate acquaintance with Indian affairs, tells us as a "remarkable fact that, in the long series of measures singled out by Mr. Disraeli (in his four hours' speech in July last) for condemnation, every one, without an exception, is an act of the Crown authorities, as distinguished from the East-India Company." And the writer expresses his amazement that Mr. Disraeli "should place a proposal for dissolving the East-India Company at the close of a speech which, whether from intention or not, has the effect of showing that exactly in proportion to the interpositions of the Crown Anglo-Indian policy has miscarried." Whether this assertion is correct or not cannot be said; but it shows the impressions which prevail in the best-informed quarters; and the necessity for pausing before the Court is condemned, and (as some would desire) executed. No; a long and patient inquiry must take place before any changes are made; and this is not a time for either agitation or change, unless, indeed, under the latter may be included the infusion of more life and spirit in the system of control. When that inquiry does take-place, the distinctive character of the two bodies should be brought to light, in order that it may be seen whether the public impression is correct as to the one being progressive, the other obstructive. If it is the nature of the Government department to be slow in its sentiments and movements, the necessity will be more evident than ever of retaining that portion of the machine which is the main spring of action.

Having endeavoured to show the usefulness of the

Court of Directors as a part of the Government, it remains to examine the effect of any change by which their powers and their independence could be impaired or destroyed. All the authorities which have been quoted as bearing testimony to the efficiency and usefulness of the Court as a body are favourable to the present system. Macaulay, Lord Broughton, Lord Ellenborough, Sir J. Malcolm; and to these may be added the late Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Hardinge, Lord John Russell, Lord Dalhousie, Sir Charles Wood, Mr. Marshman, Mr. Mill; in fact, all who have deliberately considered the subject and given responsible opinions upon it. It is only four years ago that the House of Commons decided, by a large majority, in favour of Sir Charles Wood's Bill, the principle of which was the maintenance of the double system. Other opinions have undoubtedly been maintained by men of position and ability, but never, since the time of Mr. Fox, have they formed part of the Government of the day. Mr. Disraeli is one of these men, although it is well known that Lord Derby's Cabinet, in which he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, was equally in favour of the double system when in office. But his lame effort during the last session to embarrass the Government shows too plainly the object of his *present* policy. And this instance furnishes an example of the insuperable objection to bringing India under the direct influence of parliamentary government. Mr. Disraeli no doubt expected a repetition of the China debate, and laid hold of the mutinies as a last chance during the session of rousing public feeling against the Government, and of defeating them upon a division. The Government were too strong, and the House of Commons too patriotic to allow of

any mischief being done on that occasion: but it might not always be so; and if parties were pretty evenly balanced any question of Indian politics would be made a handle for parliamentary strife and furnish cause for a struggle for office. Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden are, we believe, honest in their opinions, which are nevertheless equally dangerous. They would bring India more under the control of the House of Commons, and expect benefits from thus popularizing its Government. Constant discussions, they think, would provoke inquiry into supposed or real ills, and would protect the people of India from oppression. It would show them that their grievances would always be listened to by the people of this country, and that their representatives would see that they were righted. But do Messrs. Cobden and Bright overlook the danger of this scheme? Is India ripe for it? Would the people comprehend it? A few agitators would understand it, and reap a harvest by the perpetual preparation of cases for the consideration of the House. The native mind would be kept in a continual ferment, and the Government would be despised for its supposed impotence. But it will be said, things cannot be worse than they are now. True. But the present insurrection is not to be traced to a discontented people. It is a military rebellion fomented by Mahomedan conspirators, and the actors in it are those who have been treated better than any other class in India, who have been petted and coaxed till they have been led to the belief that they are irresistible. We have been bitten by the snake which we have nurtured in our bosom. The English have not been cruel task-masters in India. We, as a nation, have left undone things which ought to have been done, and have done things which we ought not

to have done. What human institution would be free from this accusation? But no one doubts that the government of India has been conducted upon humane and generous principles, and that its officers have set an example of integrity, morality, and justice, which does them honour. Exceptions there are, of course, to every rule; but, as a body, the Englishmen composing the civil and military services in India have ever shown themselves to be as high-minded and as honourable as any in the world, and no other branches of the state have contained a larger proportion of excellent and pious men. The cases of torture which have been brought to light were perpetrated by the native underlings of the Government, who, when detected, were punished with the severity the offence deserved. Never has a single case been discovered with which an European officer was cognizant; and yet, torture has been actually set forth as a part of the system of governing India, which has not only been tolerated, but sanctioned. If there is one part of a man's conduct upon which the Court of Directors press more heavily than another, it is abuse of authority in dealing with natives. No offence is visited with greater severity than want of consideration for their feelings and religion, and an instance cannot be pointed out in which such conduct has been passed over lightly by the authorities either in India or at home. And yet it has become the fashion among some people to designate the Government of India as "cruel," "base," and "tyrannical." The people of this country are too apt to become credulous upon matters affecting the liberty or well-being of their fellow-subjects. This is a fault which proceeds from a generous feeling. But generosity may be exercised at the

expense of justice. And it would be well to examine the source of all the allegations which reach them. Many a man, disgraced and degraded for unworthy conduct in India, comes home and finds vent for his ill-feeling against the Government, which has rewarded him according to his deserts, by abuse and misrepresentations. He gains listeners by the violence of his attacks; and, having information upon Indian subjects, he is regarded as an authority, and is made powerful to mislead. All testimony upon Indian matters should be therefore carefully weighed and considered before it is accepted, whether it be in support of the Government or in opposition to it. But it will very often be found that disappointment, failure, or disgrace are the parents of calumny and untruth.

To return, however, to the question of placing the administration of Indian affairs more directly under Parliamentary control. Supposing that India were ripe for the change; supposing that the discussion in a popular assembly of the subjects relating to her internal administration would not be attended with dangerous or inconvenient consequences, — is the House of Commons sufficiently informed upon the affairs of India to enable it to pass judgment upon questions brought before it? India is an empire—not a colony,—and cannot at present be governed according to English notions. Perhaps the expression of popular opinion—or, rather, the discussions of a section of the people of this country—has not of late tended to tranquillize the native community in India. The officers of Government have been accused of organized attempts at proselytism. But have they not been encouraged and prompted by the sympathies of the people of this country? The motive is praise-

worthy, and cannot be condemned, if the efforts are conducted prudently, quietly, and without ostentation. Christian example and Christian teaching are perfectly compatible with toleration: in fact, should be a guarantee for kindness and forbearance.' But may not the discussions in this country have furnished the designing Mussulman with a handle for his insidious warning to the alarmed sepoy, that the people of England had determined upon their conversion? It is not argued that such discussions can, or should, be stopped; but, if there is any ground for the supposition,—and we know that the native press has contained numerous garbled reports of what has been said and done upon the subject,—does it not afford an indication of the mischievous effect that would be produced by frequent debates in the House of Commons upon questions relating to the internal administration of India? And if the members of the House of Commons are not sufficiently acquainted with Indian matters to judge on the merits of questions brought under consideration, they will necessarily vote upon these, according as their political leaders may prescribe. Thus will India be brought under the influence of party spirit, and her interests sacrificed to the desire for political power. It might not be so at first; but it would infallibly follow as the corollary to the committal of the administration of India to a Government supported by a Parliamentary majority.

Mr. Gladstone, in his speech in the House of Commons regarding the Persian war, justly remarks: "It has been an absolute necessity of our Indian empire that powers of war and peace should be exercised by the Company [*i.e.* the Secret Committee of the Court], under the

control of Government, and with reference to purposes strictly Indian. In a country embracing, as British India does, the territories of many native sovereigns, with whom we have constant relations and numerous points of contact and irritation, it would be absurd, when by our Acts of Parliament we have established for Indian purposes a principle of Government separate from a Parliamentary system, to say that that Government, with reference to every Indian purpose of peace and war, should be subject to the immediate and direct control of the House of Commons."

Do not these observations tend to show the necessity of maintaining a "principle of government separate from a Parliamentary system?" And if questions of peace and war should thus be exempt from Parliamentary—*i.e. direct* Parliamentary—influence, how much more is it desirable that Parliament should not intermeddle with the numerous minor, but at the same time important measures relating to India. The present machinery of Government is called cumbrous, but would not the wheels of Government be clogged to a much greater extent if the administration of affairs were brought under the supervision * of the House of Commons; if every proposed outlay for the improvement of the country, or the development of its resources, had to be sanctioned, and every arrangement connected with its internal economy discussed by that assembly?

The more the subject is looked into, the stronger will

* In speaking of the control of Parliament, a *direct* supervision is of course intended, as now the House of Commons is able to exercise any control it chooses. It is to that House that the President of the Board and the Court of Directors are responsible.

be the conviction that a fixed and stable body like the Court of Directors is much better calculated to protect the interests of India than a Government seeking to maintain a Parliamentary majority. But it will be said that this body could be represented by a Council as well as by the East-India Company, and an attempt is made to throw dust in the eyes of the public by characterizing the Company as "the hated barrier" between the Queen and her subjects. But if a Council is to supply the place of the Court of Directors, and to be vested with equal powers and privileges,—which would be necessary to preserve its independence and proper influence—the double system, so much talked of and abused, would remain in full force, and the only difference would be in name.

Such a change would not affect the Court of Directors, who would lose no personal advantage if the East-India Company were abolished to-morrow. One acknowledged necessity for having a Council for India is that it may be the receptacle of the patronage—now, however, reduced to the nomination of cadets to the army—so that the Court, if converted into a Council, would retain this privilege. The salaries of the Directors, too, would necessarily be continued. In fact, there would be no diminution of the advantages of their position or influence, and like the present members of the Court, who are not nominees of the Crown, they would only be released from that shadow of responsibility which, as the chosen of the proprietors of the East-India Stock, they may be said to owe to that body.

There is no doubt, however, that this proprietary body has been preserved more as a convenience than from any inherent qualification to exercise its functions.

As the *Times* has recently justly observed, "The Stock-

holders have nothing to gain by sound policy, nor to lose by misgovernment." If the revenues of India were to fail, they would be the last to suffer, as their capital is guaranteed by an accumulative fund. There is, however, the important point of independence to keep in view; and might not that be sacrificed if the Indian Directors or Council were nominated by the Government of the day? "A Council appointed by the King or by the Parliament," said Mr. Macaulay, "would act from political motives: they would be appointed by the political party that happened to be uppermost; and if the Council were appointed for life, they would naturally have a strong motive and a strong disposition to support the party that supported them." It is true the present electors would not now be fixed upon, if a constituency had to be chosen. But it has done its work well, upon the whole, and has shown that it possesses the Indian and English elements in convenient proportions. Of the thirteen elected Directors in the present Court, ten are possessed of Indian experience and three are men of high position and character in the commercial world, who, by their calling, are able to afford reliable information and advice upon questions of finance.

The opportunity which is afforded to the Proprietors to assemble whenever they may desire, to discuss questions relating to India, is seldom made use of. Meet, they do, once a quarter; but the array of empty benches which every General Court presents would seem to show either that they are little interested in Indian affairs, that they have implicit confidence in their representatives, or that they are fully aware of their political impotence.

They are only practically useful, therefore, in affording the ready means of carrying out the principle of preserving a body independent of the Government of the day for the purposes of the Home Government of India. But whether this method be continued or not, it would appear that the expediency of maintaining a double system is recognized both by supporters and opponents of the East-India Company; and the Houses of Commons and of Lords, as recently as 1853, ratified the verdict by the late India Act, xvi. and xvii. Vict. cap. 95.

Sir Charles Wood, speaking on behalf of the Government and in virtue of the office he so ably filled, then said, "We do not think it would be for the advantage of India, that this course (the abolition of the double government) should be adopted. We think it far *wiser and safer* to maintain the present form of Government." The people of this country were not, he considered, in a condition to undertake, through their representatives, the direct control of Indian affairs. Four years could not have effected that alteration in the extent of their information, which would, in his eyes, justify the abrogation of the principle he laid down. Unless the calamity which we are deploring can be traced to the system of government, no alteration would now be justified, and, certainly, no worse time could be fixed upon for effecting a change, when the whole of India is agitated by the struggle which is being made to overthrow our power, and dispossess us of our territory.

It is probable that this formidable revolt will always form a momentous historical problem. There will be no agreement as to its causes, which will be represented as numerous, and will furnish as much food for

discussion, as those assigned for the French Revolution. The British empire in India has no parallel in the world's history. Whether we look to its rapid growth, to the heterogeneous composition of its people, to their antagonism to us and to each other, to its extent and the immense disproportion in the number of the conquering race to its own population, it will ever be the wonder of ages. But this insurrection has its origin in circumstances arising out of this very state of things. The desire to throw off a foreign yoke is implanted in the human breast, and that a conquered people should take any opportunity of successfully resisting their masters could not be wondered at. In India our mistake has been to afford the pretext for an opportunity. The Mahomedan has always chafed under our supremacy, and his desire to emancipate himself from our domination has been fanned by his creed and inextinguishable thirst to recover from the infidel what he had lost. When civilization and Christianity come into contact with barbarism and idolatry causes of irritation and collision will occur. The latter must ultimately give way. Light will penetrate into the blackest darkness. But in opening the way for the light there must be difficulties to overcome. The Mussulman was too keen not to perceive that civilization would fast spread throughout India, and that soon or never must the attempt be made to resist its encroachments. Most unfortunately for us, circumstances favoured the design in this instance. At least, so it has turned out. The most sagacious and far-seeing politician could not have foreseen a tithe of what has happened. It is easy to be wise after the event, and to attempt to trace this or that as the

cause of the occurrence. One thing is plain. The arm upon which we depended has failed us. The Bengal army has proved itself to be rotten to the core. Some of its defects, it is true, were known and pointed out before. But the most strenuous advocate for reform will never venture to say that he anticipated a general mutiny, or that we had not the power at once to extinguish any attempted insurrection. The progress of the mutiny shows that there was no conspiracy among the Hindoos. Was there ever a man who understood the native character better than the brave and lamented Sir Henry Lawrence? Did he not confide in his men till the last? And yet, after fighting for him, even while returning from victory, they could turn against him and basely betray him. This cannot be said to show depth of purpose. No designer, ever so deep, would risk his life in the service of his victim. An irresistible impulse seems to have overcome them, and then have they abandoned themselves to the most brutal and fiendish passions. These are the materials by which the flame of rebellion has been fed. Whether the flame might have been stayed by judgment in one place, by severity here or promptitude of action there, it is impossible to say, however strong may be individual impressions. Human affairs can only be conducted, under Divine Providence, by human agency. During the late unhappy occurrences, men's hearts and heads have—as in any other emergency recorded in history—failed them in some instances, and in others unexampled energy, fortitude, and judgment have been exhibited.

But, while we cannot alter human nature, we may take instruction from the past, and improve human institutions.

The Bengal army will of course be reconstructed with different materials and upon a different principle. The seniority system has had its day. There will be no more coaxing of sepoys, and feeding their vanity and importance by yielding to their pretended prejudices. The rules of the army must be carefully remodelled, and the soldier must then adapt himself to its regulations. But the question is, would these lamentable events have been prevented if the present system of government had not existed? One of the evils which has attended the armies in India has been the Horse Guards' influence in the selection of generals for command. A rumour has obtained currency among military men that the Directors have been greatly disappointed at many of the appointments made, and have urged upon the Government the necessity of securing the services of men not only of experience, but in the strength and vigour of life. A good beginning was at length made, upon these strong representations, in favour of Sir Patrick Grant, and the Indian Minister, to his honour be it said, warmly supported his appointment. But it received only the reluctant and ungracious confirmation of the Horse Guards. If men of ability, activity, and wisdom had been appointed to the exalted positions of Commanders-in-Chief, the army might not have been in the state in which it is now found. The East-India Company cannot be considered as responsible for the selections that have been made.

One cause which has been assigned for the insurrection is, *interference* with the religion of the natives. Some, however, attribute our present difficulties, in a great measure, to the *indifference* which the Government has

shown for the spiritual wants of the native community. These differences of opinion only prove the difficulty of the question. The Government may have shown too much timidity in extending schemes for education, and it may have pandered too much to the prejudices of caste. But to attempt to overcome religious feelings by establishing disabilities would have only led to a complete frustration of the object desired, and would be justly regarded as persecution. Any Government interference would, in fact, be looked upon in that light. The spread of religious truth must therefore be left to private efforts under Government protection: and full scope has been given to missionary labour in India. That these endeavours have not been instrumental in bringing about the disaffection of the sepoy is evident by the fact that in Madras, where perhaps missionary labour has been more extended than other parts of India, no insurrection has taken place. It is the duty of a Government, while it practises tolerance, to require its observance by others. It also is incumbent upon them to prevent practices opposed to morality and humanity. The Government of India, upon these grounds, abolished suttee, infanticide, and self-immolation. They put down dacoity and thuggism with a strong arm, and rooted them out of the land by the most determined efforts. They also removed all civil forfeitures consequent on conversion to Christianity, and they sanctioned the re-marriage of Hindoo widows. All these measures trenched upon practices which were sanctioned by the religious sentiments of those who followed them. These have been the work of time, but they were carried out cautiously and with success. The only

way in which they could have been instrumental in producing the present state of affairs is by furnishing the Mussulman with a pretext for deluding the Hindoo with the notion that the Feringhee was about to deprive him of his religion. Yet nobody will aver that these things ought not to have been done. The greased cartridges may be placed in the same category; and so would any measure of improvement and civilization have been used as an instrument of deception by the designing conspirator.

Annexation is also referred to as a cause for these disturbances; and annexation is mentioned as if it were as much a principle in the system of governing India as the monarchical, republican, or representative element in other forms of government. It is spoken of as a part of the policy of Lord Dalhousie, as if, upon assuming the authority of Governor-General, he had made a list of countries and principalities which he intended to add to the British possessions, and had made it the business of his vicegerency to put his intentions into execution. It is to be hoped, however, that the readers of the attacks upon Lord Dalhousie have not been so grossly misled.

Was he the first Governor-General who was guilty of this sin of annexation? Does not the history of our progress in India, from its very commencement, present a catalogue of annexations? What were the conquests of Clive, of Wellesley, and of Hastings? and the acquisitions of Lord Amherst, Lord William Bentinck, and Lord Ellenborough? The class who most attack Lord Dalhousie support Lord Ellenborough. While they find fault with the policy which annexed the Punjab and Oude, they

defend that which grasped Scinde. The value of this fair province, with its mighty stream and military highway, can hardly be overrated. To a power like that of Great Britain in India it is invaluable. But the mode by which it was acquired, though the military operations brought glory to our arms and renown to the brave and skilful general who conducted them, did not cast credit upon our diplomacy or lustre upon our character for justice and good faith. Lord Dalhousie was eight years Governor-General of India, and, during that time, it fell to his lot, as the representative either of the conquering or paramount power, to decide upon the fate of several states; and in no case can it be said that he acted in opposition to the principles of justice, humanity, right, or at variance with the law and practice of India. The Punjab and Pegue he took as the penalty for unprovoked aggression and insult, and to ensure the security of our own dominions. Berar and Sattara lapsed to the British, as the paramount power, in accordance with the recognized Hindoo law. The government of Oude was assumed in consequence of the violation of treaty by the sovereign, and of his obstinate persistance to misgovern his people to the peril and insecurity of his neighbours. In the Punjab, we set up a prince after we had repelled an unprovoked invasion upon our territory; but the country rose up again a second time, and annexation was forced upon us. In Oude, we supported a king upon the throne, and though repeatedly warned by successive Governors-General of the consequences of his failure to fulfil the engagements which were imposed upon him, he persisted in a course of mal-administration

so gross and tyrannical, as to call for interference and the consequent abdication of his throne. The annexation of this province may or may not have contributed to the causes of the present revolt. It remains to be seen whether the ex-King of Oude was a party to any conspiracy against us, or whether he only fanned the flame of discontent, by expressions of sympathy or promises of help, when he saw the appearance of a mutinous spirit. It is possible also that excitement may have been produced in the minds of the Oude sepoys [and many came from thence] by the dethronement of their king. But whether this be so or not, the abstract question as to whether it was just and right to annex the province, is not affected thereby. If tumult or disaffection were likely to arise from the movement, precautions should have been taken. But the act, if right, should not have been given up on that account. It is said, however, that precautionary measures were proposed by Lord Dalhousie, in the shape of an additional European force to the Indian army, and that the proposition was pressed by Lord Canning and approved by the Court. Why it was not carried out remains to be explained; but it appeared, by Mr. Vernon Smith's answer to General Evans's inquiry regarding an increase to the permanent European troops of the East-India Company, that the Government objected to the increase. If it be so, and is persisted in, a great and serious mistake will have been committed, the results of which we may feel when least prepared to meet the difficulty.

It is needless to enumerate further the alleged causes of the present disasters. Some, no doubt, may be attri-

buted to the mistakes of functionaries, some to ill-conceived measures, but the chief and foremost are the results of circumstances arising out of a most extraordinary and anomalous state of things. But it is worse than folly to lay them to the charge of the East-India Company, which, after winning the country, handed it over to the Crown, and now shares with the Government the administration of its affairs.

The feelings of this country have been cool towards India, when the great amount of benefit that has been derived to us from the connection, and the vast responsibility which it involves are considered. The policy of the House of Commons was, as respects her trade and manufactures, a selfish one, and no appeal from the East-India Company could induce them to alter it. The Government, too, have at times shown an inclination to relieve the pecuniary claims upon this country at the expense of India. Now, for the first time, the serious attention of this country is drawn to India, in a painful degree. It is not now directed to her teeming population, but to the few scattered Europeans who are offering their lives to preserve the honour and glory of England. There will be a severe ordeal to pass through; but British arms will triumph. And the same skill and courage which won the country under Clive, Wellesley, Lake, and Malcolm, will, under Havelock, Lawrence, Campbell, and Edwardes; bring the rebels to subjection, and re-establish our sway with a firm and vigorous arm.

The restoration of order and the reassertion of our supremacy will form the basis of the work of reconstruction. And if, while we raise our fresh legions, we consolidate

our strength by the rapid completion of the railway system; "if," as Lord John Russell admirably observed at Sheffield, "in providing for the future government of India, we can reconcile our duties as Christians with the most entire religious liberty, and a benevolent rule with the firm assertion of power, we may preserve to Great Britain and to civilization a fairer and more secure empire than we have even hitherto possessed."

THE SEPOY REBELLION.

by
Rev. Wm. Arthur

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THE SEPOY REBELLION.

From an early period of our connexion with the East Indies, we have sustained periodical disasters in those countries. The first of these, popularly called 'the Amboyna massacre,' was, comparatively speaking, upon so small a scale, that we can hardly conceive how it should have excited so great a commotion in this country as it did. In the year 1623, the Dutch, who were the most vigorous of our early rivals in the East, seized upon one Captain Towerson, and nine other Englishmen, and, after a trial by torture, hanged them. So greatly were the public enraged, that the Dutch merchants resident in London had to appeal to the Privy Council for protection; and a picture, commemorating the horrors of the scene, was exposed publicly by the East India Company. More than a century later, the city of Madras was wrested from us by the French, a treaty which provided for its restoration violated, the Governor and other authorities carried to Pondicherry, and marched bareheaded through the French capital of the East. Just a hundred and one years ago was perpetrated that outrage which, above all others, has made a deep impression upon the popular memory of England. One hundred and forty-six Englishmen were thrust, by a revengeful Nabob, into a dungeon eighteen feet square, at Calcutta, and the next morning only twenty-three remained alive.

These last two events together exercised an influence on our history in the East which can never be computed. Among those enraged by the capture and disgrace of Madras was a young clerk, Robert Clive, who in his fury turned soldier; and gained so much fame that, when the Black Hole tragedy occurred, he was appointed avenger; in executing which office he made himself the founder of a great empire. Several years

1. *Parliamentary Papers on the Indian Mutiny.*
2. *Defects of the Indian Government.* By Sir C. J. Napier.
3. *Bengal: its Landed Tenure, and Police System.* Speech by the Hon. A. F. Kinnaird, M.P.
4. *Crisis in India.*
5. Theobald's *Tracts on India.*
6. *Dacoitee in Excelsis.*
7. *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army.* By One who has served under Sir Charles Napier.

later, Hyder Ali suddenly appeared at the gates of Madras at the head of an army, and dictated terms of peace; and shortly after occurred the entire destruction of a detachment of our army under Colonel Baillie, by Tipu Sahib, Hyder's son. In 1806, the Sepoys in the Fort of Vellore, taking advantage of the ceremonies connected with the marriage of a Princess,—one of the daughters of Tipu, whose family were then imprisoned in the Fort,—rose in the night, and poured a murderous fire through the windows into the quarters of our European troops, of whom two Colonels, thirteen other officers, and eighty-two men fell, beside ninety-one wounded. In 1824, a regiment at Barrackpore, being ordered to Chittagong, turned the Major General off parade, and rushed to arms. Two European regiments were on the spot; some guns opened upon them at once, and seventy fell. About the year 1834, a plot was discovered in Bangalore for the murder of the whole of the European officers and their families: the leading conspirators were blown from the cannon's mouth. In 1842 occurred the greatest disaster of all, —a sudden insurrection in the recently captured capital of Affghanistan. The British Envoy was treacherously murdered, thirteen thousand troops destroyed, and the small remnant of the British force driven beyond the mountains.

Important as each of these occurrences was in its time, and serious as they are when collectively viewed; when we remember that they spread over so great a length of time, and over a series of conquests and occupations seldom equalled, it must be admitted that, in proportion to the ordinary reverses of warfare, they cannot be considered as forming a dark page in history.

In the future history of India, the crisis through which it is now passing will undoubtedly occupy a much more prominent place than any of the preceding; not because the actual loss of life has hitherto been as great as in the Affghan war, or the military reverses in the field borne any comparison with what was sustained at the hands of Hyder and others,—but because that which had always been looked to as the greatest calamity that could occur has come to pass, and the material foundation, on which our power in India seemed to rest, has been blown from under it. Besides, this outburst has been laid before the world with more details of personal suffering and domestic calamity than even wars on a grand scale usually expose to view.

Before proceeding to consider at length the mutiny, its sources, and its consequences, we will ask our readers to follow us in a cursory survey of the great country which it disturbs.

We stipulate that a map be laid down before the eye. Take your stand at the southern extremity, on Cape Comorin, and look northward. You are now only eight degrees from the equator. On your right hand lies the district of Tinnivelly, inhabited by a Tamul-speaking population, British subjects, among whom exists a larger number of Protestant Christians than in any other province of India. On your left is the little state of Travancore, with a population of a million, under a native Prince, among whose subjects also are a large number of Christians, many thousands of them Protestants, many others Syrians, the language being Malayalim. Proceeding northward, you pass by the ancient and renowned city of Trichinopoly, one of the hottest, but not unhealthiest, in the world, and presently arrive at the Neilgherry Hills, rising to a height of nearly nine thousand feet, covered at the top with plants of the temperate zone, and inhabited by a large English community. This noble chain stands across a considerable breadth of the peninsula, from west to east, and then stretches two immense and widely diverging arms away towards the north: the western arm, running for hundreds of miles within a comparatively short distance of the Indian Ocean, is called the Western Ghauts; the eastern, keeping not so close to the Bay of Bengal, is called the Eastern Ghauts, which are on an average only half the height of the Western. Enclosed between these two great mountain chains lies an elevated region of table-land, some eight hundred miles long, varying from five to one hundred in breadth, with a mild climate, undulating surface, fertile soil, and vigorous population, who produce silk, sugar, coffee, and cotton, besides all the common crops of the country.

On reaching this upland region, you find the Canarese language, and are in the territory of Mysore; whence the armies of Hyder and Tipu so long menaced our rising power. The city of Scringapatam is decaying on the banks of the Cauvery, wisely left to itself, instead of having its traditional importance maintained, like Delhi. This country is nominally the possession of a native Rajah, but really administered by our own Government, and contains a population of at least three and a half millions. Beyond this, still upon the table-lands, lie immense tracts of British territory taken from Tipu and the Mahrattas; then follow the dominions of the Nizam of Hydrabad, with ten millions of population, whose language is Teloogoo: they are frightfully misgoverned by their Mohammedan master; but we are pledged to keep him on the throne, and do. West of his territories lie those of Sattara, and east of them Nagpore, both

Mahratta states, lately absorbed into our own, through our refusal to allow the adoption of heirs by the Kings. Along the table-lands the whole of the waters flow from west to east, forming innumerable streams, and some grand rivers, such as the Cauvery, the Krishna, and the Godavery. These, on passing from the table-land, rush down the Ghauts, and water the strip of territory lying between them and the sea, called the Payeen Ghaut, or Mountain Foot. This includes Tanjore, which, with its Rajah receiving £118,000 a year from our Government, lies by the mouths of the Cauvery. North of this comes Pondicherry, still French; then the Carnatic, with its capital, Madras, the head of an army of seventy thousand men; then the Northern Circars, a hot and rich region, through which the Krishna and Godavery, coming down from the Hydrabad and Nagpore territories, reach the sea. Beyond, Orissa, where stands Juggernaut, leads to Bengal.

At the foot of the Western Ghauts runs another strip of territory, but not nearly so wide; for there the mountains, like the chain of Lebanon on the Phœnician coast, generally come close to the sea, sometimes right into it. On this tract lies the province of Canara, the Portuguese possession of Goa, and Bombay. This division of the peninsula into two distinct kinds of territory, running along side by side, lowland and upland, forming a country on two levels, the one from a thousand to three thousand feet above the other, greatly enriches the otherwise profuse variety of natural products, and delightfully varies the climate. In the Mountain Foot country the sheep have hides like a calf, with no sign of wool; within a morning's walk, above the Ghauts, they have fleeces. You sleep to-night where nothing can be grown but what is tropical; you breakfast after an early ride where Englishmen can rear strawberries, apples, and potatoes.

At the northern limit of the table-land, you are in the Bombay Presidency, in the midst of the ancient Mahratta territory, and of the Mahratta language; and now, passing from the great plateau, on which you have been for seven or eight hundred miles, you come upon a central region of mountains, the rivers of which run in the opposite direction from those of the plateau, making, not for the Bay of Bengal, but for the Indian Ocean. In this district lie many of the native states, of which a considerable number still retain their identity, their Rajahs supporting armies of their own, and administering their governments, but acknowledging the supreme authority of the British, and unable to declare war or maintain diplomatic relations with

their neighbouring states. Of these the most powerful is Sindia, King of Gwalior, and of three and a half millions; whose contingent, eight thousand four hundred strong, has joined the mutineers, though he is himself reputed loyal, and promptly sent aid to Delhi. The next in point of consideration is Holkar, King of Indore, with perhaps a million subjects. He, too, is loyal; but his troops have played the traitor. He maintains a contingent of fourteen hundred men. A contingent means a number of troops whom a native Rajah is, by treaty, bound to maintain for the service of the supreme Government whenever called for, in return for an engagement on its part to protect his territories from all invaders. These states just named are Mahratta; and west of them lie those of the Rajpoots, a nobler race, not fiercer, but prouder, and on the whole the finest of the Hindu types. Round the chief states of these two divisions are dozens of little ones, as numerous as in Germany, and as insignificant.

Pursuing our northward course, as we emerge from the central mountains, and arrive within about six hundred miles of the Himalayas, all the streams begin to follow the direction of the Ganges, and eventually join that great river. The system of drainage of which it is the trunk, extends over the greatest of all the natural divisions of India, covering a length of at least twelve hundred miles, by a breadth of six hundred, called the Plain of the Ganges, and including Bengal, Behar, Orissa, Oude, Delhi, and minor countries; with a population greater than that of France, Austria, and Prussia united, speaking several distinct languages, the chief of which are the Bengalee in the east, and the Hindui in the west. Bengal Proper is as large as France, and as populous; flat, watery, steaming with heat; inexhaustibly rich; and peopled by a cowardly, cringing race, who speak the Bengalee, and never attempt soldiering. Behar, further up the plain, lies on higher ground, with a finer population; and here you leave the tropics, entering on the temperate zone. Next comes Allahabad, a district, the capital of which lies on a most sacred site, the junction of the two great rivers, the Jumna and the Ganges. Before you reach the junction is the holiest of all Hindu sacred places, Benares, to reach which a pilgrimage from any distance is cheerfully undertaken. This is the lowest point at which a massacre has occurred, and is about three hundred and seventy miles from Calcutta. O had even that space been pierced by a railway!

Now we come into the thick of the disturbed districts. At

the junction, about seventy miles further on, lies the *city* of Allahabad, where the treacherous 6th caressed their officers in the forenoon, and slaughtered them at dinner time. Following the Ganges, to the right you come upon Oude, the most famous land of India in their old poems, one of its richest now; the chief source whence our Sepoys for the Bengal army were recruited, our latest annexation, and the bitter fountain of our present troubles. On its frontier, watered by the Ganges, lies Cawnpore, where the heroic Sir Hugh Wheeler fell; the victim of Nena Sahib and Leadenhall Street, which would not forward railways, of which one hundred miles more would have brought Neill and Havelock in time, on the jackals that tore up our noble countrymen. A little to the right lies the capital, Lucknow, a centre of indescribable depravity, where Sir Henry Lawrence first taught the feeble folk at Calcutta how to deal with the mutiny; where he maintained the glory of English valour; and where he, the greatest man in India, worth ten thousand men, fell, sacrificed for want of roads to reach and support him. Turning from Oude to the left, you are in the Doab, that is, the Delta formed by the two rivers Jumna and Ganges, where Havelock has burned Bithoor, the den of Nena Sahib. Proceeding upwards, you come upon Agra, the seat of Government for the North West Provinces, before which five hundred English troops attacked ten thousand well armed and disciplined mutineers. Ninety miles further to the north-west lies Delhi, where the splendours of the Mogul formerly dazzled eyes, accustomed only to the paler pomp of Europe; where now a new Emperor is in deadly struggle with the power which spared and protected his fathers, and liberally pensioned him.

Above the district of Delhi lies Sirhind, or Head-of-India, in which the waters begin to turn, leaving the Plain of the Ganges, on which lie all the great countries we have just traversed, and running for the Indus. The system of drainage whereof that river is the trunk, forms the last of the great natural divisions of India, the Plain of the Indus. It includes the celebrated countries of the Punjab, Cachmere, and Scinde; and between it and the central region of mountains spreads out a great sandy desert.

Any one who will clearly fix in his mind the three leading physical features of India,—in the south the table-land, with its two fringes of mountain-foot territory; on the north and north-east the great Plain of the Ganges, skirting the Himalayas, and bending downward to the Bay of Bengal; on

the west the Plain of the Indus, with its border of sandy desert, —will easily carry in his memory the outline of the country, and can insert the central mountain tract without trouble.

From the flats of Bengal, a constant progress of vigour in the population attends your advance, west and north. In Oude and its surrounding countries you are among a soldierly race, who do not, as the Hindus of the seaboard, live alone on rice, but eat a great deal of wheat. Here also is the Holy Land of the Brahmin, where that caste forms not a small class of the Hindu community, as elsewhere, but an immense proportion of it. According to Lord Metcalfe, all these tribes 'detest' Bengal, and have horrid ideas of all to the east of it. Yet here almost exclusively our Bengal authorities sought for Sepoys. Beyond this, through Delhi and Sirhind, you advance amid a progressively improving climate and race, till you reach the Punjab, and thence to Cachmere, where you are in the latitude not of the Indian Ocean, but of the Mediterranean. Since Oude was annexed, it may be said that no native states remain, either in the Plain of the Indus or that of the Ganges, except on the southern borders of the latter, where lie Gwalior and Bundlecund, and a few little ones on the borders of the Sutledge, &c. The native Rajahs still reigning, great and little, number in all two hundred; and their armies are four hundred thousand men. Among those who are deposed and pensioned, and who have no armies, the King of Delhi, at present set up against us, had, from the East India Company, £150,000 a year; the Nawab of Calcutta, £160,000; of Madras, £116,000; the families of Hyder and Tipu, £63,000; the Peishwa, or hereditary head of the Mahrattas, £80,000; and smaller Princes proportionate sums, amounting in all to about £1,500,000 a year.

As to the population inhabiting Hindustan, it is only now that the English mind is beginning to open to any conception of its magnitude. The ease with which we have attained supreme dominion in India, and the smallness of the armies which sufficed for its military occupation, together with the slowness of any people to conceive of masses of mankind greater than those with which they are familiar, have combined to maintain a popular impression respecting India far below the truth. It is only of recent years that our best writers and statesmen have spoken of it as containing anything like the amount of population now ascertained to exist; but by degrees the public estimate has been rising, and also that of careful and inquiring writers. At the time that the first number of this

journal appeared, (four years ago,) the public returns had brought up the population to a hundred and fifty millions; and we then stated our belief that it was very little short of two hundred millions. The papers lately laid before Parliament make it a hundred and eighty millions; and we have no doubt that the further researches of a few years will as easily discover the additional twenty, as those of a few past ones have discovered the thirty now added. It is easy to write of a population of two hundred millions, but extremely difficult to bring any mind to support the weight of the fact that, when we speak of India, we are speaking of one in every six human beings on the face of the earth. Yet unless this be kept in sight, confusion of ideas is constantly arising from the notion that all Hindus are one people, with one set of characteristics; whereas they are one to us only in the same way as all Europeans are one to them. The Mahratta and the Bengalee are more distinguished, by opposite traits of character, and by language, than the Englishman and the Frenchman. The Rohilla and the Tamulian are as different from each other as Swede and Neapolitan. One man in India lives as far north as our European fellow-subjects at Malta, and another as far south as Sierra Leone; one is within eight degrees of the equator, another seven hundred miles inside the temperate zone. Nova Scotia is not further west of Ireland than is Scinde of Assam: only the way between the latter two lies not over a waste of water, but through a world of population.

It may be taken as a general rule, that on the seaboard the population answer to the prevalent idea in this country, of Hindoo feebleness and effeminacy, these characteristics reaching their highest degree in damp, hot, featureless Bengal. It is from the coast population that nearly all the specimens of Hindus who appear in England, sweeping crossings, or speckling the neighbourhood of our docks, are drawn; but these differ widely from the natives of the higher lands, whether of the southern plateau, the central mountains, or the North West Provinces. The Mahrattas of the table-land are a small, ungainly, but vigorous and enterprising race, who, before they were tamed by our arms, swept the country terribly, sparing no human interest, and rejoicing chiefly in plunder. In the central district and the hills are tribes called Bheels, Ghonds, and others, who are small, ill-favoured, and savage. The Rajpoots, who inhabit the sandy desert and tracts lying immediately to the east of it, are a tall, grave, soldierly, and romantic people, capable of all the crimes and virtues of semi-barbarous highland clans, tracing the line of their Chiefs to their

sun and moon, maintaining much feudal and heraldic state, and murdering their female children, when not afraid of our authorities. The tract called the Doab, that is, the district between the Jumna and the Ganges, is inhabited chiefly by the Jats, another warlike race; and to the west of this lie the Sikhs, who are men of noble physical proportions and great military capabilities. In the romantic vale of Cachmere, the people approach again more to the feeble type of the Bengalee than the bolder races on which they border.

Throughout every region of India, the Mohammedans are to be found as a distinct people, everywhere speaking the Hindustani, which is therefore the only language useful in all parts of the country. Not that every one understands it, but that in every important village some Mohammedans will be found whose domestic tongue it is. The proportion they bear to the whole population is variously estimated at from one in seven to one in fifteen, and sixteen millions, or about half the population of France, is not an unusual guess—for, after all, it is but a guess—as to the total number of Mohammedans in India. While they retained supremacy in the country, the Court language was Persian, which continued to be used by our authorities until the day of Lord William Bentinck, who had the sense to replace it by English. It was as much a foreign language as our own, the language of fiercer conquerors, and more severe masters; therefore it was odious to the Hindu, and the use of it a homage to the power of the Mohammedans. The two greatest Mohammedan states remaining in India are Oude, which has scarcely yet disappeared, and Hydrabad, which holds together by British support alone.

It may be taken for granted that all the Mohammedans in India are incurably disaffected to the British Government. They look upon the country as the spoil of their fathers' valour, upon themselves as wronged by a hateful infidel force; and when they are not plotting for our overthrow, it is simply because no feasible movement can then be undertaken. Their habitual state of feeling is, that they will

> 'Spoil the spoiler as they may,
> And from the robber rend the prey.'

The first striking division, then, of the native population is one that pervades the whole country,—a division by religion into Hindu and Mussulman; or, to be more accurate, into Hindu, Mussulman, and Sikh; for the last deny and accept respectively

many of the principles of both the other religions, and form a sect which, on the whole, is different from both, and in some respects intolerant. In the days of Runjeet Singh, Islam was not free of the Punjab.

After the division by religions, we come upon another, equally prominent in late occurrences,—the division by caste. The whole of the people of India are divided into High-caste, Low-caste, and Out-caste. It is important to bear the three-fold character of this division in mind; for, in nearly all popular speaking and writing about India, the last division is totally forgotten, or confounded with the second; but it is highly desirable to keep in view that the caste system excludes an immense proportion of the whole people of India from every social privilege. The High-caste are Brahmins, the priestly caste, any one of whom would be dishonoured for life by dining with our gracious Queen; and the Rajpoots, who claim to be of the ancient King and soldier caste, to any private in whose ranks the same distinction would be not less ruinous. Below these two castes, the great body of the Hindu population are Low-caste, of the tribe that is called Sudra, excluded from any social admixture with either of the two High-castes, but themselves maintaining an equal exclusiveness with regard to the Out-castes, and to other divisions of caste people. Into how many castes the Sudras are divided, no one can say; for every craft is a distinct caste, from the washerman to the jeweller. None of these can eat, reside, or intermarry with the other. In the Low-castes whole nations are included, as for instance the Mahrattas; and, indeed, most of the remaining Hindu Princes, if not all, are of this caste.

At a moment when the question of caste is threatening the whole fabric of our Indian Empire, it is desirable that every man in England should have a clear idea of what it really is; and we have been much surprised, that in the great amount of writing that has taken place, no one seems to have raised the simple question, 'WHAT IS CASTE?' It is taught in the sacred books of the Hindus that caste is a distinction grounded upon the creation of different orders of men, imbued with different proportions of goodness and badness, who have transmitted their original nature to the present generations. The following account gives us briefly the substance of their doctrines on this point:—

'"Formerly," as the sage Parasara teaches, "when the truth-meditating Brumha was desirous of creating the world, there sprang

from his mouth beings especially endowed with the quality of goodness; others sprang from his breast pervaded by the quality of foulness; others from his thighs, in whom foulness and darkness prevailed; and others from his feet, in whom the quality of darkness predominated. These were in succession beings of the several castes, Bramhans, Kshetriyas, Vaisyas, and Shudras, produced from the mouth, the breast, the thighs, and the feet of Brumha." The popular account describes the Kshetriya as born from the creator's arm. These castes have thus distinct origins, and natures equally distinct. They repel the doctrine, that "God made of one blood all men to dwell upon the face of the earth;" and, in opposition to it, maintain that the different castes of men have natures as dissimilar as the different castes of grain, fruit, or animals. Caste is their word for species. Wheat, rice, and Indian corn are different castes of grain; mangoes, bananas, and tamarinds, different castes of fruit; tigers, camels, and elephants, different castes of animals; and Bramhans, Kshetriyas, Vaisyas, and Shudras, different castes of men. "You may say, if you please," they will observe, "that Bramhans and Shudras are both men. They are both men, if you will, just as a horse and an ass are both animals; but as you never can make an ass of a horse, nor a horse of an ass, so you can never make a Bramhan of a Shudra, nor a Shudra of a Bramhan." The idea that the Out-castes are sprung from the same stock as the rest of mankind is scouted with disgust.

'Into these four divisions, then, is society parted; each being a separate commonwealth, with its own heads, its own prejudices, its own pursuits, and its own laws. The various castes may not eat together, may not intermarry, may not reside in the same house, and may not assume each other's professions. Thus they are really wider apart than if separated by national distinctions, or even than races alien in blood and complexion. Again, the calling is transmitted from father to son, and it passes on through indefinite generations. The design of this was doubtless to secure perfection in the various departments of trade. Whether it has done this or not, it has certainly established professional genealogies. "Old houses" and "ancient families" are common things in India. Every tailor may confidently reckon that his sires clipped and fitted since before the days of the Cæsars, and every barber can boast an ancestry of barbers who shaved in remote antiquity: the weaver, too, the joiner, the potter, the washerman, and the blacksmith, may each pride himself that the line of his fathers stretches up through long centuries.'—*Arthur's Mission to the Mysore*, p. 381, &c.

It might be expected that the Brahmins, who, according to this account of creation, are beings 'especially endowed with the quality of goodness,' would take high rank. Accordingly, we find the great Hindu authority, Menu, speaking thus:—

'Whatever exists in the universe is all, in effect, though not in form, the wealth of the Bramhan, since the Bramhan is entitled to all by his primogeniture and eminence of birth. The Bramhan eats but his own food, wears but his own apparel, and bestows but his own alms. Through the benevolence of the Bramhan, indeed, other mortals enjoy life.'

So entirely different is the distinction created by caste from any distinction of rank as existing in other nations, that a man of lower caste cannot even be admitted to the dignity of domestic service in the house of his higher caste neighbour. Not one Brahmin or Rajpoot soldier in the whole of the Bengal army could have allowed his English General to cook a dish of curry for him, or to offer him a cup of tea, without thereby polluting himself irrecoverably. All his food must be prepared by the hands of persons of his own caste. This absurd institution has been adopted by the Mussulmans, although contrary to their own religion; so that, instead of discountenancing the Hindu nonsense, they set up a rival caste, and affect to be as strict and punctilious as their idolatrous neighbours. Hence arises the enormity of the blunder with regard to the greased cartridges, which, by some almost incredible inattention to the habits of the people, was an affront exactly prepared to frighten and wound both Hindu and Mussulman alike. A Brahmin will shriek with terror if a drop of pure water from a glass in the hand of a European fall upon him by accident; and how any Government, having even heard of India, not to say knowing it, could allow the issue of the greased cartridges to such men, is one of those marvels of human folly, in presence of which it is impossible to be angry, it looks so like judicial blindness. The best illustration we have seen, to convey to the minds of those who are not practically acquainted with the horror which the caste feeling inspires against any article of food supposed to be impure, is given by a writer who says, that the effect of asking Brahmins and Rajpoots to bite the cartridges, greased with fat either of swine or cows, or perhaps of both, was much the same as would be that of asking Roman Catholic soldiers to offer some public insult to the consecrated wafer.

The Hindu can conceive of no calamity comparable to the loss of caste; and hence, to a great extent, arises what is very often alleged as their reproach,—want of patriotism. For, in fact, all the feelings of attachment to a particular form of Government, or dynasty, or nationality, or freedom, are in the Hindu concentrated upon that which is to him the embodiment of all his family traditions and privileges, of his personal station, and religious hopes,—his caste. Governments may change, and nationalities be overthrown, but his position remains little altered: infringe, however, the regulations of his caste, and at once he is dislocated from society, and hopeless for the life to come. Hence, while he will look upon changes in the

nation with comparative indifference, he will resent any affront to the caste with ungovernable fury.

A change of religion does not necessarily involve a departure from caste; for many native Christians endeavour to combine caste with Christianity, and in the earlier stages of Protestant Missions this tendency was so far conceded to, that, in Tanjore, caste ran as high among the Christians as among the heathen, until the abuse brought down its own destruction. The Romish Missionaries adopt it. Loss of caste is most ordinarily and speedily brought about by eating or tasting anything that has been prepared by unclean hands; and hence among the Out-castes in India are to be ranked, first of all, the native Pariahs; secondly, the Mussulmans, whose affected caste the Brahmin cannot acknowledge; and, thirdly, the Europeans, who are Out-caste by a double title,—first, because they are of an unclean race; secondly, because their food is universally cooked by Pariahs. This last fact alone places the European at an infinite distance from decency, according to the code of caste; and either he must consent to have all his food cooked in England, and eat it there, or else meet Brahmins on the plain ground that their caste is a local distinction founded on untruth, and pushed to absurdity, which he is prepared to respect, so far as never to offer or invite them to anything offensive, but against which every meal he eats is a practical protest.

No barrier has ever been raised between man and man so impassable as caste. The Frank and the western Mohammedan grow friends over a meal; the European and the South Sea Islander warm at table; even the Chinese can entertain strangers; but two men may be neighbours for life, may write in the same office or parade in the same company for twenty years, and never dare to break bread together, though equals in fortune, employment, and ability. Loss of caste is also caused by the omission of established rites, neglecting to sacrifice to ancestors, or drunkenness. Of the effect of loss of caste, the following correct account is given by the Abbé Dubois:—

'He' (who has lost caste) 'is a man as it were dead to the world. He is no longer in the society of men. By losing his caste, the Hindu is bereft of friends and relations, and often of wife and children, who will rather forsake him than share in his miserable lot. No one dares to eat with him, or even to pour him out a drop of water. If he has marriageable daughters, they are shunned; no other girls can be approached by his sons. Wherever he appears, he is scorned and pointed at as an Out-caste. If he sinks under the grievous curse, his

body is suffered to rot on the place where he dies. Even if, in losing his caste, he could descend into an inferior one, the evil would be less; but he has no such resource. A Shudra, little scrupulous as he is about honour or delicacy, would scorn to give his daughter in marriage even to a Bramhan thus degraded. If he cannot re-establish himself in his own caste, he must sink into the infamous tribe of the Pariah, or mix with persons whose caste is equivocal.'

One part of the operation of the caste system which is of the first importance, and which seems to have received no notice whatever in the present agitation, is the formation of a large section of the people universally diffused, who, being Out-castes, are degraded below all social rights. What proportion these may bear to the whole population, we are not prepared to say. The Abbé Dubois, who is generally considered an authority, states that they are one in five. We imagine that this is too high an estimate, and perhaps one in ten would be nearer the truth. But, even in this proportion, the Indian Out-castes would be twenty millions of human beings, or more than the population of all England. Outside the walls of every village in India may be seen a miserable kraal of huts, inhabited by a hopeless race, who are borne down for generation after generation to a state of the extremest degradation. The following extract will give an idea of the condition of these people:—

'The Out-caste may not live in the common street; and in some parts of the extreme south, he may not even walk the street where the Bramhans reside. He is forbidden the house of all the castes; but in some districts may enter that part where the cattle are lodged, and may even show his head and one foot inside the door of the family apartment. To touch him, to enter his house, to drink water he had drawn, to eat food he had cooked, to use a vessel he had touched, to sit down beside him, to ride in the same vehicle, or even to give him a drink of water, would be unlawful for a man of caste. He would take a proposal for anything of the kind as a mortal affront. The condition of an American or West Indian slave is worse than theirs only in one respect,—compulsory labour. But the slave may tread the same floor as his master, without polluting the whole house; he may enter the room where he sits, touch the dish he uses, sleep under the same roof, and prepare the food he eats. He is not made to feel that his step defiles a room; that his touch infects the purest wares; and that he carries in his own body, no matter how clean, a cursed incurable filthiness which fills with disgust all who have proper human sentiments. He has at least the privilege of a domestic animal. Above all, he may possibly die free; his children may be intelligent and respectable. But the Out-caste has no hopes; no manumission can change his birth; he must bear his curse down to the grave; he must bequeath it to his children, who will bequeath it in turn, and from generation to generation on it must go, nor can any power arrest it, except one, of which he knows not. Nothing can

elevate the Out-caste, till the Gospel has taught his neighbours to own his rights. Every Englishman would ten thousand times prefer being a slave, permitted some semblance of intercourse with the rest of mankind, and having a possibility of ransom, with the glorious prospect of leaving his children free, to being an Out-caste, driven to live beyond the village wall, hunted from every door, scorned by the most base, loathed by the most vile, and knowing that this malediction awaits his little ones.

'The living of this hapless race is precarious: sometimes employed as scavengers, sometimes as horse-keepers, porters, or messengers; for the most part labouring in the fields for three-halfpence or twopence a day; often selling themselves for a term to a farmer, or reduced to a kind of slavery as payment of debt, they never venture to hope for aught but poverty and shame. When labour fails, charity lends no substitute; for, though I find in the sacred books directions for alms to Out-castes, I never heard of such a thing taking place. The Out-caste sees costly entertainments for beggars; but not one of these beggars would admit him to the honour of washing his dish, or dine in a room that his presence stained. Thus they are driven to eat all disgusting things: no sooner does a beast die, be the disease what it may, than a crowd of these hungry beings surround the carrion,—and even for carrion they have generally to pay. Crows, rats, snakes, reptiles, almost everything, is pressed into the service of destitute nature, and drunkenness follows to crown their shame and woe.

'It is said that, on one part of the Malabar coast, a section of Out-castes is so abhorred, that they are not allowed to erect houses, only an open shed supported on four bamboos; and that they may not approach a caste person nearer than a hundred yards, but must give notice of their approach by a loud cry. To prevent the danger of contact, they are forbidden the highway.'—*Mission to the Mysore*, p. 415, &c.

Few Englishmen have thought, that under our own sceptre some twenty millions of human beings were living in a degradation like this; and it will be well if one of the effects of the attention now excited as to the caste system, be to work into the heart of Englishmen a feeling of the unparalleled oppression which it entails. The benefits already conferred on the unhappy Out-castes by English rule are incalculable. Admitted into European families as domestic servants, they are at once raised into a new position; received by Missionaries into schools, they are proved to have the mental qualities of man. In the early days of our rule in India, they were admitted to our armies, and General Briggs has ably shown that, when that was the case, our native levies were perfectly trustworthy and efficient. An able writer in the *Edinburgh Review* for January, 1853, when none of the nervous anxiety of the present moment disturbed discussion, as to the best organization of our Sepoy army, said that in the early times the native officers 'not unfrequently

filled their ranks with Pariahs and persons of the lowest caste. Nor did the slightest inconvenience arise from this. Off duty, the Brahmin and the Rajpoot could not come into contact with the Sudra, far less touch the Pariah, or eat food which he had dressed; on duty, they rubbed shoulders freely, and were honestly attached to one another.' But then the native officers had real rank, and power over their troops; and the native army was, as General Briggs points out, composed of two classes,—gentlemen, and those of the lowest grades. But, just as the caste prejudice had before our day infected the Mohammedans, so in time it infected British officers also. 'The Sepoys,' says General Briggs, 'who fought the battles of Clive and Coote, who contributed to the humiliation of Tipu, and who gained laurels under Sir Arthur Wellesley, were of a mixed class. The infantry was composed of Pariahs, Pullars, and other low cultivators of the Carnatic, of the Northern Circars, and some few Mohammedans. The cavalry were wholly Mohammedans.' But, in the lapse of years, these men were either dismissed, or gradually dropped out of the army, and only men of caste enlisted. The same profound student of India relates how an old Rajpoot, a Subahdar, alluding to the Out-castes, whom England was now treating, not in her own spirit, but in that of the Brahmins, said, 'The day will come when you will confess how much higher qualities they possess as soldiers than the Mohammedans.' That day came long ago to men of insight, such as Sir Charles James Napier; but never came, until their comrades were massacred and their wives dishonoured, to the common run of routine officers; and even at the time when the fearful storm under which we are now shuddering, was gathering over our heads, the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay was silly enough to issue a General Order, enforcing the exclusion from the army hereafter of recruits from the Out-castes, he being resolved, of course, to make his own army as respectable, in point of caste, as that of Bengal. Owing to this miserable un-English policy, while the influence of our rule in the main has been to open up some hopes of amelioration to the down-trodden millions of the Out-castes, we have been gradually made the tools of Brahminical cunning, in excluding them from the honourable employment of soldiers, and so leaving arms in the hands chiefly of the two classes of men who, beyond all others, are our enemies, the Mohammedans and the High-castes, who must be averse to any Government not founded on their respective systems.

In reasoning upon the cause of the present outbreak, it is not uncommon to confound two things which are very distinct: disaffection, which may be chronic, and co-exist with a long course of obedience; and mutiny, which is an inflammatory action, founded upon the other, but itself brought about by some active and irritating cause. It is too generally assumed that for the whole matter some one must be to blame; whereas it may be that the only blame lies in furnishing the irritating cause where a state of disaffection existed. That this latter does constantly exist among the native Princes, the Brahmins, and the Mohammedans, no one can doubt; and in all three classes, universally, or nearly so, though exceptions may be found. Each of these classes believes in its traditional right to dominion, and is therefore disinclined to obey any foreign power. But many of the Brahmins have not yet ceased to know how much the English are preferable to the Mussulmans whom they supplanted; and many of the native Princes are aware that they are more secure under the protection of the British power, than their forefathers were, when trusting only to their own forces. To the Mohammedans, however, although even here there may be exceptions, the English are detestable on the double ground of being Christians and conquerors; through whom they themselves, from being the ruling class, have become at once a minority of the population and a subjugated race. Brahminism inspires a contempt for all who are not included within the sacred limits of caste; and can ill brook the dominion of any power that does not worship the order of the 'gods of the earth,' as the Brahmins delight to be called. Yet it is not, as a system of religion, persecuting and intolerant, and is opposed only to the English Government as it must be to any not organized on its own principles. The Mohammedans, on the other hand, have a more intolerant creed, a keener sense of the degradation of being conquered, and a more energetic character. Both parties are cunning enough to hatch great conspiracies, and neither had courage or military power to present a front to the British Government, unless they could gain the Sepoys; and therefore every hope of a far-sighted conspirator must have turned upon the possibility of uniting the two classes, of which our native troops are composed, in resistance to their European masters. The existence of plots with this object ought not to be taken, in itself, as any proof of misgovernment on the part of the East India Company, or any demonstration that we have oppressed the people. The antipathy of race and religion, with

ambition, is sufficient to account for all this. Were a general disaffection manifest among the people, and hatred to our Government shown by the traders and agriculturists of the country, it might be taken as approaching to a proof of wrongs inflicted; although even then the doubt would remain, how far it arose simply from national feeling.

There can be no doubt that the natural disaffection of all the three classes we have just alluded to has been abated under the British Government, more than could easily have been conceived possible; and at the same time it is manifest that those classes of the community—for instance, the traders and the peasantry—who had none of the ambition of governing, and were chiefly influenced by the desire of well-being, have been, on the whole, so far sensible of the benefits of English rule, that national animosity has been conquered by a sense of self-interest; and even in the present time of our peril, many of them have manifested a desire for our success. The domestic servants, also, attached to European families, drawn as they almost universally are from the Out-castes, have in the main acted well, although to them the temptation of plunder must have been inviting in the highest degree. But the feelings of self-interest which our Government has engaged on its behalf, in the case of large numbers of the people, could not be appealed to in Mussulmans and Brahmins, any more than in the native Princes. All these must see, that whatever might be the fate of individuals of their own body, the inevitable tendency of British rule was, to elevate the whole mass of the people to equal chances of employment and consideration with themselves, and to merge all traditional claims to eminence in the vulgar qualifications of energy or merit. Many reason as if great pains ought to have been taken to make these classes feel, that there was nothing in our ascendancy unfriendly to their aspirations. It is very certain that they ought to be treated so as to leave no ground to suspect underhand designs against their caste, or any idea of coercing their consciences, or of offering gratuitous affronts to their scruples. But, on the other hand, it is perfectly useless to attempt to administer government, by the agency of Englishmen and Christians, on principles that will assure Brahmins and Mohammedans that their influence is to be eternal. Therefore, whatever prejudices have been raised by their seeing that their old prophecies, foretelling a system from the west which should supplant theirs, are in course of fulfilment in the rule of

the British, must be encountered as the inseparable inconvenience of dealing with a people who have to pass through the stage of elevation from an old and jealous superstition.

We are not, however, to be understood as arguing that no disaffection, resulting from real fault on the part of our own Government, has existed in India. It is not a little significant, that at the very time when the mutineers, unknown to us, were wreaking their vengeance upon our countrymen and countrywomen, the House of Commons was discussing the motion of Mr. Kinnaird, founded on a memorial from the missionary body in Bengal, in which serious grievances suffered by the people were set forth, and much consequent disaffection on their part was affirmed to exist. The House has seldom argued a question affecting India with more intelligence than was displayed in that debate, and we would especially recommend the published speech of Mr. Kinnaird to the consideration of our readers. The mode in which the Bengal Government replied to the representations of the Missionaries was very characteristic. Mr. Halliday, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, insists *from his own knowledge* that the disaffection spoken of does not exist, and we dare say that he believes he knows as much about the matter as the Missionaries; but for any one who has lived really among the people of India, nothing is more difficult to conceive than how the civil servants of the Company can ever gain much information on the real condition of things. They are surrounded by so much state, exercise so much authority, are beset by so many native officials, who represent all things as they please, and, when they do come into personal contact with the peasantry, shed down upon them such an amount of awe, that they would do very wisely to use the eyes and ears of any European residing in the country, without power and without retinue, knowing the language, and accustomed to hear the people speak their minds. A Missionary, living at a country station, would hear a great deal more of the real feeling of the peasantry in one week, than a dignitary at Calcutta would in a lifetime. Even Mr. Theobald, who, in the pamphlets named at the head of this paper, shows perfect mastery of all points affecting the relations of the British residents and the Government, shows also complete ignorance of the feelings of the people respecting the zemindars, or middlemen; such ignorance as is inevitable in mere residents in English settlements, and, above all, in one of the Presidencies. We feel as strongly as he does the necessity of giving Englishmen an easy and permanent

tenure of land in India; and wish him all success in his able endeavours to that end. But it is impossible to put upon paper the intensity of hatred which we have seen invariably manifested by Hindus toward all systems of native middlemen. These wretches extort and torture, browbeat and deceive, under pretext of our authority, and, it must be admitted, under the shield of our power, till the curses of the people fall not only upon them, but equally upon us. We do not sanction the individual acts of wrong, or of torture; but we founded, and pledged ourselves to perpetuate, the system whence these unavoidably spring; and what has been practised on our countrymen and countrywomen helps us to conceive what is, in our name, though without our knowledge, often practised on our native subjects. *No promise to an individual can override the general principles of justice;* and while every zemindar who will administer on principles consistent with uprightness ought to be sacredly respected, every one who uses British authority to sanction native cruelties or extortions ought to be instantly struck down.

Among the causes most generally assigned for an increase of disaffection of late, one of the most prominent has been Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation. This acted upon the native Princes by denying their right of adoption where no real heir existed, and on the Mohammedans by sweeping away one of their few remaining great states, Oude. We are inclined to think that in these measures Lord Dalhousie was perfectly justified. We can see no reason upon earth why we are to perpetuate misrule over millions of men, for the sake of gratifying a Hindu Prince, whom we have protected in a shadowy sovereignty, with the feeling that he will have some one to sacrifice to him when he is dead. Yet it is not to be denied that the cases of Sattara and Nagpore have aggrieved the native Princes seriously, and stimulated the conspiracies which they have always been carrying on. Oude was a different and more complex case, and we expect will prove to have been the real cause of the present crisis. Whenever such measures are justified, our Government must be prepared to lay its account with the disaffection which will ensue; for the rule of proceeding cannot be to avoid everything that will annoy native Princes, Brahmins, and Mussulmans, but everything contrary to justice or injurious to the people; and in the long run the disaffection of classes, excited by measures founded on a true English policy, will be far less detrimental to our rule than would be injuries

to the population at large by a temporizing and half-Hindu policy. Yet, whenever steps are taken which irritate any dangerous class, the Government are responsible for adopting sufficient measures to forestall evil; and here we think Lord Dalhousie pitifully failed: failed in foresight, insight, and practical safeguards.

Another of the alleged causes of disaffection is one which has effectually played into the hands of the leaders of the conspiracy, after the fall of Oude had set them to work. Rohilcund and Oude have been, too exclusively, the recruiting ground for the Bengal army; and the Government have set on foot scrutinies into land titles there, by which many of the relations of the Sepoys have been disturbed, and thus doubtless a feeling of personal bitterness has been carried into their ranks.

Among the causes of disaffection, we have been amused to find a writer in a northern contemporary gravely alleging the too great rapidity with which Government has proceeded in matters of reform, alleging, of all things, in proof of his point, the railways, and the system of governing new countries by mixed Commissions of military men and civilians. The way in which the writer manages to connect these matters with the mutiny is, that both the one and the other, though good in themselves, as he does allow, have drafted away a great many officers from their regiments, to attend to the duties arising from the construction of railways in one case, and the administration of governments in the other. But more of the dangers of our present position are due to the spirit which could invent such an argument, than to all other causes put together. Four years ago, we said in these pages, that the delay of the Government, in the construction of railways, was as 'politically foolish, as it was unfaithful to the interests of the people;' and had a railway been completed even from Calcutta to Delhi, the saving in simple money within the last three months would have been far more than the cost of its construction. Their slowness in this particular has been a great crime against humanity in general, and especially against the English nation and the Hindu people, between whom they stood, the guardians of the honour of the one, and the interests of the other. As to the absurd apology that the construction of railways has taken away officers from their regiments,—whose fault was that? Plenty of gentlemen were to be found in England to officer both the railways and the regiments, if the Government had called for them. And if adopting a better system for governing new

countries has left regiments bare of officers, again we ask, Whose fault was that?

Another cause of disaffection frequently dwelt upon, is the change made by Lord Hardinge with regard to the law of inheritance; for, up to his time, our Government had administered the persecuting law of the Hindus, which deprives any one who forsakes the religion of his forefathers of all hereditary property. At last, however, an English prevailed over a Hindu policy, and it was declared that British subjects should no longer be persecuted 'for conscience' sake; but every man protected in his right to worship God after his convictions; even though his God was He whom our Queen addresses as OUR FATHER. It may be true that this change of the law irritated the Brahmins; as to the population generally, we do not believe they cared the least about it; and the petitions which were sent forward to England were never heard of by any but a very small section of the people, and were manifestly concocted by English lawyers. But suppose that this change in our proceeding had given serious offence, the question is, Was it right, or was it wrong? In a moral point of view, none will dispute; as a question of duty between man and man, as a question of responsibility to the great Ruler, we are right in refusing to administer, with English hands, the old cruel laws which would bind every man on the fair plains of India to the altars of obscene idols, or in default cast him out homeless.

But, though morally right, many will say, it was politically unwise. Yet we venture to think that only they who look merely at the moment and at the surface will go thus far. One first point in political wisdom is, that the governing class shall maintain self-respect. No momentary quiet they may gain by prostrating themselves before those they rule, can in the issue be of value. Only in so far as they stand high on their own honour, can they have permanent repose; and for any Governors to administer judicial persecution against their own subjects, for embracing their own religion, is a folly in politics, as it is a crime in morals, which we believe was never heard of, until that strangest of all mongrel creatures, the English Hindu, began to mutter and mumble about the respect to be paid to the prejudices of a multitude. If any man dares to propose in the British Senate that the authority of England shall ever again be exerted to persecute a native of any clime under heaven for avowing himself a disciple of Christ, we believe there are men there able to deal with him as to the political fatuity of his

course, and others who will show honest English astonishment at his moral degradation. The British power was never created to bind Brahminical chains, and enslave consciences by the million.

Another alleged cause of disaffection is our 'tampering' with the Hindu law of marriage; and, from what has been said by Mr. Disraeli, Mr. Whiteside, and other gentlemen more eloquent than informed, it might be supposed that the English in India had undertaken to compel Hindus to marry widows, or to compel widows themselves again to join in marriage, or had inflicted some other grievous wrong upon human society. Now, what is the extent to which we have actually gone? Simply that of permitting a poor widow to be reckoned in the ordinary ranks of marriageable women, instead of being, as she has been hitherto, under the accursed stroke of Hindu law, a blasted and hated thing. We do not know that we felt any indignation on reading Mr. Disraeli's attacks upon the measure, for any obliquity in that gentleman's moral perception is not wont to ruffle us; but that Mr. Whiteside, a man of feeling, of generosity, and an Irishman, should lend himself on such a question to such leading, did, we confess, excite both our astonishment and shame. Time was when Irish eloquence shed gorgeous light on Indian debates; but never did Edmund Burke kindle his fires to re-weld a chain which Christian charity had broken. We expect that Mr. Whiteside's own good feeling will promptly recall him from so false a course, when he better understands the facts.

The following description of the condition of Hindu widows was published years ago, when no such controversy as the present could have been in contemplation :—

'The girl thus pompously married is always of immature age, and, after the ceremony, remains in her father's house for a shorter or longer term, as the case may be. When deemed fit to be united to her husband, she is led to his residence, on which occasion ceremonies are renewed, but on a much smaller scale. Though we should hold the original ceremony only a betrothment, they hold it a marriage. From that moment the man has all the rights of a husband, the girl all the obligations of a wife; and should he die, though she may never have left her father's roof, she is his widow; and his widow all her days she must remain. The *tahli* is removed from her neck; then, one by one, her articles of jewellery; her dress changed for a widow's robe, and her rich black hair shaved, to be allowed to grow no more. From that day she commences a life of shame. Her lot is not regarded as an affliction to which all are liable, and which entitles the sufferer to universal sympathy, but as a retribution for the vices of a former birth. The gods hold her unworthy of the joys and honours of marriage. The husband's relatives do not scruple to charge the loss of their kinsman on her sins. Their religion teaches that the

only atonement she can make, the only path whereby she may escape days of infamy and woe, is self-destruction. She ought to burn with the clay of him whom she had never seen but at the wedding, or under whom she had lived in bondage for years. The benign spirit of Christianity has now averted this final stroke; but the life thus spared is a life of sorrow and shame. The world scorns her; and the care of her own family is to keep her steps so watched, her spirit so broken, and her frame so weak, that she may not bring disgrace upon them. Should their endeavours fail, her crime cannot make her condition much more severe. With us, a widow's weeds are the signals of charity, inviting commiseration and respect; in India, they are the brand of justice, inspiring horror. No human being is more to be pitied than a young Hindu widow. Then it is to be remembered, that this class is far more numerous in India than amongst us; for, first, every man, without exception, marries and may re-marry as often as he likes; secondly, every bride is a young girl,—a child; thirdly, every female once widowed continues a widow for life. From these three causes, widows in India must be at least twice as numerous as in England; and when it is remembered, that the population of India is seven-fold that of the British Isles, it will be seen what a multitude of breasts are pierced by Hinduism with continual sorrows.'—*Mission to the Mysore.*

It may be stated, in addition to the above, that if the widow have the honour to be of the Brahmin tribe, she is usually kept on one meal a day, and is the drudge and butt of the family; and being considered the unlucky cause of every disaster, her presence is forbidden at any festivity. Suppose, then, that England had secured some ill-will from the Brahmins, by doing the little that she could do towards the removal of this fearful curse, that is, refusing to administer penalties upon any who shall have the courage to raise themselves against it,—we ask, Is she to grudge the trouble that may arise in consequence? They are poor politicians who look to a measure like this as the root of a deep-seated and active conspiracy; but if it were, if refusing longer to stretch out our hand against the widows were the real cause of all this blood, will England shrink from the act, or stand by it? Will England prefer the favour of the Brahmins, with participation of their cruelties, or their deadly hatred, with clean hands? Among the many questionable acts, and worse, of the East India Company, on this at least they may look back with some content in their day of fiery trouble. Others, too, will find comfort in recalling a measure fraught both with justice and charity; and many an English widow and bereaved mother, thinking of husbands murdered and daughters defiled, would feel a drop of sweetness mingling with their gall, could they believe that the cup was raised to their

lips because we took it from those of the helpless. But, no, this act of justice has cost no blood.

Another alleged cause of disaffection has been education and missionary labours. We believe it is universally admitted,—at least, we have not heard any one deny it,—that the class of natives educated in Government Colleges, and there carefully protected from all Christian teaching, are to a great extent infidel in creed and dangerous in politics. But, on the other hand, we cannot, at this moment, recollect any pamphlet, or any book, in which it is asserted that the pupils of missionary schools have generally displayed those characteristics. On the contrary, we are inclined to believe that were the English power to come to its final struggle to-morrow, among its best and last native friends would be no small number of these. It must be remembered, that in every case the education received at the hands of the Missionaries has been sought by the natives themselves. Their schools have always been more frequented than those of the Government, or any others; and this simple fact is the one practical answer to all the theory, which asserts that missionary operations, in the way of education or otherwise, must create disaffection.

That the Brahmins foresee that the effect of missionary labours will be the overthrow of their own system is undoubted; for in such a matter they have a truer instinct than the class of English politicians who are their apologists, and who, while they on the one hand charge the Missionaries with turning India upside down, are continually affirming on the other that they will never acquire influence. The Brahmins, on the contrary, know that they will; that the sermon, the book, the school, are surely and irresistibly working their way into the heart of the nation; and doubtless many of them would be glad, on this as on every other account, to see the end of British domination. But all the enemies of Missions,—and they are many, bitter, and certainly free from scruples,—although they have ventured on the largest assertions, in the highest places, have yet failed to produce one authentic *fact* to prove that the labours of the Missionaries, either in schools or otherwise, have involved the Government in conflict with the people.

The writer of one of the pamphlets at the head of this article, signing himself 'Caubulee,' says, very naturally, that had the question of the greased cartridges been submitted to a jury of Missionaries, they would, to a man, have decided against any such attack upon the prejudices of the people; for they know

what does and what does not irritate. Sir Charles J. Napier never showed his insight into the native character more clearly, than when he stated that they had no objection whatever to theological discussions. What they feared was 'not conversion, but contamination.' Of this their traditions of former conquerors gave them reason to be afraid. The Mussulmans were in the habit of converting them wholesale by violence. Tales of a similar kind circulate in the villages of the south, to this day, regarding both the Portuguese and the French; and nothing but a thorough knowledge of the real spirit of Christianity will ever relieve the English, or *any foreign Government*, from the continual suspicion of being ready, by stratagem or force, to break the caste of the people. Every native, however, whose intercourse with Missionaries, or other decided and consistent Christians, has enabled him clearly to discover the principles of our religion, feels certain that what we seek is not 'contamination,' but 'conversion;' and that it would afford no pleasure whatever to us to see him deprived of his caste by trick or violence.

Gentlemen inattentive to religious questions may confidently state their opinions on one side, and we as confidently give ours on the other; but facts are much more to the purpose than the assertions of either.

Take two extremes of the Indian community,—the classes who have been most brought into contact with Missionaries, and those who have been the least. The latter are the Sepoys, and, above all, the Sepoys of the Bengal army. No Missionary ever dared to preach in their lines, or open a school among their children; no Christian native dared to enlist with them. They were studiously kept, by statesmen, from all means of knowing what Christianity really was; and the consequence is, that they are so ignorant of its spirit and aims, as to be the dupes of men who represent our Government as capable of entering into a conspiracy, to break their caste by making them eat hog's lard. Lord Ellenborough may be assured that no native who had frequently held discussions with Missionaries, would have been led away by ideas so derogatory to his Lordship, and to other statesmen who have guided the destinies of India. It may be worth noting, for those who have had a hand in maintaining this state of ignorance as to Christianity among the Sepoys, in order that they may at their leisure remember it, that the scene of the one well-known conversion of a Sepoy to Christianity, and of his consequent expulsion from the British

army, although he was a blameless, and even a meritorious, native officer,—that the scene of this crime against our national religion, against the rights of that poor man, of this reckless servility to the Koran and caste, was no other than the very city of Meerut, in which we have had so wretchedly to drink the wormwood and the gall of caste and the Koran.

On the other hand, just as enmity to the English has broken out in the classes least approached by Missionaries, and in the countries least occupied by them, so, where their labours are most extensive, and their converts most numerous, British life is at this moment most sacred, and British authority strongest. There have been no risings against the English in Tinnivelly or Travancore in the south, none in Serampore or Krishnagur in the north. In all the Madras Presidency, which has had much more of missionary labour, and had it longer, than any other part of the country, there has been no disaffection; and we will venture to assert, that in proportion as the natives have been under missionary influence, so will they be friendly and serviceable to the English. Even where the mutiny has broken out, no special enmity has been directed against those who are active Christians. Efforts are made to hold up Colonel Wheeler as a cause of mutiny, because he had been active in instructing and exhorting the natives. So far as we understand his case, he did not act the part of a good soldier in the day of trial, and therefore we will cheerfully leave him to whatever military censure his demerits may call for. But this much is plain, that when disaffection broke out in his regiment, the Adjutant, whom no one charges with preaching, was shot at and wounded, and the Colonel, who was so zealous, was let alone. By the natives generally, that class of civilians or officers who manfully identify themselves with the religion they profess, venerate its institutions, and cherish its spirit, are far more respected than those of equal rank and talent who indulge in vices, which some fluent speakers are much slower to drag to light, for public disapproval, than any occasional example of Christian zeal. One hasty and haughty oath at a native will leave a rankling wound totally different from the feeling caused by kindly conversation on religion.

Is there any proof in the conduct of the Sepoys of a special desire for the blood of the Missionaries? Even in the sacred city of Benares they have escaped, while many an officer who, poor fellow, was far enough from offence on the score of Christianity, has been laid low. Indeed, there the authorities have

sought the aid of the personal influence of a Missionary in getting stores. Only at three stations have we yet heard of Missionaries being killed, and that, we will venture to say, not from special enmity to them, but because nothing European was to be spared. No solitary Mission station has been, so far as we know, attacked. Again, the native newspapers, in their endeavours to prove a conspiracy against the caste of the people, did not allege anything that the Missionaries did, but the action of the authorities,—their mad action of thrusting unclean grease on the lips of Brahmins and Mohammedans.

The attempt to lay the disaffection at the door of the Missionaries could have been foretold with absolute certainty by every one acquainted with the history of India. We could beforehand have selected the men, and almost set down the very phrases that would be used. It has been so from the beginning, and it will be so until the dying day of the last of the race whom we have called by the name of the 'English Hindu.' What they were fifty years ago, they are to-day. Then, the Vellore mutiny had no sooner occurred than they laid it to the charge of the Missionaries; but the question was asked, Was there a Missionary in Vellore?—No. Was there one near Vellore?—No. Was there one in the whole Presidency of Madras?—Not a single English Missionary. Some Danes and Germans were peaceably labouring at Tanjore and Tranquebar, and a few Englishmen had landed a thousand miles off, in Bengal; and this rare apparition of Christianity had so disordered the vision of the 'English Hindu,' that he believed then, and believes to this day, that the Sepoys who murdered their officers and their European comrades during the wedding of Tipu's daughter, were fighting against Missionaries. The disaffection was one of race and religion, but mere disaffection did not make mutiny. That arose from irritants administered by the Government itself. The Sepoys had been forbidden earrings, forbidden to put on the marks which distinguish one caste and religion from another, commanded to trim their beards to a standard model, forced to wear black leather stocks and ungainly European jackets, and, last of all, their own beautiful turban was displaced for a horrid, ugly hat; and, moreover, they were required to use a turnscrew made in the form of a cross. They demurred to wear the hat, were savagely dealt with, took their revenge; and men were sensible enough to say that this was chargeable upon Missions. While writing this, we have put the case to a native Prince now in

England; his reply may go for what it is worth. 'They pretend that the Government want to break caste, for the sake of enraging the Sepoys: but their meaning is, "We want to get the English out of the way, and have the country to ourselves."'

This naturally leads us to look at what we have already pointed out, as needing to be distinguished from disaffection, which is chronic, and which pervades classes military and non-military,—namely, the inflammatory action upon the minds of the Sepoys which leads to mutiny. This always pre-supposes some temporary excitement, something which, irritating the habitual state of disaffection, brings it to a head. The outburst in India has been, hitherto, a military mutiny. The Sepoys have been certainly joined in several cases by such persons as would hail any revolution that promised excitement and plunder; but, as a whole, they have not met with the support of the trading and labouring classes of the country, whose interests are most immediately involved in the character of the Government. It is therefore our duty to look specially to causes affecting the Sepoys; and of these the number assigned by various writers is legion. We shall not attempt to enumerate them all, much less to estimate their value; but some of the most prominent we may indicate.

The first, and most generally assigned, is the paucity of officers on duty with their regiments. The public are weary of hearing that every man of ability looked forward, as the best reward of his talents, to be removed from his regiment and appointed to some civil employment; and so far was this carried, that in many cases none remained with the Sepoys but the youngest or the most incompetent officers. The blame of this state of things must rest on the Government alone. For them or their advocates to turn and say that the demands for improvement forced them to employ military men in civil positions, is mere trifling. It was their duty to govern the country, and train the army; and no consideration, but the miserable one of money, could for a moment suggest the policy which they pursued. Like all public measures springing from parsimoniousness, it wreaks vengeance upon the heads of its authors, by occasioning tenfold the expense which a wise liberality would have dictated.

Another cause, not less generally assigned, and more bitterly felt, than even the former, by officers of spirit and ability, is, that the regimental authorities have been gradually deprived of

all power either to promote or to punish their own men, everything being held in the hands of a bureau authority, or moved by mechanical system; so that the Colonel, instead of being a potentate in the eyes of his men, as he ought to have been, was only a better-paid mercenary, whose duty it was to go first into action, because he had most pay. In all spheres of government, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of committing a due share of power to every one invested with responsibility; but, in dealing with a race like the Hindus, and especially when under the peculiar conditions of mercenary soldiers, shortsightedness could do nothing worse, than to denude officers at the head of regiments, of anything necessary to make their will habitually powerful over the men under their command.

If these two causes reflect upon the Government, another points our attention to the officers. Much has been said about the familiarity of officers with their men in old days, and the gradual increase of distance and distrust between them in modern times. It has been very broadly intimated, by more than one, that when officers kept a kind of seraglio, like native gentry, they were more fitted for sympathy with their men, than now, when they have generally creditable Christian families. On this latter point, we would simply say, that officers enough of the old class remain. And we will engage that if all the history of the past three months were known, it would not prove that those who have by seduction dishonoured and broken the caste of the female relations of the Sepoys, were one whit more respected in the common onslaught than those who were irreproachable in their private character. Gentlemen who practise loose living in India have little idea how well the natives know it, and how heartily they despise them for it. Things which they will even justify themselves in doing, they know ought not to be done by Englishmen; and we have heard things said by natives of men who are not afraid in public to fall foul of those who have been 'too good,' which would make their ears tingle, if they were translated into plain English.

Those who deplore the decrease of fellowship between officers and men are right; but those who charge it upon an improvement in the character of the officers, are as wrong in point of fact as in point of morals. A good man has the advantage in any country under heaven; and where general respect, sympathy, and moral influence are the objects to be gained, virtue must ever be power.

But we must not be understood as denying the fact, that the

officer is, as a rule, wofully isolated from his men. Many are so through simple ignorance of their language. It is not all who have the brains, or the perseverance, to learn an Indian tongue so well, that it becomes an easy medium of communication; and nearly all the officers who do so are at once removed from their regiments to other work. Many of those who remain can just talk enough of the native language to get through routine phrases which they must employ; but they are always glad to confine conversation within the narrowest limits, and thus are all their lifetime incapacitated for gaining the hearts of their men. They meet on parade, but are strangers.

Beside this, it is not to be concealed that the habitual bearing of Englishmen to natives is marked by a high degree of pride and distance. Any traveller in Egypt or the East must be struck with the extent to which English residents there, as well as natives, are impressed with the haughty and domineering spirit of the 'Indians' whom they see constantly passing. They think that these have all the ways, not only of a lordly, but of a despotic race. We remember once seeing some Arabs laugh with astonishment and pleasure, on being heartily thanked for some service they had rendered; and when a native who spoke English was asked why they laughed, 'O,' he said, 'because you thank them.' 'Then would not a Pacha thank them, if they did anything for him?' 'Pacha thank them! He? No! Turk like Englishman in India.' And this idea of the 'Englishman in India' is far too correct. He is too much of the 'Turk.' Persons who have not observed the bearing of the English abroad, are often surprised that all nations speak of us as the most domineering and insolent of people. We award this distinction to the Americans, and they conscientiously return it to us. And both they and we are right. No two nations under the sky are half so overbearing, or half so insolent, as the English and the Americans. Others are more cruel, more tyrannical, more unjust, more revengeful; but far more willing to admit foreigners to companionable and equal relations. The Englishman or the American walks through the world, the moment he leaves his own soil, feeling, and unconsciously showing at every turn that he feels, everybody he meets with to be beneath him, not personally, but simply because he is not English or not American, as the case may be. Even among our neighbours in Paris the complaint is often heard, that our English there behave as if the place belonged to them; and there are towns on the Continent that the French have burned and sacked more

than once, where they have committed every atrocity of which men are capable, and yet, on account of their companionable ways, they are more welcome as individuals than the English, who have never done anything but good to the people, and yet by their whole bearing make them feel that they look down upon every man of them. If this is the case when Englishmen are side by side with Europeans, on terms of neighbourhood, how much more is it likely to be so, when they are placed beside the feeble Hindu, in a position of undisputed authority and power! Many a respectable native is left to stand before a European, looking meek and contented all the while, though his heart is gnawing within him. Many a one hears rude sharp words which outrage his ideas of self-respect, when his cowardly nature will not allow even a look to betray the mortification that he feels; and in every day's intercourse much is done, by these miserable faults in manners, to obliterate the good impressions of honour, justice, and truth, even where these virtues are maintained. 'You do not rob us,' said a native to Sir Charles Forbes, 'but you make us stand behind your chair.'

The organization of the native army itself, in the Bengal Presidency, has been much pointed to, and with reason, as highly favourable to a chronic state of disaffection, and to the designs of any who wished to promote actual mutiny. Recruited, as we have already stated, chiefly in the most renowned seats of Brahminism, and, to a very great extent, from territories that, until the other day, were under the Mohammedan dominion of Oude, they have had everything, in the local traditions and caste ties of the men, that was unfriendly to the English power. It is computed that a regiment of a thousand strong, on the average, contained about two hundred Mohammedans and eight hundred Hindus; that, of the latter, six hundred were High-caste, Brahmins or Rajpoots, and about two hundred Low-caste; no Out-castes or native Christians being in the army. Four hundred hereditary priests to a regiment! say, two hundred more Rajpoots! every one of them considering himself, as the name signifies, the son of a King; and two hundred Mohammedans! What should we think of the British statesman who would attempt to govern Ireland by regiments of Maynooth Priests? And yet this appears to be the nearest illustration that we have at hand, of the odd art of government we have been attempting in Bengal. No laudation of Lord Dalhousie—and we gladly give him credit for great qualities and great services—can ever redeem him, in the eyes of impar-

tial men, from the fault of having refused to see the true working of this system; and the still greater fault of disgusting and driving from India the man who did see it, and who would have saved the Hindus and the English from what has now occurred. Sir Charles J. Napier's period of command formed a crisis of Indian history, and, had he been allowed to carry out his views, a new era would have been inaugurated. His military reforms were necessary to accompany Lord Dalhousie's great political measures. The Governor-General opposed them; and, though he is in weakness and retirement now, the truth must be told, that to that opposition we owe the evils which have lately arisen. Genius and Talent were, as they so often are in affairs of Government, opposed: Genius with its insight and foresight, reading thoughts and tendencies, till it read the future; Talent priding itself in the idea of being practical, because it was carrying out now the views emitted by Genius fifty years ago; and, as to the future, assuming that to-morrow is yesterday. Lord Dalhousie was ably acting out the policy of the Marquis of Wellesley; but he had no original genius-light. The other read for himself; and 'practical men' some years hence, because they are acting out Sir Charles's views, will be wonderfully wiser in their own eyes than the next man of genius who shall arise, and who will see when it is time to modify.

Taking all these causes put together, they tended to prepare the Sepoys for any conspirators who might have the art to present them with an object, or use any cause of irritation given them by oversight. It would appear that both of these had occurred. The capture of Oude turned a wily and able minister from preying on his own country, to plotting for the overthrow of the power that had cast him and his master down. The King of Delhi was no inattentive listener to proposals emanating from this quarter. Agents were disseminated among the Sepoys; they were often sympathized with, often unsuccessful, but never betrayed. Doubtless they used every argument to persuade the Hindus that the English meant to treat them, as they would treat one another, or as Mussulmans had often treated them,—to contaminate their caste by some violence or stratagem; a crime of which Sepoys might well believe us capable, because they knew so little of what we were. Yet it is doubtful whether all this would have ever succeeded in raising a general mutiny, had not that event occurred which, we have already said, was an act of such sheer madness, that it can only be set down to judicial blindness permitted by the great Ruler of all.

Every one knows that to Hindus and Mohammedans alike the idea of tasting the flesh of a swine, in any form, is horribly disgusting; and that no English regiment would resent an order to diet them on snails or carrion, so much as would these an attempt to make them eat pig. Again, of all living things, the most sacred to the Hindu is the cow; she is one of the divinities most generally worshipped. Among the crimes on their catalogue, scarcely one ranks so high as 'cow murder.' In popular parlance, it is as great a crime to kill one woman as seven children, and to kill one cow as twenty women. Everything that comes from the cow is so sacred, that one of the most meritorious acts of religion, one of the most effectual towards attaining sanctification, is taking a mixture composed of what are called 'the five products of the cow,'—the uncleanest of them not being rejected. Even the tamest people of a country village would be fired with rage at any attempt to make them taste the flesh of a cow. It may then be imagined what was the horror of a certain Brahmin Sepoy, when a Lascar, a man of low caste, asked him to give him a drink of water out of his pot. The Sepoy refused, on caste ground; the touch of the Lascar would have polluted his pot for ever. The Lascar jeered, and told him that he was every day touching cartridges besmeared with cows' fat. The horror-struck Brahmin rushed to his comrades; and those who know the Hindu will estimate the startling effect of this intelligence, as it passed from man to man. Had the agents of the Oude conspirators produced a thousand affidavits, that the Government had bad designs, they would have weighed little with the Sepoys in comparison with this astounding discovery. The blame of issuing these cartridges is laid on Colonel Birch, the Military Secretary for India. To have been the author of such an enormous error, is a calamity that cannot well be measured, and one which all must pity; but the man through whose hands such a blow has been dealt to an honourable Government and a prosperous empire, must be swept from public life, and may be well content if his name be never heard nor his form seen in public again.

The first act of insubordination shows that mysterious meanings were now instantly attached to our scientific preparations for the good of the country. As the Sepoys no longer doubted the designs of Government against them, the electric wires became to them an evil instrument of their ruin; and, consequently, within a week from the time when the cartridge

abomination was brought to their knowledge, the first stroke was struck on the 24th of January, by burning down the Telegraph Office at Barrackpore, sixteen miles from Calcutta. That station was at this time occupied only by native troops, of whom there were four regiments; and it is almost incredible, that at the moment there was only one regiment of Europeans for a distance of four hundred miles,—half of it in the fort at Calcutta, and half seven miles off, at Dumdum. Night after night acts of incendiarism occurred; at the same time, agents of disaffection were making the most of the opportunity which the Government had given them, and it was asleep. A whole month was allowed to pass before any explanation was given; and by that time the Sepoys were fully satisfied that the design of contamination had been abandoned only because it was discovered. The native post is said to have been filled with soldiers' letters, conveying from the Sepoys to their comrades, all over the country, the terrible tidings of the Government conspiracy against them; and at last, by the middle of February, General Hearsey found it necessary to muster the troops at Barrackpore, and harangue them. On the 24th of that month, a small guard from a regiment quartered there reached Berhampore, a hundred and twenty miles from Calcutta, and doubtless excited, with their tales of the cows'-fat conspiracy, the men of the 19th regiment. The next day the latter regiment was paraded, and blank cartridges served out to them. The men, excited by the tales they had heard from the capital, thought these were the contaminated cartridges, although they were perfectly innocent, and refused them, until threatened with courts-martial, when they took them in gloomy silence; and in the night they rose as one man, shouting defiance. Colonel Mitchell marched against them with the remaining forces, and called upon them to give up their arms; but they would not even return to their lines, until the artillery and cavalry which had been marched against them were moved away. The Colonel yielded; and thus in the first conflict the victory was with the mutineers. Some years before Lord Dalhousie had first *requested* a regiment to go to Burmah, and, when it refused, quietly submitted to the affront! In mentioning the word 'lines,' it may be as well to explain that it means ten rows of huts, each row accommodating a company, and the whole a regiment.

At this point we may pause to say, that from the past history of Indian mutinies, nothing is easier than to deduce the conclusion, that Sepoys never break into resistance but when their

superiors cross them on one of the following grounds: 1. Pay. 2. Changes of costume. 3. Caste customs. 4. Going abroad. With the certainty of a law you may always trace mutiny to one of these causes. Even one exception, to 'establish the rule,' or to give colour to the outcry about Missionaries, cannot be found.

It was not until about the 4th of March that the news of this outbreak reached Calcutta; and, on the morning of the 6th, a steamer started for Rangoon. In the meantime, the regiments in the neighbourhood of the metropolis at Barrackpore showed increasing symptoms of disaffection; and reports of ill-feeling manifested far away at Meerut and Lucknow also came to hand. After fourteen days' absence, the steamer that had been dispatched to Rangoon returned with Her Majesty's 84th Regiment, which was at once placed at Chinsurah, eight miles from Barrackpore; and the 19th Regiment, which had mutinied, was ordered to march to that station. In the meantime, the 34th, from which the men who excited them had come, committed the first act of violence against any Englishman. The Adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Baugh, heard that a Sepoy was traversing the lines, calling upon his comrades to rise. He rode immediately to the parade-ground. Mungul Pandy,—for this was the Sepoy's name,—hiding himself behind a cannon which was near, took deliberate aim, and fired at the officer. The horse was wounded, and came to the ground with his rider. The officer, snatching a pistol from his holster, fired in return, but missed his man; and before he could draw his sword, the Sepoy brought him to the ground with a blow. A guard of the regiment was close by, but they did not interfere. The European Sergeant-Major called out to them, but their native Lieutenant forbade them to stir, and Mungul Pandy wounded a second Englishman, the Sergeant-Major, and then the guard struck the two wounded men with the butts of their muskets. One Mohammedan was faithful, and seized Mungul Pandy just as he had re-loaded his piece. Lieutenant-Colonel Wheeler acted feebly and inefficiently; but General Hearsey was presently on the spot, with some other officers, and Mungul Pandy fired at and wounded himself. General Hearsey promoted the faithful Sepoy to the rank of Sergeant on the spot; and it is said, in India, that Colonel Birch, the same man to whom is attributed the order for the greased cartridges, had the hardy imbecility to give a 'severe wigging' to the General for this departure from the sacred punctilios of routine

promotion. The native guard and their officer were *left at large*, while the regiment which had previously mutinied at Berhampore were marched on this station to be disarmed. It is said that, on the last night of this march, a deputation, of Mungul Pandy's comrades, joined them, and proposed that they should that very night kill all their officers, march on to Barrackpore, where the two regiments were prepared to join them, then burn the bungalows, surprise and massacre the European force, then march on Calcutta, and sack it. But the 19th, having learned that they were about to be disbanded, were already in a penitent mood, and had sent a petition to the Governor-General, offering to proceed at once to China, or any other place, by land or sea, if they were only pardoned: thus they rejected the counsel of their bloody brethren of the 34th. They were marched into Barrackpore, and there disbanded; but the 34th, who had gone much further than they, were left untouched.

The Jemadar (native Lieutenant) of that corps, who had forbidden his men to rescue the wounded Adjutant, was left three days at large, and four weeks passed before he was brought to punishment. The men of his guard, who beat the wounded officer, were at liberty; their comrades, who refused to give them up, were not disturbed; and that for five weeks. Thus Lord Canning told every Sepoy in India, in what is the most emphatic language to say anything in, *acts*, that it was a matter for long consideration whether native officers who helped in the murder of a European one should be hanged, and that it was worth while to house, clothe, feed, and pay Sepoys for beating wounded Englishmen.

The policy of conspirators is tremulous, and such steps looked not like English honesty, but native cunning. Every Sepoy would read fresh evidence of evil design in every token of fear. An oversight had irritated disaffection into suspicion; temporizing turned suspicion to certainty; and resistance broke out. From Lucknow, the capital of Oude, came the news that a doctor, who tasted a bottle of physic before giving it to a sick Sepoy, was set down as a conspirator against caste, and his house burned. At Umballah, much farther away, the Commander-in-Chief was led, by the sullenness of the men, to address and attempt to reassure them. At Sealkote, in the heart of the Punjab, letters were found from the precious 34th at Barrackpore, urging their comrades at the former place to revolt. A Jemadar of the 70th regiment was found going

through the lines, exciting the men to mutiny; and when a court-martial of his native brother officers sentenced him to the gentle pain of dismissal, the authorities complacently ratified the decision. In the midst of all this, orders were given that the British regiment which had been brought up from Burmah to overawe the 19th while being disarmed, should be sent away again.

This crowning folly was hindered by the rush of events. On May 3rd, a Sepoy at Lucknow received a letter from the 7th Oude Cavalry, which had belonged to the ex-King, and was lying seven miles off, to this effect: 'We are ready to obey the directions of our brothers of the 48th in the matter of cartridges, and to resist either actively or passively.' The Brahmin—for, be it said, he was a Brahmin—showed this to a Havildar (Serjeant), and he to a Subahdar (Captain); and the three carried it to Sir Henry Lawrence, whose great character thus elicited one of the very, very few gleams of light which have broken on the darkness of the plot. That same day he learned that four men of the regiment whence this letter came, had entered the room of their Adjutant, armed to the teeth, and told him that they did not dislike him, but he was a Feringhee (European), and must die. Lieutenant Mecham looked at them, and said, 'I am unarmed, and you may kill me if you like; but that will do you no good, for you will not succeed in this mutiny, and another Adjutant will be appointed.' The calm on his countenance and in his voice quelled the rage of the murderers, and they retired, leaving him unharmed.

When night had just fallen on the lines of these mutineers, they were thunderstruck at being summoned to meet Sir Henry Lawrence, who was backed by eight guns manned by Europeans, with one English and four native regiments. They were ordered to form close in front of him, and to lay down their arms. As they silently obeyed, the port-fires of the artillery suddenly flashed in the dark. 'Don't fire! don't fire!' screamed the mutineers, and rushed frantically away. That night all their ringleaders were secured by *native soldiers*.

This news reached Calcutta on the 4th; and, as if the electricity of the telegraph had galvanized the Government, the order to send off the English regiment to Burmah was recalled; and, two days after, the 34th were ordered out for punishment, after more weeks of respite than their accomplices at Lucknow had hours. An order of the Governor-General was read, detailing their great offences, and announcing their penalty,—simple dis-

missal. This was to be read to every regiment in India. When it reached Oude, Sir Henry Lawrence had the courage to set it aside. Lord Canning had wisely attempted to imitate his energy; *he* wisely resolved not to imitate Lord Canning's feebleness. Nevertheless, it was made known to every Sepoy that, when the Governor-General did his worst, it was but dismissal; and it is confidently affirmed that, at the same time, the Sepoys had offers of better pay from the Kings of Delhi and Oude.

The clouds had long been growing black, and now the thunderbolt was coming. On the same day that the 34th received their tardy dismissal, a parade was ordered at Meerut, on purpose to test the troops by serving out unexceptionable cartridges. Out of the ranks of the 3rd Cavalry, eighty-five men boldly advanced, and refused to take them. They were tried by a native court-martial, and eighty were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, with hard labour; the remaining five to six years. Three days after their mutinous act, in the presence of guns, and English rifles, and English horse, with their own and two other native regiments, they were stripped of the British uniform, and laden with fetters; imploring General Hewitt for mercy during the process, and at the close reproaching their comrades for permitting it. They were not put under a European guard, but lodged in the common jail, guarded only by natives.

The next day was a Sunday,—Sunday, May 10th, 1857,—henceforth in the calendar of many a family a blood-colour day. When we think how peacefully we sat in our homes or our churches that day, and that thousands in India sat in theirs just as peacefully, we feel how short is human sight! 'One who has served under Sir Charles Napier' thus tells the tale of that Sunday:—

'The Havildars made the morning report to their officers; the men of the European regiment attended morning service as usual, and there was no sign of the coming storm. The day passed away as Sundays generally pass in India, and not even the Serjeants, who live in the native lines, had noticed anything to call for report, or even for remark. Evening church-time was approaching: the 60th Rifles were turning out with their side-arms to proceed thither; officers, too, were dressing either for church or for an evening ride. Sepoys! restrain your impatience for half an hour longer, and Meerut is your own. Providentially they cannot restrain it. Suddenly the alarm of fire is given; then there is loud shouting, as if the Sepoys were turning out to quench the flames. But, then, that volley of musketry, followed by another and another! those discordant yells! that clatter-

ing of cavalry! the bugle sound of the alarm! It is not fire only that has caused this direful outcry; it is mutiny! insurrection! THE BENGAL ARMY HAS REVOLTED!

'It was nearing five o'clock on that memorable afternoon when, at a given signal, the 3rd Light Cavalry and the 20th Native Infantry rushed out of their lines, armed and furious. A detachment of the former regiment at once galloped in the direction of the jail. On reaching it, its gates were opened to them without resistance, and they at once liberated all its inmates, including their imprisoned comrades: a native smith was at hand to strike off their irons. These men, infuriated by their disgrace, ran with all possible speed to their lines, armed themselves, and mounted; they then rushed to the scene of action, yelling fearfully, and denouncing death to every European. Meanwhile the remaining portion of the 3rd Cavalry and the 20th Native Infantry had proceeded to the lines of the 11th with all possible speed. Thither also the officers of that regiment, alarmed by the shouting and noise, had gone before them. They found Colonel Finnis haranguing his men, and endeavouring to keep them firm to their colours. The men were wavering when the 20th arrived. The men of this regiment, whose hands were already red with the blood of several of their own officers, seeing this hesitation and its cause, at once fired at Colonel Finnis. The first shot took effect on his horse only, but almost immediately afterwards he was riddled with balls. All discipline, all better feelings, now vanished. It is true that the Sepoys of the 11th permitted their officers to escape with their lives; but having done this, the greater portion of them followed the example of the 20th. And now ensued a scene of disorder, rapine, and murder, which pen cannot describe. Every house and building near the lines, except the hospital, had been fired; and the smoking and blazing barracks and houses, the yells of the mutineers, and the shouts and shrieks of the multitude gathered there, numbers of whom fell from the shots of the mutineers, made on that dark night a scene than which one cannot be imagined more horrible. Officers galloping about, carrying orders to the European troops, were fired at, not only by the mutineers, but by the native guards placed over the public buildings for security. Ladies driving in their carriages, gentlemen in their buggies, who had left their houses unsuspicious of evil, were assaulted, and, if not murdered, treated with a brutality to which death would have been a relief. Not only the Sepoys, but the released jail-birds, fifteen hundred in number, the population also, that "vile rabble" which is always available for plunder or murder, had joined the movement, and spread terror and desolation all around them. Nor were houses or public offices safe places of refuge from these assaults. Most of the houses in Meerut—all of those in the military lines—are thatched with straw, and easily inflammable: the plan of the insurgents was to set fire to the roof, and to murder the frighted residents as they quitted the burning dwelling. Many met their deaths in this way; more, providentially, escaped; yet not one of those in the latter category owed their safety to the mercy of their assailants. In some instances outrages were perpetrated which the pen refuses to record. These men, whom we had pampered for a century, who had always professed the utmost devotion to us, seemed suddenly converted into demons. Nor was this a solitary example; other stations were

destined to witness atrocities fouler, more brutal, and more treacherous than even those of Meerut.'

Had the man who smothered the flame at Lucknow been at Meerut, with a regiment of English rifles, one of English horse, and a troop of English artillery, not a single company of the mutineers would have escaped. They were only three regiments. Yet they all got away, or nearly all. The British force was, after a long delay, brought out against them, but soon led back 'to guard the station,' while Delhi, India, England, were left at the mercy of the mutineers. The General who served his nation this turn was 'superseded for supineness' *after some months had passed.*

The tiger had now tasted blood, and all the ferocity of his nature was awakened. The next morning, the English at Delhi received a hasty intimation to repair to a strong place outside the walls, called the Flagstaff Tower. (After all that has passed, in alluding to those British-built towers and bastions of Delhi, we have a painful recollection that they were executed by a valued friend, who does not live to lament the unforeseen use to which his engineering science has been turned.) To the Flagstaff Tower several hastened, others never received the message, others it reached too late. The Meerut murderers were at hand. To face them, Brigadier Graves had three regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, all native! Not a company of English troops! 'Plenty of mischief,' wrote Sir Charles Napier, years before, to an officer of artillery,* 'will be hatched within those walls, and no European forces!'—'Meanwhile,' says the writer whom we have quoted just above,—

'Meanwhile the regiments were ordered out, the guns loaded, and every possible preparation made. The Brigadier harangued the troops in a manly style; told them that now was the opportunity to show their fidelity to the Company to whom they had sworn fidelity, and by whom they had never been deceived. His brief, pithy address was received with cheers. The 54th, especially, seemed eager to exterminate the mutineers, and loudly demanded to be led against them. The Brigadier, responding to their seeming enthusiasm, put himself at their head, and led them out of the Cashmere Gate to meet the rebels, whose near approach had been announced. As they marched out in gallant order, to all appearance proud and confident, a tumultuous array appeared advancing from the Hindun. In front, and in full uniform, with medals on their breasts gained in fighting for British supremacy, confidence in their manner, and fury in their gestures, galloped on about two hundred and fifty troopers of the 3rd Cavalry: behind them, at no

* Private letter, published in the *Times*.

great distance, and almost running in their efforts to reach the golden minarets of Delhi, appeared a vast mass of Infantry, their red coats soiled with dust, and their bayonets glittering in the sun. No hesitation was visible in all that advancing mass; they came on, as if confident of the result. Now the Cavalry approach nearer and nearer! At this headlong pace they will soon be on the bayonets of the 54th. These latter are ordered to fire; the fate of India hangs on their reply. They do fire, but, alas! into the air; not one saddle is emptied by that vain discharge. And now the Cavalry are amongst them; they fraternize with them; they leave the officers to their fate; and these are remorselessly cut down wherever they can be found!'

Some fled to the palace of the King of Delhi for refuge. It is said that when the Sepoys cried, 'What shall we do with them?' the clement reply from the throne was, 'What you like; I give them to you.' And with our brothers, with our sisters, with our little girls, with our merry boys, those tigers and satyrs did 'what they liked.' That day the honour of England's daughters was outraged in the streets.

There was a young Lieutenant of artillery who thought of the most important thing in Delhi, the Arsenal, which the Commandant seems to have entirely forgotten, though, with that exception, his conduct was excellent; but, had he duly ordered the firing of the magazine in case of need, the mutineers would have been comparatively powerless. The young soldier laid a train; went into a subterranean passage; waited until he heard the raging of men within the building, until he heard them wrestling outside for entrance. 'It is full,' he said. The match is applied, the ground quakes, from fifteen hundred to three thousand poor wretches are blown into the air; and yet the hand that dealt the blow, though scorched and bruised, is not dead. Some of his noble comrades reached Meerut; and have heard, no doubt, many a man's and many a woman's warm word, 'Well done;' but he has gone to the grave to which he devoted himself. Of all the names which the mention of Delhi will hereafter recall to the memories of Englishmen, none will ring upon the ear with a tone so solemn and so grand as that of Willoughby!

What he destroyed was the small-arms magazine; enough of stores remained to supply the rebels with the means of long-continued defence, which might all have been destroyed. From the Flagstaff Tower a puff of smoke was seen, then a 'huge coronet of red dust,' then came the noise of an explosion. The Sepoys in the Tower turned the two guns which were there upon the Europeans; Brigadier Graves told them to escape, and

was himself the last man to leave. And that escape! What tales have been told, and what tales remain to tell!

Through General Hewitt's 'supineness,' the disaffected Sepoys throughout the country had now obtained the one thing necessary to give them courage,—success. An English station *well manned by Europeans* had been burned; the perpetrators of the deed had marched off unhurt; and the former capital of India had become their easy prize. The man who issued the greased cartridges gave conspirators the means of turning Sepoys into mutineers; General Hewitt gave mutinous Sepoys courage to become rebels.

The King of Delhi, who owed us nothing but obligations; whose ancestors had been reduced to a mere pageant before we appeared on the field, tossed about from Mahratta to Rohilla, now with eyes put out, now with a little army; whose father, instead of this, had lived in peace, plenty, and respect, under our protection; who was himself rich, and at ease, by our bounty; he at once put himself at the head of the movement, called the regiments by the names of his sons, appointed Lall Khan, of the 3rd Cavalry, the Meerut regiment, his General-in-Chief, and issued proclamations, promising double pay to Sepoys, and plenty of blessings to the people.

'Success,' that magic word for the timid, sped through every Sepoy station;—success, in the face of an equal, or nearly equal, force of Europeans;—success, so well used as to secure boundless stores, a fortress, a metropolis, and an Emperor. No wonder that the Sepoy, who had so long hesitated between fear, hatred, and self-interest, should now think that the scale was turned as to the latter, and rush at once to vengeance and greatness by rebellion. The English had tried to rob him of his caste, dearer than life; and now their hour was come. The Bengal army revolted, murdering, violating, and burning wherever they could. All Oude soon raged around the calm, strong presence of Sir Henry Lawrence, who with five hundred men stood against a kingdom, until a shot brought him to the grave,—one of the best and greatest men whom England ever sent to India. Blood is on the head of those who placed him in that newly-annexed kingdom with but one European regiment, and of those who delayed the formation of railways by which he might have received support in time. In the Punjab, the vigour of his brother, Sir John, backed by such men as Chamberlain and Edwardes, sufficed to extinguished the flames of rebellion in detail as they broke out; so that the mutinous army received no

important accession thence, and the loyal one did. The admirable management of the Punjab supplied us with a base of operations in the Plain of the Indus, west of the insurgents, in addition to that furnished by Bengal, on their east.

Although it is no exaggeration to say that the Bengal army revolted, the prevalent ideas, and even the representations in the Press and in Parliament, of the extent of the rebellion are much exaggerated. From a tone of confidence approaching to levity, some of our journals passed at once to the position that we had to re-commence the conquest of India. The confidence was excusable, for nearly all who knew India shared it; and it will prove well founded in the long run, resting, as it did, on the full persuasion that no native power existed capable of destroying the British empire in India. But we have never yet come near the position of having to re-conquer India. First of all, out of *two hundred reigning Rajahs, not one of any importance has openly set himself against us;* for the King of Delhi had not one soldier, and Nana Sahib was a private person. Had the reigning Rajahs led out their four hundred thousand men to join the Sepoys, even then it had not been all India. But several of them promptly and energetically took our side. Again, the Madras and Bombay armies, one hundred thousand strong, remained our friends; and all the territory south of the central mountains, the whole of the great Table Land, of the Mountain Foot, were undisturbed. Scinde, Guzerat, Bengal, Orissa, never needed re-conquest. Rajpootan with its seventeen millions was on the whole steady. The Punjab was ruffled, but was immediately pacified by its own garrisons.

The rebellion never established itself west of Delhi, never (till the 'eleventh hour') broke out east of Benares; the distance between these being little over four hundred miles. At Benares, however, it never had a day's ascendancy. In fact, any one may define to himself, very easily and completely, the seat of real rebellion, the country needing to be re-conquered, if he will trace the Ganges up to its junction with the Jumna, and, beginning at Allahabad, say, 'There is the hostile frontier;' then let him ascend the line of both these great rivers, with Oude and Rohilcund skirting one, and Agra and Delhi lying on the other, and he will have before him the scene on which our soldiers have to triumph. Serious outbreaks have occurred south of this; but the mutinous troops have marched northward, from Neemuch and other stations, to Delhi, leaving the field open for re-occupation without the necessity of re-conquest.

Most of it has been already reclaimed, and forces from the south are steadily approaching Delhi.

Had all India to be re-conquered, we should have against us, first, our own Sepoys, say 250,000; secondly, the armies of the Rajahs, 400,000; thirdly, the people, either in arms or passively hostile; fourthly, all the strong places occupied by the enemy. Instead of this, we have lost about 80,000 Sepoys, of whom perhaps 60,000 are in arms against us; with what amount of abetting rabble we do not at present know. They hold *only one strong place,* Delhi; and all the other great fortresses of India are in our hands. Neither the people nor the Princes have joined the mutineers, so that the work to be done, though serious, difficult, and costly, is no more a re-conquest of India than the suppression of a French revolt, which had occurred at Paris, would be a conquest of Europe. They who speak of re-conquering India have very imperfect ideas of what such words mean. What lies before us is much less than that, and yet it is far from being a trifle.

The movement towards repressing the rebellion began from three sides,—Calcutta on the east, the Punjab and the Hills on the north-west, and the Bombay Presidency on the south. The Commander-in-Chief was hunting in the hills, though the army had long been in a state of the most alarming ferment. He moved towards Delhi, and, while pausing at Kurnaul for siege guns, was carried off by cholera. General Anson possessed all the qualities of a perfect gentleman, accomplishments unquestionably of great value in any sphere, and furnishing sufficient qualifications for an appointment about the Court; but every one knew that he had never commanded an army, every one believed he had never commanded a regiment, and many military men asserted that he had never commanded a company. It is a great crime to appoint any man to high command whose professional reputation does not insure the confidence of those below him. Every active Captain or Adjutant in India believed that he knew more of the art of war, practically, than his Commander-in-Chief. How far this feeling—for nothing is so contagious as a feeling of this kind—passed to the Sepoys, we cannot tell.

The fallen Chief was succeeded by one who had seen service, General Barnard. He reached Delhi on the 8th of June, just four weeks after it had been seized, swept the rebels before him, took twenty-six guns, paused at the walls, and resolved not to

risk an assault. He maintained himself outside the walls; bravely repulsed innumerable sorties, inflicting terrible loss on the enemy; and died at his post, of the same plague which had carried off General Anson. His policy has had one advantage, —that of making Delhi a trap, to which the mutineers have been drawn from all points; but, had he carried forward his victorious men, they would have planted his standard on the walls, and the hearts of the mutineers would have sunk all over the country. In battle, or in policy, timidity with Hindus is folly; they bend before bravery, but spring up at the least sign of weakness. From the 8th of June up to this day, Delhi has continued to be the centre of the struggle, receiving new hordes from stations which had mutinied, sending them out as they arrived to attack our forces, receiving back the defeated survivors, and again recruiting its numbers and its courage by new arrivals.

From the side of Calcutta, our movement consisted in sending reinforcements up towards the seat of war. In this, at least,— and, we fear we must say, in this only,—the Government of Lord Canning showed itself equal to the requirements of the moment. From Burmah, from Madras, from Ceylon, from Mauritius, and from the Chinese expedition, it sought and found help. As the troops arrived, they produced a double effect: first, their appearance in Calcutta quenched the hope of mutiny among the conspirators there; and, secondly, as they moved on to the interior, they carried the return tide with them. Among the first effects were the disarming of the troops at Barrackpore, and the capture of the King of Oude; but, as if everything done in Calcutta itself was to be defective, the Fakeer, whose revelations when under sentence of death led to the King's capture, was allowed to escape from prison; and whether he had told enough to be of much value, we do not know.

Among the arrivals was a regiment from Madras, and the first the English public knew of its Colonel was that, when his men were leaving by the railway, the train was ordered to start before they had all arrived. He remonstrated; the station-master insisted that, the time being up, the train must go; the Colonel put him under arrest, and, when the last of his men were in the carriage, set him free. This was Colonel Neill, and the regiment was the Madras Fusileers. He might have been in Benares in twenty-four hours, had the railway been finished; but at last he did reach that city, and the same night came the outbreak of rebellion: with more than ten to

one against him, he ended it in half an hour or so. Had he been at Meerut, with two noble regiments and artillery, Delhi would never have passed into rebel hands. It was on the 4th of June that this collision at Benares occurred, and that point was the farthest down the Ganges at which real fighting took place, before the recent outburst at Dinapore. Here the two advancing waves, of the rebel and of the re-conquering power, first met, and the former was rolled back; a tide was setting in against a stream.

From Benares, Neill and his force soon reached Allahabad. There the officers of the 6th had been murdered at mess by the men who in the forenoon assured them of their loyalty; and, though the authorities retained hold of the place, things were in fearful confusion, and were managed without energy. Colonel Neill, though junior to the officer in charge, had happily authority to take the command. 'Things changed as if by magic.' Rebels were punished, order was restored, and the surrounding district as well as the city overawed. One of the sufferers was a boy Ensign, from the smiling vale of Evesham, who, after being wounded, spent five miserable days and nights in a gully, blistered by the sun and chilled by the dews, until at last he was dragged dying to the presence of a fellow who had set up as a small Rajah. Here he saw a native Christian, a convert from Mohammedanism, and a Catechist of the American Mission, enduring menaces to make him deny Christ. He glanced round in his anguish, as if for help or courage, and the dying English boy raised his feeble frame, and said, 'O Padre, whatever you do, do not deny the Lord Jesus!' Just then a noise was heard outside, the noise of angry men: it was Colonel Neill's gallant band; the persecutors were soon punished, the native Christian was released, and the lad whose voice had strengthened him died among friends. Let his memory be cherished in every home of the peaceful, beautiful vale of his nativity!

At Allahabad a second important step was gained, the rebellion being rolled so much farther back from the metropolis. At the same time, the base of operations, on the opposite side of the rebel field, was being strengthened and made available. The whole of the regular Sepoy regiments in the Punjab, or nearly the whole, were disarmed; corps were raised from the people of the country itself, hostile to the Brahmins and Mussulmans; and some forces dispatched to Delhi. Colonel Herbert Edwardes, who gained much celebrity in the great Sikh

war, was able, with other officers, to arouse emulation to be enlisted, among the people under his government: not only did Chiefs on whom he called respond, but those whom he passed by remonstrated. At Sealkote the Sepoys broke fairly out, and, having murdered several officers, marched for Delhi; but, on their way, they were beaten into the Ravee by Brigadier Nicholson, and then, after having found temporary refuge in an island, were utterly routed; instead of them their victor marched for Delhi, and the miserable remainder of them were caught by native authorities, and delivered up. General Van Cortlandt, who had earlier performed similar feats, took the same road. Thus, from the west, as from the east, the return tide was setting in.

At Neemuch and Nusseerabad successful and bloody risings had taken place; and also at Indore and Mhow, all south of Delhi. From these points ten thousand mutineers appeared before Agra, the seat of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North West Provinces; five hundred British soldiers, instead of awaiting them in the fort, went out to attack them; and, though the proceeding was mismanaged, fought them for three hours, and made such an impression that, instead of being besieged, they saw the host move away. Holkar, the head of the second Mahratta nation in point of importance, stood firm when his troops at Indore rebelled; was reproached by them for not resembling his ancestor, who had been a foe not unworthy of the steel of Lake and Wellesley; but replied that the murder of women and children did not make part of any religion. A column under Colonel Steuart, advancing from Bombay, has taken possession of these regions, and thus the return tide has set in from the south.

We left the force advancing from Calcutta at Allahabad. There Neill fell ill; but, happily, not fatally. In the meantime, at the next important post, Cawnpore, on the banks of the Ganges, and on the frontier of Oude, one of the first soldiers in India was nobly playing his part. Sir Hugh Wheeler made a temporary but strong fort out of his barracks, and soon needed it; for his Sepoys rose, and at their head was placed a Mahratta of note living in the neighbourhood. What could have induced our Government to make the most sacred and exciting lands of Hinduism the residence of conquered Monarchs, we cannot tell; but, among others, the Peishwa, or great Mahratta Priest-King, when dethroned, was placed, with a royal pension, in the sacred land by the Ganges. Having no son, he adopted Nana Sahib,

who very naturally wished for a royal pension, in addition to all the property of the ex-Peishwa. He obtained the latter, was denied the former, lived in state, kept troops and artillery, talked English, visited the officers, and seemed very friendly. No sooner did the disturbance offer a hope of revenge for the refusal of the pension, than he took part with the mutineers; and of his atrocities all the world has heard. In Europe, they are new and horrible. In India, such things were beginning to be strange, because of British supremacy; but they formed the ordinary appendages of native war, and every year had its wars. To us the horror is, that noble British men and delicate British women were the victims over whom this wild beast gloated. We say British, rather than English; for in the streams that have reddened the Ganges the blood of the three kingdoms has flowed indiscriminately. But no one who knew the Hindus, or had even an idea of their history, would expect much better or much worse than what has occurred. The organ of Tipu Sahib is preserved in the East India House, and may be seen by any visitor in the instructive museum of that establishment. It is an instrument expressive of any native hero's feeling towards an enemy, and one after Nana Sahib's own heart. Its form is that of a British officer prostrate, with a tiger standing upon him; its music is the alternate cry of the Briton and growl of the brute.

Nana Sahib and Sir Hugh Wheeler! One burns to write two such names in the same line! Yet the latter was the prey of the former. With some three hundred men, Wheeler maintained himself against a host, in a mere barrack, riddled with cannon shot, and crowded with women and children. At last he fell, and his hapless followers, trusting to the word of Nana, took boat for Allahabad. They were fired on from the banks of the river, and most of them thus destroyed; but many women were reserved for the gratification of our enemies, until the avenger drew nigh.

Brigadier Havelock had left Allahabad, at the head of 1,800 Britons. In the terrible heats of July, this brigade in eight days marched a hundred and twenty-six miles, won four battles, took twenty-four guns, and recaptured Cawnpore. On the 12th of July, (a day memorable as the anniversary of the battle of the Boyne,) they reached Futteypore, found the rebels in force, were attacked, and the result is best told in General Havelock's words to his men, which show that he can write as well as fight:—

'MOVEABLE COLUMN.

'*Morning Order, July 13th*, 1857.

'Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., thanks his soldiers for their arduous exertions of yesterday, which produced, in four hours, the strange result of a whole army driven from a strong position, eleven guns captured, and their whole force scattered to the winds, without the loss of a single British soldier!

'To what is this astonishing effect to be attributed? To the fire of the British artillery, exceeding in rapidity and precision all that the Brigadier-General has ever witnessed in his not short career; to the power of the Enfield Rifle in British hands; to British pluck,—that good quality that has survived the revolution of the hour; and to the blessing of Almighty God on a most righteous cause,—the cause of justice, humanity, truth, and good government in India.'

Three days afterwards, they defeated the enemy in two separate engagements, again capturing several guns; but here Major Renaud, who, in the absence of Colonel Neill, commanded the Madras Fusileers, received a wound, from which he has died. The next day, they encountered the whole body of the rebels under Nana Sahib in person, in an intrenched position, which was skilfully turned, and bravely carried in the face of a determined opposition, which cost us one man in every fifteen of those engaged, but ended in the complete rout of the enemy and the surrender of Cawnpore. Nana Sahib, however, in retiring, had more caution than the Commandant of Delhi; for he took care to have the magazine blown up. More than a hundred and twenty of our countrywomen, who had been preserved up to the day of the battle, were now not to be found; a well was choked with their bodies; and all that remained of these women above ground was 'long tresses of hair, dresses covered with blood, here and there a workbox or a bonnet.'

After a day or two's rest, General Havelock passed on for Bithoor, the seat of Nana. The wretch had abandoned it, and our force burned it to the ground; and whether its savage master is drowned in the Ganges, or still lives, we are at present left in uncertainty, the report being that, in crossing the stream, he had drowned himself and his family. Hence General Havelock proceeded direct towards Lucknow, and on the 29th of July came upon 10,000 mutineers, strongly posted, with fifteen guns, whom he routed, capturing all their ordnance; and, after a halt of four hours, he assaulted a second strong position, carried it, and captured all its guns. After another victory, he fell back to place his sick, wounded, and captured guns in safety, received a small reinforcement, and set forward anew. We leave General

Havelock almost within sight of the noble little band who have held their ground around the grave of Sir Henry Lawrence; and the hope that, ere this, they have met above that great man's ashes has already made many a heart in England say, 'God bless General Havelock!'

The present position of affairs, then, is, first, symptoms of the mutiny beginning to appear in the Bombay army, at Kolapore; secondly, great anxiety in parts of the Madras Presidency lest the approaching Mohurrum should witness an outbreak; thirdly, government restored in Central India and confirmed in the Punjab; fourthly, in Bengal, the rebellion driven up the Ganges from Benares to Allahabad, from Allahabad to Cawnpore, and from Cawnpore to Oude; our besieging force at Delhi triumphant in twenty-two engagements, but kept small by constant losses, yet expecting powerful reinforcements in the columns of Van Cortlandt, Nicholson, and Havelock, all of which will come as victors; and all this before reinforcements have arrived either from the Cape or from England.

Yet by the folly of the Government in refusing to disarm three regiments at Dinapore, and keeping an imbecile old man in command, disturbance has been gratuitously imported to Behar; and the heroism of the little garrison of Arrah, where a dozen English and forty-five Sikhs repulsed and held at bay two thousand or three thousand Sepoys, has been deprived of its legitimate effect; for a detachment was driven at night into the jaws of an ambuscade, when half of them fell.

If we turn for a moment to look at the effects of this mutiny, one of the first and most obvious will be, a better knowledge in Europe of Hindu character. It was the fashion of a certain school to paint that character as so gentle, that the atrocities of this rebellion took the public by surprise. But no one familiar with the best writers upon India,—with such writers as Orme or Mill,—ever expected that Hindus in warfare would act otherwise than they have acted. Feebleness and ferociousness easily unite in the same person. Any one who had read the accounts of Bengal dacoity, or gang robbery, would know that even the most cringing of all the Hindu nations habitually indulge in incredible atrocities, when once engaged in conflict. The authentic memoirs of any native Court, whether Hindu or Mussulman, would be too horrible for belief in England. It is impossible to calculate the saving of human life which has resulted from the

British conquest, if it was only through the stopping of murders by authority. We know a case of one Rajah, now deposed, of whom his former subjects say that he killed only five thousand persons while he was on the throne; whereas his father had killed about ten thousand; and his uncle, a much greater and abler man than either, who in his day rendered services to the Government of the Marquis of Wellesley, had killed at least fifteen thousand. A case was well known, in which the Queen of the Nairs, in whose country it was not fashionable for women to cover the chest, on learning that one who had been abroad did so since her return to her own country, ordered her breasts to be cut off. But the narratives with which our papers teem have settled for ever the question in the mind of the British public, whether the character of the natives is, or is not, that which a religion full of blood, and lust, and murder, in its most sacred tales of its gods, is calculated to foster. The Hindus are heathens, with all the cruelty which heathenism continually nourishes.

Another effect will be, a clearer apprehension on the subject of native institutions, especially that of caste. This has been hitherto regarded rather as an oriental curiosity than as a bad institution, a practical curse to mankind. By the horrors of this rebellion, many will be taught that caste is the most unnatural barrier ever interposed between man and man, the greatest source of estrangement between neighbours of the same race and language, and the most dangerous obstacle to intercourse between different nations. It must henceforth be looked at gravely as one of the worst things existing under the sun; not to be rudely assailed, because that would rouse fanaticism in its defence, but to be calmly and strongly passed by, in every arrangement let alone, all ordinances and regulations proceeding upon the basis given us by our own constitution, and leaving, in the enjoyment of their rights, those who prefer the pride of caste to the advantages we offer them: and these will be very few; for when the Hindus are not forced, they easily slide into practices irreconcilable with caste, if any advantage is to be gained thereby. In fact, the scrupulous Brahmins of the south of India would not acknowledge the pure Brahminical caste of a single man of the Bengal Army, in so many ways have they departed from the strict regimen of their system to secure secular advantages, although they have resented with violence, of which we all are aware, the supposed attempt to pollute them by fraud.

Another effect of the rebellion is, to scatter for ever the confident belief which nearly all the English residents in India entertained, that the Hindus and the Mussulmans could never combine. On this point no one can reproach his neighbour; for all were agreed, and all have been equally disappointed. We put it the other day to a Hindu of rank and note, how it was that his people could unite with the Mussulmans. His reply was, 'All the men in India who remember the miseries of the Mussulman days, have now white beards. The present generation know nothing about it; the pains that we have gone through are all forgotten, and the people have joined, thinking they would clear the English out of the way, and have the country to themselves.' Henceforth our policy can never take, as the basis of any one proceeding, the assumption that the Hindu and the Mussulman cannot make common cause against us. That hitherto all-pervading element in the calculation of Indian policy must wholly disappear.

Another effect, closely allied with this one, is the proof, terribly perfect now, that the policy of our Government in matters of religion has been a total failure. That policy has been, in its public principles, purely atheistical. As a Government, to have no religion at all, and to support Hinduism for the Hindus, Mohammedanism for the Mohammedans, and Christianity for the English, with a view to please all, has been the way of our Government. Our whole Indian policy has been tinged with the original character of commerce. We have traded in everything, from crowns down to cowry-shells, and from opium up to conscience. Which would cost least, or which would pay most, has always been the ruling consideration. Meaner than any conquerors in any country before, we have been ashamed and afraid to avow and encourage our own creed. Our authorities did all that in them lay to keep Hindus and Mussulmans in complete ignorance of Christianity. They did more: they did all that in them lay to excite the jealousy of the natives against Christian efforts to enlighten them. They sowed fear and discontent, by manifesting disfavour to their own religion to obtain the confidence of the Hindus. Even with an honest and straightforward people, such conduct could not obtain respect; but to those who can never believe in the integrity of any one, so deeply is their own character imbued with dissimulation, all these evidences of tremor or anxiety could have but one meaning;—they were adopted to hide a conspiracy.

Had the Government been as honest as the Mussulmans when they were in power, or as Runjeet Singh, or as any kind of rulers that the Hindus have ever had to do with before,—that is, had they avowed, and acted on, and encouraged their own religion,—the whole body of Hindus would by this time have known what that religion and its principles are, and been persuaded that to it the idea of obtaining crowds of nominal adherents, by fraud or force, would be utterly abhorrent. The Mussulmans, acting upon their principles, and Runjeet Singh on his, not only encouraged but compelled conversion, not only discountenanced but persecuted other religions; and yet there are no traces in the history of India that this course was the cause of any material weakness to their governments. We, with other principles and another creed, which would have led us never to coerce any man's conscience, never to interfere with any man's rights, ought, by frankly displaying a purer belief and a more elevating worship, to have held out to all mild invitations to become wiser and holier, with the strong assurance of acts, not of words, of habitual acts, that their conversion by other means than that of sincere conviction was not only undesired by us, but would be dreaded, as the introduction of vices and superstitions within the pale of our religion. They who, by their un-English cowardice in all matters of morals; who, by their steady bartering of the name and form of Christianity for supposed favour with Brahmins and Moollahs; who, by abetting heathen ceremonies and administering persecuting heathen laws, by shutting up the Sepoy from all Christian enlightenment, and making the army a store-house of anti-Christian prejudices, kept a perpetual magazine of disaffection in the country, and then applied to it the match of the greased cartridges, now turn round upon those against whom their policy has been all along directed, and untruly say, 'The mischief is your doing.' *When Ahab saw Elijah, Ahab said unto him, Art thou he that troubleth Israel? And he answered, I have not troubled Israel; but thou, and thy father's house, in that ye have forsaken the commandments of the Lord, and thou hast followed Baalim.*

Again, one of the most immediate results will be, the revival in the native mind of the old dread of British valour. For years we have ceased to meet native hosts with small bands; our armies, from the days of Lord Hastings down, have assumed proportions which complimented every enemy with the show of meeting him on equal terms; and besides, European and Sepoy qualities have

been confounded, the fire of the British regiment inspiring its neighbour, the soul of the British officer animating his men. In this state of things, the deeds done by handfuls of English in the heroic days of Clive and Lawrence, Wellesley and Lake, had faded from the native memory; and many Sepoy regiments probably thought themselves quite a match for British ones. Their first trial at Meerut seemed to justify such an idea. But since that day, how often has the brow of the rebel darkened and furrowed with terror, as he heard the tale of what tens and twenties of Britons have done! Five hundred attacking ten thousand, and frightening them away, as at Agra; a handful holding Lucknow against all the forces of the kingdom; another handful holding Cawnpore; less than three hundred scattering three thousand at Benares; and the fearful charges of the Rifles at Delhi, when, ten against a hundred, they dash forward with the cry, 'Remember the Ladies,—Remember the Babies,' and everything flies before them: these are feats which heroes can appreciate, and which cowards will feel to the depths of their soul. They will tell, too, of that officer at Agra who killed five-and-twenty men; of poor Skene, who, after cutting down six or seven, saw his wife seized, and then, drawing the pistol he had reserved, sent one ball through her heart, and the other through his own head; and of Miss Wheeler, the daughter of the gallant Sir Hugh, who shot five with a revolver before they secured her.

Against such tales they can set those of women ripped, mutilated, stripped naked, sold by auction, burned alive; babies hacked and cast into the flames; husbands mutilated, and compelled to witness the dishonour of their wives; but none of heroism or prowess. They have never gained an action in the open field, no matter what their odds; never carried a position against British arms, no matter how few. Their success has been only by murder, not once by victory. In the history of the world there never was a rebellion with such means and advantages, which effected so little. The old heroic fame of British prowess rises up anew from the annals of every encounter, except the first at Meerut; from Lucknow, from Cawnpore, from the banks of the Ravee, and the field of Futteypore; and for at least another generation the records of great deeds will be alive in the memory of the people; the deeds no longer of the first conquerors, but of the modern British troops, fighting not against undisciplined hordes, but trained and picked battalions. Nothing is so forcible an

instrument of command over the Hindus as a sense of personal prowess; for this goes deeper into their hearts than either admiration of military science, or a sense of the benefits of good government. This grand element of our national ascendancy has received, and is now receiving, wonderful illustration.

Nor will the display of our military resources be less signal than that of individual heroism. Before this outbreak all the world would have agreed in saying, that the total defection of the Bengal army must overthrow our power in that Presidency. Yet this has occurred, and that at a time when the British force was extremely weak; but after three months have elapsed, the revolted army has not secured a single Province; Oude, its home and stronghold, being at the last date swept by a British army, while its capital had never been without a garrison. And not in a single place, where a British force was stationed, had they maintained themselves for a day, not even at Dinapore, before poor General Lloyd. At the same time Ceylon sends men and guns; the Mauritius, men and guns; the Chinese expedition becomes an army of reserve, and by this time the Cape of Good Hope has probably sent its men and guns; and by the time these have ceased to arrive, will begin o appear noble hosts from England, in steamers and sailing ships, which will swell our forces to eighty-seven thousand Britons,—enough to sweep India, were it all in arms, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, and from the Himalayas back again to Cape Comorin. We exaggerate to ourselves the smallness of the military resources of England, and we teach others to do the same; but this Indian rebellion will show us, and show the natives, what neither of us knew before, that by British bayonets alone we could conquer again and again the length and breadth of immense India. Time never saw an army so far distant from its own country, equal to that which we shall have in India in three months. Our steamers, well placed on the rivers, could alone command half of the great cities.

But some ulterior plans will soon present themselves before us, and demand our judgment, and require our prompt approval and our firm support. When the trouble is past, what then? What is to be the future policy of England in India? Is it to be a temporizing, hollow, half-Hindu policy, attempting to bolster up an insecure power, by cloking our national faith and principles? or is it to be a manly English policy, taking our stand as what we are, rulers; rulers now by double right, and

well-tested strength; rulers who have a character which we proclaim to be higher than that of the people we rule, a religion more enlightened, laws and institutions more benign, and a will which we mean shall command? Nothing is more remarkable than the difference of tone between the letters of practical men, resident in India, which have appeared, and the words of politicians, more or less affecting knowledge of Indian questions. Several of the latter, and among them, to judge by its quibbling dispatch on the Sonthal question, the Court of Directors, clearly feel inclined to do a little more duty for the Brahmins, to repent of the exceedingly small measures of Christian truth and justice to which we have ever dared to commit ourselves, and to 'behave ourselves' like good friends of every abomination, however much opposed to us and our interests, as well as to the Christian faith, provided only it be well pleasing to the potentates whom we subserve. On the other hand, men writing from the midst of the dangers say straightforwardly and strongly that this must end the reign of double-dealing and temporizing for ever; that we must let the natives know that we are masters, and that India is to be ruled not by either Brahmins or Moolahs, but by Englishmen, with English ends, and English principles. To this latter section we at once declare our adherence. We must henceforth feel and assume that we are not in India by permission, but by power. We now hold the country not by the good will of the Brahmins; but alone by the good hand of God, and the strength of the English people. If the Government can rely on Brahmins in time of danger, let it court them; if it can only rely on the people of England, if it can only invoke the providence of God, let it follow a Christian policy.

We are far from joining in the wild, savage, yet natural cry for a bloody retribution, wherewith our journals have horrified all Europe. Let meet and dignified punishment be administered to murderers and mutineers; but let no deed give the heathen the impression that our excitement at their crimes springs not from horror, but from emulation. As to the mosques, the towers, and the palaces of Delhi, we should be glad that not a stone remained; as to the homes of the common people, we would leave them alone. Let Britain sweep before her everything that resists, but let the defenceless feel that they have no enemy in Christian armies. With the native Princes we would be equally tolerant: their caution in the present case shows that having something to lose is not without its weight. Those who have been actively loyal ought to be well rewarded.

We are equally far from advising persecution for religion or caste; let Hindu, Mussulman, and Sikh, as heretofore, feel that, under Christian rule, his conscience is as free as air. Let no trifling with temples, processions, or questions of caste, give the impression that our Government charges itself with the direction of religious movements. Let every man be sacredly protected in his liberties; but, on the other hand, let the Government frankly say, 'We are Christians, and *our religion is to be on the footing of the most favoured;* no heritage shall be alienated, no civil penalty suffered, for becoming a Christian; no act, such as a re-marriage of a widow, consistent with Christian morals, shall be punishable; no rite stained by cruelty or obscenity publicly permitted.' Above all, let them say, 'We force no one to be educated, we leave all free; but if schools are provided by us, they *must* teach physical truths which overturn Brahminism, and therefore it is right that they should teach moral truths which lay a basis for purer religion.' There is something terrible in the fact that, at this moment, when heathenism is showing us what it is, our authorities are actually expunging from school books such sentences as, 'God is a Spirit;' showing not only their cowardice, but their ignorance; for that is a sentence which every Brahmin in India would call beautiful. The day for such trading in creeds and principles is past: either let us keep out of education entirely, or be honest, and teach what we believe to those who are willing to be instructed. We should deprecate active interference, on the part of the Government, to procure conversions; but why dread them, show a jealousy, and discourage them in every way short of actual persecution? This has been our craven policy, and has hindered many from becoming Christians. Had Sepoys, clerks, and all classes been assured of protection, every regiment and every public office might now have contained Christians, who would have felt their interest one with ours, and been ready to discover any plot.

We plead then for an English, an eminently English policy; tolerant, liberal, free; but frank and courageous, as becomes our honour, our valour, and our Christianity. With the noble institutions which have blessed ourselves, let us confront all opposition; and the people who would begin new courses of agitation at any sign of double-dealing, will respect, obey, and soon imitate us, when they see that we are true to ourselves, and resolved to be so. There must be no receding from one step taken in advance, no sop to mutiny, no shred of pretence for

any future conspirator to argue that murders will make Englishmen give way. Even if, after long years of experiment, it should prove that measures having some complexion of Christianity had better be repealed, (which time will never show,) it would be madness to think of retracing any steps now.

With an English policy we must have an English force. We are not prepared to say that a native army can be altogether dispensed with, although Colonel Macdonald's arguments to that effect have been left unanswered, by those who have written on the other side. But this we say without the shadow of a doubt, that, with railways completed throughout India, the country would be far more secure with 80,000 European troops than it was without railways with all the Sepoy hordes. There may be Sepoys still; but let them be few; money will be better spent in making roads. Lord Stanley's proposal of quickly constructed and cheap lines struck us, at the time it was made, as one of the best ever brought forward; and how much has all that has since transpired confirmed this view! It is to be hoped that his Lordship will return to this practical suggestion in great earnest when Parliament next meets.

With English troops we also want to see English settlers. Among the many errors of the East India Company, not one of the least has been its blind adherence to a policy which discouraged British independent enterprise in the country. This jealousy began in the days of trading, when the Company's servants wanted all the field for fortune-making to themselves. But it has retained a pertinacious and baneful vitality. Rather than encourage the influx of British capital, energy, and loyalty, they have fostered the opium trade, the most accursed commerce, after the Slave Trade, which ever disgraced a nominally Christian Government. We do not expect that the discouragement of settlers will end till Leadenhall Street is ended; for there the 'covenanted service' is sacred as Brahmins in Benares. For that service we have high regard; many of its members are among the best of men, and most valuable of officers; but the present events have shown of what value planters are in a time of difficulty; and had the independent British residents counted by hundreds instead of by tens, many a centre of information and influence, many a refuge and defence, would have been provided in the day of danger. Few as they were, some of the planters did the Government great service.

The petition of the British inhabitants of Calcutta falls with terrible effect on the men in power there. We reluctantly join

any cry against those who, at a great crisis, are charged with overwhelming responsibility. We give the members of Lord Canning's Council credit for doing all of which they are capable; but our own impression of their incompetence and want of principle is painful. His Lordship is surrounded by very little men, and has proved incapable of rising above them. We cordially wish to see the Queen assume the reins of power over all the empire.

Looking at the disasters which have befallen us, we may both console ourselves that they were not merited from the people, and at the same time feel that they are not unmerited from the God of our nation. Judging ourselves by Hindu standards, the people owed us nothing but gratitude. We have ruled them better than they ever were ruled; given them for the first time repose, security, and freedom; and brought into their country improvements which no other Asiatic race have yet received. But judging ourselves by Christian standards, we must not wonder that chastisements have overtaken us. If our women have been disgraced, how many of those of India have our officers and troops dishonoured! Have we not on that soil permitted wholesale murders of widows and of old men, under pretext of religion? and though we interposed, at last, on behalf of the former, the ghaut murders of the Ganges—that Ganges which ran red at Cawnpore with English blood—still continue. Have we not *introduced* licensed drinking-houses, to debauch the people, for profit? Have we not fed on the odious opium revenue? Have we not trafficked in prostitution and the obscenest idolatry by our temple subsidies? Have we not steadfastly befriended Heathenism and Mohammedism, and yielded to Christianity the commonest liberties only inch by inch, as it was necessitated by public opinion? Have we not shut out, as far as possible, the name and fear of God from our schools and Sepoys, and placed our confidence in opposing His Gospel?

The Christian people of England must hear a call to awake in the chastisements which have smitten us so sorely. Men whose thoughts go no higher than secular interests will naturally incline to their old courses of petting superstition, of dreading light and truth. But those who believe in a Ruler who smiles on goodness, and bids light speed with His blessing, will see in the new disclosures, now made, of heathen hearts, strong reason for more exertion to mollify them with the Gospel; and in the disasters of a Government carefully non-Christian, a loud

proclamation, that, to secure God's protection, we must fulfil His mission, and enlighten the land committed to our care.

We look steadily into the future. The trial long past, the new order established, and what then? Our comfort is that the destiny of India will be hastened by this awful providence. When a great work is to be accomplished for which mere human measures are hopelessly inadequate, the Almighty is wont to interpose by extraordinary means,—by means which man could not conceive and dare not execute; from which we first shrink in terror before we bow to them in gratitude. Perhaps it is so in the case of this terrible visitation. Mercy not only 'seasons justice,' but inspires it. Nothing less than a sword to 'go through the land' will plough up the field for the reception of humanizing and immortal truths. Nothing but a social earthquake could break up that system of consolidated wrongs which we call India. The curse of its native rule was the twofold curse of idolatry and oppression; it has groaned for ages under the tyranny of 'gods many and lords many.' And now that we are about more thoroughly to supersede the rapacious and cruel rule of its chiefs, it will behove us to put to shame its foolish and obscene 'divinities' by the exhibition of a purer worship. If we take the country and its people for our beloved Queen, shall we not put both it and them under the protection of the same true God? It is only as we are faithful henceforth to the spirit of our own institutions, civil and religious, that we may profit by this dreadful lesson, and hope to see the slow but steady light of prosperity advance above the plains and heights of Hindustan.

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INDIA DEBATE.

SPEECH

OF

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL,

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

MAY 14, 1858,

IN OPPOSITION TO MR. CARDWELL'S MOTION.

(*Reprinted from the* "TIMES.")

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SPEECH

OF

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

In the House of Commons,

MAY 14, 1858.

THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL rose and said,—I was at a loss, Sir, when I first read the resolution which the right hon. gentleman opposite has put into your hands, to understand whether its object was to defend, however indirectly, the policy of Lord Canning; or to promote those military operations in India the opposition to which the right hon. gentleman seems to think the conduct of the Government is calculated to prolong; or, lastly, to facilitate those operations in this country against the Treasury bench, the opposition to which the right hon. gentleman thinks has already been prolonged too much. (Loud cheers.) I confess that, after listening to the speech of the right hon. gentleman, I have come to the conclusion that it is neither the first nor the second of the objects to which I have adverted that he desires to carry into effect. (Renewed cheers.) The third object which I have mentioned is one, indeed, which is perfectly legitimate, and the furtherance of it I am ready to admit has fallen into no unskilful hands. The right hon. gentleman must, however, bear in mind that even in an assault upon a Ministry there are rules of strife which call upon

you boldly and manfully to state and to prove your case (hear, hear), and from those rules, as I think I shall be able to show the House, the right hon gentleman has widely departed. (Hear.) I must ask the House to observe that the resolution of the right hon. gentleman constitutes what is called a complex proposition. It must be resolved into its parts, and those parts are three. The right hon. gentleman in the first place asks the House to pass no opinion upon the policy of the proclamation which was issued by Lord Canning. (Hear, hear.) In the second place he seeks to censure the Government for having expressed an opinion upon that proclamation; and in the third place to condemn their conduct for having, as he alleges, published the despatch in which their adverse opinion was conveyed. Now, I maintain that if the House accepts the first part of this complex proposition, and avoids expressing any opinion as to the policy of Lord Canning's proclamation, it is impossible it can approach the consideration of that censure which the right hon. gentleman wishes it to pronounce. (Cheers.) It is impossible, with any degree of justice, to come to a decision upon the expediency of the condemnation unless you take into account the merits of that which is condemned. (Renewed cheers.) I therefore accept the terms in which the resolution of the right hon. gentleman is couched as a proof of the weakness of his case (hear, hear, hear). He is afraid to challenge the verdict of the House of Commons upon the policy of the proclamation. (Loud cheers.) I decline, however, to accept the form of the resolution, where it narrows and limits the issue which we are to try—I decline, at the instance of the right hon. gentleman, to look at an act of the Government and to shut my eyes to the occurrences by which that act has been produced. (Hear, hear.) I am quite

prepared to meet the right hon. gentleman in any discussion which he may feel disposed to raise as to the conduct of the Government, but in doing so I claim the right of taking into consideration the justice and the policy of the proclamation of Lord Canning. (Cheers.) Now, Sir, a judgment derived from that proclamation may be formed by having recourse to a very trite dilemma. It is either right or it is wrong. If it be right—if the principles which it enunciates are principles just and politic, the Government, beyond all doubt, was wrong in censuring it at all, and still more wrong in making that censure public. But if, upon the other hand, the principles which are embodied in that proclamation are neither consistent with justice nor in conformity with sound policy, then I challenge the right hon. gentleman to show upon what grounds he calls upon the House to censure the condemnation of that which in itself is contrary to justice? (Cheers.) Now, let me ask to whom was this proclamation intended to be addressed? Not to the Sepoys of India. (Hear, hear.) They were mutineers in the strictest sense of the word. They had eaten our bread and received our pay. They were our sworn subjects, bound to us by every tie of allegiance and fidelity. They threw off that allegiance and rebelled. To their rebellion they added treachery, murder, cold-blooded and deliberate cruelty. They were—or, at all events, many of them were—persons whose hands were stained by crimes of the deepest dye. Under these circumstances their lives and property were sacrificed by their crimes. But it was not to them, but to the King and people of Oude, this proclamation of Lord Canning was addressed. (Cheers.) What says Mr. Edmonstone, the secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Oude? He says, "The proclamation is addressed to the chiefs and inhabitants of Oude, and not to mutineers." (Hear, hear.) But what was this kingdom of Oude? Our relations with it were

relations of conquest, and not of allegiance. (Hear, hear.) I know it has been said that Oude had voluntarily become incorporated with our dominions—that its people had willingly come into our allegiance—and that the hostilities in Oude were rebellion and not war. Sir, these assertions I deny; and my denial is capable of easy proof. I do not now desire to enter into the merits of the question of the annexation of that kingdom. That is a question which never has been, and in all probability never will be discussed in this House as fully as it might deserve. In speaking of the subject, I will only say that the strongest feeling with which I always rise from the perusal of the papers connected with it, and I have read them more than once, is, that history may be as lenient to us in regard to that transaction as we have been to ourselves. (Cheers). But, without opening up that large question, I shall take only those facts about which there can be no dispute. In the year 1856 the treaty which the East India Company asserted was the treaty regulating our relations with the King of Oude, was a treaty made in 1801—contained a clause guaranteeing to the Vizier, his heirs and successors, the possession of their territories, together with the free exercise of their authority within their dominions. In the year 1856, however, the East India Company considered that the kingdom of Oude was misgoverned, and contended that misgovernment conferred upon them the right to annex that territory to our possessions in India. How did they carry that right into effect? Substantially by means of conquest. A commissioner was sent to Oude. A body of British troops crossed the Ganges. A treaty was presented to the King, which he refused to sign, and he was consequently dethroned, his palace taken, his property sold, and his Ministers either made prisoners or held to bail. I do not ask whether all this was justified or not. I will assume that it was justified. But I still

confidently ask whether the case of Oude was one of voluntary submission or of simple conquest? (Hear, hear.) My answer to the question is, that our relations with Oude were relations of conquest. (Hear, hear.) All that was done there was done under protest, and that protest continued until the Sepoy revolt broke out. The people of Oude, taking advantage of that rebellion, made war against England; bloody, I admit, crime stained, unrelenting war; but still war. (Hear.) By the valour of our troops, poured into the country—by the skill and energy of our Commander-in-chief—and, I cheerfully and gratefully add, by the skill and energy of Lord Canning—by the heroism, almost unparalleled, of small handfuls of men—aye, and women—who had to hold their position in the country until our troops arrived—we have achieved a decisive, and, I trust, a lasting victory. (Hear, hear.) But, now that we are victorious, let me ask what is the policy which, as victors, we ought to pursue? I am prepared to declare what that policy should be upon the broad grounds of justice; but first let me examine the question upon the narrower grounds of prudence and self-interest. Do you mean to hold Oude? If so, how do you propose to effect that object? Is it by the aid of a standing army? (Cheers.) You may achieve your end in that way, but its attainment will cost you dear. (Cheers.) Do you desire the willing and cheerful submission of the people of Oude? How can you procure that submission? (Hear.) Is it not an important element in the question to gain the good will of the landowners of that country? (Hear, hear.) A child could answer that question. (Cheers.) Which of two things do you do, let me ask—provoke hostility, or do you bring about submission by taking from them that which they hold dearer than their lives? (Cheers.) Let us go a step further. Do you desire to put down the mutiny of the Sepoys? Of course you do. Then it follows

naturally that you must also desire to prevent the Sepoys from taking refuge and obtaining support in neighbouring States. Where is it most likely that they would obtain that support which would enable them again to make head against us? In the kingdom of Oude. If we have the people of Oude in our favour, they will assist us in beating down and delivering up those Sepoys who may take refuge in their country; but if you alienate the feelings of that people, the consequence is easy to foresee. You will throw them into the arms of the Sepoys; they will combine with the Sepoys, and you will have in that distant and separate territory to crush and to subdue, not merely the natives of the territory, but also the Sepoys, who will certainly assemble there. (Hear, hear.) Therefore I say, upon the lowest ground of self-interest and policy, it is for the advantage of this country to conciliate the affections of the people of Oude. But I desire to rest the case on broader grounds than these. Whatever other nations may do, England ought not to retrograde from those laws of war which civilisation has introduced. (Cheers.) How, then, upon the principles of justice and the practice of civilised nations, which this country is bound to observe, ought we to treat the property of a conquered people? My proposition is this—you make war with Kings and Governments, but not with individuals. (Hear, hear.) If, in the course of war, individuals commit crimes, they put themselves beyond the pale of that rule; but, except as to such cases, every individual is entitled to protection for his life and property from the victorious nation. (Hear, hear.) You might as well confiscate the lives of the conquered as their property. (Loud cheers.) Well, are there authorities or precedents upon this point? I am almost ashamed to ask the House to listen to the opinion of authorities upon a question so elementary. But let me read to you what the greatest civilian of the last century—Vattel—says. The Swiss civilian says:—

"But if the entire State be conquered, if the nation be subdued, in what manner can the victor treat it without trangressing the bounds of justice? What are his rights over the conquered country? Some have dared to advance this monstrous principle, that the conqueror is absolute master of his conquest—that he may dispose of it as his property—that he may treat it as he pleases, according to the common expression of treating a State as a conquered country; and hence they derive one of the sources of despotic government. But, disregarding such writers, who reduce men to the state of transferable goods or beasts of burden, who deliver them up as the property or patrimony of another man, let us argue on the principles countenanced by reason and conformable to humanity."

Those are the words of a writer 100 years ago. I will now quote you the opinion of a distinguished writer of modern times. Dr. Wheaton says:—

"In ancient times, both the movable and unmovable property of the vanquished passed to the conqueror. Such was the Roman law of war, often asserted with unrelenting severity, and such was the fate of the Roman provinces subdued by the northern barbarians on the decline and fall of the Western Empire. A large portion, from one to two thirds, of the lands belonging to the vanquished provincials was confiscated and partitioned among their conquerors. The last example in Europe of such a conquest was that of England by William of Normandy. (Hear.) Since that period, among the civilised nations of Christendom, conquest, even when confirmed by a treaty of peace, has been followed by no general or partial transmutation of landed property. (Hear, hear.) The property belonging to the Government of the vanquished nation passes to the victorious state, which also takes the place of the former Sovereign in respect to the eminent domain. In other respects private rights are unaffected by conquest."

(Hear.) Sir, this is a question upon which the practice and views of other countries are also worthy of our attention. The House is aware that, in the United States, questions affecting the law of nations frequently come before the Supreme Court, and that Court is one from which we derive the most valuable information concerning national and international law. That court, then, has said this:—

"The modern usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated, that sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilised world would be outraged, if private property should be generally confiscated and private rights annulled. The people

change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to each other and their rights of property remain undisturbed."

The hon. and learned member for Cork has given us his views upon this subject. He has told us that, whatever might be the principle, we had precedents, and precedents, too, in relation to India, from which Lord Canning had not departed. I deny that position, and I think I will soon justify my denial. The hon. and learned member read us a proclamation of Lord Dalhousie. What did that proclamation state? Lord Dalhousie said, "If you, the zemindars and landowners, come in and submit to the new Government your rights to all your lands shall be protected." (Hear, hear.) Sir, if Lord Canning had said this, I should have found no fault with his proclamation. (Cheers.) But, says the hon. and learned gentleman, Sir C. Napier did not follow that rule. Now, we have a history of what was done by Sir C. Napier, and what does his brother say:—

"While his cannon still resounded on the banks of the Indus, he had made known that all persons, whether of high or low degree, were confirmed from the time, and would be so permanently, according to their behaviour" (ironical cheers from the Opposition)—would be confirmed in what? "In the employments they held under the Ameers (cheers and laughter); and that all the rights and possessions would"—there is no behaviour here—"be safe from confiscation, save those of the people who, contrary to the faith of nations, had assailed the residency."

Well, but, says the hon. and learned member, at all events the people of Oude were not entitled to the rights of war and conquest. Those rights were out of the question for them. They were rebels; they were mutineers; and any man connected with the Government of this country or of India who should hint that they were anything but rebels and mutineers is false to his country and a traitor to the interests of Great Britain. Now, whom would the hon. and learned member accept as a judge of the condition of the people of

Oude? Will he take the Directors of the East India Company? Certainly they have not combined to state the case of the people of Oude more favourably for that people than was absolutely necessary, but there has been placed upon the table of the House to-night, and will be in the hands of members to-morrow, a despatch from the Court of Directors to the Governor-General, dated the 5th of this month, from which I will read two paragraphs which contain the views of the Court of Directors as to the position of the people of Oude. Let the House remember that the hon. and learned member for Cork says the people of Oude are rebels—it is not fair war they are waging, but it is mutiny and rebellion. Now, what says the Court of Directors? "In dealing with the people of Oude you will doubtless be moved by special considerations of justice and of policy. Throughout the recent contest we have ever regarded such of the inhabitants of that country as, not being Sepoys or pensioners of our own army, have been in arms against us, as an exceptional class. (Hear, hear.) They cannot be considered as traitors nor even as rebels (hear, hear), for they have not pledged their fidelity to us, and they had scarcely become our subjects. (Loud cheers.) Many, by the introduction of a new system of Government, had necessarily been deprived of the maintenance which they had lately enjoyed, and others feared that the speedy loss of their means of subsistence would follow from the same cause." That was treason when Lord Ellenborough suggested it. (Cheers.) "It was natural that such persons should avail themselves of the opportunity presented by the distracted state of the country to strike a blow for the restoration of that native rule under which the permitted disorganisation of the country had been so long to them a source of unlawful profit." (Hear, hear.) When an excuse was made for the rising in arms of the people of Oude in a

despatch it is attacked by this resolution, and we are told it was a betrayal of the interests of the country; but what is it when the Court of Directors speaks of it? (Hear, hear.) "Neither the disbanded soldiers of the late native Government nor the great talookdars and other retainers were under any obligation of fidelity to our Government for benefits conferred upon them. (Hear, hear.) You would be justified therefore in dealing with them as you would with a foreign enemy (hear, hear), and in ceasing to consider them objects of punishment after they have once laid down their arms." (Hear, hear.) That is one paragraph of the despatch. I am fearful of wearying the house (loud cheers); but there is another paragraph which I would wish to read:—

"Of these arms they must be for ever deprived. You will doubtless, in prosecution of this object, address yourself in the first instance to the case of the great talookdars, who so successfully defied the late Government, and many of whom, with large bodies of armed men, appear to have aided the efforts of the mutinous soldiery of the Bengal army. The destruction of the fortified strongholds of these powerful landowners, the forfeiture of their remaining guns, the disarming and disbanding of their followers, will be among your first works. But while you are depriving this influential and once dangerous class of people of their power of openly resisting your authority, you will, we have no doubt, exert yourselves by every possible means to reconcile them to British rule, and encourage them, by liberal arrangements made in accordance with ancient usages (hear, hear), to become industrious agriculturists, and to employ in the cultivation of the soil the men who, as armed retainers, have so long wasted the substance of their masters and desolated the land. We believe that these landholders may be taught that their holdings will be more profitable to them under a strong Government, capable of maintaining the peace of the country, and severely punishing agrarian outrages, than under one which perpetually invites by its weakness the ruinous arbitration of the sword."

I say that that is a statesmanlike and manly despatch. It meets the case fairly, and it tells the truth. These men in Oude were not rebels, and it would be injustice to deal with them as rebels. The Court of Directors say, provided only

they lay down their arms and become peaceable subjects, the holding of their lands shall not be disturbed. I put it to the House to say which is the truer description, which is the wiser and the juster policy. (Cheers.) I have heard it asked what could Lord Canning have done. Could he say to men who were in arms that he would preserve to them intact their rights of property? I say, No. He should have said what Lord Dalhousie said,—"If you lay down your arms, and become peaceable subjects, promising allegiance to our rule, it is not with you we have made war, and you are safe." And if the proclamation had been couched in language of that kind, I venture to think no Government could have objected to it. But the hon. and learned gentleman the member for Cork county, who seconded this motion, has suggested a theory with regard to this proclamation which I cannot pass over. He says it is altogether a mistake to suppose that this proclamation is addressed to the people of Oude, or that it interferes with what we call the rights of property. It is, in truth, he says, merely dealing with high and abstruse feudal and baronial rights, which have been a great curse to the country. But suppose it were true that the proclamation only meddled with "feudal and baronial rights," I want to know from the right hon. gentleman what difference he makes between a feudal right and any other species of right (hear, hear, hear). He may think it an injurious thing to the country; but if it is a right of property, owned by the people of the country, high or low, I desire to know whether he can justify confiscation of that as distinguished from the confiscation of any other kind of property. (Cheers.) The supposition, however, that this proclamation meddles only with "feudal and baronial rights," is entirely without foundation. There is no shadow of a pretence for such a theory. To whom is it addressed? Is it to the talookdars and chiefs

alone? On the contrary, it is addressed to the landowners of Oude. Moreover, what is to be confiscated? Why, "the proprietary right in the soil of the province." But what is "the proprietary right in the soil?" Why, sir, it is the right of property in the soil. (Cheers.) It includes the right of the tenant, of the farmer, of the middleman, and of the owner of the land. It includes all; the whole is confiscated; and I challenge the right hon. gentleman to point out one single word in this proclamation which spares to any man, except the six persons mentioned in it, any sort of right or any sort of property. (Cheers.) Well, Sir, I now come to that part of the motion which censures the condemnation by the Government of the policy of this proclamation. What are the facts as to this? There comes home the draught of a proclamation which Lord Canning said he was about to issue as soon as the troops were in possession of Lucknow. It comes home without the modifying clause in it to which reference has been made, and it comes home without explanation. It was accompanied, so far as the Board of Control was concerned, with nothing but a letter from the Secretary to the Government of India at Calcutta to the Chief Commissioner of Oude. Let us consider for a moment what are the functions of the Home Government with regard to India. It has been said during the debate that the Government has paralysed the arm of the Governor-General. The Governor-General sends important information to the Government at home on a question of great interest. Is the Home Government to pronounce an opinion on that question, or is it not? (Cheers.) If the Home Government is to give no opinion, the right hon. gentleman may be right; but if the Government is to give an opinion, I say, I, for one, should have been ashamed to be connected with any Government which allowed a single mail to pass after a proclamation of this kind had been received without writing to

the Governor-General, and stating explicitly and distinctly their views in regard to the policy contained in it. (Cheers.) This was a question on which not a moment was to be lost. There was no time for any sensitive shrinking from wounding the feelings of the Governor-General. (Hear, hear.) I respect Lord Canning as much as any man in this House. Lord Canning is one whose kind and considerate nature, and whose upright and simple mind are such, that no person who has, however distantly, been an observer of them, can have any other feelings towards him than those of profound respect and considerable admiration (hear, hear). But in a question on which the fate of India hangs, all these merely personal feelings must be put aside (cheers). This is a part of the case with which the right hon. gentleman has not grappled. Was the proclamation right, or was it wrong? If the proclamation was right, the censure was wrong; and if the proclamation was wrong, the censure was right. I care not who the Governor-General was, or what his past services may have been. I say here was a case in which a specific act was proposed to the Home Government; it was their duty to express an opinion upon that act. They have expressed an opinion upon it, and I think they have expressed it rightly (hear). I come now to the third and the smallest part of the resolution—namely, the publication of the despatch. On that part of the case my views shall be shortly and distinctly stated. I hold that it was the duty of any Government—the proclamation having been published and become known in England—to express, in some form or other, their views of the policy contained in that proclamation, whether it was right or whether it was wrong (hear, hear). I repeat, it was wholly impossible for any Government—the proclamation having once been made public—to refuse to declare the views they entertained in respect to the policy propounded in it. (Cheers.) This was not a question of foreign negotiation or diplomatic corre-

spondence, in which a Minister might say it would be inconsistent with the public advantage to reveal the different stages of a transaction which was still pending. This was a transaction completed and done (hear, hear). The proclamation was out, the House of Commons was assembled, the Ministers were in their places, and were called on to say, aye or no—"Do you approve of the policy contained in that proclamation, or do you not?" (Hear, hear.) The right hon. gentleman is mistaken in some of the facts which he has stated to the House—inadvertently, no doubt, but unfortunately for the argument he has endeavoured to sustain. He has stated, for example, that the right hon. gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer disapproved wholly of the policy of Lord Canning. Now, my right hon. friend never said anything of the kind. (Cheers.) The hon. member for Birmingham put this question to the Government —"A proclamation has been issued confiscating the property of the kingdom of Oude; does the Government approve that proclamation or not?" My right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in reply, the Government disapproves of the confiscation of the property of Oude—that is to say, of the policy indicated in the proclamation of Lord Canning—"in every sense." (Cheers.) I hope I may say on behalf of the Government that they disapprove of that confiscation still "in every sense." (Cheers.) There are only two senses in which it can be approved or disapproved, and these are the sense of justice and the sense of expediency (hear, hear). In both of these senses my right hon. friend stated that he disapproved that part of Lord Canning's policy, and that alone (hear). In both of these senses the Government disapprove his policy, and I trust the house will affirm their decision (hear, hear). But the right hon. gentleman opposite says that in addition to the answer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer there is the publication of the

despatch, and that notwithstanding the resignation of Lord Ellenborough the whole Government is responsible for that act (hear, hear). Now, what are the facts with reference to the publication of the letter? The noble earl (Lord Ellenborough), with that frankness and high honour that are not the least characteristics of his nature, declared in the House of Lords what the facts were. The noble earl in the other House and the Secretary of the Board of Control, by his directions in this House, promised in his place to lay on the table of the House of Commons the despatch sent to Lord Canning in consequence of the proclamation. In the other House, another noble earl, a personal friend of Lord Canning, with eager, although, perhaps, justifiable haste, almost the moment after the promise was made, applied to the noble earl (Lord Ellenborough) for a copy of the despatch, and the noble earl, yielding to the entreaty addressed to him, consented to do so. The noble earl, at the same time, with a regard to fair dealing and impartiality—of which, I trust, this House will not disapprove—thought it his duty also to send a copy of the despatch to the member of this house who had put the question on the subject to my right hon. friend, with the view of giving to him the same advantage and facility for considering the dispatch that he had given to the noble lord in another place (hear, hear). Observe, that was done before any one of the members of the Government was consulted on the subject. (Hear, hear.) These two copies of the despatch were thus, in point of fact, made public. (Hear, hear.) They were in possession of individuals not bound to secresy, and the moment the despatch came into their hands they became to all intents and purposes public. (Hear, hear.) The noble earl, therefore was literally and strictly accurate when he said that the publication of the despatch was his act, and that no

other member of the Government was a party to it. (Hear, hear.) In other respects the right hon. gentleman who introduced this motion has not been quite correct. The right hon, gentleman, reproducing an old joke of my right hon. friend near me, which though a good one, is not in point at the present moment, asked if this was "a Government of limited liability," and proceeded to advert to what was done in the case of the Government of Lord Aberdeen. He said a member of Lord Aberdeen's Government resigned, but that notwithstanding this my right hon. friend the present Chancellor of the Exchequer said his resignation ought not to shelter the other members of the Government from responsibility. (Hear.) But is there the slightest resemblance or analogy between the present case and that which occurred in Lord Aberdeen's Government? (Hear, hear.) I do not desire to enter into the merits of that question; but I may observe that it had reference to a policy of years or months in matters in which every member of the Government was responsible for the policy pursued. Of course, when any member of the Government was loaded with the responsibility of that policy, it was in vain to say that when one member retired the whole responsibility incurred by the others was wiped away. (Hear, hear.) It was not a case in which the responsibility could be thrown upon one member of the Government only (hear, hear). But the present is the instance of a single and specific act, and the noble earl avows that on him lies the whole responsibility (hear, hear). He has said, "Alone I did it;" and the publication of the despatch being exclusively and solely his act, that noble earl considered it was for him to tender to Her Majesty his resignation, in order that the great merits of this case might be considered apart from the petty questions that have arisen out of that publication (hear). But then, the right hon. gentleman says, at all events I find the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the head of the Government contradicting each other, because the Chancellor of the Exchequer said in this House yesterday that the Cabinet, had they known of Lord Ellen-

borough's intended resignation, would have pressed him not to resign; while Lord Derby, in another House, said he felt bound to accept the noble earl's resignation. But is this the true state of the case? What Lord Derby said was, that Lord Ellenborough sent in his resignation to Her Majesty before he communicated his intention of resigning to his colleagues, and it was in vain, after he had done so—after his resignation was in the hands of Her Majesty —for his colleagues to discuss the question whether they would accept or decline that resignation (hear, hear). Why, the object of Lord Ellenborough was to prevent that very question being considered. If he had said to his colleagues, I desire to resign my office, as a matter of course they would have said, We decline to accept your resignation, and whatever responsibility you have incurred we will without hesitation share it with you (hear, hear). But when his resignation was in the hands of Her Majesty it was irrevocable; and it was in order that it might be irrevocable that Lord Ellenborough placed it in Her Majesty's hands before communicating with his colleagues. Therefore, looking at all the circumstances of the case, the House will see that the statement of Lord Derby and my right hon. friend on this subject were precisely and on all points alike. (Hear, hear.) But at all events, says the right hon. gentleman, your course ought to have been different with regard to Lord Canning. You ought, says the right hon. gentleman, to have recalled him; and the hon. member for Cork says, You should have either recalled him, or written him a despatch, requesting him to mitigate the severity of the proclamation in practice, and not addressed him in the terms which have been employed, Now, if the hon. gentleman would be good enough to go over the despatch he will find that the very thing he has suggested has been done, and that Lord Canning was recommended in the despatch to mitigate in practice the severity of his proclamation (hear). Then, as to the recall of Lord Canning, there were manifest reasons why that course could not have been taken, even if the Government had desired it. Had the

fall of Lucknow been delayed, the despatch would probably have reached Lord Canning in time to prevent the proclamation being issued at all; but there was every reason to believe that Lord Canning would on reflection and advice have seen good grounds of himself to modify the proclamation before it was published; and in point of fact a modification was, we believe, introduced into the proclamation before it was published. (Hear, hear.) I ask the House whether it was not a reasonable and proper ground of hope on the part of the Government in this country that with such men around Lord Canning as Sir J. Lawrence, Sir J. Outram, General Mansfield, and others who might be named—men well acquainted with Oude—he would have been induced to take the view which the Government hold on the subject, and would have been induced to reconsider the question of the proclamation? (Hear, hear.) But then the right hon. gentleman says, "Why did you not wait for an explanation?" and the hon. and learned gentleman asks the same question. They say, "Why were you so precipitate? Why did you not suppose that after a proclamation of this kind an explanation would be forthcoming?" Well, Sir, I think there is one circumstance, and one only, which might have led to some delay and postponement of the despatch sent out to Lord Canning. If Lord Canning had sent home to the President of the Board of Control a statement that if an explanation had not come with the proclamation, an explanation might shortly be expected (cheers), the publication, and probably the writing of that despatch, might well have been delayed. And I now approach a part of this subject which has, I own, filled me with painful surprise. We have had all the facts of the case from the right hon. gentleman the member for Northampton, and I must say that if there is one man in this House of whom Lord Canning has reason to complain (loud and continued cheering), it is the colleague and friend of Lord Canning, the right hon. gentleman the member for Northampton. (Continued cheers.) What was the statement that Lord Canning made to that right hon. gentle-

man? I believe I remember the words. The right hon. gentleman told us that Lord Canning sent him a letter, in which he said, "I am about to issue a proclamation to the landholders of Oude. I am anxious to send home a full explanation, but I have been so occupied that I have hitherto been unable to do so." Now, that implied that such an explanation would come by the next mail. What was the meaning of this passage? It was very short, but very significant. It meant, "I am about to issue a proclamation, which will be sent home in draught, and sent to you. You are the President of the Board of Control. It is a proclamation requiring explanation. I have an explanation to give. I wished to give it by this mail, but give me credit—trust me—put confidence in me — and consider me as one who has got an explanation to give." (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman did not himself imagine —he cannot to this moment imagine—he wonders that any one should imagine—he does not believe that any one does imagine (a laugh) that these words of Lord Canning were, or could by any artifice be shewn to be, of the slightest importance (cheers and laughter), or that they ought to be made known to the head of the Government of India. But he did think them of sufficient importance to consult the noble lord the member for Tiverton (cheers), and he and the noble lord met in conclave on this despatch. Two ex-Ministers of England received a despatch from the Governor-General of India adverting to a State proclamation. They considered the statements that he made in that letter. The right hon. gentleman says he consulted the noble lord. [Mr. V. Smith: "I never said any such thing."] I am very sorry if I have misrepresented the right hon. gentleman. I thought he said he consulted the noble lord, but at all events, he said he showed or read the letter to the noble lord (Palmerston). Now I want to know for what purpose he showed it to the noble lord (cheers). It could not be from its importance, because the right hon. gentleman said it was of no importance (continued cheering). I hope the right

hon. gentleman will tell us during the course of this debate what his motive was for showing it to the noble lord (hear, hear). At present we have this singular fact, that the right hon. gentleman received a letter—a private letter, if you will, but addressed to those eyes that the draught of the proclamation was also addressed to—which the right hon. gentleman considered of so much importance that he showed it to the late Prime Minister, but which was not of sufficient importance to be shown to the President of the Board of Control (cheers). Now, Sir, I must say a word on the theory of private letters. As regards the heads of all the Government departments of the State, they must no doubt receive a great number of private letters from the colonies, from our dependencies, and our legations abroad from those with whom they are on intimate terms. These letters are not to be displayed to clerks, and they may be to a great extent private and confidential communications. If a letter of this kind contains a passage really relating to private affairs, it is not incumbent on the Minister who may have resigned office to hand it over to his successor, but it is incumbent upon him to extract from such a letter anything relating to public affairs which had been addressed to that Minister on the supposition that he continued to be the Minister (cheers). Whatever the right hon. gentleman and the noble lord arranged, it virtually comes to this, that they intercepted that letter. (Loud cheers). Well, Sir, what may be the observation of Lord Canning upon this matter I don't know, but if I were in his position, I think I should be inclined to say, "I had a friend, as I thought, one who "was formerly my colleague—he was president of a depart- "ment with which I held the closest relation—I wrote to "him a private letter, and sent him by the same mail "one of the most important State papers that I had ever "penned. I was so occupied that I could not send him "an explanation at the time, but in my private letter, "written to him because I thought he was the Minister "still, I said an explanation would come and might be looked "for—and my friend and late colleague put that letter in

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" his pocket—he dissevered the proclamation from the " explanation, and allowed day after day and week after " week to elapse and the Government to think that no " explanation would be given, and a dispatch was written " to me by the Government which grieved and pained me, " and for all this I have to thank my friend." Loud cheers). Sir, I have gone through the charges against the Government; they are reduced to the charge of writing and the charge of publishing the despatch. The charge for publishing it has fallen to the ground. The charge for writing it depends upon the higher and broader question of the policy of the proclamation. On this question, Sir, the right hon. gentleman and myself are at direct and positive issue. He appeals to the House to be silent—I appeal to you not to be silent (cheers). I appeal to you on behalf of your dearest interests in India—aye, and also at home. I appeal to you on behalf of 5,000,000 of men—a nation misguided, misgoverned, semi-barbarous, if you will, but still men, with like passions and feelings, perceptions and prejudices as yourselves. I appeal to you on behalf of humanity and justice. I make that appeal to the British House of Commons, to which an appeal on behalf of humanity and justice has never been made and made in vain (cheers). Don't let this go forth as a matter of doubt Don't treat this as a matter to be slurrred over by a captious and catching motion, prepared by a cabal (great cheering), to embarrass and displace a Ministry (continued cheering). Tell it out by your vote, and tell it, in terms neither vague nor indistinct, to the people of India that the war we wage is the war of nations, and not of freebooters (cheers) — that England knows how to make war and how to conquer, but that she also knows how to treat those who are conquered—and that she offers to those who submit to her arms that protection for their lives and property which will be the best earnest to them of the mildness of the rule which the fate of battles has assigned them. (Cheers.) Sir, if ever there was a time at which it was necessary that our policy with regard to India

should be clear and distinct, it is the present. We are upon the point of transferring the government of India from the Company to the Queen. In the course of the discussions in this House upon the subject of our past government of that country some confessions have been made which you may rely on it have not escaped the attention of the people of India. There was a confession made by the right hon. gentleman, the member for Radnor, which I heard, I must say, with respectful amazement. (Cheers.) The right hon. gentleman the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of the Crown who was advocating the Bill introduced into Parliament to transfer the government of India to the Queen, was speaking of the past government of that country. It is true he was speaking of the government prior to the year 1784, but at a time when not the most insignificant of our acquisitions in India were made. The right hon. gentleman (Sir G. C. Lewis) said:—

"I do most confidently maintain that no civilised Government ever existed on the face of this earth which was more corrupt, more perfidious, and more rapacious than the Government of the East India Company from the years 1765 to 1784."

Sir, in this sentiment I, for one, do not concur. But, at all events, let there be no mistake with respect to our future Government of India. Let us not be ashamed to tell the people of India that we offer them mercy and justice, and not spoliation; that we seek from them submission and allegiance, and not plunder; and that no faction and no intrigue will tempt the House of Commons, even for a moment, to leave it open to suspicion that the dynasty we are about to introduce into India is a dynasty of reckless, ruthless, indiscriminate confiscation. (Loud and continued cheers, which for a few moments prevented the next speaker obtaining a hearing.)

I. R. TAYLOR, PRINTER, 54, CHANCERY-LANE.

INDIA

ITS DANGERS CONSIDERED IN 1856,

Captain Eastwick.
late Bengal N.I.

BY A RETIRED OFFICER;

Colonel Adas

TOGETHER WITH SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE AMELIORATION

OF THE CONDITION

OF THAT COUNTRY AND ITS MILLIONS.

JERSEY:
JOSHUA COUTANCHE, GENERAL PRINTER, 45, HILL STREET,
NEAR SNOW HILL.
1858.

INTRODUCTION.

THE following letter was written in October, 1857, by a retired Indian Officer, who had long been employed politically under the Government General of India and Lord Metcalfe when Lieutenant-Governor of Agra, and addressed to a friend in office in England.

The writer considers the causes of the insurrection in India, as noted in his Memoranda of 1856, to have been the true source of that unhappy calamity, as has been evinced both by the circumstances of the insurrection itself, and the field over which it has spread with more or less intensity or partiality. Having been encouraged to give the letter some circulation, the writer now does so, with a few omissions, some verbal alterations, and the addition of a few recent notes; and with one only object, namely, at this critical juncture of a change in the Home Indian Government, and on the eve of the introduction, it may be hoped, of important improvements into our recovered provinces, to add his mite of suggestions towards producing a permanent state of peace, prosperity and happiness in that great country. The removal of the Delhi and Meerut districts from the trammels of the regulation system, is already a measure of much promise.

The gigantic task of governing India well will now

fall on the British nation, which can in no way shirk any of the vast responsibilities belonging to that duty. The debt of India, whether it shall decrease or increase, is only one of them, though it may be convenient at present to blink the fact. Had the Government remained with the East India Company, from which it has been wrenched piece by piece, or were the nation to govern India by the voice of the influential classes of its Indian subjects, there would be some truth, because there would be some honesty in the proposition, that Indian revenue alone is responsible for all things connected with the Indian Government. In such case, India would have some analogy with one of our Colonies managed by its Local Assembly under the Crown. But India, when subjected to the direct arbitary rule of the Crown, will become in fact only a large, though distant integral Province of the Empire ; and should its revenues fall off, the nation will find itself constrained to assist that Province with money. If there be a constant deficit, India will prove such a drag on the mother country as to endanger the solvency of the finances of both, especially should there occur at the same time any lengthened commotion in Europe. Too much attention cannot be given to this more than possible danger, and to the means of averting it. The writer has pointed out several ways of effecting permanent reductions in Indian expenditure, accompanied with measures calculated to attach the natives more and more to our rule, which has

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hitherto conferred many benefits on them and their country. But to these should be added, the opening up of all our Indian rivers to steam navigation; the cutting of canals, as well for navigation as for transport of merchandise; the construction of connecting tram and common roads, and of single cheap railway lines at the earliest possible time, as recommended by Colonel Cotton, of the Madras Engineers, as the true means of enriching the country and multiplying its traffic at the smallest outlay of money; leaving the highly expensive, but inadequate, main lines of high speed double rails, to creep on at their tortoise pace. Supposing the result to amount to a third of Colonel Cotton's estimates, the improvement to the country and its inhabitants would be marvellous, and could not fail to attach the people to our rule, while it would render the payment of a revenue sufficient for all purposes of government, a matter of but little difficulty. Till the revenue shall be improved, the Opium, and perhaps even the Salt, monopoly cannot be removed. Above all things let it be recollected at this moment, that it is not confidence in the opinion of our power alone that is to be restored, but that confidence of a higher character is to be created, namely, a conviction, from what they shall hereafter witness and experience, in the minds of one or two hundred millions of people, our subjects and allies, that England is governing them, *with them*, for their own great and manifest advantage.

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LETTER WRITTEN IN OCTOBER 1857.

I MENTIONED when I saw you lately, that I had committed to paper, last summer, my ideas on the subject of our late government of India, as tending to produce dissatisfaction and convulsion in our Indian empire. When I wrote I was not aware that Bibles* had been introduced into some of the Government schools, and that some of our officers even had attempted to convert our Sepoys and other native subjects. These injudicious movements must have added, doubtless, to the aggregate of causes of apprehension for their religious institutions by the natives, as their penetrating character could at once clearly distinguish between free Missionary labour and that which was connected with Government institutions and Government officers. The recent horrors in which we have been steeped, almost prevent the exercise of rational thought on the Indian revolt; but, after we shall have witnessed the turning point in our favour, and confidence begins to be restored in the distracted provinces, attention will be largely turned to the causes of the outburst of national feeling,† and to the best measures for securing us against any similar disaster hereafter.

* This is not to imply that Bibles may not be safely used among some tribes.

† From the circumstance of cultivation having flourished during the troubles of the revolt many have supposed that the people of the country have taken no share in it. But the cultivators of the soil have but this at heart, viz., to stick to their property and keep it as productive

You are thoroughly acquainted with our rule in India in all its branches, and have had close communication with its people of all grades; and with this knowledge, and that also of the great opportunities which I have had of acquiring a similar experience, I will give you an abstract of my notes of 1856, and shall add some further remarks, arising out of the present deplorable state of things—knowing that, if you can make any use of this communication, it will be a discreet one.

NOTES ON INDIA,

MADE IN THE SUMMER OF 1856.

It is impossible that confidence in our good faith should not have been shaken by the conquest of Scinde,* by our unpopular and imperfect settlement of the Punjaub after the first or Sutlij campaign,† by our taking Dhulleep Singh's country to ourselves

as possible, to the end that they may maintain their own families, and be prepared to pay the Government tax when demanded, always preferring that Government which takes least and protects them best. Such men do not take up arms against the state; nevertheless, in our N. W. Provinces, those who had lost their lands by judicial process, seem to have been generally reinstated in them by popular consent. 1858.

* Had Captain Outram not been unnecessarily superseded in his Political office in Scinde; and had Sir C. Wade firstly, and secondly Sir George Clerk, not been removed from Lahore, we should have had no Scinde campaign at all, and probably no Punjaub campaigns for a long time to come.

† Had Sir C. Wade's plan of settlement, which was based on national interests, been adopted, there had probably been no second war with the Sikhs.

—an act to which we were almost constrained by the force of events, which overset our rule in that minor chief's dominions, which we had undertaken to govern for him; and finally, by the quiet confiscation of Sattarah, Nagpoor and other minor states, on the plea of failure of heirs to their thrones. It is possible also, that strong under currents of feeling against us may have set in, by reason of our legislation which, latterly, seems to trench, negatively at least, upon native usages and rights.

To these causes of dissatisfaction with our rule must now be added the confiscation of the Empire of Oude.

As every new President of the Board of Control, and every new Governor General of India cannot be expected to take the same view of Indian affairs which their predecessors did, it is manifestly most important, not only that such a body as the Court of East India Directors should continue to exist, but that it should be composed of men of great Indian experience, industry, firmness and integrity, in order that it may ever act as a check on inexperience and be a sure guide to the just and safe conduct of our Indian affairs. Such a body would merit, by deserving it, the confidence of the public and obviate all most objectionable interference by Parliament in Indian questions of detail. But as we may not be able to secure the election of such a Court, now that the Government have six nominees in it, it becomes a serious question whether it would not be better that*

* Sir John Malcolm, in his correspondence with the late Lord Durham, strongly advocated (if I recollect rightly) publicity for our acts of Indian administration, in contradistinction to that publicity which would be given by the Press in ignorance of facts. And Lord Ashburton, on the 19th May, 1855, at the anniversary meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society,

publicity should be given to all proceedings of importance which are now conducted by the secret committee, in order that they might be openly discussed and commented upon, to the gradual instruction of the public in Indian affairs, in which they would doubtless learn to take an interest and, by the mere force of public opinion, save India in the end from the incalculable perils of rash and impolitic, legislation and rule.

Oriental peoples, though most sensitive on everything that touches their rights, are very personal in their feelings towards their rulers. This feeling can never be largely extended to us and to our cold regulation system ; every native state that is absorbed, therefore, must be considered to be an abstraction of so much cordial allegiance from the imperial rule of India. This must be viewed as a cause of eventual weakness ; and, when the means of absorption is questionable or unjust, must prove a source of dissatisfaction and danger. Of such a character were the annexations to our fisc of the principalities of Sattarah and Nagpoor on the plea of *lapses* from want of heirs. The right of adoption was never before questioned by us, or of any succession in the case of any native state with which our inter-

in his address, says "that, if at the time of the foundation of this society it was desirable that the people of England should be made conversant with the wants, wishes and feelings of their fellow subjects, it becomes ten times more imperative now, when an act has been passed, which must, step by step, reduce the Government of India to a pure despotism of ignorant men, unchecked by the voice of the governed, and answerable only to the control of public opinion in this country." Lord Ashburton then proceeds to show how the balance of power, so carefully established by Mr. Pitt, has been destroyed and how the Court, which had hitherto, *in very deed*, carried on the administration of India, was at this moment at the mercy of the minister of the day.

course was regulated by treaty, unless the act was likely to disturb the peace of the country. The principle was fully recognised that, a State is never without an heir, every State having a usage of its own for supplying the place of a direct heir failing. Our treaties gives us no right of regulating successions in Native States ;* and finally, had we in any instance doubted the right of any Principality to be enrolled amongst the substantive powers of India, the fact of our making a treaty with such Principality, would deprive us of the power of treating it otherwise than as a Foreign State,† whose relations with us were fixed by such treaty. Had there however, (which there is not,) been any doubt as to the construction of our treaties, the benefit of such doubt should have been given to the weaker party—a principle of politic generosity and justice ever advocated, and often acted upon by our former magnanimous authorities in India—and of itself constituting a host of moral strength to our Rule.‡

* Our most experienced Indian Diplomatist, General Low, has already stated the bold and honest opinions of the natives of Central India on this subject, in his minute against the annexation of Nagpoor. 1858.

† We have treated them as jaghier tenures.

‡ The admirable minutes of Sir G. R. Clerk, then Governor of Bombay, and of many of the East India Directors, which are contained in the Sattarah blue book, completely support this view of the question of succession. Adverse opinions, unhappily for our fame, carried the day, and inserted the sharp edge of the wedge which has, since then, been well driven home. Sir John Malcolm, when in Malwa, received from Sir R. Jenkins, then Resident at Nagpoor, some papers found among the records of the Rajah, when the capital was taken by our troops in 1818. In one was written, "The English made peace and took Gwalior." The incident referred to is historical, and this remark upon it shews how any questionable act of our Government was taken advantage of to incite to enmity against it.

Our ablest men have ever been of opinion that our good faith was the chief corner stone of our strength and that we should never be in so much danger as when, in the too probable course of events, we should have all India under our direct rule—a time when it would be but too probable that our native troops, from want of foreign foes, would act the part of Prætorian Bands, and turn their arms against their European Masters. If faith can be placed in these prophetic sentiments, the hurried and vast aggrandisement of our Eastern Empire within the last fifteen years, and its questionable causes, cannot but be a source of infinitely more alarm than satisfaction.

The recent policy of annexation involves, not only all the advantages and disadvantages of British rule, but, as regards Oude in particular, the dangers connected with having on our hands a considerable Mahomedan population who, all over India, brood over the loss of Empire and the decadence of their best families. The management of those Rajpoot Zemeendars and Chiefs too, from whose families and estates in Oude come most of the finest recruits who fill the ranks of the Bengal Army, will possibly prove a task of considerable delicacy: and upon this management may greatly depend the continued stanch fidelity of these fine troops to our Government. But, without doubting that a just system* of Gov-

* A system, particularly as regards the judicial administration, of a more simple and much more manageable kind than that of our old regulation provinces has been introduced. Our revenue management may augment cultivation and thereby cheapen the produce of the land: but it will be wise not to look for a greatly augmented money revenue after the demolition of an expensive Royal Court. Lord Ashburton, in his address to the Royal Asiatic Society, already quoted, says, "Suffice it therefore to say that every extension of our rule, every improvement

ernment will be established in Oude, an act of so extraordinary a character as the annexation to our fisc of that great and rich country, without a symptom or suspicion of disloyal feeling on the part of its Ruler towards the British authorities in India, surely demands our most serious consideration.

Let us consider the act then as regards its justice, necessity, or policy. Loans from Lucknow had proved most important to us in our difficulties, and the subsequent investments by its chiefs of large funds in the Company's Government Loans, evinced entire confidence in our integrity and proved their fidelity to our rule. In the House of Lords the Marquis of Clanricarde is answered by the Duke of Argyle, that our Treaty of 1837 with Oude was never confirmed by the Board of Control. By that Treaty we could have introduced new measures, such as temporarily occupying any portion of the Oude territory which the king might have allowed to fall into a state of permanent anarchy, paying into his treasury any surplus revenue that might accrue on our management of the same. On the strength of that Treaty too, we actually proceeded to organise a large and expensive contingent for the king, which the Home Government righteously disallowed. But if this was all that was done the Treaty was in no way abrogated, for a native power never looks beyond the Governor-General for the

of our administration, increases the produce to be sold by the secure and peaceful cultivator, while at the same moment the market for that produce is diminished by the dissolution of the Native Courts, by the impoverishment of the Gentry, and the disbandment of their retainers. Nay, the very blessing of cheaper and better ? clothing, the produce of our power looms, has aggravated the mischief by the ruin of whole districts of weavers, who have become in consequence producers, instead of purchasers, of food."

ratification of any deed ; and the full assent of the king of Oude was as much required for the cancelling, as for the making, of that Treaty. Now, no communication was ever made to the king on the subject, as now appears. The Treaty of 1837, therefore, was not abrogated.* By the provisions we were entitled to temporarily occupy and manage, for the king, any portion of his territory which was grossly misgoverned. This great power did not exist, of course, in the Treaty of 1801, or it would have been unnecessary to have had it conceded to us in 1837. The taking of the whole country of Oude to ourselves, therefore, not being sanctioned by the late Treaty, is still less so by the earlier one, though the latter did allow of our advice † being given to the king for the amelioration of his government, without attaching any penalty for its not being acted upon.

The justice of the act cannot, therefore, be supported.

As regards its Policy, some particulars have been noticed above, in relation to the Mahomedan population of India and to both that and the Hindoo population of Oude, as likely to affect the popularity of our rule. The Hindoo recruits from Oude have hitherto proved faithful to us : they cannot now be more so. The balance of Mahomedan feeling must be expected to be against us. The loss of

* Mr. J. M. Ludlow, in his able pamphlet entitled "The War in Oude," has shown that both Lord Hardinge and Sir James Outram had quoted that treaty to the King as a thing in force. 1858.

† This is one of the impolitic clauses of our Indian Treaties, though it by no means appears in many of them. Advice judiciously, and unobtrusively given, would have been much more likely to have been taken in the absence of an offensive clause in a Treaty.

high employment in the State and throughout the country of Oude by natives of rank and business, and the consequent decadence of their families, will be deeply and extensively felt, as will also the transfer of high and well paid appointments to European functionaries. The abstraction of all surplus revenue, to be hereafter applied to purposes of the general Government of India, cannot fail to be a cause of considerable impoverishment to the kingdom of Oude, within whose limits have hitherto been spent almost the whole of its revenues. These facts lead straightway to the belief that the act is an impolitic one, though high pensions have been assigned to the king, his nobles and many of the better families of Lucknow.

But the act has been stated to have been one of overpowering necessity. If that was the case, it was surely very unnecessary to quote a treaty* which did not sanction it. The doing so evinced a want of argument to establish the actual necessity of the proceeding. The necessity itself may be taken to be, the duty of the paramount power in India to do justice to a suffering people, to suppress dacoitee† (which is by no means confined to Oude), to abolish a dissolute court, and to restore to prosperity a large and naturally rich domain. Doubt-

* The treaty of 1801.

† Dacoitee, the general term for armed, or organised, gang robberies in India, is a system most difficult of detection, by reason of the secrecy with which these bands unite and separate previously to, and after, perpetrating the most fearful robberies, which are often accompanied with bloodshed. Departing individually from their homes, following different tracts, and meeting at a preconcerted distant point at a fixed hour, they proceed at once to act. They then separate in order to play the same part over again, or to return to their homes, assuming, when prudent or necessary, different kinds of disguise.

less there existed misrule in Oude, and doubtless it was most desirable to remove so great an evil; but let us consider, at the same time, both the effects of our government, and *the limits of its power to improve.* Gang robberies have long been complained of in our old established districts of Bengal, and the inefficient state of the Police there and measures for its improvement seem to have lately engrossed the attention of the Lieutenant-Governor of that Province. Nor is it long since many of our subjects in Bengal were exposed to be murdered and plundered by another portion of our own subjects, the Santals. We should, I apprehend, have applied hard terms to Oude* had similar scenes passed within its frontier; aye, or to any other native state. But supposing that we can protect our new subjects in person and property, it is a fact indisputable, that they have many modes of advocacy under a native government, and some also escape from the evils of over-taxation, which they cannot have under one of cold rigid regulation. When all these circumstances have been duly weighed, the fact of the indispensable necessity of annexing Oude to our Indian Empire cannot be considered to have been proved in the face of the power we had to assume its management.

The prompting motive,† it may be feared, was

* The late fanatical attack, by the Mahomedans, on the temple of Hunoman, was a thing which might have happened in any part of India where there exists a large and influential Mahomedan population. The Government of Oude acted, in the end, most vigorously and justly in suppression of the aggression in this instance; and we may deem it fortunate that so bitter a religious dispute was settled before we took the Government into our own hands.

† The late honourable Frederic Shore, foreseeing that we should one day take possession of Oude, sketched an excellent plan for the easy

the vision of a Million sterling in aid of our embarrassed finance, inasmuch as we could, on the strength of the Treaty of 1837, have established our own rule over any portion of the kingdom of Oude till we had tried and proved our powers to restore it to order,—employing for the purpose the best of the old revenue and other officers of the country, superintended by a few European functionaries of administrative experience and ability. We should thus have been able to inform ourselves of the true state of the country*, and of the feelings and worldly condition of the various classes of its inhabitants, preparatory to making over the charge again to the first king of Oude, in whose discretion we could have had sufficient confidence. This was once done with Nagpoor and answered: and the same thing may in time be done with Mysore, which is now admirably managed by General Sir M. Cubbon, of the Madras Army. And surely the rulers of Oude, who had ever been loyal to our government, who had often in trying exigencies assisted us with large loans of money, and who had lately aided in supporting our public credit by large investments of their private fortunes in our Indian public funds, deserved that we should have evinced towards

and popular rule of that country, to be conducted by natives acting under six British superintendants. Had such a plan been adopted, and the chiefs been liberally confirmed in their possessions, our rule would not have been unpopular.—Vide J. M. Ludlow's "War in Oude." 1858.

* The facility with which our officers appear to have made their first revenue settlements, proves the existence of system, and possibly of good revenue officers too, under the late Oude Government. The greatest blot in the administration was probably the peculation of public functionaries which intercepted large sums of money between the tax payer and the Royal treasury.

them, by the adoption of this milder and justifiable course, a sense of regard for their past loyal conduct.

For securing the future sound government of India, two things are indispensable ; viz. : a Home Government which understands its work, and Governors-General of India who will obey that Government. The chief attribute of a Governor-General of India ought to be *magnanimity !* Ample information of all kinds is to be found on the spot, but the generous and considerate administration of a magnanimous Ruler, can never fail to produce the good fruits of confidence in the minds of our Native allies and of properity to our own Indian subjects, while it secures on these accounts the co-operation and approval of the Government at Home. The present rapid, and prospective increasingly rapid communication between India and England, ought henceforth to guard the country against any precipitate action by any Governor-General of India. When that communication was very slow, however, our local authorities were prevented by Parliamentary interference from making war, or adding to our territories by foreign conquest. Some inconvenience was certainly experienced from a restriction, which would have been better adapted to our present circircumstances ; for, previously to the Pindarah campaign of 1817-18, hords of Pindaries had plundered the territories of our allies, and at last made an inroad into the Northern Division of the Madras Presidency. Nevertheless the system was broken up in one season's campaign, and the character of our Rule was but slightly damaged by the temporary proscription of war in

India.* Then followed the inevitable war with Ava in 1823. But this was a conflict extra gangem. By its duration and mode of operation it proved most expensive.

The invasion of Affghanistan was the next great Military expedition : it proved a most expensive mistake, and was as much the act of the Home as of the Indian Government. It involved questions which might have been settled by negotiation with Russia : the expenses, therefore, ought to have been borne in equal parts at least by India and England, whereas it is to be feared that the Indian Treasury has been charged with the whole. Out of the Affghan campaign came our conquest (though not necessarily) of Scinde, and very probably also our wars* with the Sikhs. The removal of tried political officers has been assumed to have influenced some of these great events ; and to this another element may be added, namely, the employment, in later times, of officers in political duties who had not been previously trained to them.

Considering now the magnitude of our present Eastern Empire, by whatever means acquired, and

* This retrospect is had for the sole purpose of shewing how little hurtful to our Indian interests was the former extreme jealousy entertained by the British public of our Indian rulers, at a period too when communication between the two countries was very slow, and when the British Power in India had not acquired that preponderating influence in the East which was given to it by the successful issue of the Campaign of 1817-18, and the many important political and territorial settlements which followed thereupon.

* The Sikhs, cognizant of our conduct towards Scinde, doubtless distrusted us, and crossed the Rubicon. They came to us, believing we were going to them. Nevertheless, the great and uncontrollable power of the Sikh army must have sooner or later involved us in the future destinies of the Punjaub.

the difficulties attending its satisfactory rule, without further risk of creating dissatisfaction and distrust amongst our allies and subjects, it is surely a question of paramount importance that we should enquire and decide upon what principles that vast government is to be conducted hereafter.

It is due, firstly, to our native allies,* that they should be satisfied that their relations with us ensure to them, their heirs and successors, for ever, their territorial possessions, excepting only in the case of proved disloyalty or open hostility† ; and we should add to their confidence in us by withdrawing any clauses from their treaties which have an obviously suspicious or otherwise offensive tendency. Our officers stationed at their Courts should have both temper and judgment, using the influence derived from their position, for good purposes, always in a mild and unobtrusive way, and conducting all their communications in a spirit of entire civility. Men possessing such tact would occasionally find, or be able to make, opportunities for introducing ameliorations into native states. Witness Colonel Ludlow's successful exertions in suppressing Suttee in Rajpootanah, and the many improvements‡ recently introduced at Holkar's Court, by means of the influence, during a minority, of the

* Native Chiefs.

† The clause in all their treaties which confines their correspondence with each other to private friendly intercourse, evinces distrust in their loyalty, and, as suggestive of intrigue, is very objectionable. It may be considered to be in the way too of the chiefs of Rajpootanah in particular, becoming useful advisers to us in questions regarding any of themselves, or any of their feudal nobles or territories. Our confidence would be evinced by the cancelling of the offensive clause.

‡ A reformed contingent excepted. December, 1857.

present Resident in Malwa, Sir R. Hamilton. Our Government, too, might stimulate the energies of the Native Chiefs and excite them to the pride of proper action through a sense of their true position, by employing their troops and contingents* on emergencies ; and perhaps, above all, whenever we have cause of dissatisfaction with any native power, in the removal whereof the advice or influence of other native powers might be useful, our Government might do well to explain the same to them by letter in order to show respect to, and confidence in, them. Such a course would obviate misconception and those misrepresentations which are sure to be made when we confine the details of our political acts to our own archives. But they fear to act in consultation, and must be useless to us as a consulting body so long as they are prevented by treaty from holding any public political communication with each other. At present native chiefs in India are, in relation to our Government, almost non-entities, while they must now labour under the dread of eventual confiscation, however well they may rule, however loyal they may unceasingly prove to the British Government. Our early system of imposing subsidiary forces upon Native Chiefs, and of inserting

* This does not apply to those whose contingents have been reformed by commuted money payment. The late Col. Sutherland, then Resident in Rajpootanah, reported the chiefs, with whose courts he conducted British diplomatic relations, to be both loyal and prepared to aid us with their forces at the time when our difficulties in Affghanistan began to thicken. This fine spirit of our native allies allowed of the withdrawal of most of our troops from Rajpootanah and the neighbourhood. It may be well here to notice the magnanimous act of the Governor-General, Lord Ellenborough, in recommending the reduction, by one half, of the too heavy Jyepoor tribute, payable to us by treaty, and which was accordingly done.

restrictive clauses in their treaties was one effect of a gradually expanding, but imperfectly founded empire; and was intended as much for the protection of some of these chiefs against others as for the direct advancement of our own interests. Such forces have not been imposed since their injurious effects were seen; and it may perhaps be to be lamented that both the Lucknow and Hyderabad subsidiary forces had not been withdrawn many years ago. The effects of the constant presence of a foreign though friendly force, have been so often shown to be destructive of independent Native Government, that they need no repetition here; and if the Nizam of the Deccan is not to follow the King of Lucknow, it is manifestly necessary that we should interpose to save him from a fate into which our policy has, however unintentionally, largely conduced to throw him and his fortunes. Circumstances must determine how such interposition should take place.* Considering, however, the independent armed bodies of Arabs and Pathans, who now constitute that Prince's army, we should do well to assist him efficiently in reducing the number of these mercenaries to a manageable amount. Let it be ever borne in mind, after what has happened, that we have to restore our Rule to the position which it once happily and honorably occupied in India, when "Good Faith" was the "chief corner stone" of our strength! Towards this great end, our just treatment of the

* The Nizam here spoken of having died, and his successor having acted with both firmness and stanch loyalty in the outbreak of the mutiny, we ought to find little difficulty in adjusting all debts and expenses with him, by restoring his Berar districts and placing him in the independent government of his own country. The heavy expenses laid on the Nizam ought to be considered in a settlement of accounts. 1858.

aboriginal, less civilized, tribes of India will essentially conduce. Mr. Cleaveland, of the Bengal Civil Service, led the way in pacifying these oppressed (though frequently predatory) tribes, who had been, ages before, driven into the wilds and hill-fastnesses of the country, by the Brahmin and Rajpoot invaders of India. He settled the Rajghur hill tribes. Sir John Malcolm always spoke of Mr. Cleaveland's proceedings as those of a master mind, guided by a deep knowledge of human nature, to the accomplishment of a great humane and political object; and contrasted them with failures elsewhere, of our attempts by coercive means alone to establish peace and order in mountain and jungle tracts. Sir John Malcolm, accordingly availed himself of his high position in central India after the campaign of 1817-18, to settle the affairs of all the Bheel, Semi-rajpoot and other wild tribes inhabiting the Vindhya range and throughout southern Malwa, with entire success. This course was followed up in the Deccan by Mr. Elphinstone with equal success. A different policy seems to have been adopted towards the Afreedees, trans-Indus, for a considerable time. But as they now seem to be tranquillized, we must hope that a course of policy will continue to be followed up towards them which shall ensure their future allegiance, inasmuch as the strong frontier tracts which they inhabit, must prove to our Indian Empire a source of weakness or of military strength, in proportion as those tracts are filled with tribes that are ill or well affected to us.

The world knows nothing of the disaffection of the Santals beyond what is conveyed to it by the public prints; and from them may be gathered, that

some change in the ancient mode of land assessment had taken place, requiring perhaps heavier payments to our treasury, and more surely throwing that simple people into the hands of the sharp Bengalee money lenders*. This is sad blundering on our part, if true. Being satisfied to ensure tranquillity in the wilds and fastnesses of India *at some expense* to our Government, the greatest caution should be used in making any change, even with the view of ameliorating the condition of their inhabitants; and this is the more necessary when a principle of taxation is involved. To render any such change safe the people must be satisfied of its benefits and ask for it themselves.

There is no question but that our Courts of Justice have excited and cherished in our native subjects a strong spirit of litigation, that they have been the cause of much perjury,† and by means of

* The sudden outbreak was headed by a fanatic, which accounts for the excesses committed. After long brooding over their ills and sufferings, the inhabitants of India, are prone to believe in any impostor who promises them aid from heaven, and this is the reason that their disaffection generally assumes the religious character, and causes so much uncontrollable excitement and cruelty.

† It is to be feared that the word of the most simple and truth telling people, the Gonds and Northern Hill Tribes, cannot now be depended upon, though their character for truthfulness had endured through countless ages and revolutions, before coming in contact with our formal and rigid system. Here may be noticed the pertinent question once put to the British Resident in Malwa, by Tantiah Jogue, Mulhar Rao Holkar's able minister, viz.: "Is it true that in your Adawlet Courts the word, on oath, of all deponents, is held to be of the same validity? Why? we all know there are tribes amongst us who never tell a lie, and others with whom the truth has no place." It is not difficult to perceive and to apply the drift of this question; and we well know, that the natives have a vast superiority over strangers in discriminating between false, doubtful, and trustworthy testimony, from the tone of voice, manner, or other peculiarity in which it may chance to be given by their own countrymen.

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uncared for oaths, done much injury both to morals and to property. "Our Adawlet Courts have," said Sir Thomas Munro, "reduced the great estates to small, and pounded the smaller into dust." The same great authority was of opinion that when a people was incapable of administering justice to itself, no foreign power could efficiently do so. Indeed, he found no difficulty in managing all the affairs of the ceded districts including, for some time, the judicial administration. When we ask ourselves the simple and obvious question "Who governed all India in the time of Akbar?" and when every officer of extensive general experience in Indian affairs, firmly pronounces the capacity of the natives to be admirable for affairs of government, we must naturally be at a loss to know why we have so little hitherto availed ourselves of this talent? Our Civil Services were long ago purified and placed on a high footing, by the payment of handsome salaries; but the same principle has only been carried out, to a limited extent, with our native servants. On the contrary, the high paid European functionary usually works with a low paid native agency; and while he cannot work without it, he frequently wonders why it is not always trustworthy! Such a system is naturally pregnant with corruption and fraud. It cannot well be otherwise: still we persist in it, ever calling out for more European Agency, which can of course only be extended to the repression of respectably paid native agency. If it is alleged that the servants of native States are not scrupulous about taking money in the course of their administration of justice, the fact rather proves that they

are sometimes the agents of a lax system than that they are incapable of rendering justice, or even that in the main, they do not often administer it fairly. Indeed, in respect to civil justice, most of the occurring disputes can be settled, under native governments, by means of the village and district hereditary authorities,* or by reference to arbitrators or a punchayent. The cure for the evils of perjury and damage to property by litigation, can only be found in having recourse to more simple modes of administering justice in our regulation Provinces, than those now in use. This could be effected by making the natives do more justice to themselves than they now do, *and by abolishing the ordinary oaths*, only administering oaths exceptionally, and then of a nature that the recipient *must fear to break.* Above all, the judicial procedure should be the most simple and entirely free from technicalities, while the natives employed should be well paid for their responsible duties.

In process of time the subject of taxation will have to be considered. When the Opium and Salt taxes shall be considerably diminished, the land will prove unequal to bearing the rest of the burthen. Such, however, may be expected to be the opposition to the introduction of new taxes, as well as the difficulty of apportioning and collecting them, that probably nothing short of Natives participating

* It appears that in Mysore, under General Sir Mark Cubben, punchayents are in general use in the administration of justice : and it is satisfactory to hear that in the Punjaub, a simple code has been successfully used, and which it is proposed to introduce into Oude also. Our system has unhappily gone far to paralyze these authorities, when it has not almost destroyed them ; and few things can be more hurtful to the liberties and just pride of a people, than the destruction of their ancient normal institutions of local self goverment.

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highly and extensively in our system of rule, is likely to ensure success in a change of such delicacy and importance. Sir Thos. Munro* made the merchants of the ceded districts assess themselves in detail upon the amount required from the whole body. In every change in India, it is indeed of the utmost importance to success, that those whose interests are involved in it, should as far as possible, have the regulation of the modus operandi.

It seems that legislation is about to touch the undertenures of land. This is a most dangerous ground to tread. There can be no doubt that, in early times, the land throughout India, belonged to its cultivators. Colonel Wilkes, in the 5th chapter, vol. I, of his History of Southern India, clearly and eloquently, proves the important fact ; and farther inquiries have gone to establish it practically, as yet generally existing, though the pressure† of the taxes on land has in later times, been so heavy as to lead to the ready and convenient conclusion, that rent as well as land tax was what Indian rulers and their Jaghierdars and Zemindars actually levied from the Ryots in right as well as too often in fact. In Mr. Elphinstone's report on the Deccan, too, is found the telling fact, that the fields in that quarter are found generally registered in the village records of old, as the property of individual Ryots, and that such property is saleable and is occasionally sold and

* Sir Thos., however, thought it was always safer to revive an old than institute a new tax in India.

† Successive conquests and changes of Government have led to this oppression of the landed proprietors in India, as a natural consequence of arbitrary rule and the increasing wants of military conquerors.

bought.* There is no subject that a native of India deems so important as that of land : none on which he is so sensitive : should any act of our Indian legislature tend to change the nature of its tenure, therefore, it will either prove inconsequential and inoperative, or it will be likely to excite a feeling against our rule of a very bitter kind.

The suppression of Suttee, which was a rite only partially observed, and supported, as now appears, by a misquotation of a sacred text ; the enactment of a law to render inheritance to property and other rights irrespective of religious profession, and the proposed enactment of another, to legalise in certain cases, the marriage of Hindoo widows, may all pass gradually into usage without producing any overt, general, or dangerous excitement ; but we must be slow to decide from what we see, that this will be the case, inasmuch as under currents of opinion in India must ever be hidden from us, even when they are running deep and strong against us ; and as we lately awoke one morning and found a Santal rebellion added to the burthens of our rule, so may we in the well known words, ascribed to the late Lord Metcalfe, again awake and find ourselves without our Indian Empire—or that empire in such a state as to require for its restoration, the sacrifice of millions of money and thousands of lives. As tending to such fearful apprehensions, we have the certain fact that all the Mahomedan population of India brood over the loss of Empire, that the

* When a chief, therefore, is called the lord of the soil, the title only signifies that, as sovereign, he alone has the right to levy the land tax, or to confer, by grant, that right upon others, " continue to receive the government (or ruler's) share," is the conclusion of all grants of villages or lands in India.

annexation of Lucknow will add to this feeling, that they will anticipate a similar fate for the Nizam of the Deccan; and that, through both a European and Native free press, (independently of private correspondence), influential natives of all classes must acquire an ample knowledge of our unscrupulous change of policy as well as of our recent progressive course of legislation, trenching on the usages of society and the rights of property. The impression on all minds will undoubtedly be, that the British Government is bent on taking possession of all India at its own convenient opportunity and time, as well as upon changing the ancient, cherished institutions and usages, both religious and civil, of its people: and though both these apprehensions be great exaggerations of probability, they are not a whit the less likely to be made, and to be most widely circulated and deeply impressed upon the native mind. If we persevere then in our recent policy, do we not challenge our fate in India and stultify the (prophetic) opinions of all our former great men* on the subject of the true character of the position of our rule over that country and its 150 millions of people? Above all things, let us recollect, that the Hindoos and Mahomedans have many habits, sentiments and sympathies in common, while we have nothing of the kind in common with either; and that while high paid and increasing European agency deprives the government of the power to reward its native servants, bitter feelings, will on that account, become more bitter and more general, while the system impoverishes India by sending a

* The opinions of most of these men will be found in the Parliamentary reports of 1813-14, and in those of 1833-34.

large portion of its wealth to Europe, which can but ill be spared from its local resources. If we shall long escape reaction, then, and its fearful consequences, we must look to Providence alone, in its mercy, as having been our protection and our shield !

Education is happily being extended throughout India and in its most popular form, namely, by vernacular instruction,* while at our several Presidencies a higher description of instruction involving an English education, is attainable by the natives. This is as it should be. But unless employment and emolument be correspondingly extended, education must fail to add much to the moral improvement of the people. Without such accompaniments indeed, there may even be danger in making our Indian subjects acquainted with reliable history, geography, astronomy and science generally ; and the native mind cannot be usefully opened without more or less of such a course of instruction.

The formation of Canals and the opening up of fresh river navigation, cannot fail to improve the condition of the country and the people, to the augmentation also of the Government Revenue. The establishment of Electric Telegraphs over India and the construction of Railways, ought largely to conduce eventually to the same end, at the same time that that they form powerful aids to our Government of the whole country : but both of these last named works are of a most delicate character, and their maintainance must be considered to depend upon

* The Sanscrit and Arabic, in relation to the Hindoo and Mahomedan languages of India, will respectively take the place most efficiently of the Greek and Latin with us, in furnishing technical and scientific terms for advanced native literature in India.

the good temper of our native subjects, and in all the wilder tracts of country through which they pass upon the habits as well as temper of the less civilized tribes that inhabit them. It is but too well known how little is required to derange either an electric telegraph or a permanent line of rails, and how fearful might be the consequences of the latter taking place occasionally in India. These, however, are not sufficient cause of discouragement from the perfecting of these great works, but they constitute a powerful reason for rendering our rule so popular by its justice and generous policy, as to secure the maintenance of our electric telegraphs and railways through the willing assistance of all our subjects and native allies in India.

Such were my notes made in the summer of 1856, such my views of the dangers to our rule and of the remedies for warding off an impending calamity,—intending to have added to them some remarks on the subject of our Indian police which, in my opinion, ought, in the main, to be composed of the natives of the districts in which they are employed, both as being the least expensive and as having a knowledge of the outgoings and incomings of the people—a quality in which a more military description of police must be deficient, while it would be more apt to bully the village inhabitants, and unless highly paid, become corrupt.*

That calamity has arrived sooner than I expected, otherwise I should have moderated some of my expressions and endeavoured to gain an ear for my predictions in some influental quarter. As the

* Our station police should, however, be a disciplined body.

paper stands it is only fit for confidential communication. It, however, contains my convictions; and these may be said to be little else than the reflex of the opinions of great men who have gone before us. "I am but as the bit of scented clay in the bath which derived its merit from its companionship." The causes of this fearful rebellion are but too manifest: a certain state of indiscipline in the Bengal Army, chiefly arising from its being composed of Oude Brahmins and Rajpoots, * rendered it the ready instrument of its development, and the Cartridge† question (perhaps unduly pressed) effected the first explosion of a mine which had been long charging. The combination against us of Mahomedan with Hindoo feeling, as evinced in the dissolution of the Bengal Army, including so many regiments of irregular horse,—those fine corps of light cavalry,—and sundry Hybrid contingents, shows that the confiscation of Oude has operated with *thundering effect*, in producing this lamentable crisis. The mine exploded prematurely, probably providentially, for us; inasmuch as a wider spread of the treason and more deeply concocted plans of the conspirators might have succeeded in producing a calamity greater even than that which we are now harrowed by witnessing. The rule of strangers would ever be liable to some disturbance; but any rebellion like the present might, I think, have been averted if we had stemmed the tide of territorial

* Nor ought the long dissatisfied state of the Bengal Native Infantry, on account of the discontinuance of extra batta for serving in distant provinces and other distasteful changes, to be omitted here.

† A good Madras Soobahdor of Infantry, on being asked his honest opinion of the Cartridge Greese, said "Shuk hy"—there is doubt. Where there was doubt, pressure ought to have been avoided.

aggrandisement,* as in our sounder policy we had done before, instead of assisting to extend it into unprofitable vastness† at immense expense — a course which may have unhappily dictated annexations, and rendered more rigid the confiscation of rent free tenures, in the hope of propping up a falling revenue. In such case, we might have avoided the Affghan expedition and all the complications and gainless relations and conquests arising out of it, and have nourished a flourishing revenue which Lord Wm. Bentinck‡ had, with so much difficulty and such untiring perseverance, restored to a state of prosperity. In such favourable circumstances, we might have advanced the interests of our native subjects in many ways, corrected the defects of our native armies, and improved the condition of regimental officers both European and Native, while we could have afforded to rapidly conduct the execution of great and useful public works. We should then, with a full treasury and a satisfied spirit at home,

* How wisely has Colonel Cotton, Madras Engineers, written, that it was improved territory, and not more territory, that we required. 1858.

† It has been urged with much plausibility, that the possession of the Punjaub has saved India; but the assumption ignores the facts that the Sikhs always hated our Sepoys and would, at any time, have been happy to fight them; and that the necessity for keeping the bulk of our European force in and around the Punjaub, laid bare of European arms, our own provinces and Oude, in which accordingly the insurrection could not be checked. With their fair proportion of European troops, the mutiny might possibly not have been ventured upon so soon; and the sieges of Cawnpoor and Lucknow at all events could not have taken place. 1858.

‡ This wise ruler would not be tempted by Tharawaddee, to risk throwing into the Irawaddee, the money he had saved for the public: and in my humble opinion (which has never changed from the first on this subject) we might have avoided the second Burmese war.

have been prepared to meet any enemy or difficulty likely to oppose us from without. Had our territory been, even now, bounded by the Sutlij, we could have taken, with at least equal effect, the very same steps we lately did, to counteract an aggression by Persia, viz. : by sending an expedition to the Persian gulph.

Unhappily, however, there arose a party strong in intellect, who in Indian newspapers, advocated a more Filibustering line of action—British rule every where and Anglo-saxon improvements and ways in every thing. The signature of "Brahminee Bull," I believe, distinguished this advocacy; and the "Friend of India" followed up this line of argument to the last. Such doctrines, constantly repeated, may have had some effect in producing an impression on the Councils of our rulers, as "water by often falling, hollows out the stone." But these were maxims, in the main, not founded on a comprehensive knowledge of human nature : We grasped at all, and conciliated few, even when our actions, in our own imaginings, tended to the improvement of the country and its people. Formerly our rule was, in judicial proceedings, to pay regard to all laws and customs of caste and of native usage; and in doubt, to submit the circumstances for solution, to the caste authorities, before passing judgment on any case in which the peculiar usages of the natives were involved. But now, our legislative council has made laws* for castes *which they alone should have made for themselves.* This was surely

* The law rendering in heritance of property irrespective of religious profession, and that which recognises the validity of the remarriage of Hindoo widows.

a dangerous aberration from sound principle, and has often been alluded to. I hope that, after the introduction of the Macaulay or other simple code, we may be able to dispense with the legislative council in its present expensive form. Technical lawyers must be kept out of our provinces if we would thrive : a sufficient amount of instruction can always be given to our civil servants and to natives placed in the higher judicial offices, in general jurispudence including a correct knowledge of the laws of evidence. Our administration of criminal justice has always been the best because the easiest ; but civil justice must, for the most part, be administered by the natives themselves, or they will never get it satisfactorily. These remarks, together with what my memorandum of last year contains on the subject, give fully my opinion as to what ought to take place in respect to our native courts. We have, hitherto, I fear, in this matter preferred a dear and indifferent article to a better cheap one. Finally, the fact cannot be too often and too strongly urged, that we must economise in order to save insolvency, and that simple institutions alone, which are most acceptable to the governed, can enable us to do so.

Touching our Foreign policy, leaving Ava out of the question, I have ever thought it a matter of serious regret, and of eventual danger, that nothing has been done to substantially conciliate the Affghans. If strategic reasons compel us to retain Peshawar, which lies at their heart, I hope that our rulers will bear in mind the policy and justice of taking the first opportunity that may offer, of proving to that wild but manly race, that we are their real and lasting friends. We must not incur their

permanent dislike or even indifference towards us. Nor ought we to neglect any effort to save the Nizam of the Deccan: our own safety depending greatly on the continuance and well being of that Mahomedan principality in the south of India. We shall now in short see the necessity, I trust, of viewing the native chiefs as our best friends; and by removing offensive clauses from their treaties, by employing their troops, and by using their own services in an arbitrative or mediatory character, in order to assist in solving difficulties arising amongst themselves or nobles (as referred to in my Memorandum of 1856), prove to them that we shall continue to them and their posterity, their territories and their rights as Sovereigns.

Much has lately been said about Caste,* which, after all, is by no means an unmanageable thing, nor does it interfere much with the due exercise of any description of honest industry in a well peopled country where labour is light. It only asks to be let alone and not offended. Though scripturally defined in India, and very unchangeable, it may be a question whether there be not as much actual caste, though of a changeable and different character, in Europe,† girt round with the iron hoop of conventionalism, and often of as obstructive a character, as Caste is in India. The loss of the good old Anglo-Indian feeling however, is certainly to be deplored; for though we have many officers who are kind and considerate to their men, the ways and feelings of our

* Mr. J. Muir's elaborate treatise on Caste, as published lately in the *Evening Mail*, is most instructive, and very satisfying on the whole question. 1858.

† France alone, in a great degree, excepted.

officers are changed.* Their hearts are more in Europe than in India : a higher degree of education, domestic ties, thoughts of advancement by means of purchase, and of finally quitting the country—all indispose men's minds to being fixed on India and its inhabitants ; and indeed, I believe now a days, that youth is found to be a faster and less controllable affair than it was half a century ago ! But, to allege as some have done, that low, or any native habits whatever, ever gained respect or regard for a European servant of the Company, is a great mistake. Such habits are long exploded ; and I doubt not that, with an improved Military system, our native armies will be rendered excellent troops, and that their European officers, placed in a position of respectability and trust, will so act as to be both respected and cheerfully obeyed by their men.†

In remodelling the Bengal Army we have a clear field. In any case a Staff Corps, as recommended by Indophilus, is a desideratum ; and if one should be formed, the qualifications of its officers ought to be very high. Such a corps would always give us the command of men fit for any military, and many of the civil, offices of India. The Line could be reformed by the enlistment of men of all castes, no caste,‡ and of Mahomedans. Fewer European offi-

* I lately heard that a Madras Native officer seriously asked "Whether another Caste of Sahibs now came out."

† The conduct of our officers generally in the late contest, has greatly excited the admiration of Europe ; and that of the natives who have stuck by us, has also been admirable. 1858.

‡ The Mihters, with native armies, used to claim to lead the forlorn hope. A separate corps of these men might be raised for working and siege purposes. They would also act as scavengers ; or separate companies of them might be formed, each commanded by a sergeant-major in addition to native non-commission officers. The Mihters are generally

cers than before will be required, while the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers ought to be promoted for merit on the recommendation of company and commanding officers. In short the service should be placed on a footing that would attach all ranks to it and render it most efficient. The men should have the best arms, as confidence in themselves depends upon this essential point. Thus a handful of men armed with the Minié rifle, with the power to keep their distance, would be capable of routing or destroying thousands armed with matchlocks or "Brown Bess," and even of silencing light artillery.* Such arms too are the safest as we shall hereafter guard our dépôts of ammunition, from which alone our native troops can be supplied. When the tide turns in our favor, and should we organize a native police in aid, to take the duties of civil stations, &c., I am of opinion that a very moderate number of native troops will suffice to relieve the supernumerary army of Europeans required to put down the rebellion. As to Cavalry, I think the Company ought to have at least two regiments of Dragoons† of their own in Bengal, and that the rest of this arm should consist of irregular regiments, whose high qualities we have often proved. The levies now being made in the Punjaub, together with the remains

speaking, able bodied, trustworthy, and of quiet demeanour and good courage. In the end, however, when prejudice is removed, the high caste man will be allowed to be the finest soldier, especially for home service. Nor ought we to forget the services of these men in Egypt, Cabool, Mysore, the Mauritius, Ava and Java.

* The easy defeat of large rebel bodies, with their artillery, by our handfuls of men, have amply proved this assumption to be well founded. 1858.

† Really light cavalry; composed of Jaeob Omnium's men, of low stature, light and wiry frame, but broad or deep chested.

of our old irregular regiments, would yield ample ready made material for the purpose. The artillery, for some time at least, if not permanently, should be entirely European in Bengal. That corps ought to be increased, as also the corps of sappers and miners, which might consist more of Europeans than before, to superintend native sappers of low and mixed castes. This would lead to an increase of Engineer officers; but there is always useful civil work for them, when their military services can be dispensed with. But we shall have no more *hybrid contingents* I hope: they seem all to have signed their own death warrants. Neither * * * nor myself ever liked them, excepting always those bodies so usefully employed in wild tracts, or on disturbed borders, and composed chiefly of the inhabitants of the country in which they are located. The Jodhpoor and Shekhawattee Contingents, indeed, were got up for such purposes of armed frontier police; but the preponderance of Hindostanees enlisted in both Corps has caused the Jodhpoor Legion to mutiny, while the Shekhawattee Battalion* has been pronounced to be in a doubtful state. But farther, regarding the arming of Infantry, I would ask attention to Sir William Morison's pike musket, which is an admirable defence, even to the single man, against horsemen; and which enables every man holding it, to fire from a rest with a scarcely perceptible loss of time. The Enfield rifle, so mounted, would be invaluable to the native of smaller stature, who cannot in all situations wield a

* Its fidelity hitherto may be ascribed to two causes, viz.: its position at Midnapoor in the midst of our old territories, and its being still commanded by its original and excellent Commanding Officer Lt.-Col. Hy. Foster, C.B. 1858.

heavy weapon with the address of a sturdy European ; and whose fire, therefore, must often loose much of its efficacy. This consideration is independent of the pike being as easy of management as the bayonet, and of the fact that it cannot be lost. Towards the end of the Crimean campaign we were told that the Russian troops were seen to try clumsy tripods, and other expedients of *rest*, for their muskets. They felt the value of a rest, and as we have the thing in its most efficient form ready at hand, I think, though the Queen's troops may not require it, that that is no good reason why our native troops (the Madras Infantry in particular, who are generally of small stature) should be denied the use of a weapon so powerful both for offence and defence. It lies at the India House I believe along with instructions for its use : perhaps at the Horse Guards also.

On the subject of the freedom of the press in India, I can say that I always thought that the time had not arrived for so hazardous an experiment. It was a thing to keep the minds of the natives, particularly in and about the Presidencies, in a state of constant excitement. Still, had our rule continued to be politic and popular, it might not have done much harm. The recently imposed restrictions upon the Press, are right in principle, as being laid on the English as well as the Native Press. It would have been most impolitic to gag the one and not the other ; in as much as more harm has probably been done by the dissemination, through the Native Press, of articles published in the English papers, than by any original concoctions of Native Editors in their own. Of course there will be a strong party at

home against any permanent restriction of the English Press in India; but whatever may be the result, both presses should be placed on one and the same footing.

I touch, with much diffidence, upon the absorbing subject of the conversion of the Natives of India. Nevertheless, I am fully of opinion that this should be attempted by missionary labour alone, inasmuch as any appearance even of Government influence being exercised in the good work, would only act in prevention of success, even if it did not engender dislike to our rule. We are to use our reason, for the best, in this as in other important questions so as to be likely, under Providence, to ensure the best results. "A Hertfordshire incumbent" with true philosophical tact, has lately touched upon the difficulty—impossibility—of converting the Hindoo, until the *oneness* of his social, religious and traditional thoughts and habits shall be shaken by the lights of true science and knowledge. Time and education will work their effect upon the Hindoo mind; till then, the Missionaries will find ample scope for their labours among the aboriginal tribes, whom General Briggs has especially brought to notice as being much more susceptible than the Hindoo or Mahomedan of receiving the lights of religion; and large bodies of whom have, of late years, in the very south of India, been happily converted to Christianity.

I now come to the very important question, the present secrecy or future publicity of our acts of Indian administration. I have already adverted to Sir John Malcolm's opinion. So long as a thorough knowledge of India was confined to a few men, and our rulers studied to regard native feelings and

interests in most things, then secrecy was in many respects beneficial; but I think that secrecy did mischief latterly by preventing the discussion of questionable measures, before they were carried out, while it placed the truly valuable members of the Court of Directors in the false position of frequently opposing both the Board of Control and those members of their own body* who could not be expected to have much practical knowledge of the varied character of our multitudinous Indian population; the Court, nevertheless, to its honor, has sometimes, even at its own peril, rejected what it considered to be injurious measures, and evinced a proud independence of spirit, in publicly acting against the opinion of Parliament on the question of the policy of the Conquest of Scinde. But to be efficient, the Court must have publicity. The public will now probably insist on this. There will be inquiry;† and, as the Scinde and Sattarah blue books brought to light our good men, so probably will coming inquiry shew the world whether the Court has been improved by the introduction into it of Government nominees.

Whatever the Government may do on this momentous occasion, I hope they will feel persuaded, that the safest element for the Government of India is to be found in the Court of Directors. To conclude, it ought ever to be borne in mind, that our rule, to be popular and safe, must be carried on so

* This is all very sad, but proving nevertheless, that the Court would always have supported the Ministry in every prudent course. Why then the threatened change? 1858.

† With publicity the Court would have stood its ground well and gained upon public opinion: but there is to be no farther inquiry, the knot is not to be untied but cut. Inquiry would not have forwarded this summary process and is therefore avoided. 1858.

as to draw less of the revenues of India to Europe than has hitherto been done, and to leave more to be spent in the country itself.

P.S.—As far as we can judge, we are indebted to the perspicacity and firmness of John Lawrence for saving our affairs in the North-West, and enabling us to undertake the siege of Delhi.

SUGGESTIONS.

REDUCTION of expense may be found practicable both in the Home and old Presidential Governments of India, by reason of the increased and increasing quickness of communication between that country and England.

The liberal payment of all working functionaries in India ; European or Native, Civil or Military.

The introduction of simpler judicial and even revenue arrangements into the old regulation Provinces throughout India ; and the suppression, at once, of half the correspondence in writing which has hitherto occupied too much of the time of our working Civil servants.

To share all branches of the Government of India with the Natives, more than we have hitherto done.

To restore everywhere the village communities, together *with their immemorial responsibilities*, in order that India may have a complete police, interested in the protection of person and property.

Station police to be of a Military character, disciplined and well armed, to the extinction of the

present burqundaz, &c. In addition, wherever necessary, a police of the local inhabitants to be used in aid.

To unshackle our native allies, so as to render them of use to us by means of their councils, their troops and their individual influences.

A reduction to take place gradually in the number of our native troops; a corresponding efficiency being obtained by placing the best arms in their hands. A portion of the native officers to have higher rank than at present.

The eventual conversion to irregulars of such of our Light Cavalry Regiments as might prefer the change.

Strongholds, in convenient and healthy situations, to be repaired or constructed anew, so as to guard, with European soldiers, our munitions of war.

To continue, unceasingly, to open up the natural resources of the Country, a work which has been already well begun.

Finally, let us beware of the vice of over governing peoples of simple habits and peculiar institutions.

INTRODUCTION OF HER MAJESTY'S NAME INTO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

It has been assumed that the use of the Queen's name will have a favourable effect in India. This should be understood, as a common sense question, by the people of England. It may be assumed to stand thus. The contemplated effect would be ob-

tained, if popular and beneficial measures were introduced along with it ; otherwise, the prestige would be lost, and perhaps for ever. In the abstract, good measures will be equally prized, whether they are brought about in Her Majesty's name or the Company's, or in no name at all. Nevertheless, correspondence by letter, with the Crown, would be valued by our native (particularly our Rajpoot) allies, who do not feel comfortable with intercourse personal, or by letter, on terms hardly of equality, with every new Governor or Governor-General, whose status in Europe they only know not to be Royal. But letters between the Crown and our native allies could be made to pass as easily through the Board of Control, as through an Indian Minister. 1858.

Col. Colton says :—" The same money and the same length of time required to make one mile of high speed railway, will be sufficient to make 100 miles of good river navigation, 24 of first class steam canal, 12 of very good low speed railroad, 20 of an inferior kind, and 40 of perfect common road with timber bridges and 24 with masonry works."

ON THE INTERNAL STATE AND LAND SYSTEM OF OUDE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "DAILY NEWS."

SIR,—I would draw your attention to a letter dated Allahabad, Nov. 1, and signed "A Civilian," published in the *Evening Mail* of 14th to 16th inst., and which will have appeared in the *Times* of the 15th, most propably. The writer says that "the state of things in Oude requires some explanation. There we encounter not only a military, but perhaps still worse, a native opposition—quite a different state of things from anything we have had at Delhi and elswhere; and it has come about in this wise. The old Zemindaree question, so hotly contested since Lord Cornwallis's time, is in fact revived," &c. "Now," he continues, "in Oude this Talookdaree system was particularly strong. Almost the whole country was parcelled out among great Talookdars or Zemindars, and though under Mahomedan government these men were almost universally Hindoos —in fact, native chiefs; certainly more than mere farmers, and they had obtained great prescription, exercised great power and authority, and were in fact, the feudatories (and very often the rebellious feudatories) of the government. They had their own forts, and troops, and guns. Under this system village proprietary rights became much more undefined, weak, and uncertain than where the villagers hold direct of government." &c. "With whom was the settlement to be made? The Talookdars were strong in possession, the communities dormant," &c. "It must take some time to suppress the one and to re-

suscitate the other," &c. "I know no particulars myself, but I understand that the general result of the settlement has been to oust the Talookdars, and make direct village settlements. Then immediately followed the rebellion. At first the Talookdars behaved well to us personally," &c. "They are men of honour in their way. With the butchery of a rabble they have no sympathy," &c. "By none have so many European lives been saved as by these men, but our government was altogether upset," &c. "The Talookdars almost universally resumed what they considered to be their own again, and seem to have met with popular support. Thus they became committed against government, and being committed, our severities at Allahabad and Cawnpore led them to fear the worst," &c. "The chief is Rajah Maun Singh, who dislikes the Sepoys, and is besieging Havelock with the country at his back. It is a Hindoo confederacy."

These extracts well explain themselves to those who are acquainted with India; and on them I shall only remark that I do not see how the village communities in Oude, wherever the land was not under the direct management of the King's government, should be so broken down as the writer describes. It seems to be immaterial whether the Talookdar's collector assessed and received the revenues of a village, or a revenue officer of the ministry did so, as affecting the preservation of the integrity of the village system. The more concentrated, and perhaps more careful, protection afforded to their villages by a number of petty chiefs than what the government at Lucknow would have extended to them, may, how ever, be supposed to have rendered the villagers

less self-reliant, and so far have led to those communities losing some of their pristine energy and authority. Perhaps, therefore, the writer may have over-rated the effect of the Talookdaree authority. But Oude is one of the oldest of Hindoo kingdoms, and its ancient history is prominent in Hindoo legends as well as in traditions. It is, in short, almost holy land. The present Talookdars are (some at least, perhaps many) descendants of the Rajput families settled there and enjoying power from time immemorial. In short, the late King of Oude was very much in the position of one of the chiefs of Ratputana, with his landed Thakurs under him; and this peculiar position of a Mahomedan ruler, and his occasional attempts to trench on the rights of the Talookdars, gave rise to the frequent collisions that took place between his government and these his most powerful subjects. In settling that country we should have discriminated, with great nicety too, between a mere hereditary Zemindar, or collector of revenue (such as were created by the Mahomedan Kings of Delhi, and whom we found in Bengal and in our north-western provinces), and an old Rajput Thakur; and in the first case have had recourse to the system of village settlement, in the latter have received from the chief the tribute, or such portion of revenue levied by him from his lands, as long usage, or the rights of the feudatory noble, on full inquiry, should dictate. But if we have, as "A Civilian" says, made village revenue settlements in the lands of all these Talookdars, and if many of these should prove to be nothing less than old Rajput Thakurs, then we have committed a terrible mistake, and have given cause of dissatisfaction

within dissatisfaction with our rule. Mahomedans were incensed at the downfall of the King of Oude. His dependent Hindoo Talookdars must have been thrown into despair at the loss of their rights; hence the present aspect of Oude in general rebellion against us. The Talookdars would, under the circumstances, have been less than men had they neglected the opportunity of recovering their own; and their sanction for availing themselves of it was so strong that, "A Civilian" says, "they seem to have met with popular support." When, in addition to these palliating circumstances, we find that these men have saved many of our countrymen, women, and children, it is to be hoped that in the end they will not be too summarily dealt with. General Low has the most intimate acquaintance with Oude and all its belongings; and I am happy to find that he continues to remain in council to aid, with information and advice, Lord Canning, for whose quiet courage, wisdom, and conscientiousness, I have a very high respect.

We cannot be too sensible of the danger of touching landed tenures in India. "A Civilian's" letter again calls attention very pointedly to that subject. It contains the following statement:—"Whatever popular opposition there is in our older districts, besides the mere freebooting of the plundering tribes, may be traced almost exclusively to one great source of hostility, which has raised many people against us. I mean the very general transfer of landed rights which has taken place under our system, especially by the action of our civil courts, and the unlimited and summary sale of landed rights in satisfaction of decrees. These tranfers are, for

the most part, paper transfers. The old proprietors still reside on the spot; most frequently, in the character of tenants, they retain the land; but by paper transfers in the collector's office, their rights, dues, privileges, and emoluments are given to another; and there they are, discontented, angry men, still looking on themselves and looked upon by others as the real proprietors, oppressed and in abeyance. We suddenly imposed, without check, a system to which the people were altogether strangers; and the consequence has been so general a transfer of landed rights as has perhaps never been known in any age or country. Well, our government being to all intents and purposes overthrown and swept away from these provinces, the old proprietors, have, as a matter of course, resumed their own again. The auction purchaser disappears with our system, just as much as our revenue and police officers do. No native would dream of supposing that this admitted of argument; but the result is, that the old proprietors, the popular men, are committed to hostility with us. I hope that, under the circumstances, the past will be treated indulgently. Of course, right or wrong, whatever has been done by us must be re-asserted; but surely we must take warning—surely we shall not thus rudely destroy the remaining tenures, and render hostile the remaining provinces." The writer then proceeds to say that if the lands of the Punjaub had been so treated we should not now have been here, and that General Havelock would probably have been beseiged in Calcutta; and farther, after alluding to favour shown down the country to Sepoys, he adds, "There is no protection for our civil rebels, or alleged

rebels, whose case, in the *de facto* extinction of government, is very peculiar; and who, in the excited state of the European mind, are often judged by an unfairly harsh standard." The good sense and feeling of this statement speak for themselves, and will, I hope and trust, be appreciated in Calcutta. These other extracts go far to prove the immutability, the indefeasible nature, of property in the soil in India; and that all our attempts to evade the fact will prove either inconsequential or productive of the deepest feelings of enmity against our rule. But in order to effect such futile results hitherto, we have maintained expensive judicial establishments over the length and breadth of the land, neglecting those simple ways of administering justice to the people of India, so long known to themselves. Should we reorganise our civil establishments, and simplify their proceedings, it would well deserve the consideration of our government to proceed to cancel, eventually, those paper transfers of which "A Civilian" speaks by making some compensation to those to whom they have been given, and who know that no human power can actually make the transfer good. Our comparatively mushroom landed tenures in Great Britain dating from the Conquest, and from the revolution 1668, in Ireland, are guarded by entails and such legal jargon as "seized in fee," and are held irresponsible in many cases for personal debts; while we have tried to make land in India, as no native power ever did, responsible for all sorts of debt—the remote antiquity from which many of such tenures have been derived being a thing far beyond our ken. To this hour that mighty power the *Times* insists on the fact of the universal right of landlordship, in all

oriental countries, being in the government. If the editor means that Oriental governments have the right to tax the land, he is right for they do so, and the proprietors everywhere acknowledge that right. The Sirkar's (government's) share of the produce in India is nowhere contested. But the British parliament exercises the same power, and before our manufactures flourished, David Hume, in one of his essays, speculated upon the ruinous condition of England when the land-tax should amount to 19s. in the pound. The British parliament could, if it would, reduce our landed tenures by extreme taxation to a state of worthlessness, and even in some respects alter their nature; but no despot of Turkey or Persia could do this, or dream of attempting it against the rights of property and national feeling. In short, nowhere is landed property, I believe, so strictly guarded as in the East, and nowhere is it so tenaciously stuck by by those in proprietary possession. I recollect, some thirty-seven years ago, an ugly tiled hut that long stood in the way of the completion of Holkar's new palace at Indore, because, as we were told, the owner would not sell the hut and the land on which it stood to his own chief. And such instances are not rare.

There is now said to be a speculation afloat to raise up a body of large and moderately endowed freehold landed proprietors in India by allowing those in possession to purchase up their present yearly revenue payments by sums proportioned to the value of the lands to be so treated. Our Bengal Zemindarees are even spoken of as a favourable field for the experiment. Such a procedure in Bengal would hand over all the Ryots, bound neck and crop

as Russian serfs to the Zemindars. That is supposing the act were feasible. But to render it so would require immense compression; and I can hardly think that any of the Zemindars would pay much for the chance of bettering their own condition against popular feeling. I believe we still retain some power to protect the Bengal Ryot from undue exaction by his Zemindar; and that power we should lose by a sale of the Ryot's landed rights to one who never had any just claim to them. I hope such an attempt will never be made. Indeed, if the state of our finances admitted of the outlay, a contrary action would be far preferable, viz., to recompense the Zemindars and have recourse to direct village settlements. But there is, unhappily, plenty of waste land in many parts of India, never likely to be claimed, by reason of the former proprietary occupants and their descendants having perished out of the land; perhaps some that has never been occupied at all. When our railroads are extended, sales of such lands may prove feasible both to Europeans and natives of capital; but to such in my humble opinion, ought such experiments to be confined, for reasons already given.—I am, &c.,

ANGLO-INDIAN.

Dec. 22.

J. Coutanche, Printer, 45, Hill-street, Jersey.

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